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Africa has become the epicentre and experimental laboratory for UN peacekeeping missions. The 
UN peacekeeping doctrine has evolved through numerous operational experiments in Africa 
culminating in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that has been erroneously portrayed as 
the doctrine of harmony of interests and of international solidarity designed to serve international 
interests. This thesis concludes that the UN peacekeeping doctrine conceals the fact that it is 
primarily designed to advance the self-interests of the big powers at the expense of the weak states 
in conflict situations.  
 
This thesis demonstrates that UN peacekeeping missions facilitate the continued looting of 
Africa’s natural resources by big powers whose international policies are designed to entrench 
their privileged positions in violation of host state sovereignty and at the expense of the suffering 
populations. UN peacekeeping missions have been unethically used to facilitate regime change 
agendas in countries whose leaders would have fallen out of favour with the US and its Western 
allies. In this regard, humanitarian and other altruistic justifications for peacekeepers’ deployment 
have been used to camouflage and conceal the true nefarious intentions of the big powers in what 
is known as “organized hypocrisy” on the part of the main sponsors of UN peacekeeping 
operations. The study revealed that African countries with greater geo-political and geo-strategic 
importance receive significantly higher attention and probability for UN peacekeeping 
deployments and not countries with the highest human suffering requiring the most urgent 
international attention.  
 
The study demonstrated that it is a myth and a fallacy to believe that UN peacekeepers deployed 
in Africa serve the interests of local populations affected by conflicts. UN peacekeepers were 
accomplices in the assassinations of national leaders of Congo and Rwanda. In Somalia, the most 
powerful warlord was targeted for assassination by UN peacekeepers while in Sudan, the sitting 
head of state was indicted for prosecution at The Hague. The UNSC response to the genocide in 
Rwanda was morally and ethically reprehensible.  
 
In countries of no significant geo-strategic or economic interests, the big powers resort to what has 
been termed “collective waffling” as part of “organized hypocrisy.” In that regard African leaders 
must prioritise the protection of their populations as it is their internationally acknowledged 
responsibility to protect their own civilian populations without relying on foreign peacekeepers to 




United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, State Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Peacekeeping 
Challenges, Ethical Challenges, National Self–Interests, Protection of Civilians, Responsibility to 

































LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AHM Austro- Hungarian Monarch African Union 
AMIS   African Mission in Sudan 
ANC National Congolese army 
AOR   Area of Engagement 
AU African Union 
BBTG Broad Based Transitional Government 
CHRIR                        Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CNPC   China National Petroleum Company 
CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CHRIR                        Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report  
DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States 
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
EU   European Union 
GoR   Government of Rwanda 
GoS   Government of Sudan 
HCFA   Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
HRO Humanitarian Relief Organisations 
HRW    Human Rights Watch 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda 
IEA   International Energy Agency 
IPEP                            International Panel of Eminent Personalities  
IPA   International Peace Academy 
JEM   Justice and Equality Movement 
MIC   Military Industrial Complex 
NAM Non Aligned Movement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
viii 
 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
ONUC Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo 
P-5 Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council 
PPD 25 Presidential Policy Directive No. 25 
R2P Responsibility to Protect 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front 
RPF/A Rwanda Patriotic Front Army 
RPTC  Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SAM Surface to Air Missile 
SG Secretary General 
SLA   Sudan Liberation Army 
SPLM/A  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army 
TCC Troop Contributing Countries 
UK United Kingdom 
UN Charter United Nations Charter 
UN United Nations 
UNAMID  United Nations and African Union hybrid Mission in Sudan 
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
UNAMIS  United Nations Mission in Sudan 
UNCIVPOL  United Nations Civilian Police 
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force 
UNITAF United Nations Intervention Task Force 
UNOSOM I First United Nations Peacekeeping Mission to Somali 
UNOSOM II Second United Nations Peacekeeping Mission to Somali 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNSCOB United Nations Committee on the Balkans 
UNSG United Nations Secretary General 
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation 
US United States 
USSR Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics 
ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION.................................................................................................................................... i 
DEDICATION....................................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ iii 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... v 
KEY TERMS ........................................................................................................................................ vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction and Scope of the Study ................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background to the Study ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Statement of the Problem ..................................................................................................... 7 
    1.3    Objectives of the Study……………………………………………………………………. 8 
    1.4     Research Questions……………………………………………………………………...... 8 
    1.5     Hypothesis…………………………………………………………………………………..9 
1.6 Preliminary Literature Review and Reasons for Choosing the Topic ............................. 9 
    1.7       Gaps in Existing Literature………………………………………………………………. 14 
1.8 Principal Theories upon which the Research Project will be constructed .................... .15 
1.9 Research Design and Methodology ................................................................................... 18 
    1.10     New Knowledge…………………………………………………………………………… 20 
    1.11    Limitations of the Study………………………………………………………………….. 21 
    1.12    Outline Structure of the Thesis………………………………………………………….. 21 
CHAPTER TWO…………………………………………………………………………………….24 
The Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations..………………………………………………………24 
    2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………24  
2.2 An overview of peacekeeping operations .......................................................................... 25 
2.3 The genesis of “peacekeeping” missions ........................................................................... 28 
2.4 Peacekeeping operations under the League of Nations (1920-1925) .............................. 31 
2.5 UN peacekeeping missions.................................................................................................. 33 
2.5.1 UN first generation peacekeeping missions .................................................................. 34 
2.5.2 UN second generation peacekeeping ............................................................................ 39 
2.5.3 UN third generation peacekeeping operations .............................................................. 42 
2.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 46 
x 
 
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................................ 49 
Ethical Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Republic of Congo with 
reference to the period (1960-1964) ................................................................................................... 49 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 49 
3.2 Background to the 1960-64 Congo crisis ........................................................................... 50 
3.2.1 Congolese Government Request for UN military assistance ........................................ 53 
3.2.2 UNSC authorization of ONUC ..................................................................................... 57 
3.2.3 Interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions by the UNSG and Prime Minister of 
Congo………………………………………………………………………………………………….60 
3.3 Unethical deployment of pro-western troops and US civilians in Congo ....................... 64 
3.3.1 Implications of Soviet military assistance to Lumumba ............................................... 68 
3.4 Mishandling of the Congo constitutional crisis by ONUC officials ................................ 69 
3.4.1 The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba ........................................................................ 72 
3.5 Termination of secession in Katanga Province ...................................................................... 74 
3.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 75 
CHAPTER FOUR……………………………………………………………………………………77 
Ethical challenges to UN and US “humanitarian” interventions in Somalia: from       peacekeeping 
to peace-enforcement (1992-1995) ..................................................................................................... 77 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 77 
4.2 Background to the “humanitarian intervention” in Somalia ......................................... 79 
4.2.1 A Brief historical background to the crisis ................................................................... 79 
4.2.2 UN/US opportunity to experiment with new concepts of peacekeeping ...................... 81 
4.3 UN non-humanitarian motives for intervention in Somalia ........................................... 83 
4.3.1 Unethical circumventing of the requirement for host state consent .............................. 85 
4.3.2 An ethical analysis of non-humanitarian motives for military intervention in Somalia 87 
4.3.3 An ethical analysis of the relationship between Boutros-Ghali and Farah Aideed ....... 88 
4.4 Ethical analysis of US motivations in launching of UNITAF .......................................... 90 
4.4.1 The influence of the donor agencies ............................................................................. 92 
4.4.2 Unethical and non-altruistic influence of the US military establishment ..................... 94 
4.4.3 Unethical US political desire to operationalize the New World Order ......................... 97 
4.4.4 Unethical economic factors that motivated US military intervention in Somalia ......... 98 
4.5 An ethical analysis on application of UN peacekeeping principles in Somalia .............. 99 
4.5.1 Ethical violation of the principle of host state consent ................................................. 99 
4.5.2 Unethical violation of the principle of impartiality ..................................................... 101 
4.5.3 Ethical challenges to the use of force for UN humanitarian peacekeeping missions .. 102 
4.6 Some views on ethical challenges to foreign humanitarian interventionism ............... 104 
xi 
 
4.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 106 
CHAPTER FIVE .............................................................................................................................. 109 
A case study of failed UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda 1993-1995 ...................................... 109 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 109 
5.2 Historical factors that contributed to the genocide in Rwanda .................................... 111 
5.3 UNSC ethical challenges in handling the Rwanda crisis ............................................... 114 
5.3.1 UNSC unethical response to the genocide .................................................................. 119 
5.3.2 UNSC double standards in the use of force to stop the Rwandan genocide ............... 122 
5.4 Ethical challenge of sovereignty and human security .................................................... 127 
5.5 Unethical Belgian participation in UNAMIR ................................................................. 130 
5.5.1 Anti-Belgian sentiments in Kigali ............................................................................... 132 
5.6 An analysis of unethical conduct by UNAMIR .............................................................. 134 
5.6.1 UNAMIR unethical intrusiveness in Rwanda domestic affairs .................................. 134 
5.6.2 An analysis of UNAMIR’s failure to use force to stop the genocide.......................... 137 
5.6.3 Unethical and senseless withdrawal of peacekeepers amid genocide ......................... 140 
5.6.4 UNAMIR’s unholy alliance with the RPF .................................................................. 142 
5.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 147 
CHAPTER SIX ................................................................................................................................. 150 
Multilateral Response to Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur: A Case Study of United Nations 
Organized Hypocrisy in Peacekeeping ............................................................................................ 150 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 150 
6.2 Background to the Darfur conflict .................................................................................. 152 
6.3 AU response to the Darfur crisis ..................................................................................... 154 
6.4 Organized hypocrisy: UN response to the Darfur crisis ................................................ 158 
6.4.1 Definition of organized hypocrisy .............................................................................. 158 
6.4.2 An overview of UN response to the Darfur crisis ....................................................... 159 
6.4.3 An ethical assessment of UN response to the crisis in Darfur .................................... 160 
6.4.4 Ethical and political justification for a hybrid peacekeeping Mission in Darfur ........ 162 
6.5 Political and ethical challenges to UNAMID peacekeeping operations ....................... 165 
6.6 US attitude and response to the Darfur crisis ................................................................ 170 
6.7 China’s Strategic Interests in Darfur and their impact on UNAMID ......................... 174 
6.7.1 Chinese Response to the Darfur Crisis........................................................................ 175 
6.8 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 178 
CHAPTER SEVEN ........................................................................................................................... 182 
An ethical critique of the violation of UN peacekeeping principles .............................................. 182 
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 182 
xii 
 
7.2 Host state consent .............................................................................................................. 183 
7.2.1 The problem of state sovereignty and human security ................................................ 186 
7.2.2 A critique to the principle of host state consent .......................................................... 188 
7.3 The ethical principle of impartiality ................................................................................ 188 
7.3.1 Ethical challenges to the maintenance of impartiality ................................................ 190 
7.4 The use of force in UN peacekeeping missions ............................................................... 191 
7.4.1 Problems related to the use of force ............................................................................ 193 
7.5  Theoretical explanations for systematic violation of peacekeeping principles ............ 196 
7.5.1 UN peacekeeping as a vehicle to spread neo-colonial and neo-liberal values ............ 197 
7.5.2 Double Anarchy and UN peacekeeping operations .................................................... 199 
7.5.3 Group Morality and the conduct of UN peacekeeping missions ................................ 200 
    7.6        The need for African leaders to be suspicious of UN peacekeeping missions ............. 205 
7.8 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 211 
CHAPTER EIGHT ........................................................................................................................... 213 
   8.1 Prelude to ethical recommendations ................................................................................... 213 
   8.2 Ethical and Policy Recommendations…………………………………………………….219 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..…………………………………………………………………………………223 
Appendix 1: Letter of Informed Consent to Participants……………………………………..260 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire .......................................................................................................... 265 






   Introduction and Scope of the Study 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Since the end of the Cold War, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in Africa has taken     centre 
stage at both the academic and policy levels in an endeavour by the world body to promote 
collective international peace and security on the continent. This development has triggered 
debate on policy formulation and execution of UN peacekeeping missions that has often been 
problematic in all fields of study. This is due to the fact that the dynamics of conflict 
internationally and regionally are always shifting and also because of the contending view 
points between Euro-centric and Afro-centric expectations on peacekeeping outcomes.  
A major contradiction and ethical problem arises when peacekeepers are deployed in a conflict 
country without the full and voluntary consent of the host country and are expected to protect 
the local civilian population yet it is the responsibility of the host state to protect its own 
citizens. In such situations, the host state’s responsibility of protecting own citizens is 
immediately usurped by the deployment of UN peacekeepers with a mandate of protecting 
local civilians in conflict situations, leaving the host state at the mercy of the peacekeepers. As 
a result of this peacekeeping practice, this thesis argues that UN peacekeeping missions in 
Africa are failing to fulfil their mandates as a result of the normative and ethical conflict and 
dilemma that exists between UN peacekeeping missions and safeguarding of nation state 
sovereignty especially where UN peacekeepers are involved in regime change activities against 
the host government. 
Whilst much has been written about UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, there has not been 
significant scholarly research specifically addressing the ethical tension and dilemma that 
continues to exist between UN peacekeeping missions on the continent and the aspect of nation 
state sovereignty. According to the UN Charter, nation states are sovereign within their 
territories and are immune to external interference except in grave circumstances, such as war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (United Nations Charter 1945). The UN 
sometimes deploys peacekeepers, without invitation or full consent from affected member 
states, as happened in Somalia in violation of its Charter which prohibits interference in internal 
affairs of member countries (Findlay 2002).In Sudan, President Al Bashir was coerced to host 
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UN peacekeepers against his wish as he preferred African peacekeepers and troops from 
friendly countries to constitute peacekeepers in Darfur (De Haas 2008; Badescu and Bergholm 
2009). Elsewhere outside Africa, Welsh (2008) cites Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor as examples 
where coerced consent was derived from host countries as a result of pressure from some big 
powers to have peacekeepers deploy. When a country is subjected to UN peacekeeping 
operations, its sovereignty is compromised in that such deployments imply that the country’s 
ability to protect its own boarders and citizens would have been temporarily compromised or 
even suspended by the peacekeepers’ presence in the country (Hansch 1994). Thus, major 
ethical challenges to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa revolve around this dilemma.  
Experience has demonstrated that UN peacekeeping missions have either left the host countries 
with a new government through UN sponsored regime change agenda as happened in the 
Congo during the early 1960s (Wedgwood 1995) and Rwanda in 1994 (Al Qaq 2009) or the 
host country is left with recommendations that the previous government should be sent to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for trial as 
happened in the Ivory Coast. The same scenario is what is currently being orchestrated against 
President Al Bashir in Sudan. These peacekeeping activities clearly undermine host state 
sovereignty. In some of the worst cases, peacekeeping missions have even led to the deaths of 
sitting heads of state and government as was the case in Congo in 1961 when Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba was assassinated through the active connivance of UN peacekeepers (Collins 
1993) and (Spooner 2009). In Rwanda, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were 
assassinated in 1994 in a plane crash under the watch of UN peacekeepers (Davenport and 
Stam 2009) and (Del Ponte and Chuck 2011). In 2001 the DRC President Laurent Kabila was 
assassinated when UN peacekeepers were deployed in the capital Kinshasa although there is 
no substantiated complicit of UN peacekeepers. These examples demonstrate that UN 
peacekeepers should not be overly trusted with safeguarding the well-being of the local 
population and the country’s leadership. This thesis attempts to demonstrate that UN 
peacekeepers’ unpronounced main objective prior to withdrawal is to leave behind a political 
system of government in power that is amenable to the dictates and interests of some of the big 
powers in the UN Security Council and not a system of governance that is necessarily 
accountable to the majority local population as happened in the Congo and Rwanda (Sitkowski 
2006). 
At Congo’s independence, a group of Western states under the leadership of the US grossly 
interfered with the political system of Congo under the umbrella of UN peacekeeping 
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operations (Collins 1993). The US, Belgium, Britain and Canada decimated Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba’s ruling coalition government, ultimately leading to the assassination of the 
Prime Minister that was made possible with the active and deliberate connivance of some UN 
peacekeeping officials (Spooner 2009:109). The case study in chapter three of this thesis 
demonstrates that Patrice Lumumba’s assassination was a result of a well-planned and 
orchestrated conspiracy to eliminate him from the Congolese political stage (Collins 1993and 
Spooner 2009). It also demonstrates that the main conspirators were UN peacekeeping 
officials, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko (Ibid). Colonel 
Mobutu Sese Seko who was instrumental in the assassination of the first democratically elected 
Prime Minister of Congo ultimately became Africa’s most despotic dictator that nearly brought 
Congo/Zaire to the brink of financial bankruptcy as state funds were siphoned out to Swiss 
banks which are shielded by state-enacted secrecy regulations (Grovogui 2002:317).  
The outcome of the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo was both negative peace and negative 
state sovereignty in which an African dictator and his autocrats were protected by the US and 
its western allies while the toiling Congolese population was left unempowered and 
unprotected both politically and economically (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995). The net effect 
of the UN Congo peacekeeping mission was effective transfer of power and wealth from 
Congo/Zaire to Europe; specifically to Belgium and Switzerland (Ibid.). This view is shared 
by Collins (1993) who observed that the UN mission heralded the introduction of the Cold War 
in Africa and scuttled the transition of Congo from colonialism to full national sovereignty.  
This was so despite the fact that the UN peacekeeping mission had been invited by a 
legitimately elected Congolese government to help it with dealing with a Belgian foreign troop 
invasion that had violated Congo’s national sovereignty.  
Three decades later, the UN was back again in Africa this time in Somalia without a proper 
and ethical invitation to intervene, purportedly to address humanitarian concerns in an on-going 
civil war situation. What happened thereafter as reflected in chapter four was that UN 
peacekeepers together with US troops1 attempted to destroy the most powerful warlord General 
Mohammad Farah Aideed in a bid to leave the country under US preferred leadership of 
                                                          
1 US troops in this case were not UN peacekeepers in that they were not subordinated in any way to UN 
command and control as is the case with other troops participating in this mission. Whereas other troop 
contributing countries forego some measure of control of their troops deployed in UN missions, the US does 
not allow its troops to be under any foreign command structure. The US is only comfortable operating under 
UN political umbrella without subordinating its troops to UN command structures. 
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General Aideed’s main rivalry Ali Mahdi Mohammad. This military intervention launched 
under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention, violated Somalia’s national sovereignty and 
did not have the support and approval of the Somali population as evidenced by the resistance 
of the Somali population against UN peacekeepers’ attempts at imposing warlord Ali Mahdi 
Mohammad as the preferred leader of Somalia. The Somali resistance manifested itself through 
deadly military skirmishes that forced the Americans to retreat and abandon the mission 
unceremoniously. A worse fate was to befall the Rwandan population two years later when UN 
peacekeepers were deployed in that country to facilitate regime change that served the self-
interests of foreign powers thus undermining Rwanda’s national sovereignty (Grunfeld and 
Huijboom (2007).  
In Rwanda, the legitimately elected President Habyarimana was assassinated on 06 April 1994, 
together with his Burundian counterpart in a mysterious plane crash under the watch of a 
Belgian contingent of UN peacekeepers. Belgian peacekeepers were deployed in Kigali, with 
a specific mandate of guarding the capital and the airport. The Rwandan President, who had 
grudgingly granted consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers under duress from the US 
and the British, was assassinated by unknown assailants when the airport was under the 
effective control of Belgian peacekeepers, triggering the worst genocide Africa has witnessed 
in living memory.  
Chapter six demonstrates that UN peacekeepers were complicit in the assassination of the 
Rwandan President in 1994 (Bruguire Report 2006; Black 2014), as was the case in Congo in 
1961 when Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was assassinated with direct and wilful 
connivance of UN peacekeepers (Collins 1993 and Spooner 2009); incidences that expose the 
extent to which UN peacekeepers can go towards the violation of host state sovereignty in order 
to appease some powerful members of the UN Security Council. The chapter also demonstrates 
that UN peacekeepers facilitated the down fall of the Rwandan government to enable the 
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel movement fighting the legitimate government of 
Rwanda, to come to power as part of a grand strategy by the US and its allies to displace French 
influence from that Central African region. Up to this day the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
has not authorised an international enquiry into the assassination of the two African presidents 
in Rwanda on 06 April 1994 an omission that raises suspicion as to why no official independent 
enquiry has been sanctioned by the world body. The use of UN peacekeepers in toppling host 
governments that fall out of favour with the US and her Western allies did not end up with 
Congo and Rwanda (Al Qaq 2009). 
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In 2011, a UN peacekeeping mission in the Ivory Coast evolved into an offensive military 
operation whose objective was the overthrowing of a sovereign government whose leader 
President Gbagbo, had fallen out of favour with the US and its French ally in the UNSC. The 
big powers in the UNSC also happen to be the major sponsors of UN peacekeeping missions 
hence their investment of financial and logistical resources in UN sponsored peacekeeping 
missions are expected to produce outcomes predominantly beneficial to themselves as the 
leading investors. These outcomes are not necessarily tailor made or designed to address the 
root causes of the conflicts that bring untold suffering to populations in conflict situations 
where UN peacekeepers are deployed. Thus, the motives of big powers that decide on the 
deployment of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have become questionable and ethically 
suspicious especially when the sovereignty of a target country for peacekeeping mission is 
violated with impunity while at the same time the missions fail to guarantee or prioritise the 
protection of vulnerable civilian populations in target countries.  
The central argument of this thesis is that UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have 
undermined the UN principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the idea that each country, in 
its capacity as a sovereign state, has the responsibility to protect its own citizens from internal 
and external threats. Without protection from their own governments, populations under the 
jurisdiction of UN peacekeepers have remained vulnerable to abuse by both peacekeepers and 
belligerents to the conflict situation as witnessed in Somalia (Atack 2002) and in the DRC 
(Anderson 1999). Such scenarios beg ethical answerers to the question why UN missions in 
Africa continuously fail to safeguard the well-being of endangered civilians they purport to 
protect each time they are launched. Many accounts have been reported, where UN 
peacekeepers have been accused of rape; human trafficking; weapons proliferation, drug and 
minerals smuggling and even murder of the very same people they purport to protect hence the 
suspicion regarding the true intentions of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. 
The UN peacekeeping missions in Africa continue to suffer credibility crisis in that they raise 
the security expectations among affected civilians in conflict situations yet ultimately fail to 
deliver and live up to expectations as witnessed in Congo; Somalia; Rwanda and Sudan 
(Gomez 2015). In this regard, they expose the defenceless populations to retributive action 
from belligerents opposed to the presence of UN peacekeepers in the country. The behaviour 
of UN peacekeepers, as demonstrated in the four case studies of this thesis, reflects that in 
practice, they do not have as their primary objective the safety and well-being of affected 
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African populations, but rather the self-preservation of peacekeepers’ lives and the promotion 
of the values and geo-strategic self-interests of the powerful countries that sponsor them.  
In line with Peter Singer (1981) who observed the tendency of kin altruism, it appears that the 
Permanent Five (P-5) members of the UNSC; China, Britain, France, Russia and the US have 
developed a tendency of promoting and protecting not only their own self-interests, but also 
interests of allies and friends resulting in the UN failure to deploy effective peacekeeping 
missions where they are needed most as happened in Rwanda during the genocide (Wedgwood 
1995). A classic example is the favouritism and protection that Israel enjoys from the US 
regarding the Palestinian problem. The ethical challenge of selectivity in the deployment of 
UN peacekeeping missions arises from the inevitable conflict between the self-interests of the 
P-5 and the genuine need to come to the assistance of endangered civilian populations in 
African conflict situations as demonstrated in the case studies of this thesis.  
The Rwandan genocide experience is another classic example where either countries of little 
interest to some of the P-5 members results in UN inaction; or where inaction actually served 
the self-interests of some of the big powers whose veto powers influence the nature and size of 
the UN mission to be deployed and the magnitude of logistical and financial support that 
mission would eventually enjoy (Kabau 2012). In Rwanda, the Belgian UN peacekeeping 
contingent fled Kigali, leaving the defenceless Tutsi population and moderate Hutus exposed 
to an orgy of Africa’s worst twentieth century genocide (Luttwak 1999). Belgium went a step 
further to unethically influence the withdrawal of the bulk of UN peacekeepers at the height of 
the genocide demonstrating little or no respect for African lives that were abandoned for mass 
slaughter (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000:174). Chapter six of this thesis demonstrates that this 
UN withdrawal of peacekeepers was supported by Britain and the US as it served to facilitate 
the coming to power of the RPF guerrilla movement that was a protégé of the Anglo-American 
alliance designed to displace French political influence in the Central African region (Branch 
2005). This observation is supported by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report 
(CHRIR) that acknowledges that Kagame had the military and diplomatic support of the Anglo-
American and the UN authorities (CHRIR 2009). Grunfeld and Huijboom (2007) observed that 
the big powers’ unethical actions during the genocide were influenced more by petty national 
self-interests of geo-politics than addressing the basic needs of humanity. Such geo-political 
machinations by UN peacekeeping missions demonstrate that in the majority of cases, UN 
peacekeeping operations are launched in countries where one or more members of the Security 
Council have vested self-serving interests in the outcome of the mission and that they will do 
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everything in their powers to ensure their strategic plans prevail irrespective of the impact on 
the majority local population. 
Such experiences have led some scholars to argue that peacekeeping missions can only be 
effective when undertaken by regional groupings such as the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The 
rationale behind this school of thought is that conflicts can best be resolved effectively by 
fellow regional country members, as evidenced by the SADC coalition of the willing 
intervention in the DRC conflict during the period 1998-2002. 2  The SADC military 
intervention was meant to support the Congolese government of President Laurent-Desire 
Kabila against foreign invasion by Rwandan and Ugandan foreign sponsored insurgency. 
SADC coalition of the willing operation code named Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSL) 
was primarily aimed at safeguarding DRC’s sovereignty by militarily supporting the host 
government, after a formal and legitimate invitation by President Kabila’s government. This 
was a classic example of a regional economic and security organization forming a coalition of 
the willing to protect the national sovereignty of a member state against external aggression. 
Unfortunately it would appear as if the idea of regional peacekeeping as opposed to 
international peacekeeping has never been favoured and fully endorsed by the powerful 
countries in the West especially where the regional initiative lacks the backing of some of the 
members of the UNSC. This assertion is based on the deliberate exclusion of SADC countries 
that helped safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the DRC, from participation in 
UN peacekeeping missions in that troubled country.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
There appears to be ethical challenges that exist between UN peacekeeping missions and 
safeguarding of nation state sovereignty that ultimately contribute towards UN missions in 
Africa failing to fulfil their mandates. UN missions are primarily regarded as designed to 
protect the host population in a conflict situation whilst at the same time respecting host state 
sovereignty. In practice, it appears UN missions in Africa intervene where the US and her 
Western allies have geo-strategic benefits accruing from the peacekeeping interventions, such 
                                                          
2 In an interview with General Chiwenga on 28 November 2015, he cited the intervention of the Coalition of 
the Willing SADC Members who came to the rescue of the DRC in 1998 following a military invasion by Rwanda 
and Uganda as a living example of what regional countries can collectively achieve if they work together to 
enhance regional security without the involvement of outside powers. SADC intervention in the Lesotho crises 
was also cited as evidence of successful regional interventions to seek regional solutions to regional problems. 
8 
 
as access to oil and other strategic mineral resources. In the process of entrenching US self-
interests in the intervened country, UN peacekeepers seemingly appear to be deliberately 
violating host state sovereignty with impunity especially in cases where the host government 
would have fallen out of favour with the US and its allies. This violation of host state 
sovereignty is manifested through peacekeepers’ active participation in the assassination of 
heads of state and government as well as activities meant to bring about regime change, thus 
undermining host state sovereignty. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
1. To critically explore the extent to which African sovereign states with their 
mandate of responsibility to protect their own citizens can offer effective peace and 
security to their citizens rather than outside peacekeeping interventions. 
2. To analyse why UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, specifically in 
Congo/Zaire, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sudan have failed to attain the desired objectives. 
3. To proffer scholarly and policy options on how sovereign states particularly in 
Africa, with the UN mandate of responsibility to protect, can offer effective peace and 
security to their citizens rather than UN peacekeeping interventions. 
 1.4 Research Questions 
1. To what extent can African sovereign states, with their responsibility to protect, 
offer effective peace and security to own citizens without outside intervention?    
2. Why have UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and more specifically, Somalia, 
Rwanda, Sudan and DRC failed to achieve the desired objectives? 
3. What ethical scholarly solutions can be suggested to enable African states to 
effectively offer peace and security to their citizens rather that depend on outside 
interventions? 
4. What policy solutions can be proffered to enable African states to offer effective 
peace and security to their citizens rather than depend on UN peacekeeping 





It is the sovereign state, with its UN mandate of the responsibility to protect, which can offer 
effective peace and security to its own citizens in times of internal conflict rather than outside 
peacekeeping interventions. 
1.6 Preliminary Literature Review and Reasons for Choosing the Topic 
The UN was primarily established to enhance collective security among member states yet the 
advent of the Cold War during which members of the UN Security Council exercised their veto 
powers to block certain decisions related to collective security efforts led to the establishment 
of UN peacekeeping operations (James 1990; Rikhye 1984; Goulding 1993). Bellamy, 
Williams and Griffin (2010) in their voluminous book, Understanding Peacekeeping, address 
both the evolution, successes and failures of UN missions as well as extensive coverage of the 
impact of humanitarian missions on host populations.  
During the Cold War period, rarely were formal UN peacekeeping missions authorized for civil 
wars, since this would violate the strong belief of most member states in the primacy of state 
sovereignty (Al Qaq 2009). Leading contemporary authors on UN peacekeeping missions such 
as James (1990), Goulding (1993), Ramsbotham and Woodhouse and Ramsbottom (1996), and 
Gibbs (2000) have noted the increasing interference of peacekeepers in the internal affairs of 
host countries. James (1996) extensively examined the international politics around UN 
missions across the globe and the extent to which they were employed to entrench US 
hegemony in former colonies of departed Western powers. Studies such as this, led to the 
concept of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa coming under greater scrutiny in a bid to 
determine the real motives behind such deployments which are costly in financial, material and 
human lives. Findlay (2002) observed that UN peacekeepers’ interference in the internal affairs 
of Congo in the 1960s and Somalia in the early 1990s raised ethical as well as legitimacy 
questions on the extent the UN could interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign member 
state without its granted consent, especially in cases where there were no fully functional 
central government in control of state affairs. Intervention in civil wars was usually interpreted 
as illegitimate meddling in domestic affairs of a sovereign state. This view is now being 
challenged by a growing number of states, mostly in Europe, but including some from Africa 
and Latin America as they argue that the sovereignty of the individual citizen can be equally 
important as the sovereignty of the state. This school of thought argues that, when states 
blatantly violate the human rights of their people, through warfare or genocide, the international 
10 
 
community has a “Responsibility to Protect”, sometimes called R2P. This school of thought is 
highly controversial. Some states believe it violates the essence of the UN system, while others 
maintain it is the essence of the UN existence. Some dismiss it as simple imperialism; others 
believe it is essential to the credibility of the UN. Vogel (1996:4) argues that humanitarian 
politics are essentially hegemonic politics since humanitarian action is frequently used as a 
substitute for political action. Dowty and Loescher (1996:51) posit that humanitarian responses 
to political crises undermine the effort to solve the underlying problems since “charity alone 
often helps to perpetuate the injustice that caused the refugee flight, since it relieves the sending 
country of pressure to correct the injustice”. This is what appears to be happening with UN 
peacekeeping missions in Africa. 
Security challenges in Africa are considered to be so serious to the extent that the continent’s 
armed conflicts have accounted for approximately two thirds of the UN Security Council’s 
activities and have involved nearly three quarters of all its active peacekeepers. This is 
evidenced by the annual financial allocation to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa of USD 
5.8 billion out of a total annual budget of USD 8 billion (Williams 2008). The current practice 
results in billions of dollars spent on peacekeeping missions that do not necessarily improve 
the well-being of the local populations. This therefore leads to the argument that if this money 
was spent on improving the lives and well-being of affected countries and regions, the impact 
could have been more positive than what has been experienced to date through the deployment 
of UN peacekeepers. Contestation and criticism of peacekeeping missions arise from the simple 
fact that intervention negatively affects state sovereignty. The end of the Cold War brought 
with it an epistemological crisis as policy makers and security experts accelerated the 
questioning of conventional concepts in strategic and security studies. 
Throughout the past two centuries, state sovereignty was considered inviolable and sacrosanct. 
According to Mindzie (2010:174) the “pre-eminence of sovereignty...the fidelity to principles 
of non-intervention and non-interference in states’ private affairs,” is being undermined and 
eroded through the development of an international system that promotes the protection of 
human rights even when it means the violation of state sovereignty, as enshrined in the UN 
Charter. This new international norm that is evolving acknowledges and promotes the right of 
the international community to intervene in a country under the pretext of protecting its 
population from massive human rights abuses (Simons: 2001).  Three UN documents, 
predominantly influenced by Euro-centric views, namely, The UN’s Agenda for Peace (1992), 
UNDP’s Human Development Report (1994) and the International Commission on 
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Intervention and State Security (2001), constitute key regulatory documents that paved the way 
for moral justification of humanitarian intervention to protect civilian populations in violation 
of nation state sovereignty.  
According to Ayoob (2002), the new doctrine of humanitarian peacekeeping intervention 
constitutes a clear violation of the basic principle of state sovereignty and that the right to 
intervene represents a neo-colonial threat to the poorest and defenceless countries. This view 
was buttressed in 1999 at the UN General Assembly general debate, when Algerian president 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika expressed similar concerns and even defined sovereignty as “the last 
defence against the rules of an unjust world” (Ibid.). The concept has been criticized primarily 
as locating insecurity in post-colonial states in the Global South, thereby reconfiguring the 
North-South relations as primarily based on security concerns (Chandler 2008:435). It is further 
argued that this doctrine, rather than being guided by ideas of global citizenship and material 
well-being of all peoples, it is based on the idea of containment and a “self-help survival 
strategy” based on self-reliance and isolating troubled regions from the rest of the world, in 
order to create conducive environments for global business by multinational corporations and 
other international business players (Al Qaq 2009). According to this school of thought, it 
follows that UN peacekeeping missions are not primarily meant to address the root causes of 
the conflict in host countries but rather to create an enabling business environment for foreign 
powers and their multinational corporations; objectives that undermine host state sovereignty 
and national aspirations for political and economic self-determination.      
The UN interventions in Somalia, Sudan and DRC have demonstrated that military 
interventions are not an alternative to diplomacy, neither are they the only and unavoidable 
alternative to end violent intra-state conflicts. The UN and some regional organizations have 
resorted to military interventions before exhausting diplomatic and political options and 
processes as if the international community is losing faith in the power of diplomatic 
engagements to resolve political problems in developing countries. This practice poses ethical 
challenges as military interventions always result in deaths of soldiers and collateral damage 
in which innocent civilians, meant to be beneficiaries, end up being victims. Ethical challenges 
are evident and manifest in the manner and ways in which goals, interests, and means employed 
to achieve set objectives are defined, crafted and implemented. Huntington (1992) strongly 
lamented that it was morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that US members of the 
armed forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another. This meant that 
where there are no strategic national interests, the US would not allow its soldiers to die for 
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humanitarian reasons, hence their ineffective and counterproductive response to the Rwanda 
genocide. 
In Rwanda, the world community watched hopelessly as approximately one million Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus were butchered during the 1994 genocide (McNulty 1996:501). The UNSC 
was deeply divided on what action to take as the massacres took place in Rwanda with the USA 
“scandalously” declining to label the situation “genocide” lest it forced it to oblige to act in 
compliance with the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Findlay 
2002:281). In contrast, the US made serious attempts to label the situation in Darfur “genocide” 
when the gravity of the massacres were far less severe compared to what had happened in 
Rwanda, reflecting the US pursuit of national interests in Sudan, and not necessarily, the 
protection of the suffering population. Instead of reinforcing the 2500 strong UN mission in 
Rwanda following the genocide, the UNSC decided to reduce the strength to a pathetic 270 
and downgraded its mandate (UN Document S/1999/1257). This was an unethical move that 
demonstrated selectivity and insensitivity of the US and Britain where their national interests 
are not at stake. Inevitably, humanitarian intervention on a selective basis arouses suspicion 
and cynicism as it undermines the credibility of the UN 3  and divides the international 
community.  
Following the Rwanda 1994 genocide, a huge failure on the part of the UN collective security 
system, a consensus appears to be building up among UN member states that a “state’s 
sovereignty should not shield it from outside military intervention when it brutalizes its own 
people, and certainly, when a genocide is taking place” (Chatterjee and Scheid 2003:5). Ethical 
challenges and objections to such interventions arise when considering two issues namely; the 
violation of national sovereignty and the use of force with the concomitant and unavoidable 
loss of life and human suffering resulting from military operations(Findlay 2002).The ethical 
challenges arise when considering the conditions, under which military humanitarian 
interventions should be undertaken against a sovereign state, the countries to intervene, the 
decision making process and the interests of the authorizing powers. Thus, a conflict appears 
to exist between the legality and morality of such robust interventions on humanitarian grounds 
                                                          
3 The fact that the UN is divided into two main entities of the UN Security Council dominated by the 
Permanent Five Members and ten rotating members on one hand and the General Assembly comprising the 
rest of the UN membership implies that the UNSC has un proportional and unrepresentative influence towards 
influencing world events as well as the responses that the world body ultimately adopt to a given situation. In 
this regard, such responses are not necessarily reflective of the generality of UN membership.   
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(Ibid.).  These are some of the issues that this research will be examining in an effort to come 
up with a better understanding of the ethical challenges associated with UN peacekeeping and 
national sovereignty when dealing with peacekeeping missions in Africa.  Current debate on 
UN peacekeeping in Africa does not fully address the negative implications on the sovereignty 
of the host nation as it is seriously undermined by the presence of peacekeepers and 
humanitarian agencies that are bent on promoting their national and organizational strategic 
interests and not addressing the real root problems of the conflict. 
The UN peacekeeping intervention in Somalia was legitimized as a humanitarian mission, 
whose aim was to protect convoys that delivered food to starving Somali population. It will be 
observed in the case study on Somalia that self-serving motives, not mandated by the UNSC 
resolution, were adopted as the US troops as they openly declared, with fanfare, their objective 
of capturing General Mohamed Farah Aideed. In this regard, the humanitarian mission was 
transformed “into a security postulate and a symbolic and prestigious political and military 
objective” resulting in the death of many civilians as collateral damage. Finnemore (1996:158) 
argues that humanitarian justifications for military interventions are used to disguise deeper 
and more important motives. He adds that, while humanitarian motives may be genuine, they 
usually constitute a portion of a mix of motivations driving states into interventions. In the case 
of Somalia, international diplomacy was given little chance to ameliorate the conflict as ethical 
considerations 4  were not given adequate attention prior to the launch of robust military 
operations. The end result of the military intervention was more conflict, more civilian 
suffering and deaths and prolongation of the Somali conflict, all pointing towards unethical 
outcomes of the intervention. 
 Mandates for most missions in Africa are not always clear, as they are rather diffuse, and above 
all, they are not always democratically legitimized. One ethical challenge, as demonstrated in 
Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and DRC, is that humanitarian aid can sometimes exacerbate conflict 
by supporting the war economy or providing legitimacy to combatants (Anderson 1999).  The 
ethical challenges come with the collateral damage of well-intended assistance since the 
                                                          
4 Ethical considerations that were ignored included internal displacements of the population, collateral 
damage to both infrastructure and civilian population as well as the hostility that was to be further fuelled 
between Aid Agencies and the local militias resulting from the robust military intervention purportedly to save 
the starving population of Somalia. Efforts to seek political solutions among Somali ethnic groups that were 
being spearheaded by Ambassador Sahnoun, UN special representative were scuttled by the rushed decision 
to embark on robust military intervention as the militias considered the intervention as a military invasion.  
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continuation of fighting always affect civilians who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of UN 
peacekeeping missions. Since the UN is dominated by the Five Permanent Members of the 
Security Council which has the primary responsibility of maintaining world peace, the duration 
of UN missions deployed is dependent on the wishes of these permanent members and not 
necessarily the wishes of the majority states of the General Assembly.  
Chesterman (2004) and Wheeler (2000) rightly point out that the “right to intervene” does not  
primarily address the humanitarian needs of the affected populations for three reasons: first it 
emphasizes the claims and rights of the interveners rather than the needs of the beneficiaries; 
second, it sticks to the traditional language and the act of intervening rather than on preventive 
and long term engagements; and third, the rhetoric of intervention trumping questions of 
sovereignty cut short a discussion on potential dissent. To further buttress this point, Makaremi 
(2010:113) argues that the reduction of human security to protection or freedom from fear, 
turns the concept’s initial ambition of ‘deepening’, ‘widening’ and demilitarizing security 
upside down. Thus, the legitimacy of military action for protection purposes leads to a re-
militarization of security. He argues further that prioritization of protection shifts the focus 
from matters of everyday insecurity related to health and food towards the question of violence 
(Ibid. 113). Such misplaced priorities justify this research project, as it aims to argue that 
military solutions are not the best options in addressing security related problems in intra-state 
conflicts in Africa. 
1.7 Gaps in existing literature 
Existing literature on UN peacekeeping missions extensively covers various aspects of UN 
peacekeeping operations ranging from the political justification, legality of the missions, 
factors affecting success and failure of operations and their humanitarian justification. There 
has been no systematic and focused study on the extent to which UN peacekeeping missions 
deliberately and systematically violate host state sovereignty in Africa with the ultimate aim of 
realising regime change in a bid to promote self-interests of Western powers under the guise 
of coming to the rescue of African populations in conflict situations. Moreover, existing 
literature does not adequately address the magnitude of negative implications of deploying UN 
peacekeepers in African countries bedevilled with internal conflicts, especially the negative 
impact on host state sovereignty. This research aims to address that gap through a focused 
analysis of four case studies. The research aims to unbundle the real unethical motives that 
have influenced the deployment of UN peacekeepers as well as establishing if there is indeed 
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a pattern of using UN peacekeepers as proxies to undermine and in some cases, depose African 
political regimes that would have fallen out of favour with Western powers. 
1.8 Principal Theories upon which the Research Project will be constructed 
This research will be influenced to a very large extent, by four theories namely: the theory of 
hermeneutics of suspicion; the theory of realism and ethical sceptical realism; the theory of 
state sovereignty and the theory of organized hypocrisy.  
The theory of hermeneutics of suspicion is used by researchers and practitioners involved in 
critical analysis of a given phenomenon, it is a widespread practice of interpretation embedded 
in more mundane, diffuse and variegated forms of life (Felski 2011:220).Considering that the 
central argument of this thesis is that authentic peacekeeping does not come from without the 
nation state through UN peacekeeping interventions but rather from within the state, it is 
appropriate to use this guiding theory as peacekeepers’ activities are not always transparent 
and tend to serve the interests of outside powers at the expense of the local populations they 
purport to come and rescue.  
The thesis argues that foreign sponsored peacekeeping missions are suspicious and 
retrogressive to the host populations and their governments, as they are not designed to promote 
the well-being and prosperity of the local citizens thereby undermining host state sovereignty. 
Critically, the study demonstrates that UN peacekeeping missions in practice do not wrestle 
with or address the deep rooted complexities related to the causes of the conflict situation hence 
they rarely create opportunities for “emancipatory social transformation” that is truly in favour 
of the host population (Featherstone 2007:198). Rather they are primarily motivated by the 
promotion of self-interests of the main sponsors of peacekeeping missions, who happen to be 
Western powers and former colonial masters trying to re-invent their lost control and influence 
over their former colonies in Africa (Ayoob 2002; Al Qaq 2009). The basis of this argument 
and suspicion is that, since the former colonial powers did not rule Africa on the principle of 
promoting prosperity, peace and harmony among their colonies, it therefore becomes 
suspicious when Western powers return to African countries experiencing conflict and turmoil 
on the pretext of promoting peace among the tribal/ethnic groupings and upholding human 
rights which they never observed and safeguarded during colonialism.  
Deep and critical hermeneutics are useful in this study as they lead to objective interpretations 
of real motives and interests of both sponsors and practitioners of peacekeeping operations 
especially the troop contributing countries; multinational corporations and various non-
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governmental organizations. Related to the theory of hermeneutics of suspicion is the theory 
of sceptical realism which states that peacekeeping missions are usually undertaken with an 
aura of motives which at closer scrutiny are not about peacekeeping but the promotion of 
national self-interests of troop contributing countries (TCC) and major sponsors of UN 
peacekeeping missions.  
The theory of realism in international relations emerged from identified weaknesses of idealism 
which was viewed as being utopian implying that it propounded for desirable outcomes that 
were not realistic in practice5 . The idealist/liberalist school of thought was castigated by 
theorists such as Edward Carr (2001); Morgenthau (1985) and others following the failure by 
the idealist oriented League of Nations to stop World War II.      
Hobbes (1962) propounded the realist argument that it was not feasible to have a common 
world government simply because each nation state acts in a way that promotes its self-interests 
whilst at the same time remaining suspicious of the motives and intentions of other states hence 
there was little room for morality in the conduct of national business with other states in 
international politics. Hobbes’ observations dovetail with the theory of hermeneutics of 
suspicion in that international relations is dominated by acts of aggression, deceitful political 
practices and power politics exercised by international actors in their endeavour to maximise 
their self-interests irrespective of the impact on the receiving states. Murove (2005:8) is of a 
similar view as he argues that it is futile to wish the existence of a shared moral world view 
among nation states in their interaction in world affairs. Sceptical realism emphasizes the limits 
of morality and ethics in the conduct of international politics and this includes UN 
peacekeeping operations.  
Political theorists that deny the role of ethics in international politics include Charles Beitz 
(1979:15) who argues that realism is derived from a firm foundation that is of the view that 
“moral judgments have no place in discussions of international affairs or foreign policy.” 
Buchanan and Keohane (2004) are of the view that the way international relations are 
conducted by the main actors, rules out considerations of morality in that sphere.” Cohen 
(1986) argues that the conduct of nation states assessed and judged exclusively by self-serving 
                                                          
5The major attributes for liberalism or idealism were: power of ideas hence the euphemistically referred to as 
idealism; positive mindedness towards others hence raising the capacity and opportunities for collaboration among 
different states; peaceful behaviour that emanated from institutions that discouraged selfishness and resort to war 
and lastly upholding of democratic value systems and civil liberties.      
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and amoral national interests. These sentiments are in sync with what Meinecke (1924) had 
earlier observed that the primary role of political leaders is to promote and advance the self-
interests of their own countries ahead and above all other considerations. This line of thinking 
is what has guided US attitude and influence on UN peacekeeping operations as revealed in 
this thesis. The fact that the US has always paid more towards financing of UN peacekeeping 
missions than any other UN member state indicates that it has had correspondingly more 
influence in the conduct of peacekeeping operations in pursuit of its self-interests as revealed 
in the case studies of this thesis. The case studies demonstrate that the pursuit of US self-
interests dominate the determination of the size, level of funding and resource allocation for all 
the four case studies of this thesis with little or no attention paid towards safeguarding of host 
state sovereignty. 
The theory of national sovereignty is based on the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 that ended the 
Thirty Years War in Europe and gave birth to nation states that were sovereign implying that 
they did not have any other authority over them. The Westphalian concept of national 
sovereignty was predicated on non-recognition of a supranational authority and non-
interference in the internal affairs of United Nations member states (Gelot and Söderbaum 
2012:132). The UN Charter upholds nation states’ sovereignty within their territories and 
acknowledges their immunity to external interference except in grave circumstances, namely: 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter prohibits 
the world body from intervening in matters that are within the purview of domestic jurisdiction 
of member states (United Nations Charter 1945). The founding fathers of UN peacekeeping 
operations allayed fears regarding the violation of host state sovereignty by adopting the 
peacekeeping principles of “host state consent, impartiality and use of force only in self-
defence” (Pelz and Lehmann 2007:2). However, case studies of this thesis demonstrate that 
these principles were flagrantly violated by UN peacekeepers deployed in decolonised 
countries on the periphery as their sovereignty was viewed as “quasi states”6 a derogatory 
classification deliberately meant to undermine their national sovereignty.  
The theory of organized hypocrisy is not very common among many scholars hence the 
political and diplomatic dynamics associated with this concept are little known to students and 
                                                          
6 Jackson (1990) argues that these decolonized states are not truly sovereign, but only “quasi-states” as if they 
deserve to be treated like a football pitch for the big powers that can play their football games in these weak 
decolonized countries.  
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practitioners of global politics and diplomacy (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003). These dynamics 
have direct implications on the conduct of UN peacekeeping missions and global governance 
(Ibid). According to Lipson (2007) organized hypocrisy is a phenomenon espoused by 
organizational behaviour theorists to explain how organizations respond to conflicting and 
challenging pressures emanating from external environments through adoption of 
contradictory actions and statements in order to deliberately mislead the public. Organized 
hypocrisy is manifested by inconsistencies and contradictions between publicly pronounced 
organizational expressions and aspirations to respect norms such as state sovereignty yet in real 
practice, these norms are violated. Krasner (1999) argued that organized hypocrisy explains 
the enduring and routine violation of state sovereignty.  
Brunsson (1989), one of the leading theorists on organized hypocrisy argued that organized 
hypocrisy refers to organizational responses to “conflicting logics of consequences and 
appropriateness.” It also refers to parallel structures that are set by organizations as what 
happened during UN peacekeeping operations in Congo during the early 1960s where 
Secretary General Hammarskjold established a secretive cabinet of American special advisers 
and himself known as the “Congo Club” to run the affairs of the UN peacekeeping mission 
whose aim was to entrench US hegemony in Africa after dislodging Belgian post-colonial 
influence in that country (O’Brien 1962:56). Brunsson (1989:27) concluded that “organized 
hypocrisy is a fundamental type of behaviour” in most political organizations such as the UN. 
1.9 Research Design and Methodology 
Research design in this thesis refers to the methodology adopted for data collection as well as 
data generation to satisfy the requirements of the study. Based on the preliminary literature 
review and the objectives of the study, this research adopted a predominantly historical and 
comparative case study approach and design.  
The researcher embarked on a rigorous, systematic investigation to find answers to the research 
questions stated above. The research involved exploring repetitively, carefully and closely 
some major phenomenon regarding ethical challenges existing between UN peacekeeping 
missions in Africa and violation of host state sovereignty. The qualitative research 
methodology adopted, served as a strategy of enquiry that moved from the underlying 
philosophical assumptions to research design and data collection. The research design served 
as a framework and a guide in systematic data collection and analysis. 
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The research adopted a qualitative approach as its methodology since qualitative research 
yields data that provides depth and detail to create understanding of phenomena and lived 
experiences (Bowen 2005). The research used grounded theory with comparative study being 
a product, rather than a method of this research project. To analyse the ethical challenges to 
peacekeeping and nation-state sovereignty in Africa, the researcher used the comparative case 
study approach focusing on a comprehensive comparison between four UN peacekeeping 
missions in Africa: Congo, Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur-Sudan. Case study research falls 
under qualitative research and it focusses on providing a detailed analysis of one or more cases. 
According to Hancock (1998:6) the case study approach offers “richness and depth of 
information not usually offered by other methods.” The research attempted to illustrate the 
relationship between practical peacekeeping and theoretical debates in other sub-fields of 
ethics, international relations and international diplomacy.  
A focused comparison offered methodological advantages for a better understanding of ethical 
variables associated with UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Congo experienced traditional 
peacekeeping operations that ended with the UN undertaking offensive military operations in 
violation of existing peacekeeping principles. Somalia experienced humanitarian peacekeeping 
intervention soon after the end of the Cold War where UN sponsored peacekeepers launched 
offensive operations to kill or capture General Mohammad Farah Aideed the leading warlord. 
In Rwanda, despite having the worst humanitarian disaster among the case studies under 
investigation in which approximately one million people were butchered in cold blood, the 
affected population did not benefit from the sympathy of the international community 
reflecting the organized hypocritical nature of the UNSC decision making process regarding 
peacekeeping operations. In Darfur, a very weak and ineffective AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping 
mission was deployed yet the local population was being subjected to crimes against humanity. 
The experiences of all four countries under study are very different and therefore offer great 
scope for the study of ethical challenges to UN peacekeeping in Africa and how they impact 
on host state sovereignty. 
This research study was based on various sources of data and information, some of which 
include the following: perusal and study of primary official documents on UN peacekeeping 
missions and international diplomacy regarding state sovereignty with specific reference to 
countries under study and the examination of secondary published and internet material on the 
subject under study. Personal interviews were extensively used in this study and the target 
groups included diplomats accredited to Zimbabwe whose countries have played host to the 
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missions under study. Current and previous force commanders of both military and civilian 
police were contacted to get first-hand information of their views and experiences regarding 
the ethical dilemma between UN peacekeeping operations and host state sovereignty. Where 
feasible and applicable, participants (military and civilian police) and others were interviewed 
to gather detailed personal insights of the subject under study.  
Resources of various university library facilities as well as the Regional Peacekeeping Training 
Centre (RPTC) library in Harare, were extensively used to gather valuable secondary data. 
Equally, additional valuable data was obtained from the AU Headquarters in Addis Abba 
Ethiopia through extensive interviews with various authorities and diplomats who proved to be 
extremely valuable. Additional secondary information was accessed from the AU 
peacekeeping department. Officials at the AU headquarters responsible for peacekeeping in 
Africa were interviewed for their views and they shared with the researcher, their detailed 
perspectives at the strategic and operational levels of UN peacekeeping operations. Previous 
force commanders of both military and civilian police were approached and interviewed in 
order to get first-hand information of their views and experiences. An interview guide was 
extensively used during the information gathering stage of the research project.  
To enhance the trustworthiness of the research findings the researcher was guided by the 
recommendations made by Denzin and Lincoln (1994) who stated that the safeguarding of 
credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability of research findings was crucial 
throughout the study. In order to realise and guarantee the trustworthiness of the research 
findings, the researcher carried out interviews in the most rigorous ways possible in order to 
enhance the reliability and validity of the findings. 
Given the fact that peacekeeping operations are still on going in Darfur-Sudan at the time of 
concluding this research, and due to limited financial resources available for the project, 
regional and local interviews were limited to those officials that were accessible and willing to 
participate in the research project. Research trips to affected countries were replaced by 
extensive interviews conducted in Addis Ababa during a three week study tour in Ethiopia. In 
addition, interviews were carried out in Zimbabwe among embassies accredited to Zimbabwe.  
1.10 New Knowledge 
The new knowledge that this thesis contributes to existing body of knowledge is a deeper 
understanding of the degree to which UN peacekeeping missions engage in illegal and 
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unethical practices when used as proxy forces for some big powers in order to further their geo-
strategic self-interests under the guise of coming to the rescue of civilian populations in conflict 
situations in Africa. The study dispels the myth that UN peacekeeping missions are inherently 
ethical undertakings designed to produce positive results such as durable peace and security, 
re-building war-torn societies and the promotion of the rule of law for the good of the world 
community. The thesis reveals a deliberate and unethical trend of using UN peacekeepers to 
subvert host state governments even to the extent of participating in the assassination of sitting 
heads of state and governments as happened in Congo and Rwanda. 
1.11 Limitations of the Study 
The thesis primarily focusses on the four case studies of Congo, Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan 
(Darfur). Other UN peacekeeping missions will only be referred to in passing in order to 
buttress a given point of view. 
1.12 Outline Structure of the Thesis 
The outline structure of this thesis is as detailed below. 
Chapter One: Introduction and Scope of the Study  
This chapter consists of the background to the study and reasons for choosing this area of study. 
It contains the objectives of the study, research questions, theoretical framework adopted, 
preliminary literature review, and research methodology used to gather necessary data. This 
chapter sets the stage for detailed research to address the requirements of the research topic. 
Chapter Two: The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations 
Chapter two traces the historical evolution of peacekeeping operations from ancient times up 
to the twenty-first century. This approach is aimed at giving a succinct and firm foundation to 
readers in order to facilitate their conceptualization and understanding of the roots and concepts 
of UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice.  
Chapter Three: Ethical Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Republic of 
Congo with reference to the period (1960-1964) 
Chapter three is the first case study in a series of four cases that attempt to demonstrate that 
UN peacekeeping operations are routinely involved not only in unethical practices but also 
illegal activities that are deliberately meant to seriously undermine host state sovereignty in 
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pursuit of serving foreign interests and not to further national aspirations of host countries and 
their populations. The Congo peacekeeping operation generated serious controversies resulting 
from the mission’s “entrapment” into a complex web of interlocking local, regional and 
international crises that resulted in deliberate violation of Congo’s national sovereignty. 
Chapter Four: Ethical challenges to UN and US “humanitarian” interventions in Somalia: from 
peacekeeping to peace-enforcement (1992-1995)  
This chapter dispels the myth that since UN peacekeeping missions are authorised by the 
UNSC on behalf of the world community, they are inherently ethical undertakings meant to 
produce positive results such as durable peace and security, re-building war-torn societies and 
the promotion of the rule of law for the good of the world community. The chapter 
demonstrates that the joint UN/US military “humanitarian intervention” in Somalia was not 
driven by purely humanitarian motives and that the use of force by the UN sponsored missions 
in Somalia caused more harm than good for the ordinary Somali citizens. To make matters 
worse, the chapter established that the Somali population was left in worse political and 
security situation than what the UN peacekeepers found on the ground following the US 
abandonment of the mission.  
Chapter Five: A Case Study of United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda 1993-1995 
The chapter argues that the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda undermined host state 
sovereignty through the provision of a false sense of security for the host government and its 
population as the mission reneged on its duties to protect both Rwandan government officials 
and civilians during the genocide. Instead, the mission facilitated the establishment of a pro-
Anglo-American regime in Rwanda through a regime change strategy that was implemented 
with the full knowledge of the UN peacekeepers whose unethical connivance with the RPF 
rebel movement was a conspiracy aimed at the demise of the host Rwandan government in 
violation of that country’s state sovereignty. 
Chapter Six: Multilateral Response to Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur: A Case Study of UN 
Organized Hypocrisy 
The chapter exposes the myth that Western powers are truly concerned about saving civilian 
strangers’ lives in African conflict situations when they organize highly publicized marches 
and campaigns such as the “Save Darfur” rallies in Western capitals. Instead of coming to the 
effective rescue of dying civilians in Darfur, the Security Council opted for the adoption of an 
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ineffective and under resourced AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping mission that exposed the 
hypocrisy of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa as the reaction to the atrocities in Darfur 
were similar to that of Rwanda during genocide.  
Chapter Seven: An ethical critique of the violation of UN peacekeeping principles  
The chapter highlights the cardinal, normative principles of UN peacekeeping and how in 
practice they are manipulated and violated by the big powers through peacekeepers deployed 
in the field to undermine host state sovereignty. The chapter also proffers some theoretical 
explanations as to why UN peacekeepers do not genuinely come to the rescue of African 
populations in conflict situations. 
Chapter Eight: Ethical and Policy Recommendations  
This chapter provides scholarly and practical recommendations that will result in African states 
themselves prioritizing the security of their populations singly or collectively. It argues that 
African leaders should desist from relying on foreign UN peacekeepers that engage in unethical 
practices that undermine national sovereignty and the dignity of African populations in target 
countries. The chapter further argues that African leaders themselves should endeavour to be 
part of the solutions and not continue to be part of the problems that create conducive 
environments for conflict on the continent by desisting from applying divide and rule strategies. 
The chapter emphasizes that where national dialogue to resolve domestic conflicts fail, African 
leaders should resort to regional political and security arrangements to resolve their conflicts 
before the AU is invited to intervene. Primarily the chapter recommends that African leaders 
should do some serious introspections as to why internal conflicts continue to surface on the 
continent and that they should give voice to the voiceless minorities that are generally 
marginalised and given a raw deal in the sharing of the national resources.  Serious commitment 
to African based conflict resolution mechanisms should see an end to the involvement of UN 
peacekeeping missions in Africa whose primary agenda is neither the resolution of African 
conflicts nor the upliftment of African lives but rather, the entrenchment of western neo-
colonialism and unfettered access to African natural resources that sustain their economies at 






The Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations 
2.1 Introduction 
The term peacekeeping does not appear in the United Nations Charter. According to O’Neill 
and Rees (2005:30) and Hill and Malik (1996:25) the term itself explicitly came into use after 
the creation and deployment of the first armed UN operations in Egypt (1956-1967) and Congo 
(1960-64). The use of the term peacekeeping was officially formalised when the UN General 
Assembly commissioned a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February 1965 
to deal with peacekeeping matters (Rikhye 1984 and Siekmann 1985). The lightly armed 
peacekeeping operations in Egypt and Congo were different from earlier observer missions 
undertaken by unarmed UN personnel deployed in the Middle-East to separate Israel and her 
Arab neighbours. However, the official view is that the United Nations Truce Supervisory 
Organization (UNTSO), deployed in June 1948 following the first Arab-Israeli war, is the first 
peacekeeping operation (Goulding 1993:452). 
Peacekeeping missions have evolved through three different eras: “first generation” 
peacekeeping during the Cold War, “second generation” peacekeeping in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s during the transition to the post-Cold War, and “third generation” peacekeeping 
since the late 1990s to date (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 2005). According to 
(Osmançavuşoğlu 2000) first-generation peacekeeping was the traditional or classic version in 
which two warring states consent to the deployment of international troops to establish a buffer 
between them as the former protagonists implement a peace agreement. The second generation 
was characterised by multidimensional missions that included “robust peacekeeping,” peace 
enforcement missions and humanitarian interventions, a development that was in conflict with 
the concept of Westphalian nation-state sovereignty predicated on non-recognition of 
supranational authority and non-interference in the internal affairs of United Nations member 
states (Gelot and Söderbaum 2012:132). The third and current generation of peacekeeping 
evolution is characterized by humanitarian interventionism, peace-building activities and the 
“slowly building consensus” that the UN has a “responsibility to protect” innocent civilian lives 
under severe threat from their respective governments (Frederking 2007:45). Most of the 
evolutionary changes materialized at the end of the Cold War as the ideological deadlock that 
crippled decision making in the Security Council during the early years of the Cold War eased. 
Reduced mutual suspicion between the superpowers led to cooperation in attempts to resolve 
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international conflict creating an environment conducive to experimenting with new forms of 
peacekeeping that were not applicable during the Cold War era. 
The official and popular narrative of the United Nations is that post-World War II concept of 
peacekeeping evolved out of necessity to create a conducive environment for the peaceful 
resolution of international conflicts following the failure of collective security arrangements as 
enshrined in the UN Charter. Fetherston (1994:12) writes that: “It was this need to avert the 
potential escalation of local conflicts into superpower confrontations, coupled with an inability 
to act, that led to the development of peacekeeping.” Ebegbulem (2011) observed that the 
envisaged United Nations collective security system has failed mainly due to the unwillingness 
of most countries to subordinate their national sovereign self-interests to international 
collective action. This view is supported by Rourke and Boyer (1998) who argues that 
“…governments have generally maintained their right to view conflict in terms of their national 
interest and to support or oppose UN action based on their nationalistic point of view.” In that 
regard the concept of peacekeeping was developed as a compromised approach to solving 
direct conflicts between member states in situations where disputing states agreed to 
peacekeeping interventions. A deeper analysis of the evolution of peacekeeping however 
reveals that peacekeeping operations have been used as proxies to advance Western liberal 
agendas in developing and under developed countries as they became increasingly intrusive in 
internal political affairs of target countries. This chapter attempts to provide contextual ethical 
insights towards explaining the evolutionary trends of peacekeeping operations and their 
relationship with state sovereignty. 
The chapter is divided into six main sections. The first section is the introduction. The second 
section covers the conceptual definitions and broad overview of peacekeeping operations that 
attempt to unpack the underlying logic of peacekeeping operations. The third section attempts 
to identify and highlight pre-League of Nations peacekeeping operations as a precursor to 
modern peacekeeping. The fourth section highlights peacekeeping missions under the League 
of Nations. The fifth section examines in detail the evolution of peacekeeping under the United 
Nations. Section six is the conclusion that summarises the chapter. The next section examines 
the conceptual definitions and meaning of peacekeeping operations. 
2.2 An overview of peacekeeping operations 
There is no agreed definition of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is a technique which was 
developed by the United Nations to help manage and resolve armed conflicts first between 
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states and later within states (Goulding 1993). Classical or traditional peacekeepers separate 
combatants at a physical distance thereby preventing accidental clashes of opposing forces thus 
inhibiting minor incidents that could result in major conflict. Traditional peacekeeping does 
not involve military enforcement measures but entails the active participation of United 
Nations personnel in helping to control and resolve actual or potential international conflicts 
or internal conflicts which have a clear international dimension (Ibid.). This view is supported 
by Goulding (1993) who defines peacekeeping as follows: 
Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to 
help control and resolve conflicts between them under United Nations command and control, at 
the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and 
equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force 
to the minimum extent possible (Goulding 1993:455) 
Mullenbach (2005:529) views peacekeeping as constituting “a military and/or civilian 
personnel deployment by one or more third-party states, under the auspices of a global or 
regional organization, into a conflict or post-conflict situation for the purposes of preventing 
the resumption of military hostilities between two parties and/or for the purpose of creating an 
environment conducive for negotiations between two antagonistic parties.” The International 
Peace Academy (IPA) defines peacekeeping as: 
The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within States 
through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally 
using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace (IPA 
1974:11). 
Basing on the above definitions it is clear that there is no agreed definition of peacekeeping 
hence it has evolved to assume certain characteristics and responsibilities that were never 
envisaged at its conceptualization.  
The need for UN peacekeeping operations arose after the Charter had already entered into 
force, when the nature of international conflicts could not be addressed through the mechanism 
provided for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. According to Diehl (1988:486) the 
provisions provided for in Chapter VI, concerning the pacific settlement of disputes, were 
considered inadequate and the Security Council stalemate resulting from the use of the veto 
powers effectively signalled an end to collective security as a viable option for settling 
international conflict since the permanent members of the Security Council could not agree on 
collective measures provided for in Chapter VII. The proliferation of decolonized states in the 
developing world increased the demand for peacekeepers to manage the transition to statehood. 
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Jackson (1990) argued that sadly these decolonized states are not truly sovereign, but only 
“quasi-states”. Such an argument seems to suggest that these newly decolonized states are 
liable to outside intervention if they fail in their duties of state governance, especially 
safeguarding human security (Lang 2010:335). The evolutionary nature and characteristics of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations seem to buttress the controversial views expressed by 
Jackson (1990) that decolonized states are indeed “quasi states” susceptible to interference in 
their internal affairs by outsiders. According to Wedgwood (1995:634), the concept of UN 
peacekeeping is deeply connected to strategic conflict management where a need arose to 
“neutralize and quarantine quarrels with strategic potential” to spread across the affected region 
or even beyond, hence the selectivity in the conflicts that attracted the attention and intervention 
by the UN peacekeepers.  
Peacekeeping troops are deployed in the classical sense first with authorization of the Security 
Council and the consent of the host governments and/or the main parties to the conflict after 
the fighting has stopped rather than before or during the conflict. Diehl (1994) observes that in 
classical peacekeeping, troops deploy, occupy and patrol a given area while acting as an 
interposition force between protagonists. This means that ideally, peacekeepers have neither 
military offensive role nor the offensive capability to engage the protagonists. The goal of 
peacekeeping was to provide a buffer zone between hostile forces and prevent dangerous 
shooting and provocative incidents that could escalate hostilities and permanently jeopardize 
the cease-fire agreement (Diehl 1994:6). Peacekeeping has traditionally involved primarily a 
military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after interstate wars, 
compared to current practice where it is involved in complex operations that include the 
military, civilian police and civilian organizations, working together to build a presumed firm 
foundation for sustainable peace (The United Nations Today 2008:780). In theory, this sounds 
like an ideal and worthwhile undertaking that primarily aims at alleviating the suffering of 
affected populations, which unfortunately is not the case in real practice as will be 
demonstrated in the case studies that are covered in this thesis.  
William Durch (1993) observes that peacekeeping supplements other efforts and initiatives 
targeted at conflict management and resolution such as diplomatic and political initiatives. 
These initiatives are applied in the self-help system of international politics with the help of 
“disinterested” outside assistance that is meant to assist parties to a conflict disengage 
themselves from fighting. Durch further observes that United Nations peacekeeping missions 
may include in their mandate in ascending order of complexity and intrusiveness:  
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…uncovering the facts of a conflict; monitoring of border or buffer zones after armistice 
agreements have been signed; verification of agreed-upon force disengagements or withdrawals; 
supervision of the disarming and demobilization of local forces; maintenance of security 
conditions essential to the conduct of elections; and even the temporary transnational 
administration of countries (Durch 1993:3-4.). 
In this regard, peacekeeping is designed to be a confidence building initiative that provides a 
means and opportunity for nations or factions “exhausted of war, but suspicious of one 
another’s intentions to live in relative peace whilst they explore lasting and durable areas of 
agreement to live in peace after the withdrawal of the peacekeepers” (Ibid.). 
The term ”peacekeeping” was first used during the deployment of the first United Nations 
armed peacekeeping mission in Egypt in 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). 
The exact origins of peacekeeping operations remain contested (Goulding 1993:452). In terms 
of having developed a systematic approach to solving interstate and intrastate disputes, it is 
commonly agreed that the UN invented peacekeeping missions although the phenomenon did 
not originate with UN or even its predecessor, the League of Nations. Pre-UN prototype 
“peacekeeping” was a system originally designed to deal with interstate conflicts as part of the 
broader conflict and dispute management systems applied by powerful nations dating back to 
ancient times (Heldt and Wallensteen 2007:4). The next section attempts to trace the origins of 
peacekeeping from ancient times up to the formation of the League of Nations. 
2.3 The genesis of “peacekeeping” missions 
Some historians have argued that the origins of peacekeeping can be traced as far back as the 
Delian League of ancient Greece in the fifth century. Sorenson and Wood (2005:1) argue that 
it is virtually impossible to determine exactly when the first peacekeeping mission was 
launched since the deployment of military forces to maintain peace between potential 
combatants could be traced to the period of pre-Roman Empire. They noted that ancient Greeks 
developed and established the idea of peaceful resolution of conflicts through the 
institutionalization of a religious “Amphictyony” which resembled a "league of neighbours" 
that was designed to resolve differences among the city states of ancient Greece around the 
mid-7th century BC. The Greek model of “amphictyonia” can be viewed as the collective will 
among the city states to manage crises in order to avert potential wars and that this collective 
security system foreshadows the League of Nations and the UN system that institutionalized 
peacekeeping practices. From a Western view perspective, the closest example from history 
that first resembled peacekeeping was initiated by the early medieval Catholic Church through 
its initiatives related to “the Peace of God and Truce of God” in the late tenth century to try 
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and limit the spread and effect of war. This was a Catholic Church European medieval 
movement that applied spiritual sanctions to limit the violence of private war in the feudal 
societal system of governance and conflict prevention and management (Ibid).  
Heldt and Wallensteen (Op.Cit:4) trace the origins of peacekeeping to the 19th Century during 
the years 1849-50 when Sweden and Norway deployed a 4 000 strong military contingent to 
conduct a “peacekeeping” operation following an armistice between Denmark and German to 
resolve the political issue of whether or not the Schleswig – Holstein region should be divided. 
The multinational military troops deployed were tasked to maintain law and order in the 
contested region until a comprehensive peace agreement had been established. Withdrawal of 
these troops in July 1850 took effect following the successful conclusion of a peace treaty 
between affected countries (Ibid.).  
At the end of the 19th Century, European powers began a scramble to feel the vacuum left by 
the crumbling Ottoman Empire. According to Pasqualini (2006:23) a multinational military 
force was deployed to Crete during period 1897-1906 following riots between Christians and 
Muslims, a situation that was aggravated by contestation for absolute control of the island 
between Athens and Constantinople. The Great European Powers deployed a multinational 
force “to sedate the riots and above all to keep a situation of security in the island and the 
equilibrium in the Mediterranean Sea” (Ibid.). European powers were keen to ensure that no 
single power dominated the Mediterranean Sea hence the multinational “collective 
security/peacekeeping” effort was undertaken to keep the balance of power in the geo-strategic 
Mediterranean region (Ibid). At face value, it would appear as if the multinational military 
deployment was simply meant to assist the Cypriots settle their differences yet the geo-strategic 
importance of Cyprus and the strategic need to deny any regional powers to dominate this 
region were the actual motives hence the deployment was designed to serve the interests of the 
big European powers and not those of affected populations. In order to effectively pacify the 
post-Ottoman Empire geo-strategic situation and fill in the vacuum created by the declining 
empire, a regiment of International ‘Gendarmerie’ composed of European -military personnel 
was formed and deployed in Cyprus to replace the local Turkish regiment that was dominated 
by the majority Muslim elements viewed as “highly corrupted and above all unable to secure 
public order” (Pasqualini (2006). Thus the international regiment effectively replaced the 
Turkish regiment in order to effectively pacify the volatile situation in a characteristic modern 
day peacekeeping and regime change fashion.  
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Pasqualini (2006) further observed that the Cyprus multinational mission had significant 
similarities with contemporary modern peacekeeping missions in that:  
…the mission was multinational; the area of the island was divided into Areas of Responsibility 
(AOR) for the countries participating in it; the mission wanted to have the consent of the two 
armed parties; the military command was unified in order to reach the political and diplomatic 
strategies sought for by the Powers involved; involvement of the military components of the 
mission in activities not strictly military like the administration of justice, local disarmament, 
building and reorganizing the local police, this task particularly given to the Italians, to the 
Carabinieri (Pasqualini 2006:24). 
The 19th century multinational military deployments with characteristics similar to those of 
modern peacekeeping operations can indeed be classified as prototypes and forerunners of UN 
peacekeeping missions. Based on the facts above it is evident that military deployments in 
support of political and diplomatic initiatives to resolve conflicts or consolidate peace 
following the signing of peace treaties date back to pre-modern times when the idea of having 
the UN was not even on the horizon.  
Jakus (2005:81) observed that indeed peace support and crisis management through military 
operations are not novel initiatives and undertakings as the military has been involved in similar 
activities such as diplomatic, police, administrative and humanitarian tasks.  He highlights the 
fact that during the 19th and early 20th centuries prior to the establishment of the UN, the armed 
forces of the Austro- Hungarian Monarch (AHM) were involved in crisis prevention and crisis 
management missions which were known as “fire extinguisher missions.” Examples include 
troop deployments in Crete 1897-1909 and in Skutar 1912-1913 (Ibid.). Evidence of these 
deployments give further credence to the argument that military peacekeeping operations were 
not invented by the UN Organization. The purposes of these missions were never meant to 
serve the interests of affected populations but rather those of the big powers sanctioning the 
deployments. 
James (1990) posited that the rationale for European powers’ participation in conflicts within 
Europe and on the periphery was to serve European self-interests by ensuring the maintenance 
of the balance of power on the European continent or to promote the newly achieved balance 
of power where the outcome of the conflict had weakened the opposing power bloc. He further 
concluded that European powers deployed “fire extinguisher” missions to conflict areas 
because the conflicts had taken place on European soil hence they aimed at mitigating the 
spread of the conflict (James 1990:82). James further pointed out that one of the major reasons 
for the deployment of military contingents was that they served to facilitate the establishment 
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of European spheres of regional influence and interests designed to fill the vacuum left by the 
collapsing and shrinking Ottoman Empire (Ibid).  
Based on the facts above, it is clear that prior to the establishment of the League of Nations, 
the Great Powers of Europe indeed participated in military deployments synonymous with 
modern day peacekeeping missions. The Concert of Great Powers in Europe decided where 
and when peace should be maintained in order to maintain international peace and security at 
the same time promoting and safeguarding their own interests primarily the maintenance of the 
Balance of Power Concept (James 1990). These military deployments were therefore not 
primarily meant to promote the interests of the host countries but rather, those of the intervening 
states, a practice we will keep encountering during operations undertaken by the League of 
Nations during the 1920s as well as UN peacekeeping missions since 1948. 
The next section examines “fire extinguisher” military deployments that seem to define 
military commissions deployed under the League of Nations during the inter-war period. 
2.4 Peacekeeping operations under the League of Nations (1920-1925) 
This section highlights the character of prototype “peacekeeping operations” undertaken by the 
League of Nations as forerunners of United Nations peacekeeping missions.   
Alan James (1990) traces the origins of peacekeeping back to the inter-war period, (1919-1938) 
when delimitation commissions were established in the 1920s to draw several European 
frontiers following the end of World War I. These were missions deployed under the League 
of Nations in an endeavour to implement the collective security paradigm as enshrined in the 
League of Nations Covenant.  These missions and those discussed above, led James (1990:11) 
to argue that peacekeeping can be considered as “little more than a modern application of an 
ancient arrangement – that of the use of impartial and non-threatening go-betweens” in an effort 
to diffuse tension between state parties in a conflict situation.  
The immediate aftermath of World War I witnessed the victorious powers exercising political 
control over most of Europe, including attempts to solve disputes and conflicts among 
European countries. Some of the strategies used by these powers, with wisdom of the hindsight, 
can be categorized as “peacekeeping operations” although this term was never used during this 
period. Initially the World War I victorious nations were facilitating these arrangements to 
realign and re-dress the frontiers of affected states, in an environment where affected weak 
states had “little option but to accept what was on offer” (James 1990:18). Basically what this 
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implied was that the big powers imposed their views on the weak hence there was little room 
for consent as the weak nation states had to cooperate willingly or unwillingly with the dictates 
of the powerful nations. It is equally important to note that affected states in most cases would 
have earlier given their formal and in some cases coerced consent to the operations that were 
to be undertaken. It appears the big powers practiced some respect for the national sovereignty 
of affected countries and tried to remain as impartial as they could possibly be since the 
Westphalian Treaty agreement viewed the respect for state sovereignty as critical for the 
maintenance of peace and security in Europe.   
A Conference of Ambassadors held in Paris in 1920 after the First World War was convened 
to interpret and implement peace treaties entered into between the victorious and defeated 
European powers. The conference was mandated to attend to “all matters concerning the 
execution and interpretation of the peace treaties” (James Op.Cit:24). A number of delimitation 
commissions, with integrated military officers were established to re-draw the national 
boundaries and in the process address any political issues that could arise in the process of 
discharging their mandates. The multinational military officers were tasked to facilitate the 
implementation of the mandates given to the delimitation commissions (James Op.Cit:19). This 
activity qualifies to be categorized under international peacekeeping operations as the 
multinational military teams were engaged in impartial and non-threatening activities meant to 
promote peaceful co-existence among European countries.  An additional task undertaken by 
these missions was the administration of territory on behalf of the League of Nations, a practice 
carried forward to the United Nations peacekeeping operations (Ibid).   
In 1920, the League of Nations called for a plebiscite in Vilna (now Vilnius) after the cessation 
of hostilities between Poland and Lithuania over the disputed Lithuanian territory. It was 
planned that the disputed region would be neutralized, and British, French, Spanish and Belgian 
Governments each offered to provide troops to keep order in the region to facilitate a peaceful 
plebiscite which did not eventually materialize due to continued disagreements between the 
parties to the conflict. The planned operation, though not launched, had many characteristics 
reminiscent to United Nations peacekeeping operations (Briscoe 2003:15). 
The first League of Nations “peacekeeping” mission was to attend to a dispute between Sweden 
and Finland over the Aaland Islands which resulted in the creation of a commission of inquiry 
to investigate and make recommendations on possible solutions to the controversy (James 
1990. Although the dispute did not point to an imminent armed conflict between the two 
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countries, this mission set a precedent that the League could intervene in a neutral manner to 
resolve disputes  between its members in pursuit of a peaceful resolution. The two countries 
unenthusiastically accepted the final report of the commission which helped establish the 
League’s reputation as a fair arbiter, a practice that was adopted and institutionalized by the 
UN through peacekeeping operations (Ibid.:33). 
The second category of “peacekeeping” operations undertaken by the League of Nations 
involved the use of multinational military forces in a “law and order” maintenance role, 
especially in situations where peace treaties signed and entered into, provided for the holding 
of plebiscites to facilitate the re-drawing of national frontiers with the full and accurate 
knowledge of the wishes of people concerned (James 1990). In order for such exercises to be 
transparent and credible, neutral and impartial military forces had to facilitate and monitor the 
entire process and report back. Multinational forces were, in this regard, deployed in support 
of plebiscite commissions for the purpose of maintaining law and order during the referendums 
(Ibid.). 
At the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War the League of Nations deployed a dozen 
“observers” that constituted the International Military Commission mandated to verify the 
withdrawal of foreign troops (Ibid.). The deployment which lasted from October 1938 to June 
1939 had striking similarities with operations conducted by the United Nations. In that regard, 
it is considered a fair assessment to conclude that the concept of “peacekeeping” missions 
manifested itself in operations conducted by the League of Nations during the inter-war period 
and was eventually formalized by the UN after World War II.  
2.5 UN peacekeeping missions 
This section seeks to demonstrate that United Nations peacekeeping practice evolved and 
developed from an ad hoc mechanism designed to help manage the transition to formal 
independence through decolonization, and as a device used to institutionalise and police a 
certain set of post-colonial relationships in countries on the periphery. These missions were 
used as “an all-encompassing apparatus” to facilitate the reorganization of state-society 
relationships along narrow neo-liberal lines, including, where necessary, facilitating the 
transfer of power from one elite group to another (Al Qaq 2009:7). The section traces and 
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highlights the three phased evolution of United Nations peacekeeping operations as a basis for 
the case studies to be undertaken in this thesis.7 
The authors of the United Nations Charter anticipated that disputes and conflicts were to be 
“pacifically’’ settled through the employment and application of traditional methods of conflict 
resolution such as enquiry, conciliation, mediation and other similar initiatives (James 
1990:10). In addition to these measures, the drafters also envisaged economic and military 
sanctions being imposed as a means of dealing with threats to and actual breaches of 
international peace and security (Ibid.). This did not materialize as the two superpowers namely 
the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union were suspicious of each other’s 
intentions as they conducted their realist dominated international foreign relations policies that 
give birth to the Cold War situation during period 1945 to 1988.  
The outbreak of the Cold War soon after the end of World War II ushered in a world divided 
along ideological camps of capitalism versus communism. This ideological division curtailed 
the United Nation’s ability to engage in collective action, a direct result of impediments by 
East-West divisions which effectively limited cooperation among the permanent members of 
the Security Council (O’Neill and Rees 2005:1). It became apparently clear that the United 
Nations could not effectively carryout the job it had been created for through collective security 
arrangements. Faced with minor wars and conflicts during its nascent period, the UN being a 
“neutral” world organization improvised a peacekeeping system to resolve these inter-state 
conflicts primarily to avoid direct superpower confrontation (Durch 1993:1). The evolutionary 
phases of UN peacekeeping operations are discussed below starting with the “first generation” 
peacekeeping missions. 
2.5.1 UN first generation peacekeeping missions 
The UN observer mission (UNTSO) deployed in 1948 to monitor, observe and report illegal 
incursions across the armistice lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours is generally 
considered to be the first peacekeeping mission deployment by the UN (Durch 1993:85-86). In 
                                                          
7 There are different ways of categorizing the evolutionary phases of UN peacekeeping operations. The most 
commonly adopted categorization is that the first generation of peacekeeping stretched from the 1948 to mid-
1950s and these were mainly small, unarmed observer missions in the Middle East and Asia. The second 
generation started with the deployment of a large contingent of armed UN troops in Egypt following the Suez 
crisis in 1956. This was followed by the deployment of the UN mission in Congo during period 1960-1964. This 
second generation lasted up to the end of the Cold War. As from 1992, starting with the humanitarian mission in 
Somalia till now, missions launched by the UN constitute third generation operations that are launched in response 
to internal conflicts with a bias towards humanitarian considerations.  
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old style UN peacekeeping, peacekeepers were portrayed as third parties disinterested in the 
outcome of a dispute, neutral/impartial towards the disputants as well as non-threatening since 
they were mandated to use force only in self-defence. This portrayal of peacekeepers 
influenced Fabian (1971) to entitled his study Soldiers without Enemies depicting the non-
threatening posture of traditional peacekeeping operations. According to Hill and Malik 
(1996:6), the adoption of peacekeeping approach or concept towards resolving international 
conflict through collective security was a compromise, designed to maintain the United 
Nation’s relevance in the sphere of maintaining international peace and security which happens 
to be its primary objective. Osmançavuşoğlu (2000), observed that early peacekeeping 
missions played a relatively minor role that was largely confined to solving crises in the Middle 
East and regional conflicts associated with de-colonization, especially crises in which neither 
superpower had major geo-strategic interests thus forestalling their direct involvement and 
subsequent escalation of the conflicts. This assessment misses the point that these missions 
served to formalize the withdrawal of the British and French colonial masters from the Middle 
East and their replacement by American influence thus effectively keeping the Soviet Union 
out of this oil rich region. 
During the first decade of its existence (1946-1956) the UN deployed three observer missions 
and commissions to which the term “peacekeeping” was not used. The first mission to be 
deployed by the UN was the UN Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) deployed during 
period 1947-1951. This followed a request by the Greek Government for UN Observers to 
investigate foreign supplies of military weapons and equipment to the communist guerrillas 
fighting the government. The mission’s task was to investigate outside support for Greek 
Communist guerrillas fighting the Greek government. Despite being the first UN deployment, 
this mission is not acknowledged as the first peacekeeping mission because the other parties to 
the conflict did not consent to the deployment of foreign troops to monitor their activities (Hill 
and Malik 1996:27-28).  
The next observer mission was the deployment of UNTSO in 1948, mandated to monitor the 
borders between Israel and her Arab neighbours. According to Goulding (1993:452), UNTSO 
is officially regarded as the first UN peacekeeping operation. The third observer mission was 
the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) deployed in 1949 
following a request from India. The UN responded with the dispatch of observers whose 
mission remains deployed up to this day after more than six decades of continuous deployment 
due to the volatility of the Kashmir region.  
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The first UN mission explicitly named “peacekeeping” was UNEF deployed to the Sinai 
Peninsula in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis (Durch 1993:7; MacQueen, 2006). The Suez 
crisis is considered to be perhaps the first significant step in the conceptual transformation of 
how the UN responded to international security crises.  
Unable to invoke collective security in a situation where two members of the Security Council 
were embroiled in international conflict against a member state, and constrained by practical 
and ideological challenges of bipolarity, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and 
sympathetic middle powers devised a way to get the UN involved in the crisis – largely with 
the encouragement and blessing of the US (Aksu 2003:78). The mission was designed and 
deployed with utmost attention and emphasis placed on protecting the sovereignty of state 
parties to the conflict as well as respecting  fully host state sovereignty implying upholding the 
UN principle of non-intervention (Ibid). 
UNEF 1 was the first ever armed UN peacekeeping mission in the entire history of the world 
body and it helped to define the three core principles of traditional peacekeeping namely: 
consent of conflict parties; impartiality; and use of force only for self-defence (Pelz and 
Lehmann 2007:2). These principles will be discussed in detail in Chapter III of this thesis. The 
mission was deployed in Egypt as a “face saving” initiative to cover the withdrawal from Egypt 
by Britain, France and Israel (Adebajo: 2011:25). Thus the primary mission of this deployment 
was not the safeguarding and protection of Egyptian sovereignty, but rather the protection of 
the international image of the invading powers and ensuring that Egypt remained firmly within 
the American sphere of influence in the face of growing Soviet influence among liberation 
movements and former colonies (Al Qaq 2009). The Egyptians welcomed the mission because 
its deployment saved the country from an embarrassing defeat by the three powerful invading 
countries namely Britain, France and Israel. It has been argued that Egypt agreed to the 
deployment of UNEF from a position of weakness since it had been invaded by three powerful 
armies hence its consent was not truly voluntary. Egypt, however, officially managed to portray 
the deployment of UN peacekeepers as a national victory against the invading foreign armies.  
Unashamedly, following the launch of British and French invasion of Egypt on 31 October 
1956, Pierson Dixon the British ambassador to the UN, made a passionate attempt to persuade 
the UN to allow the Anglo-French invasion force to fly the UN flag as peacekeepers (Louis 
and Owen 1989:683) as the USA had done in Korea in 1950.  This mentality of labelling self-
serving multilateral missions in small and weak countries as peacekeeping missions appears to 
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continue up to this day especially humanitarian peacekeeping interventions. Such missions will 
be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
According to Urquhart (1987:133), UNEF served as a mid-wife towards the drafting of a set 
of principles that were to guide the conduct of UN peacekeeping missions for the next four 
decades. The guiding principles that were to govern the deployment and conduct of 
peacekeepers included the following: 
1) Peacekeeping operations would be deployed with the consent of the nations/ parties to the 
dispute,8 
2) Peacekeepers were allowed to use force only in self defence, 
3) Peacekeepers were to be composed of troops voluntarily furnished by neutral countries, 
4) Peacekeepers were expected to be impartial and 
5) Peacekeeping operations were to be under the control and guidance of the Secretary General 
for their day- to-day activities.  
UNEF’s successful accomplishment of its mandate gave confidence to the UN that resulted in 
an unprecedented increase in UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, the majority of which 
were in former colonies in the Sothern hemisphere.  The deployment of peacekeepers also 
served to guarantee that newly independent countries on the periphery remained within the 
sphere of Western influence thus avoiding their drifting towards the socialist/communist camp 
led by the Soviet Union (Al Qaq, Op.Cit.). This success story led to the deployment of ONUC 
during 1960-1964, a more ambitious peacekeeping mission in a civil war setting.  
At the height of the Cold War, the UN found little space to manoeuvre and deployed 
peacekeeping missions in intra-state conflicts as the permanent members of the Security 
Council jealously guarded their spheres of influence and strongly discouraged multilateral 
interventions in their client states’ internal affairs (Aksu 2003:80). Examples include the British 
preference of deploying Commonwealth peacekeepers in Zimbabwe at independence as 
opposed to UN peacekeepers as this was a former British colony. In French West Africa, France 
preferred the deployment of own troops or French speaking allies in former French colonies. 
                                                          
8During the Cold War era, the most important consent considered by the UNSC was that of the host 
government as deployment of UN peacekeepers could not be successfully implemented without the express 
approval of the host government. In this regard, as happened in Congo, the non-approval for UN deployment 
by the secessionists was of little consequence regarding the deployment of peacekeepers. However failure to 
secure the consent of all parties to the conflict means UN peacekeepers would be operating in a hostile 
environment where they are most likely to suffer casualties as they would be considered as an invading force.   
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This was all in an endeavour to protect and perpetuate neo-colonialism that benefitted the 
former colonial masters as well as keeping other powers outside that sphere of influence. 
Where both superpowers were willing to accommodate and tolerate UN peacekeeping outside 
of their spheres of influence, the Soviet Union in particular insisted that deployed UN 
peacekeepers should endeavour to protect the host state’s sovereignty and not intervene in its 
domestic affairs (Ibid). During the first armed UN peacekeeping mission in Egypt, the Soviet 
Union made an effort to minimise peacekeepers’ interference with internal politics of the host 
country. The Soviets maintained the same attitude during the Congo mission as evidenced by 
the clashes between the superpowers over the UN handling of the Congo crisis of the early 
1960s as will be discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis. Third World aligned or non-
aligned countries, shared strong anti-colonial sentiments hence they called for increased UN 
involvement in settling conflicts in the South as they fought against colonialism (Al-Qaq 
Op.Cit.). Significantly, both superpowers supported the de-colonization process as they sought 
to win client states, fill the vacuum left by departing colonial powers and guaranteeing own 
access to natural resources in newly independent states. In this regard, it was the North–South 
conflict that gave meaning, impetus and content to the de-colonization process as well as the 
most crucial factor that made possible the deployment of peacekeepers in the few intra-state 
peacekeeping missions of this era (Ibid). 
A total of thirteen pre-1988 Cold War peacekeeping operations were launched by the UN and 
these were classified as "largely military in composition and their tasks were to monitor cease-
fires, control buffer zones, investigate alleged arms flows, and prevent a resumption of 
hostilities" (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In other words, they were to maintain calm on the front lines 
and give time for the peacemakers and diplomats to negotiate a settlement of the dispute that 
had led to the conflict in the first place (Karns and Mingst 1995:80). Although many of the 
political negotiations failed, nonetheless, the UN peacekeeping forces prevented the expansion 
of many conflicts. An important ethical characteristic of the first generation or classical 
peacekeeping operations is that they involved the post-truce interposition of a peacekeeping 
force with the consent of the parties to the conflict thus reflecting some degree of respect for 
host state sovereignty, a practice that was watered down during second and third generation 
peacekeeping operations.9 
                                                          
9 During the first generation of UN peacekeeping operations, peacekeepers were deployed along the 
demilitarised zones as happened between India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey in Cyprus, Israel and 
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2.5.2 UN second generation peacekeeping 
The second generation of UN peacekeeping started after 1988 when peacekeeping went 
through a radical transformation as a direct result of the Soviet Union’s adoption of “glasnost 
and perestroika.” It ushered in a new phase of less mutual suspicion between the superpowers 
and unprecedented co-operation among the five permanent members of the Security Council 
(Osmançavuşoğlu 2000). Since the end of the Cold War, several attempts were made to 
redefine peacekeeping operations spawning a host of new classifications such as ‘multi-
dimensional peacekeeping’, ‘second generation peacekeeping’ and ‘peace enforcement’. These 
terms reflected a significant departure from traditional/classic peacekeeping as well as 
signalling the arrival of multi-faceted tasks that UN peacekeepers were expected to undertake 
(Schmidl 2000:18). The evolution of peacekeeping operations during this period reflects 
growing acceptance that conflict resolution prospects could be enhanced by direct and at times 
unethical UN involvement in internal affairs of affected countries thus eroding and trampling 
on host state sovereignty. 
A critical analysis of the new terms of peacekeeping reflects that what they have in common is 
their occupation of an ethically sound moral high ground that appeals to the much desired peace 
whilst portraying a commitment towards attending to the suffering populations in conflict 
situations through humanitarianism widely acknowledged and approved as an ethical response 
to the suffering populations (Pugh 2007:47-48). In this regard ‘peace support’ operations are 
portrayed as a positive undertaking that signifies the UN Security Council’s moral concern for 
international order and human security in the international states system.  
Peacekeeping missions of this era became multi-dimensional in scope, lacked explicit consent 
of the host countries and were more intrusive in the host state domestic affairs as humanitarian 
and human security issues were being given more prominence over state security. Supporters 
of liberal internationalism such as (Anderson and Rieff, 2005) argue that the protection of 
human rights and enhancement of human security requires the reconstruction of sovereign 
states whilst acknowledging at the same time that this process involves violating national 
                                                          
Syria/Egypt in the Middle East and many more. The deployment of armed peacekeepers inside one of the 
belligerents’ country started with UNEF when Egypt agreed to host peacekeepers on its soil yet Israel refused 
to have UN peacekeepers stationed in its country. There after the next mission to have UN peacekeepers fully 
deployed in a country was in Congo during ONUC, a mission that resembled in every respect the characteristics 
of second generations UN peacekeeping operations that interfere with host state internal affairs. This practice 
ii now rampant across the African continent.   
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sovereignty in order to create a liberal political order. In war-ravaged societies hosting UN 
peace-building missions, “political entrepreneurs” have taken advantage of the situation to 
impose neoliberal processes, such as privatization of the economy, in order to promote their 
“narrow patrimonial interests” (Sorensen 2002). It follows therefore that liberalism views the 
evolution of traditional peacekeeping missions to peace enforcement as “a positive 
development in the international system” as it entrenches capitalist practices in host countries 
on the periphery (Ibid.). 
The former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali a staunch advocate for human rights 
and a strong proponent of the promotion and safeguarding of human security argued that 
innocent civilians were more threatened by lack of basic human needs, weak economies, 
disease, environmental degradation, and political instability than by invading foreign armies. 
He further observed that states were often not a source of protection but a source of harm to 
their populations in situations of internal tension and conflict (Boutros-Ghali 1992). What is of 
great significance to this study is that Boutros-Ghali advocated for UN intervention in conflict 
countries primarily to bolster human security, arguing that it was not interference in domestic 
affairs of member states. In doing so he acknowledged that contemporary peacekeeping 
missions could not always adhere to traditional norms and principles of observing host state 
consent, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence that aimed at respecting host state 
sovereignty. He also identified “peace-building” as a legitimate UNSC undertaking whose 
activities were meant to identify and support national structures that helped in strengthening 
and solidifying national peace and harmony hence contributing to the avoidance of a relapse 
into national conflict among the belligerents (Ibid.). An examination of peace-building 
activities reveals that they are very intrusive in domestic affairs of targeted states. The ultimate 
goal of these peace-building activities is to successfully manipulate the power and political 
dynamics in those countries so that institutions created through peace-building are in sync with 
neo-liberal norms and values advocated by the western powers, to serve western interests and 
not those of the local populations.  
Anne Orford (2003) examined Australian led peace-building operations in East Timor and 
concluded that such UN sponsored interventions constructed an international order in which 
some powerful states manipulate and control the local political system by taking advantage of 
discourses of failed states. Peace-building missions allow elites from the UN and other 
international organizations to step in and govern political communities, developments which 
led Bain (2003) to point out to the similarities of these UN led peace making interventions as 
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evidence of a “neo-trusteeship” emerging in the evolving international order. The evolving 
international order has also been influential in the evolving trends of peacekeeping operations 
in that peacekeepers under this generation were mandated to carry out new tasks such as 
elections monitoring through electoral assistance and evaluations, human rights monitoring in 
host countries, resettlement and management of refugees, re-training of civilian police as part 
of security sector reforms, protection and distribution of humanitarian relief efforts, and 
disarmament and demobilization of armed forces as well as integrating some of them in the 
newly established security system (Boutros-Ghali 1992). These missions were overly 
ambitious considering the resource base constrains that characterized UN peacekeeping 
missions. Thus the transitional period from the Cold War to the post-Cold War witnessed many 
experiments aimed at enhancing the role of the UN in its endeavours to maintain international 
peace and security, taking advantage of the unprecedented cooperation among the permanent 
members of the Security Council. The transformation and evolution of peacekeeping during 
this era was made possible by the fundamental geo-political changes in world politics brought 
about by the end of the Cold War that ushered in a new phase of veto wielding powers’ 
cooperation within the Security Council (Sanderson 1998). This development gave the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) an opportunity to experiment with 
intrusive types of UN peacekeeping that were not common during the Cold War period. 
According to Frederking (2007:44) most common peace-building tasks include the following: 
internal security activities to maintain law and order; disarming and reintegrating former 
combatants; assisting in the management and return of refugees and displaced populations; 
democratization, electoral assistance and institutions building; security sector reforms through 
reforming the military, police, and judiciary; economic development along neo-liberal value 
systems; promotion of human rights; conflict management and dispute resolution training; de-
mining; and continued humanitarian assistance. Buoyed by the successes of this generation, 
the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the UN peacekeepers for their “decisive contribution 
toward the initiation of actual peace negotiations.” The general view was that, “further 
development of the principles and practices would allow the UN to serve as an effective 
instrument to reduce violent conflict within the international system” (Berdal, 1993:3). Not 
surprisingly, the enthusiasm was short lived as the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia 
and Rwanda during the early 1990s went terribly wrong leading to a significant lull in UN 




The deployment of second generation peacekeeping missions, in ongoing civil war situations 
increasingly complicated and violated the norms of host state consent and sovereignty.  At 
times peacekeepers were viewed with suspicion as some rebel groups felt peacekeeping troops 
were deployed to protect the government at their expense. In situations where multiple warring 
parties existed, it became extremely difficult to obtain consent from each protagonist group 
thereby creating dangerous and unpredictable operating environments not conducive for 
classical and traditional peacekeeping settings. Mandates for this generation of peacekeeping 
missions often included enforcement of ceasefires as opposed to monitoring ceasefire 
agreements. This made the missions more likely to be involved in unethical coercive operations 
in violation of peacekeeping norms of consent, neutrality, and use of force only in self-defence.  
The emerging norm of human security was given greater priority and importance over state 
sovereignty. As a result, it challenged the norm of the inviolability of state sovereignty, 
resulting in increasingly complex peacekeeping missions that undermined host state 
sovereignty (Hampson and Malone 2002). Based on this development, second-generation 
peacekeeping operations were routinely mandated to carryout tasks such as maintaining 
internal security, ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid, protecting civilian populations, 
helping repatriate refugees, and monitoring human rights abuses; tasks that increased the 
probability of peacekeeping troops violating the traditional principles of impartiality and the 
use of force only in self-defence particularly in situations where there were no ceasefire 
agreements to monitor (Frederking Op.Cit.:44). Missions mandated to maintain internal 
security, a traditional preserve of the host state, had to violate the norm of use of force in self-
defence when the combatants fired on each other in a bid to stop the fighting. Missions 
mandated to protect human rights violated the norm of neutrality/impartiality when one side 
started killing innocent civilians (Ibid). Based on the facts above, it is evident that second 
generation peacekeeping designed to promote human security often trumped traditional 
peacekeeping norms, a practice that was further enhanced during the third generation of UN 
peacekeeping operations. 
2.5.3 UN third generation peacekeeping operations 
The third era of UN peacekeeping evolution is again characterized by the increasing scope of 
UN Security Council mandates: increasing willingness to use coercive military measures and  
radical re-interpretation as well as transformation of traditional peacekeeping principles to 
facilitate more intrusive activities that have little respect for state sovereignty of host countries 
(Frederking Op.Cit.:41-42). Third generation peacekeeping has witnessed a significant shift 
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towards coercive political and military re-engineering of host countries by dominant states 
armed with a moral and ethical design to safeguard human rights. Big powers have attuned 
their peace support doctrines to the discourses of ethics, humanitarianism, justice and what they 
term the ‘will of the international community’ (Pugh Op.Cit.:48). In this case the international 
community is synonymous with the Western world that comprises the US and her Western 
allies. 
Contemporary UN peace-building operations seek to preside over political and socio-economic 
transformation from one form of politico-economic system to the neo-liberal system that 
primarily serves the interests of the western powers. Al Qaq (2009) observed that UN 
peacekeeping operations are “a deeply political project in that they represent a particular 
minority vision of what the UN should be preoccupied with” especially in the aftermath of the 
rapid disintegration of organised Third World resistance through the Non-Aligned Movement 
at the UN. The twin disaster of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and weakening of the Non-
Aligned Movement jointly exposed the weak and vulnerable Third World countries to 
increased manipulation by Western neo-liberal forces. This was done in the name of promoting 
democracy and market economies. 
During the current period of “third-generation” peacekeeping missions, the Security Council is 
pre-occupied with “peace-building” activities that, in theory, include protecting civilians from 
violent conflict in pursuit of the human security agenda. This has been given impetus by a 
“slowly building consensus that the UN has a responsibility to protect civilian populations” in 
situations where the respective governments would have failed or are deemed unwilling to 
protect own citizens (Frederking Op.Cit.:41-42). Western sponsored regimes can indeed invite 
their powerful backers as has been happening with French speaking countries in West Africa 
and they may even invite the UN to come to their rescue when they are not popularly elected 
by the majority population. This indeed raises a dilemma on how to handle such cases. Like 
the second era of peacekeeping evolution, the third generation is again characterized by the 
increasing scope of the mandates and a radical transformation of traditional peacekeeping 
principles to embrace interventionist characteristics that grossly undermine the principle of 
host state sovereignty. A distinction between the third generation of UN peacekeeping and 
second generation is a willingness to use coercive measures to attain the ambitious and 
increasingly intrusive UN mandates that violate host state sovereignty (Ibid: 45). A close 
scrutiny of these ambitious mandates reveals that they are meant to serve the self-interests of 
the big powers at the expense of the local population as demonstrated in the “humanitarian” 
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Libyan mission that was launched under the umbrella of responsibility to protect doctrine and 
mandate, yet the true objective was regime change in that country. 
In a situation where a Western sponsored puppet government appeals to the UN for protection 
through deployment of peacekeepers, its request of likely to be granted or a coalition of willing 
Western countries can be assembled to intervene to protect that regime as happened in Libya 
where a small minority appealed for outside intervention to protect them from Gaddafi received 
overwhelming support from NATO allies. 
The 21st century has already seen a burgeoning of different forms of outside interferences and 
interventions by a range of state (and non-state) actors and for many different purposes, such 
as humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, rebuilding failed states, and 
development interventions (Leurdijk 1997). Indeed, intervention by ‘outsiders’ in the affairs of 
‘insiders,’ has become a routine and disturbing structural characteristic of today’s global 
politics that undermines and violates the sovereignty of weak states by powerful states through 
the use of UN peacekeepers. As a result, there has been intense discussion about the ethical, 
legal and political dilemmas involved in humanitarian intervention, particularly when respect 
for state sovereignty conflicts with the protection of human rights (Holzgrefe and Keohane 
2003).  
Advocates for the doctrine of R2P include the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan who 
challenged: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to Rwanda, to Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that offend every precept of our common humanity” (Annan 2000:48). Annan’s famous 
quotation highlights the central ethical problem confronting the debate on humanitarian 
intervention namely “the challenge of reconciling two competing norms in international law: 
sovereignty and human rights (Badescu 2011:19). The ethical challenge is that on the one hand, 
state sovereignty inhibits foreign intervention into the internal affairs of states, and on the other 
hand, there is growing concern that the international community should react to massive and 
systematic violations of human rights by any state (ibid). Fernando Teson (2006) further 
clarifies the ethical challenge of humanitarian intervention versus sovereignty when he states 
that: “… either we intervene to end massacres, and so we are liable to violate the prohibition 
of war and respect for sovereignty, or we do not intervene, which means we tolerate the 
violation of the prohibition of gross human rights abuses.” This is indeed an ethical dilemma 
associated with humanitarian interventions. Thus the continuing tension between these two sets 
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of international norms rests at the heart of the humanitarian intervention debate which has taken 
the evolution of peacekeeping operations to new controversial heights. This tension further 
highlights the ethical dilemmas associated with humanitarian interventions that continue to 
trigger debate on this important subject. The adoption of the humanitarian agenda serves 
several purposes that in some cases promote Western neo-liberal value systems without 
addressing the root causes of conflict in the periphery. 
According to Duffield (2001) the representational rhetoric about humanitarianism serves to 
promote moral values and the spread of a superior liberal ideology whilst avoiding addressing 
the societal structural injustices that constitute the root causes of conflict and instabilities in the 
system. This approach takes place despite having acknowledged that poverty and under-
development are security challenges that lead to conflict if they continue unchecked. Use of 
humanitarian rhetoric also serves in some cases as an ethical smoke screen to camouflage real 
self-interests of the big powers sanctioning the humanitarian peacekeeping interventions 
(Mayall 2000:326) and (Gibbs 2000:41-55). Given the above, it can be concluded that 
“rational, civilized, humanitarian” peacekeeping interventions appear to be part of a strategic 
packaging of Western sponsored moral initiatives in which “Western security culture, self-
perception and self-interest are wrapped” (Pugh 2007:50).  
The prevailing phenomenon where the Security Council increasingly invokes enforcement 
provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandating the use of force to achieve tasks such 
as the protection of the civilians under immediate danger of physical violence has witnessed a 
radical transformation of the idea of peacekeeping into an idea of peace enforcement, a more 
aggressive form of peacekeeping (Lang 2010:330). Peacekeepers are now able to use force to 
protect civilians to achieve their mandate and if necessary, to force aid through to the starving 
populations, to repulse attacks on civilians, to forcibly disarm troublemakers and to arrest war 
criminals (Farrell 1995). Additional tasks that peacekeepers engage in include the following 
broad undertakings: “…maintaining law and order; monitoring or verifying ceasefire or 
disengagement agreements; supervising the disarmament or demobilization of combatants; the 
protection of civilians and protecting humanitarian assistance” (Mullenbach 2005:529). These 
additional tasks have drastically changed the dynamics of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold 
War era as the missions are expected to militarily engage human rights violators. In the process 
of implementing these additional tasks, peacekeeping activities have come into conflict with 
host state sovereignty as they intrude into spheres of domestic sovereignty once considered to 
be outside the jurisdiction of the UN activities (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).  
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The magnitude and nature of interference differs from one mission to another however, as will 
be discussed and demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the meddling in internal politics of host 
countries has reached in some cases, proportions where the elimination of local leaders is 
sanctioned by UN peacekeepers as happened in Congo (Adebajo and Landsberg 2007). In 
Somalia, the elimination of the most powerful warlord General Farah Aideed was pursued 
overtly by US forces under the umbrella of UN mandates (Peterson 1992). In Rwanda, the 
assassination of the Rwandan President and his Burundian counterpart took place after UN 
peacekeepers had closed one of the runways of the airport thus channelling approaching aircraft 
to one lane (Black 2014). This decision was made without consulting Rwandan authorities in 
violation of host state sovereignty. The Bruguire Report (2006) highlights the degree of UN 
peacekeepers’ complicity in the preparation for the downfall of the Rwandan government. This 
will be addressed in detail in chapter five of this thesis. 
The concept of state sovereignty has been viewed as a fundamental pillar of the international 
states system: “the basic norm” upon which the society of states is anchored, the “cardinal 
principle” of international law, the “cornerstone” of the UN Charter, and “the global covenant” 
that must be abided with by all peace loving states (Ayoob 2002). It is therefore disheartening 
that the new multidimensional tasks being authorized by UN Security Council indeed violate 
state sovereignty as they seek to promote neo-liberal and neo-colonial agendas of the big 
powers in the name of protecting civilian populations yet in practice the outcomes of these 
missions are not primarily in the interests of the host population. The case studies in subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate the magnitude of UN peacekeepers’ violation of host state 
sovereignty as each mission is examined in greater detail. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that there were no institutionalized peacekeeping operations as 
we now know them, prior to the establishment of the UN Organization. There were however 
prototypes of peacekeeping initiatives that evolved and developed through a nonlinear 
progressive fashion to reach the current stage. The chapter established that the logic of adopting 
peacekeeping operations in the early years of the UN was a process of managing the violent 
consequences of the dismantlement of formal colonial empires through decolonization and 
entrenching the replacing US hegemony in the process. This is evidenced by the nature of 
peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights, Cyprus, Kashmir, the Suez Crisis in Egypt and 
in Congo where the US effectively replaced departed colonial powers through the employment 
of UN peacekeeping missions (Al Qaq 2009).   
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Peacekeeping was invented as an improvisation of proxy military operations by the UN 
following the failure of collective security arrangements as enshrined in the Charter (Diehl 
1994:28-29). Through evolution, the objectives of peacekeeping intervention have generally 
transformed from managing inter-state conflicts to ostensibly getting embroiled in internal 
conflicts where peacekeeping activities are now much more widely utilized as a form of global 
governance. UN peacekeeping and peace-building interventions in the countries under study 
have evolved into intrusive mechanisms for regulating post-colonial affairs, and they often 
reflect in their design and implementation, a wider political agenda set outside the continent. 
The functions performed by peacekeepers have evolved from the traditional and limited 
military tasks such as patrolling border areas to such complicated assignments such as 
facilitating ‘national reconciliation’ or setting up a ‘temporary authority’, functions that require 
not only complex networking along the military–civilian and technical–political spectra as 
detailed in comprehensive peace accords, but also a higher degree of UN involvement in 
‘domestic affairs’ of host nations, as exemplified by direct UN responsibility in ‘conducting’ 
elections (Aksu 2003:92).  
This chapter has also demonstrated that UN peacekeeping operations have evolved from being 
facilitators in the institutionalization and transmission of various visions of liberal modernity 
on the periphery of the world system, the buffering of nation-states, to the policing of the 
international political economy and lately participation in sensitive and intrusive intricate 
restructuring of state-society relations to suit the neo-liberal market oriented agenda that 
guarantee the supply of raw materials to developed economies as designed by former colonial 
masters. Viewed from a critical theory perspective, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian 
missions illustrate the disempowering effects of statist sovereignty through globalization. Rich 
and powerful states and their institutions are the sources of key decisions about policing and 
riot control in the periphery where the root causes of conflict would have been aggravated by 
global capitalism since conflicts in the developing world are a manifestation of stresses in the 
international system for which corporations, states, and the international financial institutions 
are largely responsible. These global trends have seen the erosion of the requirement of host 
state consent especially in those cases where ‘humanitarian interventions’ accompanied 
peacekeeping missions. 
Based on the discussion above, it has been argued that the evolution of peacekeeping operations 
has served to reinforce the structure of the world system as preferred by developed Western 
powerful nations particularly the US. The merger of peacekeeping operations with 
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humanitarianism has provided an ethical platform and justification for “riot control” like 
operations in “rogue” countries and “failed states” whilst promoting the globalization of a 
particular ideology of “good governance” and the “liberal peace” without necessarily 
addressing the root causes of conflict in countries on the periphery.  
The case studies that follow attempt to establish the extent to which UN peacekeepers meddled 
in the political power dynamics of host countries in order to influence the final outcomes of the 
conflict in favour of the chief sponsors of UN peacekeeping missions. The next chapter 
examines and highlights the unethical conduct of UN peacekeepers in Congo during the early 
1960s and how that mission condemned that country to perpetual dependency on foreign troops 










Ethical Challenges to United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Republic of Congo 
with reference to the period (1960-1964) 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it is to place the Congo crisis in its wider geo-
political context that enables a critical examination of why Congo, in its early years of 
independence (1960-1964) failed to offer its own citizens peace and security despite the 
deployment of UN peacekeepers in the country. Secondly, it is to highlight unethical 
manipulation of the internal political power dynamics in Congo by some senior UN officials 
in violation of Congo’s sovereignty which resulted in the mission failing to accomplish desired 
objectives of bringing about durable peace and security in the Congo. 
The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo (ONUC) served as a proxy force to legitimize a regime 
change agenda that culminated in the installation of a pro-Western government that did not 
serve the interests of the Congolese population (Al Qaq 2009;Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 
2010). ONUC was originally deployed to preserve the sovereignty of the country following 
Belgian military intervention. It succeeded in securing the withdrawal of the invading Belgian 
forces and it also succeeded in reversing the disintegration of Congo into fiefdoms. However, 
it dismally failed to restore the nascent democracy in Congo and equally failed to bring about 
long term self-determination, political and economic stability in the host country (Collins 
1993). 
The significance of starting with ONUC in this comparative case study rests on four major 
factors. First, as observed by Durch (1993), ONUC was the first multilateral UN peacekeeping 
operation with attributes of “peace-building and peace enforcement” that were clearly 
manifested well before these terms were incorporated into UN peacekeeping (post-Cold War) 
vocabulary. According to Al Qaq (2009) ONUC was by far the largest peacekeeping mission 
to be deployed during the Cold War period and it was the first mission to have non-military 
members tasked with the responsibility of re-building and administering key aspects of a host 
country’s public institutions inclusive of security sector reform, activities that interfered with 
the sovereignty of Congo. Moreover, it was the first UN peacekeeping mission to be authorised 
to use force to facilitate the execution of its mandate (Findlay 2002). Second, the mission was 
the most advanced and sophisticated experiment in international cooperation ever attempted 
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by the world (Lippmann 1961). Third, ONUC was the most complex and most controversial 
mission because it violated all the rules and principles of peacekeeping especially the “holy 
trinity” of UN peacekeeping namely: consent of host nation, impartiality and non-use of force 
except in self-defence that applied to previous peacekeeping missions (Abi-Saab 1978:17-18). 
Fourth, ONUC served as a “watershed” peacekeeping operation in UN interference in internal 
affairs of a sovereign member state in violation of the UN Charter. ONUC overwhelmingly 
demonstrated the extent to which the UN through its Secretary General and his advisers, could 
determine the course of political events in the host country without paying due attention to the 
wishes, interests and aspirations of citizens of the host nation. Considering its size, cost and 
controversy in mandate interpretation, ONUC was a precursor to the peacekeeping missions 
that were to be undertaken by the world body in the post-Cold War era hence it was indeed “a 
watershed in the development of international peacekeeping” (James 1996:25). 
This chapter consists of six sections that follow the operational and political phases of ONUC 
deployment. Section 1 is the introduction to the chapter. Section 2 covers the background 
knowledge of activities that led to ONUC deployment. Section 3 highlights unethical 
deployment of pro-Western troops and civilian close advisers to the Secretary General in 
violation of existing agreed principles of selecting troop contributing countries. Section 4 
covers ONUC’s mishandling of the Congo Constitutional Crisis and the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba. Section 5 addresses the use of force by ONUC to end the secession of Katanga 
Province in a demonstration of double standards by UN officials as they had earlier refused to 
use force when requested to do so by Patrice Lumumba. The section also briefly covers the 
legitimization of a pro-Western non-elected government amenable to the US. Section 6 is the 
conclusion that summarises the chapter. 
A brief background account of events leading to the Congo crisis which is essential to the 
overall understanding of unethical practices by UN peacekeepers that undermined Congo’s 
sovereignty is covered in the next section.  
3.2 Background to the 1960-64 Congo crisis 
This section briefly explores events that contributed to the 1960 -1964 Congo crisis. It is 
important to contextualise the circumstances and environment in which ONUC was deployed 
and operated. However, no attempt will be made to give a detailed historical account of all 
events related to this crisis as this is outside the scope of this chapter. 
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The Republic of Congo (now Democratic Republic of Congo), was reluctantly granted 
independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, following a hasty transfer of power that soon 
resulted in a power vacuum caused by lack of capacity to centrally control and administer the 
country (Gibbs 2000:361). In his independence speech Patrice Lumumba the then Prime 
Minister of Congo denounced Belgium for its racist colonial rule and lamented that law and 
order in an independent Congo was to remain the responsibility of Force Publique, the 
Congolese Army under 1 000 Belgian officers left behind by the former colonial master based 
on the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which was never ratified by the Congolese 
Government and did not grant Belgium the right to intervene without the express request or 
concurrence of the Congolese Government (Abi-Saab 1978:8; Durch 1993:317).  
Five days after independence the new National Congolese Army (ANC) mutinied against 
continued presents of Belgian officers in the national army of independent Congo. The mutiny 
by black Congolese troops started because they remained under command of Belgian officers 
in an independent Congo and were subjected to appalling conditions of service compared to 
their Belgian counterparts in Force Publique in a similar arrangement to the apartheid system 
in South Africa. On realisation that they were subjected to continued harsh treatment and poor 
conditions of service under Belgian officership in a free Congo, a country-wide mutiny ensued 
(Krasno 2004:233). The mutinous soldiers supported by excited mobs attacked Belgian officers 
and other foreigners, looting, raping and harassing civilians across the country (Sitkowski 
2006:64). The rumours that Belgian officers were planning to disarm black Congolese troops 
in preparation for the landing of Belgian metropolitan paratroopers to selected military 
garrisons in Congo, were interpreted as an attempt at re-colonization of the Congo, and this 
aggravated an already volatile situation (Higgins 1980:12). 
Belgium responded to the country wide chaos with military deployments of its metropolitan 
paratroopers in what it termed a “humanitarian operation” to protect foreigners and its white 
population that were being harassed by mutinous soldiers and civilian mobs (Durch 1993). The 
classification of Belgian aggression of a sovereign state as “humanitarian intervention” was 
supported by Western countries while the Soviet Union and former colonies vehemently 
challenged this characterisation preferring to call it an aggression that warranted international 
“collective measures” to evict, (forcefully if necessary), the invading foreign troops (Al Qaq 
2009). This researcher shares the views of the Soviet Union and former colonies in that the 
mutinous behaviour of Congolese troops was triggered by Belgian plans to invade Congo, a 
move that was interpreted as re-colonisation of the country. The unruly behaviour of Congolese 
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troops was totally unacceptable, however it was imperative that the root cause for the mutinous 
behaviour be removed to restore calm in the country. Unfortunately this was not to be the case. 
Lack of consensus in the classification of Belgian invasion of Congo would later lead to sharp 
differences in the interpretation of UN Security Council Resolutions and the implementation 
of the mandate. Ultimately this lack of consensus formed the basis of bitter misunderstandings 
between the two Cold War camps at the UN and their sympathisers in Congo. 
Moise Tshombe (the self-appointed President of Katanga Province) on July 11, 1960 declared 
Katanga an independent state. Tshombe received enormous political and economic support 
from Belgium as well as the services of the Belgian military and civilian personnel. All 
operational and administrative expenses for the illegal Katanga administration were catered for 
by massive financial support from the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, the Belgian Mining 
conglomerate in Katanga Province (De Witte 2001). Tshombe’s government received 
approximately fourty million dollars (USD$ 40 000 000) annually from the mining company 
in Katanga Province depriving the Congolese Central Government of vital financial resources 
to administer the nation (UN Doc. Dated 23.01.63 and UN Doc. Dated 23October 1961). Such 
massive financial support would have been enough proof to dispel the myth that the Katanga 
rebellion was an internal power struggle between the Congolese Central Government and the 
secessionist authorities in Katanga Province (Abi-Saab 1978). Faced with a fast deteriorating 
situation across the country, characterised by a fragile state with mutinous soldiers, foreign 
aggression from Belgium, hired mercenaries and a secessionist province, the central 
government in Leopoldville had to appeal for external assistance to re-establish legitimate 
control over the chaotic and disintegrating state. 
The Congo government, led by bitter rivalries President Joseph Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba on 12 July 1960, appealed for UN assistance to deal with foreign mercenaries 
and invading Belgian forces (UN Document S/4382:125). Assuming that the UN would act in 
sympathy and defence of the victim country, the original purpose for seeking UN intervention 
was to preserve Congo’s sovereignty from foreign interventions through the withdrawal of 
Belgian forces and the defeat of foreign mercenaries in the country (Adebajo 2011:69). 
However, this was not to happen as anticipated as will be explained in subsequent sections. An 
understanding of the factors that caused the deployment of ONUC would help for one to 
appreciate the different interpretations of the mandate for the peacekeepers.  
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Gibbs (2000:361) on one hand identified the factors that contributed to UN’ involvement in the 
Congo crisis as: state fragility, lack of a strong central government, and ethnic and regional 
fragmentation. This view is in sync with what Kissinger (1994:808) termed “the destabilising 
effects of ethnic groups single minded pursuing their accumulated rivalries and ancient 
hatreds”. It is unfortunately a proven fact that Africans are too ethnocentric and tribalistic to 
the extent of fiercely resisting the accommodation of other minority groups in the decision 
making of running the affairs of a country to the satisfaction of all tribal groupings and these 
divisions are taken advantage of by outsiders to fuel armed conflict in African countries to their 
benefit and disadvantage of the local population. On the other hand, Hoskyns (1961:7) 
observed three critical developments that contributed to the Congo crisis: (1) the country-wide 
mutiny by Congolese soldiers immediately after independence; (2) the secession of the mineral 
rich Katanga Province and (3) the Belgian military intervention in support of Katanga’s 
secessionism. Both views are correct as they place different emphasis on similar factors 
expressed differently. These factors will be assessed in depth in the sections below. 
The next section examines the nature of the Congolese government request for UN 
peacekeepers and the controversial interpretation of UN Security Council Resolutions that 
authorised the deployment of ONUC. The controversy arose from undiplomatic and 
disrespectful manner in which ONUC officials dealt with the Congolese Government, 
particularly the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.  
3.2.1 Congolese Government Request for UN military assistance 
This section highlights the sources and nature of the misunderstandings between the 
legitimately elected Prime Minister of Congo and the UN Secretary General that significantly 
contributed to the constitutional crisis and the ultimate failure of the overall peacekeeping 
mission. To fully appreciate the controversial interpretation of UN Security Council 
Resolutions by the Secretary General and his close advisers, it is necessary first to have an in-
depth understanding of the nature of military assistance requested by Congolese Central 
Government to the UN Secretary General. 
On 12July 1960 President Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba jointly sent an 
appeal to the UN Secretary General urgently requesting for military assistance to deal with the 
invading Belgian forces. The Congolese appeal was very succinct and unambiguous as it stated 
that, “the purpose of the requested military aid was to protect the national territory of the Congo 
against the present external aggression which was a threat to international peace” (UN Doc. 
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S/4382, 13 July 1960). President Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba jointly dispatched 
another cable to the Secretary General correcting the erroneous message sent earlier by their 
three ministers while they were out of the capital Leopoldville. According to (UN Doc. S/4382 
dated 13 July 1960) the follow up message to the UN by the central government was meant to 
further clarify and elaborate the exact nature of the urgent request in order to remove any 
ambiguities. Essential aspects of the message were as follows: 
…(1) the purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation in Congo but rather 
to protect the national territory against acts of aggression posed by Belgian metropolitan troops. 
(2) The request for assistance relates only to a UN force consisting of military personnel of neutral 
countries and not of US as reported by certain radio stations. (3) If requested assistance is not 
received without delay the Republic of the Congo will be obliged to appeal to the Bandung Treaty 
Powers. (4) The aid has been requested by the Republic of the Congo in the exercise of its 
sovereign rights and not in agreement with Belgium as reported, 
It is crystal clear that the Congolese central government wanted military assistance to 
effectively engage the invading Belgian troops and ensure their withdrawal from Congo as a 
precondition for the restoration of status quo ante. Considering that the US had declined a 
request for military assistance from the same Congolese government, the legitimate 
government of Congo sought to cast their net wider by approaching the Soviet Union for 
military assistance in the event that there was no speedy response from the UN to their request 
for military assistance. 
Hoskyns (1961:127-8) observed that the two Congolese leaders concurrently dispatched a cable 
to the Soviet leader requesting him to be on standby while closely monitoring the developments 
in the Congo. The request for Soviet assistance was sent on 14 July, the day the Security 
Council authorised the deployment of ONUC through Security Council Resolution 145 dated 
14 June 1960 (Higgins 1980). Abi-Saab (1978:9) is of the view that the request made to the 
Soviet Union was probably an initiative “conceived as a lever inciting the UN and the Western 
powers to exert pressure on Belgium to withdraw.” This view cannot be substantiated however 
it is important to note that it was well within the powers of the Congolese leadership to invite 
international assistance to bolster the country’s self-defence when faced by foreign military 
aggression. Equally, it cannot be ruled out that the invitation extended to the Soviet Union was 
a desperate attempt at influencing the Western powers to speedily influence their NATO 
counterpart (Belgium) to withdraw from Congo. ONUC officials, sadly interpreted the 
initiative differently as they believed this was enough proof that Lumumba was pro-Soviet and 
that he wanted to set the two super powers against each other, a development they resolved to 
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thwart at all costs. The viewing of Lumumba as a pro-Soviet revolutionary significantly 
influenced the decision making process of the Secretary General and his close advisers that 
were predominantly American citizens (O’Brien 1962; Collins 1992). 
Grovogui (2002:332) argues that the US, Belgium and their Western allies wanted to preserve 
their access to Congo’s strategic and rare minerals and other natural resources to offset Soviet 
advantages in access to raw materials. Thus the need to explicitly reverse the unilateral 
intervention by Belgian troops, the fear of Soviet involvement in Congo, and the determination 
to deny the Soviets access to strategic minerals as well as depriving them any pretext for 
unilateral or covert involvement in the Congo influenced the deployment of ONUC (Collins 
1992). The purpose of deploying UN peacekeepers was therefore not necessarily to assist the 
Congolese re-assert their independence and sovereignty as requested by central government 
following external aggression by Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries. It was rather to 
facilitate the smooth withdrawal of Belgian metropolitan troops that were to be replaced by 
peacekeepers that had come to guarantee the safety of the Congolese white population and 
other foreigners (Ibid). The full strategic implications of deploying peacekeepers in Congo 
were not apparent to the Soviet Union that voted in favour of the deployment in Congo while 
Britain and France abstained. 
James (1990:291) is of the view that the idea of deploying UN peacekeepers in Congo was 
widely embraced “although its implications were less than fully understood” by the majority 
of nations that believed such missions were meant to truly address international crises in an 
impartial manner. Taking advantage of the wisdom of hind sight, it is now apparent that the 
Secretary General and his American dominated advisory team (as will be explained later) had 
sinister and malicious strategic designs to ensure that Western interests were preserved and 
promoted at the expense of the well-being of the Congolese population and government as long 
as Western interests, particularly American interests were safeguarded. 
The Congolese initial request for “technical assistance” from the UN was with a view “to 
reorganizing and retraining the Congolese National Army” (Urquhart 1987:393), as a 
component of security sector reform that was meant to be part of the larger scheme of peace-
building measures advocated by the Secretary General. Important to note is that the Congolese 
Government’s appeal for UN assistance came after the US had declined a similar request from 
three Cabinet Ministers namely Gizenga, Bamboko and Nyembo (Hoskyns 1961:114) at a time 
when the President and the Prime Minister were away touring the country. The US advised the 
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Congolese authorities to approach the UN for assistance as they publicly declared that it was 
“undesirable” for any country to unilaterally come to the aid of Congo (Higgins 1980:264).  
Ball (1961:6-7) argues that on receipt of the Congolese request for military assistance, the US 
considered three options for their response namely: to do nothing; it could agree to the 
Congolese request for American troops, or it could encourage the Congolese to approach the 
UN. The US authorities were afraid that the Soviets would influence the Congolese leadership 
towards adopting communism in a “from chaos to communism syndrome.” As such, the US 
opted to use the UN peacekeepers as an “umbrella” for its anti-communist policy in Congo that 
would achieve desired results at a far less cost compared to direct military involvement 
(Housen 2002). American strategic interests in Africa were driven by a desire to secure 
valuable natural resources and political influence that would guarantee the longevity of 
America’s capitalist system, Military Industrial Complex (MIC), and global economic 
superiority while denying the same to the Soviet Union (Ibid.). 
It is therefore apparent that the Americans suggested the channelling of the Congolese 
Government request to the UN because of two reasons. Firstly, they wanted to keep the Soviets 
out of the Central African region hence they ensured that the Soviets would not have any 
plausible pretext for unilateral intervention in Congo once international peacekeepers were in 
the country performing their tasks. Secondly, the US knew fully well that American national 
strategic interests would be safeguarded by the American dominated UN peacekeeping political 
structure without its direct involvement. This view is supported by the composition of the UN 
Security Council in 1960 when Taiwan held the Chinese seat in the Security Council and the 
domination of the General Assembly by the pro-Western Latin American countries as 
explained below. 
Weissman (1974:60) observed that during the early 1960s, the UN acted as a satisfactory 
vehicle for the promotion of American policy through its domination of key and strategic 
organs of the world body. In the Security Council the West had four out of five permanent seats 
with the power of veto (Taiwan represented China) and three out of six of the elected seats. In 
the General Assembly, the Western and Latin American states only needed 12 Afro-Asian 
votes to secure the two-thirds majority. A high percentage of staff that manned the Secretariat 
was basically Western in orientation and outlook in a situation where Americans, British and 
French staff members held 49 of the 102 senior appointments (Ibid). Weissman highlights the 
fact that the closest advisors to the Secretary General Hammarskjold were all Americans 
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namely; Ralph Bunche; Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, Andrew; Executive 
Assistant and Heinz Wieschoff; Bunche’s deputy and the Secretariat’s African expert (Ibid). 
This point is critical in that critical strategic decisions made regarding ONUC were handled by 
the Secretary General and his close American advisers. 
During the early 1960s before most colonies attained independence, the UN membership had 
a predominantly pro-Western bias. Added to this scenario was the fact that the Secretary 
General had an American dominated advisory team for peacekeeping in Congo. It is therefore 
prudent to conclude that the drafting of the mandate and controversial interpretation of Security 
Council resolutions on the Congo crisis were influenced by the pro-Western bias of critical 
institutions of the UN to the detriment of the Congolese people and Government thereby 
rendering the Congolese Government ineffective and incapable to serve the interests of its 
citizens. 
3.2.2 UNSC authorization of ONUC 
This section aims to highlight the Secretary General’s cunning presentation of the Congolese 
crisis to the Security Council that led to the authorization of a peacekeeping mission to facilitate 
the withdrawal of invading Belgian troops as opposed to what the Congolese Government had 
requested for-military action against invading foreign forces and secessionist elements in 
Katanga Province.  
On receipt of the Congolese government request for military assistance to evict the invading 
Belgian troops, the Secretary General presented the crisis to the Security Council in a manner 
that ensured that Belgium’s intervention was not characterized as an aggression as this would 
have meant condemnation of Belgium by fellow NATO powers as well as calling for collective 
measures against it as provided for by Article 39 of the Charter of which Belgian allies were 
not prepared to do (Abi-Saab 1978:11). The Secretary General packaged and characterized the 
Congo crisis in such a manner as to nudge the Security Council to respond to the crisis without 
either taking military action to forcefully evict the invading troops nor taking action that would 
condemn their illegality (Ibid:13).  
ONUC was established by Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960 which referred to the “request 
for military assistance” made by the President and Prime Minister of Congo and authorised the 
Secretary General to “provide military assistance until the national security forces could meet 
their tasks”. The exact UN Charter basis for the establishment of ONUC was not very clear 
however, it was assumed that the basis was predicated on Article 40 in Chapter VII though 
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there was no formal determination under Article 39 of a “threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression” (Higgins 1980:54). The Security Council Resolution was crafted 
in such a manner that it did not formally condemn the Belgian act of aggression which was 
indeed a violation of international law and the UN Charter. In the view of the Western powers 
who dominated the Security Council as outlined above, Belgium was fulfilling a necessary 
function of protecting the lives of threatened foreigners in Congo. The Secretary General 
Hammarskjold referred the crisis in Congo as “the situation in Congo” as opposed to using 
such terms as the “dispute” or “conflict” in Congo, a deliberate move to avoid expressions that 
would lead to the condemnation of Belgian intervention by the Security Council (Al Qaq 2009). 
It has been argued that the Secretary General’s presentation to the Security Council was 
designed to avoid a veto and ensure support from the two colonial powers in the Security 
Council namely Britain and France (Abi-Saab 1978:11). Given this scenario, Secretary General 
Hammarskjold opted to avoid the use of the term “aggression” in order to save a fellow Western 
nation from condemnation and embarrassment (Ibid.). The interests of the Congolese people 
were not a priority in the Secretary General’s priorities as there was no mention of the plight 
of the Congolese population whatsoever. The use of peacekeepers as a face saving strategy for 
big powers was also used during the Suez Crisis of 1956 when the same Secretary General 
crafted UNEF 1’s mandate to facilitate and ensure a face saving withdrawal of foreign 
aggressor nations, Britain, France and Israel as they withdrew from Egypt (Urquhart 1987:132). 
The Secretary General’s deliberate failure to condemn Belgian intervention in Congo as a 
violation of Congo’s sovereignty resulted in bitter exchanges between him and Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba (Abi Saab 1978). This also led to serious misunderstandings on the 
interpretation of the Security Council’s resolutions and the role of ONUC specifically on 
dealing with the invading Belgian troops and the rebellious Katangese troops supporting the 
secessionist regime of Tshombe. 
Security Council Resolution 143 of 14 July 1960 (UN SC Res S/4387, 14 July 1960)authorized 
the deployment of ONUC to facilitate a smooth withdrawal of Belgian troops that had invaded 
Congo and not to evict the invading foreign troops as requested by the host government 
(O’Neill and Rees 2005:46). The Security Council Resolution authorized the Secretary 
General:  
…to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Congo, to 
provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the 
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efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the 
national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks… 
(UN Doc. (S/4387); Abi-Saab (1978:16) and The Blue Helmets (1990:219). 
The Secretary General’s perspective was that the Congo mission was not initially deployed to 
resolve an internal conflict in that country but to contain the conflict that could possibly have 
otherwise drawn in the great powers and to assist in the decolonization process (Fortuna 
2004:271). Here lies the initial source of UN peacekeeping mission failure in Congo. The 
mandate’s failure to prioritize and address the root causes of the conflict in Congo became a 
bitter source of acrimonious friction between Prime Minister Lumumba and the Secretary 
General Dag Hammarskjold. 
Important to note is the fact that the mandate envisaged a strong collaboration between the 
peacekeeping mission in Congo and the Congolese government in order to “provide the 
Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until…the national security 
forces… meet fully their tasks” (UN SC Res. 143 of 1960). The wording of the mandate was a 
compromise among Security Council members who were pursuing different agendas through 
the deployment of the peacekeepers. The two superpowers supported the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers to rescue a failing decolonization gamble that was fast spiralling out of control 
as a result of manipulation by foreign powers. 
They were each jostling for the friendship of this rich and strategically important new African 
state (James 1990:291). Cognisant of the strategic importance of the Congo in terms of its vital 
mineral resources and its strategic locations in the heart of Africa, the US and the Soviet Union 
agreed to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (Adebajo and Landsberg 2007:165) 
hoping that this would avert direct or indirect rivalry between the two Cold War ideological 
camps (James 1990:291). Unfortunately this was not to be the case as tensions between the 
Congolese government and ONUC officials took a nasty twist as a direct result of the Secretary 
General’s mishandling of the crisis.  
A close examination of differing interpretations of the mandates would shed some light on the 
magnitude and intensity of the conflict of interests between the host government’s priorities 
and those of the Secretary General and his close advisers and further exposes the hypocritical 
interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions to serve US interests.  
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3.2.3 Interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions by the UNSG and Prime Minister of 
Congo 
This section highlights the magnitude and intensity of the enmity and suspicion that developed 
between the secretary General Hammarskjold and the Prime Minister Lumumba as a direct 
result of different interpretations of the UN mandate for ONUC. This is critical as it forms the 
crux of the problem that complicated the Congo crisis ultimately leading to the assassination 
of Patrice Lumumba and mission overall failure to bring lasting peace and security to Congo.  
The Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of ONUC did not outline the exact 
objectives of the mission and did not define what tasks were to be carried out by the Congolese 
security forces in cooperation with the peacekeepers until the mission was declared a success. 
This lack of detailed tasks to ensure mission success partly contributed to mission failure as it 
became not only difficult but controversial to determine what peacekeeping mission success 
could be defined as under prevailing circumstances.  
According to Abi-Saab (1978:17), Secretary General Hammarskjold interpreted ONUC’s 
mission in Congo as having “no direct functions in relation to withdrawal of Belgian troops” 
in the Congo but rather indirectly in that the Belgians would withdraw after law and order had 
been re-established. Accordingly, this meant that the mission was designed to facilitate a way 
out, a face saving and a decent withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo without any 
embarrassment whatsoever. In addition, the Secretary General in a report to the Security 
Council made a firm statement that ONUC was “neither to become a party to any internal 
dispute nor to resort to force except in self-defence” (James 1990:292). This approach was in 
sharp contrast with Lumumba’s view, that ONUC’s primary mission was to effectively engage 
and deal with the invading Belgian forces first and later the secessionist forces to end Katanga’s 
claim of independence. 
Despite the requests jointly submitted to the UN by Lumumba and Kasa Vubu for military 
assistance to effectively deal with the Belgian invasion of Congo, the ambiguous Security 
Council resolution was interpreted by Secretary General Hammarskjold as implying that 
ONUC was not legally mandated to engage in military action against the invading Belgian 
troops although Belgium’s military invasion was the main trigger for ONUC deployment. Thus 
ONUC’s main mission was to assist the Congolese government to maintain law and order.  
Once this was achieved, it was assumed the Belgians would then withdraw after realizing that 
the Europeans in Congo were safe and did not need Belgian troops for their protection 
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(Akehurst 1984:189). The ambiguity regarding the peacekeeping mission and its obscure 
objectives formed a bitter source of conflict between Lumumba and the UN Secretary General. 
O’Neill and Rees (2005) have argued that ambiguous mandates were meant to give the 
Secretary General enough room to manoeuvre where the circumstances were not legally 
binding and left room for flexibility in deciding what mandate the peacekeepers would have. 
Prime Minister Lumumba could be forgiven for having interpreted the deployment of ONUC 
as “the government’s right arm” since that was what the Congolese government had requested 
for, as a reinforcement to their efforts to get rid of the invading Belgian troops and foreign 
mercenaries (O’Neill and Rees 2005:56). The UN role was tacitly but clearly predicated on the 
assumption that it was willing and capable of helping the new Congolese Government exert 
total and effective control over all its national territory and effectively neutralize and ultimately 
defeat the secessionists (Ekpebu 1989:31-38).  
Prime Minister Lumumba questioned the impartiality of Secretary General Hammarskjold in 
his interpretation of the resolution as well as his initiatives to engage in negotiations with 
Katangese authorities behind the government’s back. Lumumba wrote to the Hammarskjold a 
scathing letter convinced that the 14 July UN resolution firmly stated that “in its intervention 
in the Congo the UN is not to act as a neutral organization but rather that the Security Council 
was to place all its resources at the disposal of my government” (Abi-Saab 1978:46). Lumumba 
castigated and challenged Hammarskjold’s initiative to engage in “secretive” negotiations with 
Tshombe the secessionist leader without prior consultation with the Central Government. He 
made his views clear that he considered Hammarskjold to be interfering in Congo’s internal 
affairs between his government and secessionist Katanga using the UN peacekeepers “to 
influence its outcome which is formally prohibited by the very paragraph which you invoked” 
(Ibid.:46-47). This in Lumumba’s view was in violation of the UN Charter as well as Congo’s 
sovereignty. On his part, Hammarskjold insisted that his actions were part of “quiet diplomacy” 
essential for securing an agreement from secessionist leader Moise Tshombe to comply with 
the demands from ONUC. The sharp contrast in the interpretation of the mandate which 
continued to sour relations between the Secretary General and the Prime Minister can be 
discerned from detailed tasks given to General Carl von Horn by the Secretary General’s 
Special Representative in Congo.  
Briefing General Carl von Horn the substantive commander of ONUC on his arrival in Congo, 
Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Ralph Bunche interpreted the Security Council 
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resolution loosely as follows: ONUC was to replace the Belgians in key strategic areas and 
once this was achieved, the Belgians would withdraw followed by ONUC’s replacement of the 
unreliable Congolese National Army (ANC) troops, curb the unruly behaviour and activities 
of the local army and gradually transform them into a more reliable and professional force. 
Bunche further emphasised that General Von Horn was expected to secure ONUC’s freedom 
of movement across the length and breadth of Congo and was to ensure that he prevented any 
unilateral interference by the Soviets following the request for assistance made by Lumumba. 
Bunche made it clear to General von Horn that his mission was to effectively “take over the 
responsibility for law and order maintenance in the country both from the Belgians and the 
rebellious Congolese troops posing as the Congolese Army” (Sitkowski 2006:66). This 
interpretation of the mandate literally implied that ONUC was the “de-facto security force” of 
an independent Congo whose operations were not obliged to respect the sovereignty of the host 
country. The legitimacy of this interpretation of the Security Council Resolution raises an 
ethical dilemma considering that the Congolese Army was rebellious and harassing innocent 
civilians and the other troops in the country were the invading Belgian troops. In such a 
situation the UN peacekeepers appeared to be the only legitimate force available to bring about 
law and order in the country. 
The tasks outlined by Bunche to General von Horn could not have been successfully 
accomplished without serious and controversial interference in the internal affairs of the host 
country. Higgins (1980:40) observed that it was extremely difficult not to interfere in Congo’s 
domestic affairs, considering that the mission had been tasked with the responsibility to 
maintain law and order and territorial integrity of the host country in an attempt to prevent an 
outbreak of civil war. In addition he is of the view that overseeing Belgian troop withdrawal 
was to prove increasingly challenging considering that the UN had “a clear bias towards the 
central government and its juridical sovereignty (Ibid.).” Important to note is the fact that there 
was no serious emphasis given for cooperation with the Congolese Army or authorities in the 
law and order maintenance instructions given to General von Horn by Bunche. Moreover the 
interpretation of the Security Council Resolution posed a dilemma in that Bunche’s 
interpretation also served as an alternative legitimate interpretation. However, lack of emphasis 
on cooperation with Congolese political leadership served as a clear demonstration of contempt 
of Congolese authorities in violation of that country’s sovereignty. 
Hammarskjold and Bunche’s interpretation of the Security Council resolution angered 
Lumumba who argued that the UN forces were in the Congo on the invitation of the Congolese 
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Government specifically to deal with the invading Belgian troops. Moreover, Lumumba argued 
that the Katanga secessionist movement was not an authentic secessionist movement but rather 
“a mere façade for foreign intervention” without which the whole attempt to secede would have 
collapsed much earlier (Hoskyns 1961:173). The Secretary General Hammarskjold remained 
adamant and insisted that the Katanga problem was an internal crisis which the UN would 
remain neutral and impartial, a strategy meant to buy time for the consolidation of the 
Katangese authorities that was designed to make the Katanga secession appear less directly 
dependent on Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries (Ibid). 
Tshombe welcomed the Secretary General’s interpretation of the UN resolution and his 
proposed terms of introducing ONUC troops in Katanga as this served his strategic designs to 
hypocritically enter into an unexplained relationship with Central Government while buying 
time to consolidate the foundations of his illegitimate independence (Abi-Saab 1978:45). In 
the interim, the CIA, the Secretary General and his inner core advisers were working out a plan 
to immobilize, neutralize and ultimately eliminate Lumumba from Congo’s political scene in 
blatant violation of Congo’s national sovereignty (Collins 1993). 
Lumumba, sensing the conspiracy, made five requests to the Secretary General: “(a) to send 
exclusively African and Congolese troops immediately to Katanga; (b) to withdraw all non-
African troops there from; (c) to provide UN planes for the transport of Congolese civil and 
military personnel to Katanga; (d) to seize all arms and ammunitions distributed by the 
Belgians in Katanga and give them to the Central Government; and (e) to entrust the guarding 
of all airfields exclusively to Congolese army and police instead of UN troops” (UN Doc. 
S/4417/Add. 7/II). Secretary General Hammarskjold in a demonstration of contempt for the 
Prime Minister refused to respond to the substance of Lumumba’s demands but promised to 
forward them for discussion in the next Security Council meeting where both the Secretary 
General and Lumumba would have an opportunity to defend their positions and views (Ibid.). 
The Secretary General remained adamant that ONUC would remain “impartial” yet covertly it 
was working towards promoting Western interests in Congo as will be explained in detail in 
subsequent paragraphs below. 
The ambiguity of the mandate and competing interpretations of the mandate created 
irreconcilable enmity and mistrust between the Secretary General Hammarskjold and Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba. The suspicion battle between these two influential individuals 
played out prominently after the deployment of ONUC as their inter-personal conflicts further 
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complicated an already complex situation that served to undermine the ability of the host 
government to protect its population in fulfilment of its mandate to safeguard the well-being 
of the Congolese population.  
3.3 Unethical deployment of pro-western troops and US civilians in Congo 
This section sets the stage for a deeper understanding of why the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Congo was accused by non-Western countries of having been reduced to a proxy military force 
for the advancement of US foreign policy manoeuvres and not as a conflict resolution agent of 
the UN Security Council  (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010:87).The section further 
highlights ONUC’s failure to tackle the crisis triggering challenges that the Congolese 
Government had requested the UN military force to deal with. During the first year of its 
deployment in Congo, ONUC did not engage itself in any robust diplomatic and military 
offensive operations to evict the foreign invading forces (Al Qaq 2009). Instead, the leadership 
of ONUC became embroiled in the power politics of Congo that resulted in the assassination 
of Lumumba with ONUC connivance. Ultimately ONUC became the legitimizing force of an 
unelected and undemocratic dictatorial regime that was installed to serve Western interests and 
not the self-determination aspirations of the Congolese people (Saksena 1974). 
During the first few weeks of deployment ONUC failed to immediately engage the invading 
Belgian troops and secessionist Katangese troops, as requested by the Congolese authorities. 
As a result of this failure the UN force was harassed and rebuked rather than being assisted by 
the Congolese Government as tribal and ideological considerations fuelled by outside forces 
were tearing the Congolese government apart (James 1990:295). The role of outside military 
and political forces in transforming ONUC into a US proxy force is fully explained by the 
selection and appointment of key decision makers in the affairs of ONUC which is covered in 
detail below. In an interview with an AU diplomat in Addis Ababa, he stated that this should 
not have come as a surprise as UN peacekeeping missions were designed as political games 
that are played at the grand strategic level among the competing world powers with little 
consideration paid to the ultimate effects on the local population (Mwanasali September 2015). 
The first UN guiding principle in the selection of troop contributing countries for ONUC was 
that no military units or staff officers from any of the permanent members of the Security 
Council were to participate “given the potential…to escalate rather than reduce cold War 
rivalries (Annan 2012:33). The second principle was that the concept of regionalism in the 
resolution of international conflicts was to be upheld hence the appeal to African leaders to 
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provide the bulk of the peacekeeping troops (Simmonds 1968:137). These principles were both 
violated at the onset of the operation. The appointment of a Special Representative of the 
Secretary General to Congo, Ralph Bunche a seasoned American diplomat who was also the 
overall commander of ONUC in the field during the early days of its deployment was in 
violation of the first principle that prohibited staff officers and troops from permanent members 
of the Security Council from participating in UN peacekeeping operations. It also contributed 
to the violation of the peacekeeping principle of “impartiality”, which for the sake of this study 
is defined as follows: “peacekeepers will be expected to serve universalistic interests … and 
must not serve the parochial interests of specific foreign powers, which seek to project their 
influence into the conflict in question” (Gibbs 2000:360). The critical importance of 
impartiality has been emphasised by several scholars such as James (1990: 106); Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse and Ramsbottom (1996:125) and Goulding (1993:454). James (1996:211) 
emphasises that “it is impartiality which gives peacekeepers its distinctiveness … is the 
lifeblood of peacekeeping.” 
The Secretary General’s initiative to deploy a seasoned and “prestigious internationally 
known” American diplomat in Congo to “provide overall supervision for the operation” raises 
serious ethical and moral concerns regarding the Secretary General’s impartiality and neutrality 
in dealing with the two superpowers. The UN peacekeeping mission had “the preponderance 
of American personnel” in charge of the planning in New York and execution in the Congo 
(Gibbs 2000:364). Members of the Eastern Bloc countries were excluded from key decision 
sessions and “care was taken to see that no member of Secretariat, who was a citizen of a 
communist state, saw the Congo telegrams” (O’Brien 1962:55-66). Bunche’s deployment to 
Congo gave far reaching advantages to the US and her allies at the expense of the Soviet Union 
and her allies and the host country since both superpowers were jostling to establish friendship 
with this mineral rich and strategically located central African state (James 1990:291).  
The deployment of senior US officials in peacekeeping operations was a way of facilitating the 
entrenchment of US influence in post-colonial countries to replace the vacuum left behind by 
the weakened and withdrawing former colonial masters (Al Qaq 2009). Bunche worked closely 
with the US Ambassador to Congo to the extent that the US Embassy saw some of his cables 
dispatched to the UN Headquarters in New York and at some point relied on US Embassy 
communication facilities to link up with his Secretary General (Urquhart 1993:312).To make 
matters worse, the first two military commanders of ONUC were from NATO member states, 
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further giving the Western countries unrivalled advantage over their Soviet counterparts since 
the top leadership of ONUC was effectively under Western oriented practitioners. 
General Alexander, a Briton, was ONUC’s first military commander followed by Swedish 
General Carl von Horn. At the start of ONUC operations, the two most senior UN officials in 
Congo were an American, Ralph Bunche and a Briton, General Alexander thus heavily tilting 
the geo-strategic and geo-political balance in favour of Western interests. British General 
Alexander was later succeeded by “a fierce anti-communist” Swedish General Carl von Horn 
(Dayal 1976) which guaranteed a further entrenchment of Western interests in Congo. The 
decision of appointing a known “fierce anti-communist” Swedish General to command ONUC 
could hardly be coincidental given the deliberate efforts to deny the Soviets access to Congo’s 
strategic minerals and natural resources. At the UN headquarters in New York, the set-up was 
such that decisions made were to guarantee the promotion and safeguarding of Western 
interests in the Congo with little regard to the implications on the local population and the host 
government.  
According to (Al-Qaq 2009:155) at the beginning of ONUC operations in Congo, three 
prominent American citizens namely-Ralph Bunche, Andrew Cordier and Heinz Wieschof 
were virtually running the show regarding the planning and execution of ONUC operations. 
The Secretary General Hammarskjold had an inner secretive cabinet, the so called ‘Congo 
Club’ that exclusively consisted of himself and Americans and an outer layer of neutrals mainly 
Afro-Asians (O’Brien 1962:56). This goes to demonstrate that the top command and 
administrative hierarchy of ONUC was set up in an unprofessional and unethical fashion. The 
Secretary General Hammarskjold went to the extent of insisting that the overall military 
command authority for ONUC was vested in himself as he created a command structure that 
was predominantly civilian resulting in sustained civilian-military friction from the beginning 
of the operation (O’Neill and Rees 2005:64). This strange command arrangement led 
Simmonds (1968:161) to lament that “the wisdom of charging the Secretary-General with 
"command authority" for ONUC operations is one that cannot readily be accepted.” To buttress 
the preponderance of American influence over ONUC affairs, Saksena (1974:272) observed 
that: “…from beginning to the end the shadow of the greatest Power on earth, the US loomed 
large in the UN operations in Congo…The result was that they could not help becoming an 
instrument to achieve US policy goals.”  
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It is therefore apparent that Secretary General Hammarskjold and his “inner cabinet” made 
maximum use of this command and administrative arrangement to successfully influence 
operations in the field to suit Western political and strategic designs. This assertion buttresses 
the argument that ONUC, through the machinations of the UN Secretary General and his close 
associates in New York and UN officials in Congo deliberately undermined the authority of 
the Congolese Government, further weakening the government’s ability to take charge of 
events in the country by hand picking their preferred leaders loyal their western masters. 
American financial assistance to ONUC amounted to approximately 42 per cent of all total 
expenses incurred during entire operation (Lefever and Joshua 1966:154-155). Had the US 
withdrawn this massive financial support, the operation could have been brought to a grinding 
halt considering that France and the Soviet Union had declined to pay their dues arguing that 
the mission was serving American and not UN interests. Considering the operating 
environment prevailing within the UN Headquarters, O’Brien (1962:56) is of the view that, “it 
is almost certainly true to say that any Secretary General who lost the confidence of 
Washington would have to resign.” The predominance of Western influence was extended to 
field troops in Congo, a situation that was unsuccessfully challenged by the Eastern Bloc.  
The Soviet Union queried Canada’s involvement in the peacekeeping operation arguing that 
Canada was an ally of Belgium in NATO hence its participation was incompatible with the 
obligations of a UN international military service constituted by non-interested member 
countries (Simmonds 1968:139). Canada was even given a sensitive responsibility of providing 
communication resources to all peacekeepers deployed in Congo, an opportunity that was later 
taken advantage of when a Canadian officer tracked Lumumba’s movements in an unethical 
conspiracy to facilitate his arrest and subsequent assassination by Katangese 
authorities(Spooner  2009:109). Swedish troops were first introduced into Katanga Province 
several months before African peacekeepers could be allowed in the Province. This was said 
to be a confidence building initiative by the Secretary General to calm the white foreigners in 
this secessionist province, a development that infuriated Lumumba and further compounded 
their mutual suspicion and mistrust (Al Qaq 2009). Not surprisingly therefore, many 
complaints were later raised at various stages of the operation sharply critical of the 
employment of non-African troops in the Congo operation. 
This section has demonstrated the degree to which ONUC decision making hierarchy was 
Western biased and predominantly American. It has been articulated that major decisions 
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regarding the composition of ONUC leadership were meant not to advance UN and Congolese 
interests but rather American geo-strategic self-interests in its Cold War competition with the 
Soviet Union and its endeavour to fill the vacuum left by departing former colonial powers. 
Whereas the US was ahead of the Soviet Union in scheming its strategic moves in Congo, 
Prime Minister Lumumba was equally busy with counter moves designed to secure Soviet 
involvement in the Congo crisis; an initiative that ultimately aggravated western hatred against 
the Prime Minister as he was seen as trying to introduce communist influence in this region 
considered a preserve of Western influence.  
3.3.1 Implications of Soviet military assistance to Lumumba 
This section attempts to illustrate how the predominantly American decision making ONUC 
hierarchy misinterpreted Lumumba’s motivation in requesting for Soviet military assistance. It 
also evaluates the implications for Lumumba’s deployment of government troops to fight 
secessionists in Kasai Province that had followed the lead taken by Katanga Province. 
Having failed to convince Secretary General Hammarskjold to militarily engage invading 
Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries, Lumumba requested and received military assistance 
from the Soviet Union. This was in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter that 
authorises foreign military assistance for the sake of self-defence in the case of military 
aggression. Congo thus became the first independent African country to receive military aid 
from the Soviet Union and this infuriated the Hammarskjold who vowed to “under-cut 
Lumumba” (Arnold 1999:94). 
In connivance with his American close advisers, the Secretary General sought to ensure that 
decolonised Congo remained within the Western powers’ sphere of influence and not to depart 
too far from the colonial path of paternalism that existed during the Belgian colonial era. The 
Secretary General and his advisors believed that Lumumba had raised the pitch of the crisis to 
Cold War super power confrontation level. They interpreted Lumumba’s use of Soviet military 
equipment as an initiative to establish a communist foothold in the Southern African region 
primarily designed to scuttle Western strategic interests in that part of Africa. This 
misunderstanding was a clear manifestation of a conflict characterised by mistrust between the 
UN senior officials and the Prime Minister of Congo and his followers. Instead of creating a 
harmonious and constructive working relationship between the UN mission and the host 
government, serious friction and pursuit of conflicting agendas ensued as a result of 
irreconcilable interpretation of the mandate issued by the UN Security Council Resolutions and 
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failure to agree on priority tasks for ONUC. The misunderstanding between the Prime Minister 
and the Secretary General deteriorated to such levels where UN officials began to explore ways 
of removing Lumumba from the political stage in Congo in preference of a more moderate pro-
Western Congolese leader; initiatives that were directly in conflict with the principle of host 
state sovereignty.  
In a demonstration of double standards by ONUC officials who had earlier violently opposed 
Lumumba’s military request from the Soviet Union, President Kasa Vubu was later allowed to 
appeal for external forces to deal with Katangese rebels and mercenaries well after the death 
of Lumumba. This action was condoned by ONUC officials because the Congolese government 
was firmly under pro-Western leaders (UN Doc. S/4630 of 16 Jan. 1961). 
The next section examines the handling of the constitutional crisis in Congo that aggravated an 
already precarious situation; a direct result of ONUC officials’ meddling in the internal affairs 
of the host nation. 
3.4 Mishandling of the Congo constitutional crisis by ONUC officials 
This section aims to expose the magnitude of unethical meddling in Congolese political power 
dynamics by senior members of ONUC in violation of the principal of impartiality. 
Ralph Bunche, the first UN Special Representative to Congo unceremoniously left the country 
as a result of his political clashes with Prime Minister Lumumba. He was replaced by another 
American diplomat Andrew Cordier. The arrival of Andrew Cordier coincided with a serious 
constitutional crisis in which President Joseph Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Patrice 
Lumumba engaged in reciprocal efforts to dismiss each other from office (Collins 1993:10). 
Cordier's controversial and unethical decisions in his capacity as the Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary General effectively threw UN political support behind the moderate and pro-
Western Kasa Vubu. In doing so he reinforced US and Belgian efforts to oust the radical and 
pro-Eastern Lumumba - seriously compromising the UN principles of neutrality and 
impartiality (Ibid: 10-11).  
Cordier’s first strategic move was to authorise the use of ONUC budgeted funds to purchase 
food and payment of outstanding salaries to the mutinous Congolese soldiers which became a 
very important factor in the maintenance of the soldiers’ ’‘neutrality’ during and after the 
constitutional crisis (Dayal 1976:34). He took this decision acting on the understanding that 
ONUC was responsible for the maintenance of law and order and fearing the possible arrival 
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of Lumumba’s reinforcements and supporters in the capital city.  This action was neither taken 
in good faith nor was it neutral. It was designed to consolidate the newly promoted Colonel 
Mobutu’s authority and popularity among the Congolese soldiers who had not been paid their 
salaries for months. Cordier’s initiative was meant to buy the soldiers’ loyalty for Mobutu and 
prepare the ground for his coup attempt a few days later (Kalb 1982:96). Thereafter, Cordier 
made several key decisions that effectively aligned the UN with Kasa Vubu in his dispute with 
Lumumba.  
Following the dismissal of Lumumba from office Cordier made his most important and 
strategic decisions that completely changed the political landscape and power dynamics in 
Congo. He ordered UN troops to close the major airports and to seize the national radio station 
in the capital under the false pretence to ostensibly keep the crisis within bounds and especially 
to avoid bloody civil outbreaks (Dayal 1976:37). This illegal and unethical act in violation of 
Congolese sovereignty had far reaching implications as it primarily hurt Lumumba’s political 
plans and ambitions and tilted the political power balance in favour of Kasa Vubu.  
Prior arrangements had been made for Kasa Vubu to have access to radio facilities in 
neighbouring Congo (Brazzaville) while Lumumba was denied a platform to appeal to his 
national political followers (Weissman 1974:91-2). Similarly, Kasa Vubu's political allies were 
allowed to use the ostensibly closed airport to travel into the Congolese interior to mobilize 
support for the president while Lumumba's supporters were grounded(O'Brien:1962).Both 
actions served to entrench Kasa Vubu's control of the capital while silencing his charismatic 
rival Lumumba.  
Cordier did not bother to consult or inform the newly appointed UN Special Representative 
who was already in Leopoldville before issuing such far reaching instructions that violated 
Congo’s sovereignty. Urquhart observed that Dayal the newly posted Special Representative 
was “taken aback by Cordier’s decisions,” to the extent that, “for a moment he considered 
resigning” (Urquhart 1987:446). Cordier’s failure to inform Dayal about his controversial 
decisions would suggest that he knew that Dayal would not endorse such unethical decisions 
that openly favoured one party in the Congo crisis against the other.  
The political decisions taken by Cordier, a UN senior diplomat in Leopoldville were a strategic 
master-stroke that eventually led to the downfall and subsequent arrest and assassination of 
Lumumba. Al-Qaq (2009:31) concludes that this equally demonstrated the futility of 
considering UN peacekeeping activities as “impartial, neutral and disinterested.” The rationale 
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of deploying senior American diplomats as Special Representatives of the Secretary General 
appear to have paid dividends towards fulfilment of a deliberately well calculated strategic plan 
to influence events in Congo in the direction preferred by the American government. 
Cordier, in his acting capacity succeeded in "immobilizing" the Congolese Army to such an 
extent that it could not be used by Lumumba who had been placed under virtual house arrest. 
His unethical and illegal actions served to deepen the Congolese crisis and enhanced greater 
chances of Congolese civil war as some tribes felt deliberately short changed by the UN 
peacekeeping mission through biased interference in the country’s internal affairs. This view 
is supported by Dayal (1976) who stated that at worst Cordier inadvertently abetted an anti-
Lumumba plot conceived and directed by Western embassies. O'Brien (1968:93-94) who was 
the UN representative in Katanga in 1961, believes that Cordier deliberately helped 
Washington plot Lumumba's ouster, and may have done so with Secretary General 
Hammarskjold's plausibly deniable approval. This researcher shares O’Brien’s version 
considering that Secretary General Hammarskjold and Cordier strongly believed that 
Congolese internal squabbles and bickering were of less significance in international politics 
compared to the potential of East-West conflict arising from the Congo crisis.  
The facilitation of Mobutu’s coup d’état and immediate closure of Soviet and Eastern 
countries’ embassies in Congo culminating in the assassination of Lumumba, were meant to 
ensure that the communist bloc, was effectively denied a possibility of having meaningful 
influence in post-independence Congo (Collins 1993). In trying to ensure the success of the 
UN mission as they conceived it in the Congo, Cordier and other top UN leaders took steps 
which constituted de facto intervention in internal Congolese affairs. In effect, they played 
kingmaker, albeit within certain constraints of deniability (Ibid.). ONUC officials made a 
deliberate choice of their preferred Congolese leaders and gave them full support in complete 
disregard of the wishes of the majority of Congolese people and parliament. In so doing 
Cordier’s actions compromised the UN professed principles of neutrality, impartiality and non-
interference in internal affairs of member countries. It is therefore not surprising that many 
Africans, Non-Aligned Members as well as the Eastern bloc countries expressed their 
indignation at the manner in which ONUC handled the crisis and equally questioned the UN 
allegedly neutral role in the Congo (Al Qaq 2009). 
The next section examines the role played by some accomplice peacekeepers in the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba. This is important as it buttresses the point that ONUC was 
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not primarily deployed to serve the interests of the Congolese population but rather, those of 
Western powers. 
3.4.1 The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba 
This section exposes the unethical practices by ONUC officials that contributed to the 
assassination of the elected Prime Minister of Congo Patrice Lumumba who was killed in 
January 1961.  
Lumumba was arrested following the constitutional crisis. He escaped from detention and was 
tracked, captured, tortured and eventually assassinated through the coordinated efforts of 
Mobutu, Kasa Vubu, Tshombe and the CIA agents (Weissman 1974:88-90. A Canadian 
Lieutenant Colonel Berthiaume, who continuously monitored Lumumba’s movements over the 
UN communication system supplied and manned by the Canadian contingent, passed up-to-
date information to Mobutu of Lumumba’s whereabouts who then arranged the capture of 
Lumumba (Spooner 2009:109). Berthiaume was known to be “sympathetic to the aims, if not 
always the methods of the Kasa Vubu-Mobutu elements in the Congo” and was therefore an 
accomplice in the capture and subsequent assassination of Lumumba (Ibid.). 
On the night of 27-28 November 1960, Lumumba escaped arrest from Leopoldville where he 
was under the protection of the UN troops (Sitkowski 2006:69). As the legally elected Prime 
Minister, Lumumba later requested for a protection unit from ONUC when he was moving 
from Port Francqui to Mweka but this was declined by ONUC officials after having consulted 
Secretary General Hammarskjold, thus deliberately exposing him to danger (Ibid.). He was 
later captured by pro-Mobutu soldiers and subjected to harsh treatment. A Ghanaian platoon 
commander who witnessed Lumumba being kicked and slapped, tried to intervene to stop the 
beating without realizing that this could be misconstrued as interference in internal Congolese 
political affairs (Ibid :69-70).  
The Ghanaian attempts to secure UN authority to take Lumumba into safe custody were again 
declined by ONUC officials after consultation with UN headquarters. Challenged in York to 
explain why ONUC had not protected Lumumba once he was seen being beaten by Congolese 
troops, Secretary General Hammarskjold replied that it would have necessitated the use of force 
by ONUC, “an initiative which lay beyond their mandate and was in violation of the principle 
of the non-use of force” (Abi-Saab 1978:90). The UN assessed that getting Lumumba into their 
custody and protecting him from his enemies would amount to interference in internal affairs 
of the Congo as Lumumba was pursuing his political aims in the Province of Kasai where he 
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was apprehended by Mobutu loyalists. Ultimately Lumumba was handed over to Katanga 
authorities, where he was later assassinated. His death was announced over the Katanga radio 
by Godefroid Munongo, Katanga’s Interior Minister on 13 February 1961 to the astonishment 
of the progressive world (Abi Saab 1978). 
This political and moral disaster drew sharp criticisms from across the globe with the Soviets 
accusing the Secretary General Hammarskjold and his ONUC command in Congo of 
complicity in surrendering Lumumba to Katanga authorities. Indonesia and UAR immediately 
withdrew their military contingents from ONUC in protest (Sitkowski Op.cit.:70).  African 
members of the “radical Casablanca group” namely Egypt, Morocco and Guinea also withdrew 
their troops resulting in the UN suffering tremendous reputational damage as a result of the 
unethical mishandling of this mission by senior ONUC officials (Adebajo and Landsberg  
2007:165). 
The circumstances surrounding the downfall and elimination of Lumumba reflected serious 
unethical practices by the UN officials as they connived with Western backed authorities to 
oust a legitimately elected national leader of the host country, in violation of Congo’s national 
sovereignty. ONUC officials also denied him protection when he needed it most. The denial of 
Ghanaian officers to protect Lumumba was a demonstration of utmost contempt of the 
legitimate host government of Congo by ONUC officials. The fact that the new Congolese 
authorities handed Lumumba to Katangese officials suggests that there was some prior 
communication going on between the secessionist leaders and the newly installed Congolese 
government a situation that explains why Lumumba was not satisfied with Hammarskjöld’s 
handling of the crisis through his ‘secret diplomacy’ meetings with Tshombe. 
Once the US had achieved its strategic goal of eliminating Lumumba from the Congo political 
scene and the elevation of General Joseph Mobutu to the helm of power, “Washington 
eventually devised the military plan to end the secession in Katanga” as this marked the first 
UN peace enforcement mission that not only entrenched US hegemony in Congo but also 
seriously violated Congo’s national sovereignty (James 1994:44-58). 
The use of force by ONUC to incorporate Katanga back into the unified Congo is not part of 
this study as it was properly constituted through legitimate authorization by the Security 
Council. However, of major concern is the fact that UN peacekeeping offensive operations in 
Congo were primarily meant to consolidate the power base of the imposed, unelected and 
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unconstitutional government in Leopoldville a development that did not serve the self-
determination national interests of the Congolese population.   
3.5 Termination of secession in Katanga Province 
This section serves to highlight the double standards in the use of force exhibited by the UN 
mission to Congo. It focuses only on the key issues that amplify unethical practices by the UN 
peacekeepers in the use of force to further subjugate the host population in violation of its 
national sovereignty. 
After the elimination of Lumumba from the Congolese political stage, ONUC became 
embroiled in what Trevor Findlay (1999), has called the “UN peacekeeping’s first war” in 
which peacekeepers actively participated in armed conflict with one of the parties to the 
conflict. This was in sharp contrast with what the Secretary General Hammarskjold argued very 
strongly against the use of force by ONUC. In a deliberate effort to mislead the international 
community about the true intentions of the US and the Secretary General, UN officials in 
Congo working closely with the secret cabinet in New York, embarked on “organised 
hypocrisy” activities to camouflage their unethical activities in Congo. The SG strongly argued 
that peacekeepers could not be used to settle internal political problems in Congo of whatever 
nature including ending the Katanga problem as it clearly “had an internal dimension” yet the 
same organization was deliberately seeking a military solution to a political problem in order 
to guarantee the end result that satisfied the geo-political interests of the US and its western 
allies. 
Tshombe failed to get international recognition of his separatist Katanga Province as an 
independent country (UN Blue Berets 1990:239). The Security Council granted ONUC 
authority to militarily engage the secessionist rebels in Katanga. The UN was forced to resort 
to more coercive measures to bring Katanga under the control of Congo Central Government 
because of Tshombe’s intransigence coupled with repeated attacks on ONUC by Katangese 
rebel troops led by non-Congolese officers (Ibid :245). 
The Security Council in Resolution 169 of November 1961 authorised the Secretary General 
to use force to complete the removal of mercenaries from Katanga Province (James 1990:295). 
This was achieved by 21 January 1963 when ONUC took full control of key installations 
previously held by Katangese rebel troops and mercenaries thereby consolidating the authority 
of the foreign imposed and un-elected government in Congo. Thereafter there were no 
controversial or unethical decisions taken by ONUC officials because Congolese Central 
75 
 
Government was now in the hands of the preferred politicians whose coming to power was 
facilitated by ONUC officials in violation of Congo’s sovereignty. 
Ultimately the UN peacekeeping mission had succeeded in safeguarding social, economic and 
political interests and privileges of white settlers across the Southern African sub-region (Al 
Qaq 2009:161). This view is shared by Stockwell (1978:137) who concluded that “the US went 
to the extent of manipulating rival Congolese factions and their supporters as well as the United 
Nations itself… as it mounted an extensive public diplomacy to camouflage its covert 
operations….ultimately making Congolese politics more complex and fluid.” The extent to 
which ONUC violated Congo’s national sovereignty had never been witnessed in previous UN 
missions. It signalled future US manipulation of UN missions to advance its own self-interests 
and those of its western allies at the expense of the host populations. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has managed to place ONUC, the first UN peacekeeping mission in sub-Saharan 
Africa in its wider geo-political and geo-strategic context which determined the fate of the 
peacekeeping mission as a failed attempt to bring about lasting peace and security to the 
population of Congo. The chapter highlighted unethical political manipulations of Congo’s 
internal politics by some high ranking ONUC officials that significantly contributed to the host 
government’s failure to exercise its sovereignty towards advancing the aspirations of its people 
as UN officials promoted American and Allied Powers’ interests at the expense of the 
Congolese people as argued in Section 3.4 above. 
The Congo crisis (1960-64) marked a significant “watershed” in the evolution of peacekeeping. 
For the first time ever, the UN got embroiled in domestic affairs of the host country thus setting 
a major precedent on future UN interventions in domestic affairs of host countries as will be 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters. The ethical challenge in UN interventions in civil 
conflicts is that the world body risks becoming embroiled in internal conflicts thereby 
compromising its “ostensible role as a non-partisan mediator”. The chapter has demonstrated 
that the UN intervention in Congo served as a “midwife to the arrival of the Cold War in Africa; 
and it inadvertently aborted … Congo's transition from colonial to democratic rule” (Collins 
1993). This abortion was a deliberate and successful attempt to promote American interests 
during the Cold War at the expense of Congolese wishes and aspirations for political and 
economic self-determination that were thwarted in favour of promoting western neo-liberal 
political and economic interests.  
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This chapter has demonstrated that it is false to argue that peacekeeping operations are 
primarily designed to bring about peace and tranquillity to the host nation state. The UN 
mission in Congo was meant to facilitate the introduction and entrenchment of American 
hegemony in Central and Southern Africa in replacement of the departing colonial powers 
during decolonization. This view is confirmed by Wedgwood (1995:632) who noted that the 
US likes peacekeeping operations because they are “the denouement, the winding down of old 
battles for influence in the Third World between strategic opponents” in which the American 
hegemony replaces departed colonial powers. This is what transpired in Congo where the 
peacekeeping mission was used to effect a well calculated and executed regime change agenda. 
This chapter has therefore convincingly argued that the UN peacekeepers deployed in Congo 
during the early 1960s did not serve the interests of the Congolese people they purported to 
have gone to serve and protect. The peacekeepers were used as a proxy force to advance geo-
strategic interests of the US and her Western allies. 
The next chapter attempts to un-package the UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia and 
determine to what extent the mission violated Somalia’s sovereignty and whether the 
deployment was truly motivated by purely humanitarian justifications to help suffering 
Somalis. 














Ethical challenges to UN and US “humanitarian” interventions in Somalia: from       
peacekeeping to peace-enforcement (1992-1995) 
4.1 Introduction 
Peacekeeping missions are essentially self-interested responses by the international security 
system designed to contain conflicts that would otherwise threaten the normal fabric of the 
system if left unchecked (MacQueen 2006: xiii). Since these missions are authorized by the 
UNSC on behalf of the world community, it is assumed that they are “inherently good” and 
therefore expected to produce positive outcomes such as durable peace and stability, re-
building war-torn societies, generating respect for the rule of law, and promotion of human 
rights and democratic principles (Aoi 2011:8). Sadly in reality, this is not always the case since 
some humanitarian peace enforcement missions result in improved levels of human security, 
while others lead to greater conflict and human insecurity, as well as prolonging the conflict as 
happened in Somalia during the early 1990s.  
The underlying ethical humanitarian challenge as exemplified in Somalia is that when powerful 
states agree to intervene in a target country in pursuit of human security, such interventions do 
not always take cognizance of the political needs and interests of those whom interventions are 
being undertaken (Lang 2002). Moreover these interventions pay little attention towards 
respecting the sovereignty of the host country. The recurrent failure to prioritize the genuine 
wishes of the local population has led to advocacy for stronger modes of peace enforcement in 
situations where some local actors may not accept the presence of foreign troops on their soil 
as happened in the Congo during the early 1960s and in Somalia in the early 1990s. To 
effectively deal with elements resisting the presence of foreign troops, the UN peacekeepers 
have been increasingly resorting to the use of military force to enhance human security of 
affected populations without a thorough study of underlying causes of the problems that 
triggered the conflict in the first place hence this is a matter of trying to impose a military 
solution to political problems. Unfortunately, the increased UN propensity to resort to the use 
of force was embraced by Western liberalism as a positive evolution in the international 
security system (Bell 2010:330). The US-led military “humanitarian” intervention in Somalia 
is a classic example of UN failure to identify the real causes of the conflict and seek solutions 
that identify with the wishes of the local population. Ignoring the Somali traditional ways of 
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solving ethnic problems served to undermine the national sovereignty of the Somali people 
despite the fact that there was no central government to run the country at the time of the 
intervention (Nyambuya 13 October 2015). There are a number of reasons that make this 
chapter important for the current study. 
First, the UN and US-led military intervention in Somalia was the first “humanitarian” mission 
authorized by the Security Council to take military action “without the consent of a sovereign 
government” and that the mission was undertaken for “explicitly humanitarian reasons” 
(Wheeler 2000:172). Second, the absence of a central government enabled more experimental 
intrusive peace-building initiatives and activities that were undertaken by foreign actors in 
violation of Somalia’s state sovereignty (Greig and Diehl 2005). Third, Atack (2002:279) 
observed that the US led military “humanitarian intervention” highlights major reasons for 
ethical objections to such interventions because of “the violation of national sovereignty” of 
the target state and “the use of armed force with the concomitant loss of life and human 
suffering.” Fourth, the intervention served as a platform through which the US government 
usurped control of the “humanitarian mission” from the UN secretariat and later abandoned the 
world body after setting it up for a dramatic political embarrassment and dismal operational 
failure (Kapteijns 2013:435). These aspects will be examined further in subsequent paragraphs 
in order to unravel the true motivational factors that led the UN and US to launch a massive 
military campaign under the auspices of waging a humanitarian intervention. 
This chapter aims to critically examine the underlying motives for military “humanitarian 
intervention” and the unethical conduct of military operations that not only violated Somalia’s 
sovereignty but also resulted in the deaths of thousands of ordinary Somali civilians whose 
hopes had been earlier raised by the arrival of foreign troops to save them from conflict and 
famine. The main thrust of the chapter is to demonstrate that the joint UN/US military 
“humanitarian intervention” in Somalia was not driven by purely humanitarian motives and 
that the use of force by UNOSOM II overwhelmed and undermined the humanitarian concerns 
for the well-being of ordinary Somalis (Ibid.:422). In doing so, the UN/US military intervention 
was violating Somalia’s national sovereignty hence the primary objective of this chapter is to 
determine the extent to which UN/US military adventures violated Somalia’s national 
sovereignty and the principles of peacekeeping operations.  
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is a brief historical background to 
the events that contributed towards the “humanitarian” intervention in Somalia. Section two 
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explores the non-humanitarian motivations that influenced the UN to deploy a peace 
enforcement mission in Somalia. Section three is an analysis of non-humanitarian factors that 
influenced the US to offer the UN 28 000 troops out of a total of 37 000 for intervention in 
Somalia and how the intervention violated Somalia’s national sovereignty. Section four 
explores the extent to which principles of UN peacekeeping operations were violated by the 
intervening forces. Section five is the conclusion that summarises major discussions of the 
chapter.  
4.2 Background to the “humanitarian intervention” in Somalia 
This section highlights the post-Cold War security and political environment that led to the 
“humanitarian intervention” in Somalia by the UN and US peace enforcement forces. Orford 
(2003:2) observed that following the demise of the Soviet Union, a new kind of international 
law and internationalist spirit appeared to have been ushered in the conduct of international 
relations as world conditions were no longer constrained by the ideological struggle between 
communism and capitalism. This international environment led Douzinas (2003) to argue that 
the demise of the Soviet Union ushered in a “new moral order … which sees individual human 
rights being promoted at the expense of state sovereignty” as exemplified in the Somalia crisis 
where humanitarian interveners paid little attention towards respecting Somalia’s state 
sovereignty. 
 Humanitarian intervention has been defined as "the justifiable use of force for the purpose of 
protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive 
as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice 
(Fonteyne 1974:304). In the case of Somalia, there was no central government to blame for the 
plight of the suffering Somalis. There were however, two powerful warlords contesting for the 
control of the capital and parts of Southern Somalia who were running quasi-government 
militia organizations whose struggle and competition for power exacerbated the famine that 
ravaged Somalia in 1991-1992.  
4.2.1 A Brief historical background to the crisis 
Somalia is a country that is ethnically, religiously and linguistically unified though it is 
however divided along clan loyalties (Hirsch and Oakley 1995:3). The origins of the 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia can be traced back to the war between Somalia and Ethiopia 
(1977-78) over the Somali dominated Ogaden region in which Somalia was defeated and left 
impoverished (De Waal 1997). This conflict ruined the Somali economy and burdened it with 
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the challenge of supporting approximately 2 million refugees from Ethiopia a situation where 
Somalia ended up having the highest ratio of refugees to indigenous population in the entire 
world; a burden it could not sustain on its own (Furley and May 1998:144). War torn Somalia 
thus became an important market for the disposal of other countries’ surplus agricultural 
produce including from the US as donor agencies scrambled for opportunities to participate in 
the lucrative humanitarian business where the UN High Commission for Refugees was 
spending an average of US$ 70 million per annum (Sitkowski 2006). Prior to the demise of 
President Siyad Barre’s oppressive regime, food aid was systematically abused as a tool for 
rewarding allies and keeping them loyal to him, as well as punishing opponents by depriving 
them access to the food aid a situation that continued unabated up to the last day of his rule.  
President Siyad Barre’s rule ended in January 1991 following a civil war in which the most 
powerful opponent to his rule was General Farah Aideed. A political vacuum resulted from the 
ousting of President Siyad Barre as there was no single political/military faction powerful 
enough to form a central government in Mogadishu. The fall of President Siyad Barre was 
immediately followed by the country’s implosion and deconstruction of the state leading to 
chaos and anarchy that was a direct result of ‘the unravelling of the country’s densely knit 
structure of clans and kinship networks (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2012:39). Following the 
downfall of Siyad Barre’s regime the Somali civil war worsened as the two most powerful 
factions led by interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohammed Farah Aideed 
fought for the control of the capital, Mogadishu (Adam 1995:69-78). The post-Barre political 
and security environment threatened the highly lucrative international humanitarian aid 
industry that had worked relatively smoothly under Siyad Barre’s regime as the regime “created 
and exaggerated food emergencies,” a situation that favoured aid agencies (De Waal, 
1997:163-178). This meant that aid agencies were conniving with the Siyad Barre regime to 
exaggerate food aid required in order to profiteer from the excess food donations.  
The civil war that ensued crystallized around sub-clan divisions which made it difficult for 
humanitarian organizations to effectively distribute relief aid because of high levels of banditry 
that looted food aid and even threatened the lives of the aid workers, a situation that qualified 
Somalia to join the list of “failed states” following the collapse of its central government 
(Adebajo and Landsberg 2007:170). The fall of the repressive Siyad Barre regime, instead of 
ushering in peace and stability, triggered and unleashed more conflict and bloodshed as the 
“liberators began fighting for spoils of the war and for the new loot” leading to a situation 
where there was nothing else left to loot from Mogadishu except the foreign donations by 
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foreign humanitarian organizations hence fighting in Mogadishu was predominantly over the 
control of foreign relief supplies (Durch 1996:317-318). Some international aid agencies began 
to view military intervention for the protection of international humanitarian aid as the only 
viable and just solution to the Somali crisis hence they began to lobby UN and US officials for 
a “humanitarian” military intervention. 
What makes this appeal suspicious is the observation that there were no similar calls for 
military humanitarian intervention in similar cases on the African continent, involving 
countries stricken by war and famine. Sitkowski (2006) observed that in Sudan where an 
estimated 250 000 people died of starvation in 1988 alone, there were no calls made by aid 
agencies for UN peacekeepers to launch a humanitarian mission to rescue the dying Sudanese 
population. This discrepancy led him to conclude that Somalia was targeted for military 
intervention because of its smaller size compared to Sudan and that it was more easily 
accessible by sea and air, hence it was an ideal and more feasible target for an experimental 
large scale military humanitarian intervention to distribute food aid (Ibid.). Added to this, 
Somalia neither had a strong ally among the P-5 in the Security Council nor a formidable 
centralized military establishment the size of the Sudanese military apparatus that could 
effectively resist any foreign, uninvited military “humanitarian intervention” on its territory.  
4.2.2 UN/US opportunity to experiment with new concepts of peacekeeping 
The Somali humanitarian crisis presented the UN Secretariat and the US military leadership 
with an ideal opportunity to experiment with new concepts and doctrines of second generation 
peacekeeping operations that included operational innovations in military humanitarian 
missions in troubled countries on the periphery (Al Qaq Op.Cit.). The Somalia crisis came at 
an opportune time when the world body was embarking on more intrusive peace-building 
missions designed to establish liberal democracies in rogue countries unhindered by the Cold 
War politics (Francis 2006:101). The argument for peace-building interventions was that post-
Cold War internal conflicts were global problems that called for multilateral responses by the 
world community (Sisk 2001). The argument goes further to state that internal conflicts had 
direct and indirect implications for neighbouring states through spill overs such as refugees or 
small arms proliferation as well as indirect implications for the entire international community 
that included violation of international norms on crimes against humanity, or through the 
creation of humanitarian emergencies manifested through acute food insecurity, lack of water 
or housing, and basic safety for affected populations (Hazem, Huth, and Russett 2003). In order 
to operationalize the new peace-building concept of peacekeeping, a military humanitarian 
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intervention plan for Somalia was therefore hatched by the UN Secretary General with the full 
backing of the US military leadership right from its conception.  
Former US ambassador Oakley acknowledges that the Bush administration wanted to partner 
with a more globally active UN “… with greater US support and participation, particularly in 
peacekeeping and nation building” (Hirsch and Oakley 1995:152). Such partnering with a more 
globally active UN would suggest that the US was trying to maximize on the opportunity 
availed by the end of the Cold War to assert itself as the dominant remaining power through 
the manipulation of the UN and other multilateral institutions in an attempt to spread Western 
liberal value systems across the Third World countries on the periphery. Maren (1997:221) 
observed that the active partnering of the US and the UN immediately after the Cold War where 
the UN received “…greater US support and participation, particularly in peacekeeping and 
nation building” resulted in the US going to the extent of drafting Somalia’s unrealistic 
humanitarian mandates for peacekeeping and peace enforcement resolutions on behalf of the 
UN Secretariat. He highlights that the humanitarian mandates for Somalia were drafted in the 
office of the US Chief of Staff, General Colin Powell (Ibid.). Haass (1994:73) concurs and 
further posits that all the major Security Council resolutions on Somalia during the early 1990s, 
including the "nation-building resolutions” were authored by US officials, mainly in the 
Pentagon, and handed to the UN as faits accomplis. Haass adds that only after the disastrous 
October 3, 1993 fire fight did the US try to exonerate itself from the operation that it had started, 
sponsored, commanded and almost entirely directed after having usurped the powers of the 
Secretary General and the Secretariat that are normally charged with the overall responsibility 
of controlling and giving direction to peacekeeping operations.10 Haass (1994) noted that one 
international civil servant remarked that the UN was seduced and hoodwinked ultimately 
resulting in its eventual abandonment by the US to clean up the Somali political and military 
mess when the humanitarian adventure operations disastrously went wrong.  
It is evident that the US/UN military adventure in Somalia that was launched without the 
express approval by the Somalis was part of a well calculated grand strategy of the “noble 
                                                          
10 The Director of Africa Centre at Great Zimbabwe University Dr. R. Uriga is of the view that the interest shown 
by the US in trying to create a new central government in Somalia through a military humanitarian intervention 
appears to suggest that the US could have fuelled the conflict in Somalia in order to avail itself and the UN an 
opportunity to intervene so that a completely new regime accountable to the US was left in power after the 
withdrawal of peacekeepers. He added that as part of the US efforts to create a New World Order after the demise 
of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that most of the conflicts in Africa were externally engineered and 
sponsored in order to create crises that called for UN peacekeeping intervention yet African leaders ended up 
inviting the very sponsors of conflict on the continent to come as peacekeepers to solve the problems they created. 
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Leviathan” world-wide design to protect the developed world and some parts of the 
international society from “rogue states and truculent warlords.” The second generation 
humanitarian peacekeeping missions in Africa that started with the Somali peacekeeping 
experiment were deliberately designed to deeply embroil UN peacekeepers and peace-builders 
in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The creation of a New World Order through the 
cooperation between the UN and the US was expected to usher in a new dispensation that 
would replace power politics in international relations with “moral and ethical” considerations 
implemented by the “newly non-polarized UN” and where necessary, coercively imposed by 
the Security Council that was free from bi-polar balance of power politics. The humanitarian 
argument of the 1990s portrayed a scenario where both ethical considerations and international 
law were converging towards defining an international obligation to intervene and interfere 
across national borders for humanitarian reasons in situations where serious human rights 
violations where seen to have been perpetrated by the government of the society in question or 
in cases where the government was seen to be failing to contain such violations (Johnson 
2006:115). It was under this dispensation that the UN and the US military operations were 
launched in Somalia which raises a requirement to establish the real motivating factors outside 
the alleged humanitarian justifications.  
The next section examines the non-humanitarian motives that could have influenced the UN 
Secretary General and his Secretariat to champion the advocacy for launching a military 
“humanitarian intervention” in Somalia at a time when the famine and starvation crisis was 
subsiding.  
4.3 UN non-humanitarian motives for intervention in Somalia 
This section attempts to challenge the dominant narrative that the decision by the newly 
appointed Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to launch a military “humanitarian” mission was 
based on purely humanitarian concerns of facilitating effective distribution of food aid to 
starving Somalis. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali for some reason, adopted an extremely 
proactive position in advancing the military humanitarian option as the only solution to the 
crisis in Somalia before exhaustion of other non-violent options (Al Qaq 2009:72) suggesting 
that there could have been other non-humanitarian motivating factors for the military 
intervention that was deliberately going to violate Somalia’s national sovereignty. The section 
highlights the extent to which Somalia’s national sovereignty was violated during a historical 
period when the ethical norms of state sovereignty and prohibition of foreign intervention in 
domestic disputes were being reconsidered in international and regional debates. At the time 
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of UN/US intervention in Somalia, it was clear that humanitarian considerations had taken 
precedence over state sovereignty (Keller 1995:3) as will be demonstrated in subsequent 
paragraphs.   
Available literature and interviews conducted during this research point towards a pre-
determined mind-set by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to use Somalia as a laboratory to 
experiment with new concepts of “assertive peace enforcement” operations. In his Agenda for 
Peace document, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali unveiled and proposed multiple approaches 
towards rejuvenating the UN in its pursuit of peace in the post-Cold War period through 
prevention, peace-making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace-building operations 
sponsored by the world body  (Boutros-Ghali 1992). The Secretary General and his team of 
advisors at the UN headquarters were strong advocates for new and radical changes in the “on-
going evolution of liberal forms of intervention in the South that would culminate, at its apogee 
with ‘humanitarian’ military intervention” (Al Qaq 2009:54). The Secretary General’s 
willingness to experiment with UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era 
coincided with the determination by the US to experiment with its concept of “multilateral 
assertiveness” in dealing with rogue states and destabilizing regions on the periphery (Ibid.). 
Moreover the US was exploiting every available opportunity to take over regions and countries 
that had been abandoned by the Soviet Union following its demise at the end of the Cold War. 
President Bush, was in the process of attempting to operationalize his “New World Order” 
vision that he announced in 1991 following the spectacular military operations of the American 
led UN coalition in the liberation of Kuwait and an absence of constraints from superpower 
rivalry (Adebajo and Landsberg 2007:166). The US was at the same time exploiting every 
opportunity to demonstrate that it was the triumphant remaining super power determined to 
promote the “New World Order” through the spread of Western liberal values of democracy 
and the capitalist economic system. The humanitarian and political crisis in Somalia availed 
such an opportunity where the UN and the US could jointly experiment with novel concepts of 
peace enforcement operations that had little or no respect for national sovereignty of the host 
country. Prior to deploying UN peacekeepers in Somalia, there was an ethical and legal 
requirement to secure Somalia’s consent to the deployment of UN troops in that country yet 
there existed no central government in Mogadishu the Somali capital.  
To satisfy the requirement for host state consent in a situation where there was no central 
government to bring forward the Somali crisis for discussion, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, 
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at the unethical instigation of some Security Council members constructed what has been 
termed a “legal fiction” in an effort to legalize UN direct involvement and deployment in 
Somalia’s civil war (Jonah 2012). The Secretary General and his team manufactured a solution 
that violated Somalia’s sovereignty and which was ostensibly against the wishes of the OAU 
members who had not taken up the Crisis in Somalia for discussion at the UN. 11  The 
Secretariat, acting in place of the non-existing central government in Somalia took the initiative 
to appoint a country representative at the UN Headquarters to make a request for UN 
intervention in Somalia without consulting the leading warlords in Somalia. 
4.3.1 Unethical circumventing of the requirement for host state consent 
Following the departure of Somalia’s substantive permanent representative Abdillahi Said 
Osman, the UN Secretariat elevated Fatun Hassan the second counsellor in Somalia’s 
permanent mission to the UN to the position of head of mission who was then asked to formally 
request the Security Council to intervene in Somalia yet he did not represent any of the major 
factions in the Somali civil war (Hirsh and Oakley 1995). This initiative marked the beginning 
of UN violation of Somalia’s state sovereignty with the birth of a peacekeeping operation 
launched in that country without appropriate host state consent. There is no consensus on 
whether the act of invitation performed by Fatun Hassan amounted to lawful granting of host 
state consent for the deployment of UNOSOM I a traditional peacekeeping mission since there 
was no central government in Mogadishu.  
Christine Gray (2008:244) argues that the Security Council secured the consent of the Somali 
government, through the Fatun Hassan initiative even though there was no central government 
in Mogadishu with effective control over the whole Somali territory. Ottaway and Lacina 
(2003:73) argue that when there is no real government or central authority in a sovereign 
country like Somalia, “the notion that intervention constitutes a violation of sovereignty unless 
requested by the government appears outright absurd.” It would appear that in the view of 
these authors, the absence of a central government translates to an absence of a state in which 
national sovereignty is insignificant and of no consequences. The counter argument to this line 
                                                          
11 In an interview with a retired African diplomat who was based in Addis Ababa at the time of the UN decision 
to launch a humanitarian mission in Somalia, he emphasised that the majority of African states were opposed to 
UN intervention in a sovereign country without a proper invitation to deploy foreign troops in that country. To 
make matters worse, the OAU had not appealed to the world organization to intervene as African leaders 
considered the Somali civil war to be an internal matter that was to be resolved among the belligerents in that 




of thinking which this researcher agrees with was articulated by Teson (1995:353) who argued 
that the absence of a central government does not constitute an absence of the state whose 
sovereignty deserves respect. If indeed the primary motive for intervention was humanitarian, 
there was no justification for circumventing the OAU and the powerful warlords in Somalia to 
secure a properly constituted invitation for UN peacekeepers. 
The Chinese delegate at the UN Security Council queried whether the handling of the Somali 
crisis was setting a precedent that would be followed in future humanitarian cases. He pointed 
out that “… as we understand it, according to the recommendations of the Secretary-General, 
the military operation authorized by the draft resolution is an exceptional action in view of the 
unique situation in Somalia” (UN doc. S/PV.3145 1992:541). What made this Somali case 
unique, diplomats argued, was the lack of a responsible government that could act as an 
interlocutor at the UN for the purposes of permitting a military action designed to facilitate 
delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance.12 This initiative was novel and unethical 
as it disregarded the authority and relevance of the most powerful warlords in Somalia who 
were not consulted on the appointment of Fatun Hassan a development that led Lewis and 
Mayall (1996:114) to observe that this initiative had practically established an unprecedented 
level of UN intervention in a sovereign state’s internal affairs. In the view of this researcher, 
the two major warring factions in Somalia should have been consulted on the matter of 
elevating Fatun Hassan as the two powerful Somali factions were retrospectively invited to 
New York to sign a ceasefire agreement to facilitate the deployment of UN peacekeepers. 
Understandably, the warlords were not invited to sanction the deployment of UN/US military 
offensive peace enforcement missions launched by the Security Council considering that peace 
enforcement missions are authorised by the UN Security Council without the consent of the 
target country. 
The UN Secretary General did not make a serious effort to secure the consent of all parties 
involved in the conflict. Instead he fired his Special Representative Ambassador Sahnoun who 
was painstakingly making an effort to secure the consent of all militia factions involved. 
Boutros-Ghali, under pressure from the US, ignored the fact that it was politically prudent to 
secure the consent of all parties to the conflict because host state consent enhances the 
                                                          
12 In an interview with former foreign minister during the Somalia crisis, he lamented the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the weak Chinese response to the clear violation of Somalia’s sovereignty by a UN/US initiative and 
conspiracy to attempt at creating a Somalia that suited their vision of a New World Order through a process that 
disregarded the wishes of the Somali population. 
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legitimacy and acceptance of the mission by the parties to the conflict. When the first UN 
peacekeeping mission to Somalia (UNOSOM I) was deployed, only two factions were 
belatedly invited to consent to UN peacekeepers’ deployment in Somalia leaving out the 
smaller groups. This marked a preferential treatment of some of the factions that ultimately 
precipitated the failure of the entire peacekeeping effort in Somalia (Tsagourias 2006:10). 
Important to note is the fact that the deployment of UNOSOM I did not have the full blessings 
of Aideed who felt threatened by the presence of UN peacekeepers in Somalia as he felt his 
faction had an upper hand over his main rival Mahdi Mohammed (Murphy 2007:51). Based on 
the suspicion that UN peacekeepers had a hidden agenda in Somalia, opposition to their 
deployment ensued since there was no broad based consent among the belligerents a situation 
that was aggravated by deliberate preferential treatment of some of the factions at the expense 
of others. This leads this study to the question why the Secretary General appeared to be in a 
rush to deploy robust peace enforcement troops. 
4.3.2 An ethical analysis of non-humanitarian motives for military intervention in Somalia 
The UN Secretariat under the leadership of Boutros-Ghali appear to have had grand ideas of 
making Somalia an example of how the UN would deal with countries and regions of instability 
in the post-Cold War era. Diehl (1994:186) observed that Somalia was supposed to have been 
the UN benchmark mission for peace-building in the post-Cold War era. Proactive actions 
adopted by the Secretariat were partly in response to severe pressure emanating from the US 
which dictated to the Secretariat to either “reform or die” hence the Secretary General had to 
revitalize the UN post-Cold War peace and security role in conformity with the US dictates 
and wishes which served as a precondition for guaranteed access to US financial support for 
the world organization (Solomon 1996:6). The argument that humanitarian considerations were 
the main driving force for military intervention in Somalia has been challenged by several 
political analysts and academics.  
De Waal and others have queried whether humanitarian concerns centered on Somalis’ 
starvation were indeed the major motivating factors for the UN/US intervention in Somalia. 
Their argument is mainly centered on the fact that at the time of deploying UN peacekeepers 
in Somalia, the bigger challenge in that country was death from diseases possibly caused by 
malnutrition and not famine induced starvation (De Waal 1994:152). Some humanitarian and 
human rights organizations that were against the military humanitarian intervention in Somalia 
included Save the Children Fund, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the 
American Friends Service Committee. Their anti-military humanitarian intervention argument 
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was based on the fact that “more limited alternative options had not been exhausted and that 
the intervention was based on false information about the Somali situation and (that the military 
option) would not solve the political crisis in Somalia” (De Waal 1996:296). Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that were deployed in the country together with the 
Secretary General’s Special Representative to Somalia who was directly ceased with the crisis 
did not believe that time was ripe for a military humanitarian intervention yet the UN under 
pressure from the US decided on the contrary to proceed with military deployments before all 
alternative peaceful options had been exhausted. Such observations and sentiments justify the 
search for unethical non-humanitarian motives that influenced the launch of military peace 
enforcement operations when the assessment of some of the donors on the ground was that the 
military intervention was not only unnecessary but also that it was not going to produce positive 
results, a view that was ultimately vindicated less than a year later. 
4.3.3 An ethical analysis of the relationship between Boutros-Ghali and Farah Aideed 
The New World Order that was anticipated at the end of the Cold War did not immediately 
materialise as disorder and violent internal conflicts across the globe characterised international 
affairs to the dismay of the proponents of the envisioned ideal world and doctrine (Utley 2006). 
In line with this ideology, Boutros-Ghali was a strong advocate for military humanitarian peace 
enforcement missions as he formulated a plan in conjunction with US officials at the Pentagon, 
towards the deployment of a humanitarian peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Not surprisingly, 
the Somalis, especially General Farah Aideed and his followers were suspicious of Boutros-
Ghali’s ulterior motives for intervention in Somalia as they did not believe that he and the UN 
he represented had good intentions in intervening in the domestic affairs of Somalia. This view 
is shared by Hirsch and Oakley (1995:19) who noted that General Aideed and his militias 
maintained old animosities towards Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.  
Prior to becoming Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali served as Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs in Egypt. During that period, Egypt strongly supported the rule of President 
Siyad Barre, the man who had imprisoned and tortured Aideed for more than five years, which 
General Aideed now held against the Secretary General (Ibid.). The feeling that Boutros-Ghali 
had found an opportunity to effectively deal with Aideed cannot be ruled out as the Secretary 
General rushed to embrace the military offensive option before exhausting other non-coercive 
measures that were being pursued by Sahnoun, his special representative whose approach was 
respected by the warlords and traditional leaders in Somalia. As a result, the powerful mutual 
feelings of animosity between the Secretary General and Farah Aideed played a critical role in 
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the promotion of difficulties encountered by the UN/US mission in Somalia (Ibid.). In this 
regard, it can be considered rational to conclude that one of the contributing factors for 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s enthusiasm for military intervention in Somalia that 
violated that country’s national sovereignty was the pursuit of the military defeat of his arch 
enemy General Farah Aideed as reflected in one of the Secretary General’s public address.   
Addressing an American Conference on Global Development at the Carter Centre, Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali revealed his ambitious goal in Somalia when he stated that after the 
food distribution in Somalia, the militia gangs would completely disappear following United 
Nations aggressive peace negotiations with the Somali warring clans. What this implied was 
that the warlords like General Aideed were to “disappear” and be replaced by preferred leaders 
after the elimination and disappearance of the militia gangs. This was confirmed by comments 
made by one senior UN official who stated that, ‘‘…the factions will be weakened by this 
military intervention, so the creation of a new force—with United Nations assistance—might 
work’’ (Peterson 1992). All these ambitious targets aimed at reconstructing and politically re-
engineering Somalia were being planned for execution without any input or participation of 
the Somalis in clear violation of that country’s sovereignty and self-determination. In that 
regard, General Farah Aideed and his militias were justified in harbouring suspicions regarding 
the true motives of the UN/US military intervention in Somalia.  
Suspicious of the true intentions of the UN military involvement in their country, Somali 
spokesmen representing various warlords opposed to peacekeepers’ deployment warned 
Boutros-Ghali that the UN force would be resisted if deployed as they were considered to be 
an invading foreign force (Wheeler and Roberts 2012:13-14). Secretary Bolton, who was 
serving in the Bush Administration warned that it was not advisable to deploy any foreign 
troops in Somalia arguing that it was ‘‘premature until there is an effective ceasefire.’’ His 
advice was not taken heed of by both the UN Secretary General and the Bush administration. 
Bolton’s advice was based on a warning made to him by an aide to General Aideed who warned 
that ‘‘…if the UN sent in 50 military observers, they might as well send in 50 coffins too’’ 
(Moffett III:1992) a warning that was not taken seriously considering the operational handling 
of General Aideed’s faction during the course of the operation. Such warnings clearly 
demonstrated that the UN troops were not welcome at all in Somalia hence the fabricated 
consent in New York was considered invalid. True to their word, the Somalis were determined 
not to succumb to a foreign imposed military solution to their internal political and security 
crisis as they intensified their resistance to UN sponsored foreign military invasion.  
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Mohamed Sahnoun, the former UN Special Representative to Somalia, once remarked that 
UNOSOM’s military heavy handedness and its “heavy military presence' led the Somalis to 
perceive the peacekeepers’ presence as an occupation force trying to impose an alien political 
solution without the full participation of the Somali people (Thakur 1994:399). The UN 
sponsored “humanitarian” intervention in Somalia was not an ordinary military intervention to 
help the suffering population in that impoverished country. Richard Haass (1994:26-27) 
observed the difference between standard humanitarian interventions aimed at "providing 
protection and other basic needs," and much more complex endeavours, such as nation-
building, which envision "recasting the institutions of the society” and he concluded that the 
Somalia humanitarian mission was widened to include nation building because "policymakers 
got ambitious." The ambitious and aggressive conduct of UN operations in Somalia tended to 
suggest that the Secretary General had other ulterior motives in the outcome of the Somali 
operation.  
According to (Kapteijns 2013:437), during the course of the peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia, the military dimension overwhelmed and cancelled out the humanitarian one leading 
to serious violation of Somali people’s human rights and the country’s national sovereignty. 
Kapteijns adds that the “humanitarian label” placed on the military campaign in Somalia, 
helped to camouflage the true UN and US highly subjective political preferences in Somalia 
(Ibid.). Such subjective preferences could only be attained through the violation of Somalia’s 
national sovereignty by the invading UN sponsored forces. The dilemma faced by the 
peacekeepers in Somalia was therefore whether to appease those with power, the warlords on 
the ground or oppose them with force and face the consequences (Mayall 1996:109), a dilemma 
that found a solution in the excessive use of force against the most powerful warlord General 
Farah Aideed in which thousands of innocent civilians were killed in cold blood.  
Considering the fact that the initiative to launch a military “humanitarian” mission in Somalia 
was largely that of Boutros-Ghali backed by the Bush Administration, it is prudent that the 
chapter now focuses on examining the non-humanitarian motivations that influenced the US to 
deploy a massive military force in Somalia; the United Task Force (UNITAF) at a time when 
the effects of the famine were already in decline.  
4.4 Ethical analysis of US motivations in launching of UNITAF 
This section aims to explore and identify non-humanitarian military, political and economic 
factors that influenced the US to offer and deploy 28 000 troops for the UN humanitarian 
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mission in Somalia. This is important in order to effectively challenge the official narrative, 
that US troops were primarily and solely deployed to help stabilize the Somali crisis, “in order 
to facilitate the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid” to the neediest Somali citizens. 
The section argues that the US deployment was not driven by altruistic considerations but by 
geo-strategic self-interests of the post-Cold War US ambitions which had little bearing on 
humanitarian justifications.  
The mantra about ethical and humanitarian justifications for the military operations served as 
a smoke screen to hide the organized hypocrisy that was being practiced by the UN and US 
planners.13 In order to give credence to the altruistic justification for the military deployments 
in Somalia, there are strong allegations and suspicions that US officials connived with UN and 
some donor community officials in manipulating data and information emanating from 
Somalia to exaggerate the real humanitarian situation in Somalia in order to mislead the 
international community from the true motives of their military intervention as they were bent 
on achieving premeditated geo-political and geo-strategic outcomes favourable to the US and 
not the population of Somalia (De Waal 1996). This view is shared by Uriga (Interview August 
2015) who observed that “donor agencies serve to destroy the cohesion of a country and that 
host government loses part of its sovereignty” if it becomes too dependent on donor support. 
The predetermined US policy position in Somalia was to impose an undeclared UN rule and 
trusteeship through military coercion in occupied Somalia in violation of the national 
sovereignty of a sovereign member of the UN, and re-build the country along neo-liberal 
capitalist value systems accountable to the US and not the Somali population (Al Qaq 
Op.Cit.:73-74). This observation goes to demonstrate that it is foolhardy for African 
populations to expect UN sponsored peacekeepers to genuinely come to risk their lives and 
treasure for purely altruistic reasons meant to rescue African populations from whatever 
conflict or crisis they may be facing. This is in line with the realist school of thought that argues 
that nation states should always find opportunities to maximize their national benefits and self-
interests in their international engagements with other nations.  
                                                          
13 In an interview with a retired army general who served with UNOSOM, he emphasized the fact that the US 
approach to the humanitarian crisis was markedly different from other contingents such as the Italian and 
Zimbabwean troops that preferred a painstakingly negotiated approach towards securing the cooperation of the 
warlords and their followers as opposed to a military imposed solution that did not have a buy-in of the local 
leadership and the population they controlled. He added that those contingents that preferred negotiations over 
military coercion enjoyed more local support from the population whilst the more aggressive contingents that 
believed in military mighty faced fierce resistance and suffered a lot of casualties further poisoning the operating 
environment to the detriment of the entire mission.   
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In this regard, the US offer of troops for deployment in Somalia came as a surprise to many 
because of the financial challenges faced by Russia and the US at the time of the Somali crisis. 
Murphy (2007:33) has argued that the financial position of Russia and the US during the early 
1990s was such that none of them was interested in pro-active deployment of peacekeepers in 
Somalia because both countries were in arrears on their peacekeeping payments hence they 
would rather have deferred deployments of non-strategically important missions. More 
specifically, the US was publicly against the deployment of a large peacekeeping mission to 
Somalia because it feared that it would end up bearing the financial burden of the mission a 
situation worsened by other tactical and logistic constrains that militated against the 
deployment of a large force in the war torn country (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996:203). 
Given this background, this chapter argues that “humanitarian” reasons alone could not have 
motivated US deployment of a large military force in Somalia. Tactical and logistical 
limitations together with other geo-political constraints could have led the US leadership to 
prefer a multilateral intervention force in Somalia as a way of minimizing and spreading the 
peacekeeping risks and costs. Moreover, this approach also aimed at building domestic political 
support for such missions (Ibid.). As a result, the UN sponsored intervention force had other 
countries co-opted to give an impression that the mission was indeed a UN multinational 
intervention as opposed to a US invasion.  
4.4.1 The influence of the donor agencies 
There is a strong school of thought that suggests that the donor community strongly lobbied 
for US military “humanitarian intervention” in Somalia to serve some of their own selfish 
economic interests. Finnemore (2003) an advocate for the humanitarian motive, argues that the 
absence of geo-strategic or economic advantages to be gained by the US reflects that the 
intervention can only be explained by reference to humanitarian norms. Mayall (1996) also 
supports the humanitarian motive thesis as he argues that the “humanitarian” disaster was the 
primary reason for the US intervention in Somalia. Bjørn Møller (2009:19) equally supports 
the narrative that the US mounted a military “humanitarian intervention” in Somalia, officially 
mandated as a peacekeeping operation, even though there was no peace to keep. The mission 
has been referred to as a “humanitarian intervention” in an attempt at “saving strangers” 
(Wheeler 2000). However some analysts have queried whether humanitarian concerns centered 
on Somalis’ starvation was indeed the major motivating factor for US intervention in Somalia 
especially when the famine crisis had significantly subsided.  
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As noted above, De Waal (1994:152) argued that by the time UNITAF arrived in Somalia, the 
bigger problem in Somalia was death from diseases and not starvation as the draught season 
had already ended or significantly improved. The intensive lobbying for a US military 
intervention by the director of CARE, a US based humanitarian relief organizations (HRO) 
already working in Somalia had a significant impact on the decision by US authorities to 
intervene in Somalia (De Waal 1997:181). This support for a military humanitarian 
intervention sponsored by CARE raised eyebrows considering that other international 
humanitarian donor agencies operating in Somalia were strongly opposed to military 
deployments as they saw no justification for the militarization of the humanitarian crisis that 
was already significantly improving and that military operations were bound to complicate the 
operating environment already infested with multiple militia groups with competing political 
allegiances.  
Andrew Natsios, Director in the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was the 
main proponent of US military involvement as he led the strong campaign and advocacy for 
UN/US military deployments in Somalia when he declared in January 1992 that the famine in 
Somalia was 'the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world' (Clark 1993:212). This 
declaration triggered an international media campaign to paint a gloomy picture in Somalia 
where it was estimated that over 1,000 Somalis were dying weekly (Wheeler 2000:179). 
Natsios (1997:79) also claimed that starvation and malnutrition were the major sources of 
disease that was threatening the lives of 2 million Somalis in danger of dying, in a country 
facing food deficit that was driving food prices by up to 800–1,200 percent. The exaggerated 
media coverage brought the suffering of the civilian population to the attention of the 
proverbial “international community” with a primary aim of enticing the world community to 
intervene with humanitarian assistance.  
Important to note is the fact that most of the food aid arrived after the famine had run its course, 
and that aid arguably exacerbated the local problems by contributing to the emergent “war 
economy”, upon which the militias thrived (De Waal 1997). It cannot therefore be ruled out 
that the announcement by Natsios that the Somalia crisis was the “the greatest humanitarian 
emergency in the world” could have been a deliberate act to psych the international community 
to anticipate and ultimately sympathize and support a military “humanitarian intervention” in 
Somalia that had other non-altruistic ulterior motives. The fact that UNSC resolutions for 
Somalia were drafted and compiled at the Pentagon under the guidance of General Collin 
Powell suggests the existence of US military vested interests in the outcome of a post-conflict 
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Somalia that had to be within the geo-strategic influence of the sole superpower remaining. 
The direct involvement of the Pentagon in the framing of a case for a military intervention in 
Somalia and the unanticipated offer of massive troops for the mission by the US authorities 
raises suspicion as to what the true motive of the military intervention was in Somalia.   
4.4.2 Unethical and non-altruistic influence of the US military establishment 
The UN/US Somalia military intervention mission was portrayed to the entire world as a 
credible and genuine humanitarian undertaking in which the US was alleged to have had no 
geo-strategic or economic interests in that country. To reinforce the official US narrative of not 
having vital self-serving interests in Somalia, a military investigation commissioned to study 
US involvement in Somalia highlighted that ―the US involvement in Somalia was as a result 
of being the sole remaining world power and the leader of the new world order hence it was 
duty bound to respond to the humanitarian crisis for humanitarian purposes (Stewart 2003). 
The conclusion drawn by the investigating team implied that US new found status as the sole 
super power significantly influenced its decision to intervene in Somalia for the sake of 
demonstrating its benevolence as the sole superpower. UNITAF was perceived by many 
political and military leaders as a way to pioneering and championing a new kind of American 
“intervention policy,” based on “humanitarian” justifications (Al Qaq 2009). There were 
indeed more non-humanitarian motives that influenced the intervention. 
Lowther (2007) identified four factors that initially militated against US deployment of ground 
troops in Somalia. First, was the nature of Somali guerrilla warfare type conflict “fuelled by 
age-old inter-clan rivalry” which did not suit the large scale open warfare the American troops 
were primarily trained to fight. Second the heavily armed militias whose survival was based 
on blending with the population making it difficult to distinguish the militias from the general 
population. This factor made it difficult to guarantee target identification and safeguarding 
American force protection despite their being heavily armed with the latest sophisticated 
weapon systems. Third, Somalia’s geographical terrain presented tactical and logistical 
challenges for American troops. Fourth, US military commanders were arguing that the US 
had no vital national interests at stake in Somalia to justify a massive military deployment 
hence there was no valid reason to risk American lives now that the Soviet Union had collapsed 
and the Soviet backed regime in Ethiopia was crumbling (Lowther 2007:107). These 
limitations were eventually overcome by stronger non-humanitarian motivating factors that the 
chapter now turns to examine. 
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One of the major motivating factors for US military deployment in Somalia was the immediate 
availability of a large number of American troops in the Gulf region that could have influenced 
the US decision to offer troops to the UN for the “humanitarian intervention.”  Hoar (1993:56) 
observed that at the time of the US troop offer to the UN, the US military had just completed 
“a large scale training exercise simulating famine intervention in north-east Africa” a scenario 
that perfectly suited the Somalia crisis situation. The assumption that the US military leadership 
took advantage of the prevailing crisis in Somalia to put into practice what they had simulated 
and rehearsed during the famine relief field exercise sounds logical and plausible. It is difficult 
to imagine that the US training exercise in the Gulf region did not specifically have Somalia in 
mind at the time of planning the exercise considering that the situation in that country suited 
perfectly well the scenario painted in the simulated famine field exercise. Moreover the build-
up to the US offer of troops for intervention was characterized by the Pentagon drafting UNSC 
mandates that would eventually suit US troop deployments in Somalia hence the 
“humanitarian” military intervention was not simply an urgent response to the humanitarian 
crisis in that war stricken and famine ravaged country but a deliberate decision arrived at after 
a thorough cost-benefit analysis by the US military authorities.   
Different scenarios and options were presented to President Bush for consideration regarding 
the US response to the situation in Somalia. Surprisingly, the best response option selected by 
the presidential advisers “was not just a US-led, UN-approved military intervention but rather 
a military intervention that was twice as large as the largest option on the table,” a scenario that 
was labelled as not just “the sledgehammer option” but “a doubling in size for the 
sledgehammer option” (Menkhaus and Ortmayer 1995:7). Doubling the size of force that 
military planners had determined as adequate at a time when the US was in arrears with her 
UN peacekeeping contributions suggests that there were other ulterior motives beyond 
humanitarian justification for US involvement in Somalia. Such massive deployments in any 
country were bound to impact negatively on the sovereignty of the host state and its population 
and Somalia was no exception. Moreover all the military intervention options that were being 
considered did not have Somalia’s population consent as the intended and ultimate 
beneficiaries of the massive military intervention. To make matters worse, the massive military 
intervention options that were being considered were indeed against the informed advice from 
Ambassador Sahnoun, the Special Representative in Somalia who had been making steady but 
slow progress in trying to get a buy-in from all the warlords and militia groups about finding a 
common ground to a political solution to the political and humanitarian crisis. It is critically 
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important for this study to keep in mind the fact that at the time of the US military intervention 
in Somalia, the real threat of famine had significantly subsided. Hansch (1994:32) observed 
that the famine threat had significantly diminished to the extent that the majority of non-
governmental organizations operating in Somalia vehemently opposed massive military 
deployments as they feared that their security and impartiality would be compromised by the 
massive military presence in their theatre of humanitarian operations. These observations serve 
to dispel or challenge the purely “humanitarian” justification for US military intervention in 
Somalia. It is equally important to keep in mind the fact that US military employment is strictly 
governed by the realist school of thought where US troops are deployed in situations that 
enhance the protection or advancement of US self-interests and not for altruistic reasons. 
According to Wheeler and Roberts (2012:181), only the geographically and economically 
naive observers and analysts could believe the official and popular narrative that the US did 
not have strategic military and economic interests in Somalia that ultimately influenced its offer 
of military participation in Somalia. Wheeler and Roberts quote a 19th Century philosopher 
Mihael Bukhanin who remarked on the realistic and materialistic imperatives of the religious 
wars in Europe when he stated that: "No one at all interested in the study of history could have 
failed to see that there was always some great material interest at the bottom of the most 
abstract, the most sublime and idealistic, theological and religious struggles" (Ibid.). The 
argument being advanced by Wheeler and Roberts (2012) is that Somalia’s geo-strategic 
location, despite its relative diminished importance following the end of the Cold War, was 
still vital to US regional strategic interests.14 Specifically US presence in Somalia would allow 
rapid deployment of troops to critical areas of more significant national geo-strategic interests 
to the remaining superpower such as the oil rich Middle East as well as safeguarding the vital 
sea lanes through the Strait of Eden (Ibid.). Based on these observations and arguments, it is 
evident that there were indeed military strategic factors that influenced President Bush’s 
decision to offer US troops to deploy in Somalia in violation of that country’s national 
sovereignty under the false pretext of “humanitarian Intervention” to save starving Somalis. 
The military intervention mission was designed to implement a regime change agenda crafted 
at the Pentagon through dislodging the status quo in Somalia of fragmented militia ethnic 
                                                          
14 In an interview on 12 March 2015 with a retired General who served in Somalia, he cited the fact that the only 
US military base on the African continent is in Djibouti following the refusal by the AU to grant the US Africa 
Command (Africom) a permanent military base in Africa. The significance of this base is strategic for it covers 
the vital and strategic sea route via the Gulf of Eden as well as operations in Somalia and Yemen. 
97 
 
groups and replacing them by an imposed puppet regime answerable to the dictates and wishes 
of the US and its allies.  
4.4.3 Unethical US political desire to operationalize the New World Order 
Sorensen (2006) observed that since the end of the Cold War, the US participated in conflict-
ridden areas where it heavily preferred UN-mandated peacekeeping operations as opposed to 
UN-commanded or controlled missions thus confirming US wish to avoid placing its troops 
under command and institutional control of UN-led peacekeeping operations. He added that 
the conduct of the US reveals that American peacekeepers were dispatched to regions it 
considers strategically or politically vital to its foreign policy and that the US sparingly used 
peacekeeping as a policy instrument for brief periods and only in areas that the US considered 
strategically important (Ibid.115). This view is in sync with the realist view point that such 
massive US troops are only deployed where their presence serve to advance or safeguard US 
strategic interests. In this regard, it is prudent to determine whether US participation in UN 
mandated intervention in Somalia had anything to do US strategic self-interests.  
Considering the fact that President Bush offered US troops for deployment in Somalia after he 
had lost the Presidential elections to the incoming President Bill Clinton, some analysts have 
argued that he was eager to boost his legacy by participating in a “humanitarian military 
intervention” in Somalia but not Bosnia where the military situation was more challenging 
(Kapteijns 2013:424). In line with this argument, Blumenthal (1995:52-53) believes President 
Bush also wanted to operationalize his publicly articulated vision of a peaceful “New World 
Order” as well as getting a foothold in the attractive potential oil reserves in Somalia coupled 
with early concerns about Islamic fundamentalism. This researcher agrees with the potential 
oil reserves theory as one of the main motivating factors for US participation in the UN mission 
in Somalia. 
To further buttress the view that humanitarian concerns were not the primary motivation for 
intervention, the National Security Adviser to President Bush, Brent Scott is quoted as having 
remarked that, “So if you look at Somalia, it’s Third World, it’s black, it’s Muslim…it had 
everything going for it in terms of making a judgment”(Rosegrant and Watkins 1996:10). Such 
a blunt and emotional statement, coming from one of the most senior officials in the Bush 
Administration appears to suggest that in the post-Cold War international world order, 
underdeveloped countries no longer enjoyed the protection of the Soviet Union hence African 
and Muslim countries on the periphery were rightfully susceptible to intervention when crises 
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emerged within their states. In that regard, post-Cold War versions of UN peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement missions were to be considered as forms of riot control directed against the 
unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace ushered in by the end of the Cold War 
(Pugh 2007:41). An interpretation of Brent Scott’s statement about Somalia being “Third 
World, Black and Muslim” and therefore an obvious and “legitimate target” for “riot control” 
by western powers, leads to the conclusion that the military “humanitarian intervention” 
argument had little to do with genuine humanitarian concerns about assisting starving Somalis 
or “saving strangers” purely for altruistic justifications. This point buttresses the view that 
humanitarian considerations were not the primary driving force for US military intervention in 
Somalia. 
Several other scholars such as Chandler (2009); Duffield (2010); have queried the motives of 
Western liberal states that have developed a habit of using humanitarian reasons to justify 
violation of principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of 
other states. They have warned that the growing trend of humanitarian intervention serves as a 
strategy employed by Western liberal governments and institutions to “expand their influence 
and control over the illiberal regimes of the global borderlands …that humanitarian 
intervention is part of a liberal technology of global governance”(Ibid). These views are shared 
by Third World countries that also believe economic considerations play a critical role in 
influencing foreign military interventions under the pretext of humanitarian interventions in 
peripheral developing countries as was the case in Somalia. 
4.4.4 Unethical economic factors that motivated US military intervention in Somalia 
From an economic perspective, Wheeler and Roberts (Op.Cit.:181) argue that it is naive to 
believe that President Bush, who made his own personal fortune as a Texas oilman, was 
unaware of the favourable geological and seismic analyses regarding the oil and gas production 
potential in the undeveloped Somalian geological strata. Information based on American oil 
company reports of the late 1980's reflect that among unexplored regions with substantial oil 
reserves yet to be tapped across the entire world, “the region lying from the southern tip of the 
Arabian Peninsula, under the Red Sea, south through Somalia to the Kenyan border and off the 
coast represented potentially the world's second largest undeveloped oil and gas province after 
the Siberian region” (Ibid.). Under President Siyad Barre’s rule, American multinational 
corporations were scrambling for exploration opportunities and rapidly building refineries, 
purchasing drilling leases, and engaging in exploration (Ibid.). These lucrative commercial 
activities were seriously disrupted by the demise of the US surrogate President Siyad Barre, a 
99 
 
scenario that could have triggered an interest not only to reverse the trend but also deny the 
Chinese and other interested powers access to the oil and gas reserves deposited under the 
Somalian geological strata.  
This section has exposed and highlighted the non-humanitarian factors that contributed to the 
decision to launch the so called US military “humanitarian” intervention in Somalia and the 
extent to which Somalia’s national sovereignty was violated through these military 
interventions. Based on the ensuing discussion, it is evident that the much talked about 
“humanitarian” justification for intervention was simply a smoke screen for the pursuit of geo-
strategic; geo-political and economic self-interests by western powers under the leadership of 
the US.  
4.5 An ethical analysis on application of UN peacekeeping principles in Somalia 
The UN/US missions in Somalia violated the three “fundamental principles” of UN 
peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping “holy trinity” of consent, impartiality, and non-
use of force was violated during all the three phases of military intervention in Somalia. The 
cardinal principles of  UN peacekeeping were replaced by the “concept of campaign authority,” 
which was derived from the UN Security Council mandates that sanctioned the missions and 
not the legitimacy derived from observing the cardinal and normative peacekeeping principles 
(Aoi 2011:7). This was done in an effort to operationalise the “New World Order” concept 
coined by President Bush senior following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
4.5.1 Ethical violation of the principle of host state consent 
Mersiades (2006) observed the significance of securing host consent as well as that of the local 
non-state actors when he stated that “consent equates to an absence of active opposition, violent 
or otherwise, to the presence of peacekeepers in the country ... consent not only equates to a 
passive acceptance of peacekeeper authority, and it can also translate to active support” 
(Mersiades 2006:205). When deploying peacekeepers in circumstances of ongoing civil war, 
it is critical that mechanisms of obtaining consent from the dominant players are established 
and maintained if peacekeepers are to continuously get cooperation from the belligerents 
during the entire tour of deployment (Ibid.). Failure to do so ultimately result in non-consenting 
parties to the conflict seriously disrupting and frustrating peacekeepers’ efforts as happened to 
the UN mission in Congo.  
In the case of Somalia, the process adopted by the UN Secretariat in securing host state consent 
was fraught with legal and ethical irregularities considering that the Secretariat had to 
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improvise and upgrade the most senior country representative at the UN to make a request for 
humanitarian peacekeeping intervention in Somalia as highlighted above. The second time the 
UN violated Somalia’s national sovereignty was when it authorized the deployment of an 
additional 3000 troops on 28 August 1992 without consulting any of the warlords in Somalia, 
including the Special Representative of the Secretary General. Initiatives such as these 
demonstrated the organized hypocrisy of the UN peacekeeping operations. This is so in that if 
the troop increase was meant to address genuine and commonly agreed concerns in Somalia, 
at least the Special Representative and the two most powerful warlords should have been 
informed or consulted. The fact that they were not deliberately consulted implies that there was 
a hidden agenda behind the troop increase that naturally raised suspicion once it became public 
knowledge. 
At the request of the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali the UN Security Council through 
Resolution 775 of 28 August 1992 authorized the expansion of UNOSOM I peacekeepers to 
3,500, without notification of the warlords who were signatories to the initial ceasefire earlier 
signed in New York (Murphy 2007:54). To make matters worse and to demonstrate that there 
was organized hypocrisy and a hidden agenda about the entire mission, Ambassador Sahnoun, 
the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Somalia, was neither consulted nor 
informed of the decision in advance to increase the size of the peacekeepers. This error of 
omission served to undermine Ambassador Sahnoun’s authority and credibility among the 
Somali warlords and portrayed him as duplicitous in the eyes of Aideed who was furious about 
the unexplained increase of UN troops. This development equally served to undermine 
Aideed’s dominant military authority in the theatre of operations. Instead of insisting on finding 
ways of securing consent from the various warlords as Ambassador Sahnoun was doing, the 
Boutros-Ghali in collaboration with the US secured Security Council authorization to launch a 
peace enforcement mission to impose the will of the UN and the US on the Somali people in 
violation of that country’s national sovereignty. The absence of a central government in 
Somalia gave the UN Secretary General and his team the impression that they could violate 
Somalia’s sovereignty with impunity which was indeed unethical. 
UNITAF later known as Operation Restore Hope was authorized through UNSC Resolution 
794 of 1992 to ‘use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment 
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’. The use of force by UNITAF was justified on 
the basis of the alleged ‘magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia” 
(Welsh 2008:541) yet the magnitude of human suffering was on the decline as noted above. 
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Kapteijns (2013:424) observed that this mandate was not just unusual in its authorization of 
the use of all necessary means, but also that it disregarded Somalia’s national sovereignty, as 
it was based on the argument that the crisis in Somalia, posed a threat to “international peace 
and security” as outlined in UNSC Resolution  794 of 1992. It is evident from this discussion 
that Somalia’s national sovereignty was deliberately violated by UN/US intervention 
peacekeeping missions whose primary objectives have been erroneously portrayed as 
“humanitarian intervention” to save civilian lives in Somalia.   
4.5.2 Unethical violation of the principle of impartiality 
The peacekeeping principle of impartiality was the biggest casualty right from the start of the 
UN/US operations in Somalia. Fox (2000:10) observed that the main aim of Operation Restore 
Hope/UNITAF was to alter the political-military environment in Somalia with the ultimate 
intention being to alter the balance of power in Somalia prior to the withdrawal of the US 
military, an environment that was viewed as allowing effective distribution of food aid by 
donor agencies. Important to note is the fact that the moment a UN peacekeeping mission aims 
to alter the status quo in the host country, it amounts to interference with the existing structures 
and systems of that country and ultimately violates the sovereignty of the host state. 
Approaches such as these by UN peacekeepers trigger local resistance by those elements whose 
survival and social status would be negatively altered by the presence of foreign troops in their 
country. This view is in sync with the argument presented by Gelot and Soderbaum (2012:240) 
that an intervention cannot be a neutral or impartial act because it introduces new political, 
social and economic opportunities and rewards for both interveners and intervened upon at 
various stages of the intervention especially when we consider that interventions often end up 
embroiled in local power struggles and dynamics. UNITAF and UNOSOM II increasingly 
became embroiled in Somali politics in order to alter the political-military situation in Somalia 
without the consent of the Somali people whilst at the same time the missions were clearly 
violating the principle of impartiality.  
Offensive military operations mounted to disarm some factions in the Kismayu region and 
Mogadishu the capital, were clear evidence of UN favouritism which backfired as militias 
resisted disarmament leading to outright offensive action against the peacekeepers turned 
combatants. According to Chris Alden (1997:3) the official and public targeting of General 
Farah Aideed in which an offer of USD 25 000 was made for his capture or death destroyed 
any remaining perception of neutrality and impartiality, subsequently, resulting in the overall 
loss of credibility and legitimacy of the UN mission. UN troops were embroiled into the 
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factional fighting and ended up being both partisan and legitimate military targets of Somali 
militias as they had lost their international peacekeeping immunity.  
The peacekeeping debacle in Somalia that resulted in the hasty withdrawal of US troops under 
UNOSOM II underlines the critical importance of impartiality in UN peacekeeping operations. 
According to Adebajo and Landsberg (2007:181) the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General during UNOSOM II’s tour of duty Admiral Howe’s handling of the situation in 
Somalia seriously undermined the mission’s ability to positively influence events and served 
to worsen the operating environment in the theatre of operations. UNOSOM II relinquished 
and totally disregarded any pretences of neutrality or impartiality in handling critical and 
contentious issues involving some of the warlords in Somalia (Collison and Muggah 
2010:290). 
Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (1997:79) observed that the illusion that traditional 
peacekeeping methods emphasizing neutrality and impartiality were adequate to handle state 
failure in Somalia was finally swept aside when Aideed's forces ambushed a group of Pakistani 
soldiers on June 5, 1993, killing 24. What these authors fail to realize was that the militias had 
not consented to the massive deployment of foreign troops in their country and more so that 
the militias were responding to attempts at disarming them without their consent. 
4.5.3 Ethical challenges to the use of force for UN humanitarian peacekeeping missions 
The ethical legitimacy for the use of armed force during humanitarian peacekeeping 
interventions was established after the Cold War. UN peacekeeping experiences of the early 
1990s witnessed a growing frequency of the Security Council authorization of the use of force 
other than in self-defence during operations in Yugoslavia, Somalia and later Sierra Leone. In 
the case of Somalia, poor execution of the mandate through excessive use of force and violation 
of Somalia’s national sovereignty compromised the international support for the mission 
casting doubt on the justifiability of humanitarian intervention.  
UNOSOM II used force in defence of its mandate as well as offensively when trying to enforce 
disarmament of the militias, which also violated the principle of impartiality. Substantial 
offensive military force was used after the 5th of June 1993 incident when 24 Pakistani soldiers 
were killed by suspected Aideed’s loyalists. This incident marked the beginning of continuous 
offensive operations in which the UN mission was preoccupied with the attempt to capture 
Aideed (Shawcross 2001:100), who was suspected to have authorized the attack on Pakistani 
soldiers. The continuous military offensive operations marked a significant shift in the conduct 
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of the humanitarian mission, “as it involved, for the first time since the Cold War, the 
deployment of UN military troops to go after a specified enemy” (Ibid.). 
Futile attempts at capturing or killing Aideed and his senior subordinates resulted in the most 
violent offensive military operations launched by US troops, in what was clear excessive use 
of force. Wheeler (2000:116) noted that during the UN-sanctioned US operations in Somalia, 
“it is estimated that 6,000–8,000 Somali citizens were killed as the US employed force 
indiscriminately” in complete violation of the principle of the use of force and that of 
impartiality. The most brutal offensive operations launched at the Olympic Hotel were initiated 
and conducted by US Special forces acting outside the UN chain of command (Fink 1995:192). 
The outcome of this offensive operation was shocking. Chesterman (2001:143) estimates that 
“at least 500 and as many as 1,000 Somalis – many of them civilians – were killed in the fire 
fight.” There was clearly no sense of proportionality or self-restraint in the use of deadly force 
by American soldiers as they massacred mainly civilian Somalis, a situation that came to haunt 
them three months later when 18 American Special Forces were killed on 3rd October 1993. 
Wheeler and Roberts (2012) state that a total of forty-three American Soldiers and Marines 
were killed in Somalia, within a period of only four months. This demonstrates the degree of 
resistance to the presence of unwelcome foreign troops in Somalia. 
Armed with a Chapter VII mandate that authorized the use of force, the UNOSOM II 
peacekeepers aggressively attempted to disarm the Somali population and bring the entire 
country under the direct control of the UN in direct violation of Somalia’s national sovereignty. 
Adekanye (1997) observed that “the method for disarming the Somali war-lords soon changed 
to that of weapons confiscation, without any compensating offer or guarantees of security to 
the warring clan leaders. The attempt at pacifying the Somali population was meant to create a 
conducive environment for the reconstruction of central government following a 
comprehensive security sector reform that would have guaranteed the establishment of a liberal 
capitalist system of government without the popular approval of the Somali population (Al Qaq 
Op.Cit.:72). 
Stung by its own experiences when eighteen American troops were killed in October 1993 
during a botched military mission, Washington withdrew her troops. The UN sponsored 
mission that was intended to sort out the “humanitarian” challenges faced by Somalia crumbled 
soon after the US panicked after losing eighteen troops in one battle encounter. The US 
withdrawal in March 1994 was followed within months by that of India, and the entire 
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enterprise was wound up in March 1995 (Dunbabin 2008:502). This left the Somali population 
in no better position than prior to the deployment of UN troops. 
4.6 Some views on ethical challenges to foreign humanitarian interventionism 
The peacekeepers deployed in Somalia were thrown into a hostile operating environment, in 
the middle of a civil war where violence was not only directed against civilians, but also against 
the UN peacekeepers themselves. The “failed state” status of Somalia and the “imbroglio of 
inter-tribal warfare” made attempts at immediate and fast tracked “political settlement illusory, 
any attempt at a cease-fire vain, and consequently, any traditional type of peacekeeping 
operation inconceivable” (Coulon and Liégeois 2010:13). This was aggravated by the existence 
of other agendas being pursued to satisfy the self-interests of both the UN and the US and its 
allies. In future, when faced with such cases, the UN Security Council should first establish an 
appropriate operating environment as was being attempted by Ambassador Sahnoun as there 
remains no moral or ethical justification for plunging UN peacekeepers into a civil war, causing 
extensive infrastructure damage and several thousands of civilian deaths in the name of 
humanitarian assistance and later on abandon the host population once the body bags started to 
rise on the interveners’ side.15 
The key to sustainable peace in Somalia lay in the continuation of Mohamed Sahnoun’s 
political bottom up strategy that had achieved so much political progress in a relatively short 
term period, a development that was not appreciated by the proponents of a military 
humanitarian intervention solution instead of a political solution that was the original cause of 
the Somali crisis. Regrettably, the Secretary General and the US Administration were impatient 
with Sahnoun’s elaborate political process and opted for a forceful military intervention to 
impose their wishes on the Somali people. That approach unsurprisingly resulted in a spirited 
resistance to foreign imposed military solutions to local political problems without the full 
participation of local actors.  
Peacekeeping does not always succeed and where it is successful, peacekeeping offers no 
lasting solutions to the root causes of war (Peou 2007:1). The Somali experience demonstrates 
that political usurpation of local powers by alienating key local players in an attempt at 
                                                          
15These were the views expressed by a retired Lieutenant General who served in Somalia during the climax of 
hostilities between intervention forces and the local militias loyal to General Farah Aideed. He further stressed 
that missions similar to that in Somalia would always be considered as trying to impose neo-colonialism on a 
population that had previously enjoyed independence, a development that would continue to face resistance from 
the local population despite their internal differences.   
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imposing settlements not acceptable to all warring parties can be counterproductive in the long 
term and can only work when supported by overwhelming enforcement effort which is not 
always sustainable for long durations (Ibid.). In the case of Somalia, UNITAF’s mission was 
the first major post-Cold War UN military humanitarian intervention undertaken purportedly 
to protect delivery of aid and aid workers responsible for its distribution. Ironically, the mission 
had little or nothing to do with the protection of the poor and starving Somalis, the recipients 
of that food aid on whose behalf the military “humanitarian” interventions were launched. 
Sitkowski (2006:108) argues succinctly that, “humanitarianism was somehow reduced to 
feeding people while abstaining from protecting their lives” and in some cases the peacekeepers 
were acting as obstacles to the distribution process. Such negative observations contribute 
towards the suspicion that the suffering Somali masses were not the real prime target for rescue, 
but rather that the intervening forces had other ulterior motives for the so called “humanitarian 
intervention,” namely to impose a regime amenable to the dictates of the US and the UN 
bureaucracy (Ibid.). Minear and Weiss (1993) observed that externally supplied donor 
assistance and relief aid often fuel further conflict among local belligerents, as combatants 
compete for rents and abuse the available funds to finance continued domestic conflict as was 
the case in Somalia. 
The responsibility to launch armed struggle is predominantly a domestic affair and is based on 
a range of often very complex decisions. The same principle applies to end the armed struggle; 
it is a process which must be politically owned by local leadership and find broad based 
acceptance. The prolonged political crisis in Somalia is a case in point. The reconciliation and 
peace conferences as well as the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
are externally initiated, donor financed processes, politically controlled by regional and 
international actors, and so far without tangible results. On the other hand the establishment of 
the government and public administration in Somaliland are locally driven and has so far 
neither received international recognition nor political support. The Somaliland administration 
is exclusively accountable to the local actors and population, represented by clan elders, 
organizations of youths, women, and professionals, such as lawyers, medical doctors and 
businessmen a situation where political processes are first of all locally driven events, where 
the acknowledgement of locally dictated conditions defines what is possible (Hirsi 2011). 
On managing conflict and violence, Cousens (2001:12) believes that durable peace can be 
consolidated when belligerents within a given society develop non-violent conflict 
management mechanisms that prioritize prevention of renewed hostilities effective social, 
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political and legal strategies that fully address genuine and rival claims to power and 
competition over national resources. She goes further to argue that the “elements of positive 
peace that hold the most promise for peace-building include – effective public institutions, 
meaningful political inclusion, norms of fairness and access, legal protection for groups and 
individuals, … precisely those that create mechanisms for addressing grievances and resolving 
conflict” (Ibid. 13). Important to note is that for her, mechanisms for conflict management in 
post-war societies need not always take a liberal democratic form (Ibid.). The external 
imposition of liberal democracy on war-torn societies, others argue, can exacerbate existing 
violent conflicts or bring about further social and political disorder (Hobsbawm 2004:40–1). 
This was exactly the case in Somalia where the presence of UN peacekeepers aggravated the 
war economy thereby exacerbating the civil war to the detriment of the Somali population 
which the peacekeepers had purported to have come to their rescue. The departure of UN/US 
peacekeepers left the Somali population worse off compared to what the peacekeepers found 
on the ground as was the case in in the Republic of Congo during the early 1960s following the 
deployment of ONUC. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The initial objective of the Somali humanitarian mission was to mitigate the impact of the 
humanitarian crisis aggravated by civil war and famine at the same time attempting to create 
an enabling environment suitable for encouraging and promoting diplomatic and political 
solutions to the crisis (Dandeker and Gow 1997:336). The combined US and UN peace 
enforcement mission was a typical second generation peacekeeping operation, as identified in 
Chapter Two of this thesis, in which peacekeepers or more appropriately peace enforcers make 
forceful attempts to fulfil their mandate amidst ongoing hostilities in which they end up being 
embroiled in fierce and deadly local fights (Coulon 2010:12). Predictably, the “humanitarian” 
mission in Somalia deviated from the original core objectives and resorted to the capture or 
defeat of one of the warlords, General Mohammed Farah Aideed an initiative that was 
resolutely resisted by the local militias causing thousands of innocent civilian casualties. The 
attempt to kill Aideed significantly contributed to the serious erosion of mission legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Somalis, as well as loss of international political and financial support necessary 
to achieve set objectives (Johansen (1996:62). The war fighting spirit that characterized the 
humanitarian mission in Somalia marked a significant departure from the conduct of Cold War 
peacekeeping missions that made attempts to uphold the cardinal normative principles of 
peacekeeping operations. The two missions UNITAF and UNOSOM II violated Somalia’s 
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state sovereignty and the norms of peacekeeping in total disregard of the wishes and aspirations 
of the Somali population. Hoffman (2002), points out that the actions taken by the international 
community especially the UN and the US after the collapse of the state of Somalia further 
aggravated the inability of the southern Somalis to reconcile themselves and find a common 
solution to their political problems as the humanitarian operations applied the principle of 
divide and rule through preferential treatment of some of the warlords. The joint humanitarian 
operations failed to effectively utilize traditional institutions of self-governance in an effort to 
consolidate peace and re-establish effective and just institutions of governance at the level of 
the state as interveners were determined to impose foreign solutions to local political problems. 
As a result, the peace-building phase of the operation never effectively took off the ground 
because of local resistance to alien solutions that were not in sync with the predominantly clan 
based system of governance. 
The military intervention in Somalia demonstrated the practical and political limits of the US 
readiness to play the role of world policeman. It strengthened the argument against American 
military participation in UN interventions for the sake of preserving international stability, 
democracy or human rights (Holmes 1993:338). It also exposed the myth that military 
humanitarian interventions are launched primarily to rescue the suffering populations in target 
countries. The military intervention in Somalia was packaged and portrayed as if it was well 
intentioned yet it was designed to effectively interfere with Somali domestic politics in order 
to influence future political outcomes favourable to the interests of the US and its allies. The 
fact that the US offered to deploy 28 000 troops in Somalia under UNITAF after UNOSOM I 
had not fully exploited non-coercive options available to create a conducive environment for 
distribution of food aid suggests that the US had national self-interests in Somalia some of 
which have been highlighted above. After Operation Restore Hope had completed its tour of 
duty, the US offered to retain troops in Somalia under a different chain of command from that 
of the UN. This further suggests that the US had vested interests in the outcome of the Somali 
military and political experiment during the “humanitarian intervention” and nation building 
exercise. 
What happened in Somalia serves to confirm what Ayoob (2002:86) observed that 
humanitarian peacekeeping and international politics appear, arguably, inextricably linked. His 
argument is based on the fact that the success of a “humanitarian peacekeeping” intervention, 
and the amount of resources and attention paid to a humanitarian disaster are dependent not on 
the level of suffering going on in the target country, but rather on whether there exists geo-
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strategic and economic interests. This is further coupled with motivations for the intervening 
states implying that humanitarian intervention has become dependent, on the neo-imperialistic 
interests of the most powerful states (Ibid.). 
On its completion, UNOSOM II, as happened with ONUC before it, left behind the host 
country in a worse situation than they found it as Islamic fundamentalism was bred out of 
hatred against US sponsored military intervention. Another negative outcome of the Somali 
mission was the determination by the UN and its main sponsors not to try again “military 
humanitarian interventions” in ongoing civil war environments, a policy position that 
influenced the embarrassing failure by the world community to respond effectively to the 
genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994. 
The next chapter examines the ethical challenges encountered by the UN in dealing with the 
Rwanda genocide in order to determine if there is a consistent pattern of behaviour by the world 














A case study of failed UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda 1993-1995 
5.1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted among scholars that the shooting down of the presidential airplane, 
carrying Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Hutu President Cyprien 
Ntaryamire, of Burundi on 06 April 1994 triggered an orgy of violence that resulted in the 
Rwandan genocide.16 Within a period of one hundred days, eight hundred thousand to a million 
lives were lost in what has been acknowledged as “the fastest genocide rate in recorded history” 
(Graybill 2002:86). The genocide took place when the United Nations had peacekeepers 
deployed in Rwanda who had warned the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of 
the potential dangers of an impending genocide (Dallaire 2004). The failure by the Security 
Council to intervene during the genocide reflected the degree to which the organization is 
bedevilled with power politics (Arnold 2008). 
Failure to effectively stop the genocide in Rwanda generated a lot of controversy which 
revolves around the issues of violation of state sovereignty and the use of force by UN 
peacekeepers for humanitarian purposes (Findlay 2002:276). The Security Council’s “shocking 
indifference” and selectivity that was manifested by “its sins of omission and its failure to try 
and stop the killing despite the fact that it had a peacekeeping operation on the ground” 
generated controversy regarding the ethical conduct of UN peacekeepers (Barnett 2014:1). The 
United Nations Secretariat acted unethically in trivializing the value of Rwandan lives as it 
prioritized the evacuation of foreign nationals from Rwanda; leaving behind gathered civilians 
to be butchered in their thousands by the genocideries. 
The Rwanda peacekeeping mission came soon after the disastrous and traumatic peacekeeping 
adventure in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 where the United Nations and the US orchestrated 
adventurous attempts at imposing a central government without the participation of Somalia’s 
population. The intervening forces in Somalia were trying to create peace where there was no 
                                                          
16Friend and Guralnik (1960:582) define genocide as “the systematic killing of, or program of action intended to 
destroy a whole national or ethnic group.” Melvern (2008) has classified the terrorist attack on the presidential 
plane as one of the greatest mysteries of the 20th century since the identity of the assassins remains unknown more 




peace to keep. This resulted in most UN member states not willing to participate in yet another 
potentially dangerous mission with a fragile peace to keep as the Rwandan mission was 
considered “a stepchild of the disaster in Mogadishu” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:284). The 
Rwanda disaster and the Somali debacle reflected the degree of UN exposure to serious moral 
and ethical problems in peacekeeping cases where peacekeepers were increasingly embroiled 
in on-going “civil and ethnic wars, failed states, humanitarian crises and human rights 
disasters.” Furthermore, these conflicts were involving human security as opposed to classical 
inter-state peace and security challenges as envisioned in the UN Charter (Urquhart and 
Heisbourg1998:189-190).  
The ethical challenge faced by the post-Cold War peacekeeping missions as observed by 
Roberts (1998:52) was that on one hand, if peacekeepers engaged in robust military action as 
happened in Somalia, they faced accusations of promoting neo-colonial agendas of powerful 
states and the “imposition of an unbearable burden” on troop contributing countries whose 
soldiers faced the danger of being killed or falling prey to hostage taking by spoilers. On the 
other hand, if the peacekeepers took little or no action as happened in Rwanda, they were 
accused of ineffectiveness, dereliction of duty to protect vulnerable civilians and “unjustifiable 
selectivity” in the choice of missions that deserved significant United Nations assistance. 
This chapter aims to examine the ethical conduct of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) and how it impacted on Rwandan state sovereignty. The chapter argues 
that in line with the realist school of thought which emphasizes the prioritization of national 
self-interests above all else in international relations, the US resisted any suggestions of 
launching a military humanitarian operation to save Rwandan lives during the genocide. Ten 
years later, the US authorities publicly accused the Government of Sudan for deliberately 
orchestrating a well-planned genocide, a charge the US government refused to acknowledge 
when human slaughter was underway in Rwanda in 1994 (Rupp 1994:93). This was because 
the US together with her allies were more interested in serving their own national self-interests 
and not necessarily saving Rwandan civilians facing imminent danger of genocide. The 
Rwandan genocide led Grunfeld and Huijboom (2007: xi) to conclude that the big powers’ 
actions during the genocide were “more consonant with the petty interests of politics than the 
basic needs of humanity.” Lastly the chapter attempts to highlight the extent to which 
UNAMIR undermined host state sovereignty through the provision of a false sense of security 
for the host government and its population as the mission reneged on its duties to protect 
Rwandan government officials and civilians during the genocide. 
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The chapter is divided into six sections. Section one is a brief historical background to the 
genocide. Section two examines the Security Council mandates that authorized a weak and 
ineffective peacekeeping mission and further withdrew the bulk of peacekeepers at the peak of 
the genocide. Section three explores the ethical challenges faced by peacekeepers when dealing 
with state sovereignty versus human security. Section four scrutinizes the rationale and motives 
of Belgian participation in UNAMIR against prevailing peacekeeping norms that prohibited 
former colonial powers from participating in UN missions in their former colonies. Section 
five exposes UNAMIR’s unethical intrusiveness in the internal affairs of Rwanda and how this 
served to undermine host state sovereignty. The last section is the conclusion that summarises 
the main arguments of the chapter. 
5.2 Historical factors that contributed to the genocide in Rwanda 
This section covers a brief background history of Rwanda in order to appreciate the political 
and social dynamics that gave rise to the genocide. The political and ethnic tensions that 
culminated in the Rwandan genocide date back to the period of colonization by Germans in 
1899 and later by the Belgians, after Germany lost her colonies in World War I (Destexhe 
1995:40). The Rwandan population of seven million consists of two main ethnic groups, 85 
percent Hutu and approximately 15 percent Tutsi (Jefferson, 1992). During the pre-colonial 
era, the terms ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ were mainly depicting social and political status or categories, 
as opposed to being ethnic categorizations. In this regard, Tutsis were referred to as cattle 
owners, while the Hutus were considered to be cultivators (Gourevitch and Lamb, 1998). There 
are however conflicting views among historians and scholars regarding the exact origins of the 
Hutu/Tutsi ethnic conflicts. 
According to Prunier (1997) the Hutu version is that the Tutsi were treacherous foreign 
conquerors who had oppressed the Hutu since time immemorial. The Tutsi version argues that 
the Hutu and Tutsi lived in harmony up to the time of colonization when artificial segregation 
and social divisions were created and nurtured; ultimately leading to the 1994 genocide. It is 
however generally agreed that the root causes of the Hutu-Tutsi conflicts revolved around the 
basic fundamental human needs for sustainable human life, namely: access to arable land, 
individual and group safety and human security, the need for tolerance of identity differences, 
respect for self-esteem and availability of unhindered opportunities for human development 
across all ethnic groups (Ibid.). Magnarella (2002:34) adds that the root causes of the Rwandan 
genocide were the disproportionate allocation of scarce agricultural land which led to fierce 
competition over the control of land resulting in food shortages and malnutrition due to periodic 
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famine. Magnarella (2002) also observed that Rwanda’s Hutu leaders felt that land related 
problems could only be addressed through the elimination of the entire Tutsi population as well 
as Hutu political rivals. Diamond (2005) adds that a combination of unsustainable farming 
practices that resulted in inadequate food supplies, recurrent drought, and high population 
migration to cities coupled with a very high population growth served as catalysts towards the 
genocide. It can be concluded from this background that foreigners, especially former colonial 
masters institutionalised and magnified the social differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi.17  
The Germans introduced rivalries over ethnic and racial hierarchies that were based on the 
‘Hamitic’ hypothesis that considered the Tutsi as a superior race to the subservient Hutu 
population (Watson 1992).  
The “Hamitic hypothesis” argues that the Tutsi were off-springs from the superior “Caucasoid” 
race that originated from the Nile Valley and were considered more similar to the whites than 
the black Bantu, Hutu majority who had typical African features (Prunier 1997:6-9). Belgium 
took over the colonial responsibility over Rwanda after World War I and entrenched the ethnic 
divide to enhance its control over the indigenous population by introducing far reaching 
measures that reinforced minority Tutsi domination of the Hutu majority (Shawcross 2001). 
According to Destexhe (1995), Belgian administrative reforms drastically altered the Hutu-
Tutsi political and social standing to the extent that identity cards were progressively 
introduced that reflected whether one was Tutsi or Hutu. Regrettably, the identity cards 
facilitated the identification of Tutsi targets for slaughter during the 1994 genocide (Prunier 
Op.Cit.). 
At independence in 1961, the majority Hutu gained power over the Tutsi. A United Nations 
report of 1961 noted that an oppressive Hutu dominated system had replaced the previous Tutsi 
dominated political dispensation and that it was plausible to anticipate violent reactions and 
reprisals on the part of the Tutsi in the foreseeable future (Prunier 1997:53). This prediction 
was fulfilled in the early 1990s when the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a series of 
                                                          
17In an interview with Dr. Martha Mutisi on 15 July 2015, she emphasised the fact that for African states to offer 
effective security to their citizens and not rely on outsiders to bring peace to their countries, they need to prioritise 
the provision of soft security that includes the following: improved livelihoods of all sectors of the population;  
adoption of effective poverty reduction strategies; employment creation; guaranteeing human security through 
effective linkages between state security and human security, measures that reduce the likelihood of rebellions by 
the population. Failure to implement these soft security strategies result in conflicts that are taken advantage of 
by foreign powers whose Military Industrial Complexes are always on the lookout for opportunities to sell their 
military hardware to conflict areas.  
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incursions into Rwanda to force the Hutu dominated government to accommodate the Tutsi in 
the running of state affairs. 
Unfortunately, the Hutu dominated Government of Rwanda (GoR) did not make any serious 
effort towards reconciliation with their Tutsi counterparts as they continued to widen their 
ethnic and social divisions at the same time blaming the Tutsi for political and economic 
problems facing the country during the years leading to the genocide (Hintjens 1999). The Hutu 
political elite indulged in Tutsi persecution and human rights violations resulting in 
approximately 100,000 Tutsis going into exile in neighbouring Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, and 
Uganda (Ibid.). Out of these refugees emerged a formidable guerrilla army under the political 
leadership of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) that mounted its first serious attempt at 
defeating the Hutu dominated Rwandan Government on 01 October 1990 from Uganda. 
Supported by Uganda,  and her Western allies, the RPF launched military offensive operations 
into Rwanda in an attempt to force the Rwandan government to allow the exiled refugees to 
return and participate in political, economic, social and military activities of running the 
country (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:286). These military incursions into Rwanda culminated 
in the 1994 RPF “blitzkrieg style” military offensive operations that toppled the Hutu 
dominated government. This military success translated into the displacement of French 
influence from Rwanda by English speaking RPF government. 
The assassination of the Rwandan president marked the launch of a deliberately planned 
“blitzkrieg style” RPF military assault to seize political and military power from the incumbent 
government (Davenport and Stam 2009). In less than a month, the RPF had overrun almost 
half of the country demonstrating long term deliberate and detailed strategic, logistical, and 
operational planning for the offensive military assault by the RPF whose military superiority 
had been proven during the February 1993 military invasion.18 It is therefore critical to keep in 
mind the fact that the RPF entered the Arusha Peace negotiations with a superior military 
advantage over the GoR. In that regard, allowing the full implementation of the Arusha 
protocols would have meant that the RPF would become a minority political partner in the 
                                                          
18 General Dallaire confirmed this in his cable to New York, MIR 829, dated April 24, 1994.  The testimonies at 
the ICTR reveal extensive evidence of detailed advance military planning for offensive war by RPF between June 
1993 and April 1994. In an interview with one of the seniour commanders of the UN peacekeepers military 
contingents in Rwanda, he confirmed that they were aware of the meticulous and detailed military planning phases 
for the eventual takeover of the entire country by the RPF. This planning was proven by the efficient and effective 
execution of the rapid offensive operations in which the movement  of  advancing troops  and logistical materiel  
demonstrated  a very high degree of pre-planning  of  a  military  assault, that was a continuation of the February 
1993 invasion that was stopped by the French military intervention. 
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post-transition government considering that the Tutsi constitute not more than 15 percent of 
the entire population. More importantly, the RPF would have given up its military superiority 
in a political environment where it was not guaranteed an outright majority at the polls 
scheduled after the transitional period (Valentino 2004:181). 
Based on the discussion above, it is evident that whereas outsiders sowed the seeds of ethnic 
hatred and mistrust among the Rwandan population, poor management and distribution of 
resources, lust for absolute power and indifference to ethical practices in running the affairs of 
the state contributed to the lack of tolerant political practices in independent Rwanda19. In turn, 
this bred and nurtured the conflict between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi 
culminating into the genocide (Alozie 2007:223). Failure to accommodate and tolerate social 
and ethnic differences among African ethnic groups and failure to share power and national 
resources remain major sources of conflict in Africa as discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis 
on a case study of Somalia. 
The next section examines the failure by the United Nations Security Council to authorise a 
peacekeeping mission strong enough to effectively deal with the volatile politico-security 
situation in Rwanda. 
5.3 UNSC ethical challenges in handling the Rwanda crisis 
This section examines the ethical challenges that the UNSC had to grapple with in dealing with 
the Rwandan crisis and the rationale used to mandate a poorly manned and under-equipped 
UNAMIR that could hardly carry out its mandate. The main argument of this section is that the 
USA and the UK deliberately influenced the Security Council to deploy a weak UNAMIR. 
This is because such weakness would serve the interests of the UK and US sponsors of the RPF 
due to the fact that a weak mission would not effectively interfere with a pre-planned RPF 
military offensive operation to usurp power from the incumbent Rwandan government (Al Qaq 
2009).  
The UNSC authorised UNAMIR through Resolution 872 of 05 October 1993 and its primary 
mission was to monitor the ceasefire implementation by the belligerents, carrying out the 
                                                          
19Professor Madhuku concurs and adds that one of the major contributing factors to African states’ failure to 
provide adequate security to their citizens is that they do not prioritise politics of inclusivity as they believe in the 
winner takes all political concept of keeping the losers who happen to be the minority groups completely outside 
the corridors of power. This political alienation cascades to economic resource distribution as well as 
marginalization of certain regions from infrastructure development, practices that breed discontent and resistance 
among the minority groups leading to armed conflict to bring their issues to the attention of central government.   
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disarmament process as agreed by the parties to the conflict and report any attempts at 
destabilizing the peace process and provision of human rights assistance (S.C. Res. 872, U.N. 
DOC. S/RES/872 dd. 5 Oct. 1993). Following the deterioration of the security situation in the 
country as the belligerents violated the terms of the ceasefire, UNAMIR was later given the 
task of negotiating as an intermediary between the belligerents in order to create a peaceful 
operating environment for the implementation of the Arusha peace process (Häussler 2007). 
Instead of reinforcing the mission to meet the changing security circumstances in Rwanda, the 
Security Council prioritized and emphasised on negotiations as opposed to adoption of more 
practical measures to deter the spoilers. 
At the time UNAMIR deployed in Rwanda, low rate massacres were already taking place. Such 
a situation demanded a review of the mission with the intention of positively influencing the 
course of the political and security developments in Rwanda. This was not to be the case as the 
prevailing attitude among some key international players was that “Africans were savages 
capable of violent ethnic clashes and anarchy”, and that Rwanda was a tiny African country of 
little geo-strategic importance that contained no economic interests among the big powers 
(Prunier 2009:29). This perception influenced the formulation of UN mandates for the 
Rwandan mission and it also clearly demonstrated little respect and value for African lives. 
The authorised peacekeeping mission remained small, with a weak mandate and very few 
financial and material resources; limitations and conditions which reflected that UNAMIR was 
indeed equipped and geared for a minimalist mission. UNAMIR remained with no enforcement 
powers as it was simply expected to monitor a fragile peace agreement between the belligerents 
that had consented to the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers. According to the OAU 
International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IPEP), four issues enraged some African 
countries regarding the handling of the Rwandan crisis by UN planners. 
Firstly, the signs and symptoms of not taking UNAMIR seriously were revealed when the 
mission was considered by UN planners as not to be “a particularly difficult mission.” This is 
reflected by the Security Council’s approval and deployment of a force that was “substantially 
weaker than the one the Arusha negotiators deemed necessary to implement the accords.” 
Secondly, the UNSC mandate was “wholly inadequate for the task at hand, denying the force 
the capacity to function effectively.” Thirdly, appeals for expansion and reinforcements for 
UNAMIR to match the operational exigencies and demands of the prevailing situation and 
realities in Rwanda were repeatedly denied as demonstrated by the fact that “no expansion of 
the mandate or capacity was approved until five weeks into the genocide, and by the time the 
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genocide ended, not one of the new soldiers assigned had arrived due to US deliberate 
procrastination in deploying UNAMIR II.” Lastly, the panel concluded that the “UN's insistent 
and utterly wrong-headed neutrality regarding the genocideries and the RPF compromised its 
integrity and led it to concentrate on mediating an end to the civil war rather than saving the 
lives of innocent Rwandans” (Ibid:105). These observations serve to buttress the fact that 
UNAMIR was deliberately deployed as a very weak mission incapable of fulfilling its mandate 
reflecting unethical practice by the UNSC through deliberately deploying ineffective missions 
in African conflict situations. This was in addition to the fact that the OAU was denied the 
mandate to handle the Rwandan crisis despite its request to do so hence the continental body 
just watched hopelessly while Africans were butchering each other and the whole continent 
was awaiting for a solution to come from outside Africa, an experience that should serve as a 
wake-up call for the entire continent not to over rely on the benevolence of outsiders to come 
and resolve conflicts in Africa (Interview with Nyambuya 13 October 2015).  
Dallaire and Poulin (1995) observed that UNAMIR was deployed without a budget and 
supporting logistical backup, such as fixed wing and rotary aircraft thus seriously undermining 
the effectiveness of the mission. They equally noted that some contingents of UNAMIR were 
deployed “with little or no ammunition and barely a third of the minimum operational 
equipment needed in the theatre of operations, and hardly any defence stores.” Water, food, 
fuels, spare parts and lubricants were all in short supply thus effectively rendering the mission 
useless as there were no skilled logisticians and mechanics to support the mission in the field. 
Thus poor logistic arrangements severely curtailed UNAMIR’s capacity to carry out any 
meaningful operational activities in support of the transitional process (Dallaire and Poulin 
1995:14-15). Having noted the deteriorating security situation in Rwanda, UNAMIR 
commanders appealed for reinforcements under a new and expanded mandate but the Security 
Council, refused due to British and US influence (Branch 2005:115). The official narrative that 
attempts to explain why the Security Council deployed an ineffective peacekeeping mission in 
Rwanda argues that the world body was influenced by the traumatizing experience of the 
October 1993, Somalia debacle in which 18 US soldiers were killed in an attempt to capture or 
kill General Muhammad Farah Aideed and that the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD 25) of 
May 1994 curtailed and restrained both US peacekeeping activities as well as its support for 
other UN member states activities in peacekeeping missions (Power 2001; Kuperman 2004). 
According to this narrative, the US “tragically and erroneously” viewed the situation in 
Rwanda through tainted and distorted Somali lenses (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000:173). 
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The same narrative advances the argument that the Rwandan genocide was deliberately 
planned by the Presidential Guards elements together with the Hutu extremists who were afraid 
of the power sharing agreement arrived at in Arusha. The extremists, it is said, felt that the 
power-sharing arrangement was a betrayal and a serious threat to their political and economic 
privileges. Moreover, they feared that Tutsi participation in the integrated Rwandan Army 
would ultimately end up with a military coup d’état, fears linked to the Tutsi assassination of 
the Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye  in neighbouring Burundi in October 1993 (Adebajo and 
Landsberg 2000:174). 
The coincidence of the Somalia debacle in 1993 and the Rwanda genocide less than a year later 
served as a very convenient and effective smoke screen for what was actually happening behind 
the scenes at the grand-strategic level. Under the cover of political dust coming out of Somalia, 
the Anglo-American alliance was plotting the displacement of French influence from the 
Central African Great Lakes region through a military victory of their sponsored RPF rebel 
movement over the French speaking and French sponsored GoR. 20  According to the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report (CHRIR) Kagame had the powerful support 
of the USA and the UK, as well as the UN. The report states that this is best illustrated by the 
Gersony report (1994), which the Boutros–Ghali “ensured that the report was not published, 
and initiated the process of de-legitimising Gersony’s findings, with the approval of the US … 
Kofi Annan...was instructed to follow up, and to ensure that the report was not made public” 
(CHRIR 2009:33). The assertion that the RPF was sponsored by the US and the UK further 
confirmed by the observation made by Bellamy and Wheeler (2007) who noted that the French 
President Francois Mitterrand was fearful of Anglo-American influence spreading into 
previously French-speaking Rwanda through a military victory of the English-speaking RPF. 
This partly explains why the French offered to intervene in Rwanda at the height of the 
genocide citing humanitarian concerns when in actual fact the primary purpose was to 
safeguard French national interests against spreading Anglo-American sphere of influence that 
was using Uganda and the RPF as the vehicle to achieve this strategic goal (Philpot 2005). The 
fact that the RPF was sponsored by the US and the UK is critical to this study because it forms 
                                                          
20 In an interview with an African diplomat in Addis Ababa on 13 September 2015 who was based in Tanzania at 
the time of the genocide, he argued that US military support for the RPF was massive and it was extended not 
only to the training of the RPF military personnel by the US special forces but also during the RPF military 
offensive operations. He emphasised that the RPF did not wage a war to stop the genocide but rather it was “A 
War for Grabbing Power” as opposed to what the official narrative makes us believe. Adding that it was evident 
that the Rwandan Government Forces did not have the capacity to repel a determined RPF military onslaught and 
the RPF were aware of this reality.  
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the basis of understanding the unethical conduct of UNAMIR whose peacekeepers were meant 
to ensure that the RPF came to power in fulfilment of Anglo-American geo-strategic interests. 
This was to be realized through a regime change in Rwanda in clear violation of Rwanda’s 
national sovereignty. 
Black (2014:6) argues that for the role Kofi Annan played in promoting US strategic interests 
through peacekeeping operations, he was handpicked by the Clinton Administration for the 
post of Secretary General of the United Nations. In turn, he replaced Boutros-Ghali who was 
denied a second term in office due to his critical stance against US policies during the Rwandan 
genocide. Based on the ensuing discussion, it is evident that the US and Britain thwarted any 
attempts at strengthening UNAMIR as doing so would have jeopardised their long term geo-
strategic plans for the Great Lakes region. Philpot (2005) emphasises the fact that the French 
and Nigerian efforts within the Security Council targeted at strengthening UNAMIR before 
and during the genocide were strongly resisted by the Americans and the British because doing 
so would have “scuttled plans for a decisive RPF victory, forced some form of power sharing 
and spoiled plans to remodel Central Africa.” This view is shared by Del Ponte and Chuck 
(2011) who was fired from the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) for exposing 
RPF complicity in the assassination of the Rwandan President as a trigger for the genocide.  
A trigger for a nation-wide pandemonium had to be found in order to justify the RPF blitzkrieg 
military offensive operation in the name of trying to stop the genocide and yet the real aim was 
to violently take over the reins of power in Kigali and avoid a power-sharing political 
arrangement as agreed in the Arusha Protocols. Assured of covert US military and financial 
support from the most powerful member of the Security Council, the USA; the RPF refused 
offers for a ceasefire from the government side as they were guaranteed of military victory over 
government forces. US sponsorship of the RPF military invasion of Rwanda in violation of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement explains why the US lobbied for a weak peacekeeping mission in the 
first place and later advocated for the withdrawal of most of the peacekeepers at the height of 
the genocide. The Security Council’s failure to deploy a strong peacekeeping mission and its 
decision to further weaken the mission at the height of the genocide reflect insensitivity to the 
plight of the Rwandan population. These decisions were unethical and served the self-interests 
of the US and her allies whilst violating Rwanda’s national sovereignty and undermining the 
national aspirations and self-determination of the Rwandan population. 
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5.3.1 UNSC unethical response to the genocide 
When the Rwanda genocide broke out the US administration made concerted efforts to 
minimize the physical and financial involvement of the UN. This was in sharp contrast with 
what President Clinton had advocated for during his 1992 campaign trail to unseat President 
Bush Senior. President elect Bill Clinton had envisioned and publicly advocated for US-UN 
cooperation as the foremost vehicle for resolving crises that required international intervention 
(Tatum 2010:43). Once in office, this was not to be, as Ali Mazrui noted that a gap often exists 
between what one advocates and professes before entering public office and activities 
undertaken once one enters office. Before assuming office one champions and promulgates 
appealing policy goals however after assuming office the priority focuses on retaining power 
(Mazrui 1990:55-56). The Clinton administration sought to and succeeded in constraining UN 
involvement in the Rwandan crisis for reasons that best served US national self-interests in line 
with the realist school of thought which argues that morality has little space in international 
relations. 
Bellamy and Wheeler (2007) argue that world leaders are still gripped by the realist theory of 
international relations mind-set that prioritizes national self-interests over humanitarian 
considerations. They argue that there was no intervention in Rwanda simply because no 
powerful countries with the military resources and capability to intervene were willing to 
sacrifice their troops and treasure to protect citizens of little known Rwanda. The international 
response limited to solidarity slogans, moral outrage and the provision of humanitarian aid well 
after the genocide had ended (Bellamy and Wheeler 2007). Whereas this observation could be 
having some merits, it misses the fact that the RPF was fighting a proxy war on behalf of the 
Anglo-American alliance; hence these two countries could have vetoed any Security Council 
resolution authorizing a coalition of the willing to intervene in Rwanda to stop the genocide. 
Any strong intervention in Rwanda could have seriously derailed the grand geo-strategic plan 
of avoiding a power sharing regime in Rwanda as agreed in the Arusha Peace Accord brokered 
by the OAU. 
At the height of the genocide, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali proposed the deployment of 5 
500 additional peacekeepers to reinforce UNAMIR and the US refused arguing “… that an 
expanded UN-led peacekeeping operation would need, but did not have, the consent of the 
Rwandan parties, and that a peace-enforcement operation without Rwandan consent would 
need, but did not have, a major power to undertake it” (Murphy 1996:245). The US emphasis 
on the need to respect Rwanda’s sovereignty and consent was indeed hypocritical and was 
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therefore part of organized hypocrisy on the part of the Anglo-American allies in the Security 
Council considering that the same allies were sponsoring the RPF forces that were overrunning 
the country through a military invasion to topple a legitimate government that the US was 
falsely purporting to be respecting its sovereignty. This assertion is corroborated by the 
findings of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report (CHRIR) that acknowledges 
that Kagame and the RPF indeed received military and diplomatic support from the Anglo-
American allies and from some UN authorities (CHRIR 2009). The Security Council thus 
resorted to issuing resolutions that expressed outrage at the carnage in Rwanda without doing 
anything meaningful to come to the rescue of the Rwandan population that was experiencing 
genocide. 
UN Security Council Resolution 912 of April 21 1994, adopted during the third week of the 
genocide, highlighted that the Security Council with the mandate to maintain world peace was 
appalled on learning about the large-scale violence in Rwanda that had resulted in the deaths 
of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children. The Security 
Council was further appalled by the internal displacement the Rwandan population, including 
those who sought refuge with UNAMIR and outside the country resulting in a significant 
increase in refugees in neighbouring countries. 
The UNSC under the influence of the US and Britain, deployed “a laughably small contingent 
of blue helmets” at the height of the genocide (United Nations 1996:268).  The Security 
Council was aware of the deaths and wanton destruction in Rwanda, yet it proceeded with the 
irresponsible and unethical decision not to defend the innocent victims of these heinous and 
inhumane acts; leaving the Rwandan population to their own fate (Tatum 2010:45). This was 
a classic demonstration that African states and governments together with their populations 
should not put too much trust in the protection of the populations in conflict areas by UN 
peacekeepers. Uriga (2015) emphasised the fact that most African conflicts are planned and 
organized outside the continent yet to secure peace, the very sponsors of the conflicts are 
invited as peacekeepers to resolve the same conflicts they would have instigated.21 In lobbying 
                                                          
21In an interview with Dr. R. Uriga on 10 March 2014at Great Zimbabwe University, he lamented the naiveté of 
African leaders who continue to entrust western powers that sponsor UN peacekeeping missions as benevolent 
gestures towards genuinely assisting Africans find long lasting solutions to their conflicts through UN missions. 
He highlighted that it was high time African leaders learnt from the outcomes of UN peacekeeping missions on 
the continent where sitting heads of state and government were either assassinated or removed from power under 
the watch of the UN missions as their presence facilitated regime change in line with the wishes of some foreign 
powers at the expense of the local populations. He also emphasised that Africans must prioritize dialogue instead 
of fighting each time there were serious issues under contention as foreign powers always try to take advantage 
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for the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers during the genocide, Britain and the US were arguing 
that they preferred an “African Solution” to the Rwandan crisis (Furley 1998:241) yet they 
were not only the instigators of the Rwandan crisis through their military sponsorship of the 
RPF, but also that they had spear-headed the refusal of the OAU to be in charge of the 
peacekeeping mission. Ironically, in a move that demonstrated UNSC double standards, 
Resolution 914 on April 27 1994 authorized a significant expansion of the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Bosnia, a country that was not experiencing the same gravity of humanitarian crisis 
as Rwanda. Surprisingly, a week earlier, the same UNSC had drastically reduced the size of 
UNAMIR in a country that was facing a worse humanitarian disaster than what was happening 
in Bosnia (OAU Panel of Experts Report 2000). This demonstrated George Orwell’s dictum 
that all animals are equal however some are more equal than others (Ibid.). The UN 
Independent Inquiry on Rwanda (1999:33) was unequivocal in its assessment of Security 
Council response to the genocide when it stated that adherence to the traditional norm of 
peacekeeping neutrality in a situation where hundreds of civilians were being killed in genocide 
was morally and ethically wrong.  
The UN inquiry added that faced with unequivocal evidence of genocide, the UN was legally 
and morally obliged to abandon the original mediation role by UNAMIR since the original 
mandate for the peacekeepers had been overtaken by events. The report adds that UN 
peacekeepers’ resort to mediation was therefore inadequate as the situation demanded a more 
robust and assertive response to the ongoing genocide and that, there was no justification for 
being neutral in the case of a genocide (Ibid.). The response by the UNSC to the genocide in 
Rwanda reflected gross disrespect for African lives, compared to those of Europeans and other 
regions, a phenomenon that continues up to this day which must serve as a reminder that 
African countries should desist from paying lip service to the slogan “African Solutions for 
African Problems”. UN peacekeepers’ practices of undermining host state sovereignty 
continue to take place yet African countries remain dependent on the developed countries to 
come and finance their security programmes with little input from the African nations 
themselves yet in so doing, the collective sovereignty of African countries continues to be 
eroded.22 
                                                          
of the political fault lines emanating from tribalism and ethnic differences to advance their own geo-political 
agendas.  
22Uriga further added that the IMF, World Bank and multinational corporations from developed countries are 
interested in the outcomes of UN peacekeeping missions hence the meddling in African political dynamics in 
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5.3.2 UNSC double standards in the use of force to stop the Rwandan genocide 
When Secretary General Hammarskjold learnt about the alleged massacres of the Baluba tribe 
by Prime Minister Lumumba’s forces fighting the separatists, he classified this conflict as an 
“incipient genocide.” His reaction was very quick and unambiguous when he declared that: 
“Prohibition against intervention in internal conflicts cannot be considered to apply to the 
senseless slaughter of civilians or fighting arising from tribal hostilities” (Urquhart 1987:435, 
438). Hammarskjold then directed his Special Representative in Congo, Cordier to UN troops 
in offensive military operations in order to stop the “incipient genocide.” In doing so 
Hammarskjold did not seek Security Council approval before ordering a military offensive 
operation against Prime Minister Lumumba’s government forces that were fighting to keep 
Congo united (Sitkowski 2006).  
A united Congo under the leadership of Prime Minister Lumumba was against the geo-strategic 
interests of the US and its allies hence his troops had to be defeated by UN forces whilst plans 
were underway to assassinate the Prime Minister through active and deliberate participation of 
some UN officials in Congo as demonstrated in chapter three of this thesis. As directed, ONUC 
launched the military offensive operation and the alleged massacres were effectively stopped. 
This was followed by a relief operation for 250,000 Baluba refugees. Sitkowski further 
observes that Secretary General Hammarskjold’s decisions and responses to the Kasai crisis 
reflected “a man of integrity, torn between deep moral convictions and professional diplomatic 
instincts” where “the moralist wanted to follow the ethic judgment without calculating political 
price, while the diplomat, estimating the price for preventing evil, resolved not to bear the 
costs” (Ibid.). The Balubas were indeed fortunate in that they were saved from the “on-going 
massacres” while the Tutsis and moderate Hutus were unlucky as they were killed in their 
hundreds of thousands in the presence of UN peacekeepers. In both cases the outcomes served 
the interests of foreign powers through the violation of host state sovereignty. 
It proved easier for the UN peacekeepers to save thousands of people in Kasai Province from 
the “incipient genocide” than saving the life of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba who had 
                                                          
order to advance their neo-colonial agendas. He suggested that Africans should desist from practicing politics 
based on “Late Comer Philosophy” where tribal/ethnic groups considered to have settled in certain parts of the 
continent are marginalised. Such late comer groups include the Ndebele in Zimbabwe; Tutsis in Rwanda and 
DRC. These ethnic divisions are blown out of proportions by foreign powers and their business interest groups 
leading to conflict that not only provide markets for their Military Industrial Complex but also give them an 
opportunity to come under the umbrella of UN peacekeeping to re-engineer the institutions of the affected 
countries along their preferred neo-liberal value systems.   
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invited the UN peacekeepers to Congo to assist in stabilizing a deteriorating situation that was 
instigated by illegal Belgian military intervention in matters that were purely within the 
Congolese jurisdiction. In Rwanda, just like the Patrice Lumumba assassination, the interim 
Prime Minister of the transitional government was murdered in the presence of UNAMIR 
troops “in a country that had invited them to keep the peace” (Sitkowski 2006:115). This failure 
by UNAMIR to protect the Prime Minister along with the failure to rescue the ten Belgian 
soldiers is an eloquent appraisal of the effectiveness of UNAMIR as a peacekeeping mission 
(Report of the UN Independent Inquiry 1999). This goes to demonstrate that the primary 
objective of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa is not necessarily the protection of African 
lives but to bring about the establishment of regimes that serve the interests of western powers 
at the expense of the local population. 
It is important to note that ONUC peacekeepers were ordered to fight Lumumba’s forces under 
the pretext of stopping the alleged massacres of the Baluba population by government forces 
fighting to keep Congo united. The ethical excuse given was to save the Baluba population 
from advancing government troops. In actual fact, the moral justification for launching military 
offensive operations against the forces of a legitimate government trying to keep the country 
united was both a violation of host state sovereignty as well as a smoke screen for the real 
intensions and motives for mounting the offensive operations. ONUC offensive mission was a 
strategic masterstroke by UN peacekeepers to deny Prime Minister Lumumba military success 
in Kasai Province since the next target of his military offensive operations was the rebellious 
Katanga Province that had declared independence from Congo with Belgian and American 
support (Aksu 2003:109). A successful military offensive by Prime Minister Lumumba’s 
forces would have seriously scuttled Western geo-strategic designs of keeping Congo within 
the effective sphere of Western politico-economic influence at the height of the Cold War. 
If indeed the Western powers cared about the well-being and human security of Rwandan 
civilians as they purported during the Congo crisis, they could have reinforced UNAMIR as 
opposed to withdrawing the bulk of the troops further exposing the population to the 
genocideries. This observation reinforces the point of view that Western powers wanted 
minimum disruption of RPF military offensive operations in a bid to effectively take over the 
reins of government in Kigali without having to go through the tedious elections and power 
sharing process negotiated at Arusha (Del Ponte 2009; Branch 2005; Philpot 2005). In this 
regard, a strategy of having a weak UNAMIR or no peacekeepers at all was meant to create an 
ideal environment for unhindered successful RPF military offensive operations to topple the 
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incumbent central government hence the insistence of the US on initially having a weak 
UNAMIR and withdrawal of most of the UN troops once hostilities had started. There are a 
number of angles through which US negative influence on the Security Council can be 
explained from a realist theory perspective. 
It can be argued that US involvement in a UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda could have 
resulted in the downfall of the Clinton Administration as the Republicans were determined to 
limit Clinton’s Presidency to one term only. This was certainly not a risk worth taking in an 
effort to save strangers whose value systems were considered inferior to those of the Western 
world (Interview with a retired Lieutenant General on 13 October 2015). He also emphasised 
that in their geo-strategic calculations, US and UK planners had to create a situation that 
facilitated an RPF military victory without outside interference in order to establish an 
undiluted pro Anglo-American regime in Rwanda a view that is shared by Philpot (2005). This 
therefore explains the Clinton Administration’s insistence on its US officials at the UN not to 
classify the deaths in Rwanda as resulting from genocide (Jehl 1994). Classification of the 
massacres as genocide would have legally and morally obliged the US and the UN Security 
Council to act to stop the genocide in conformity with the provisions of the 1948 Geneva 
Conventions against genocide (Ibid). 
In an unprecedented action of abandoning a host state in the midst of genocide the US 
Government strongly opposed any military intervention in Rwanda and even went to the extent 
of influencing the withdrawal of the bulk of the peacekeepers fearful of a repeat of the Somalia 
nightmare. Evans and Sahnoun (2002:101) have argued that the U.S. military authorities were 
avoiding involvement in a country of little strategic importance and of which the establishment 
did not have contingency plans for military intervention adding that the Rwandan situation 
resembled another Somalia. They added that the US military leadership was not keen to be 
embroiled in another failed mission in the name of humanitarian intervention (Ibid.). Evans 
and Sahnoun further noted that the Security Council under pressure from the US reneged on its 
international responsibility to protect human rights of endangered communities since it has an 
undisputed ethical “duty to protect communities from mass killings, women from systematic 
rape, and children from starvation” (Ibid.). The ethical implications of abandoning civilians 
facing imminent danger of genocide is that respect and integrity for UN peacekeeping missions 
was diminished, at the same time allowing the perpetrators of genocide to have a free rein in 
carrying out the atrocities, ethnic cleansing and civil war (Sitkowski 2006:116). In this regard, 
the physical presence of UNAMIR troops sent an implied, though misleading message of 
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civilian protection by the peacekeepers yet the deployment of an ineffective UN mission to 
Rwanda served the role of organized hypocrisy by the US and its allies. 
Vulnerable civilians were left to congregating in large numbers at UNAMIR bases hoping for 
peacekeepers’ protection yet they were ultimately exposed to the genocideries as large visible 
easy targets demonstrating the false pretence of UN peacekeepers’ protection of civilian 
population and complicity to mass murder (Ibid.). It has been observed that the presence of UN 
peacekeepers that are not willing or unable to effectively protect endangered civilians inhibits 
the local population from adopting the normal remedy of escaping from war because they will 
be hoping for protection from the peacekeepers. The delusion of a false sense of security makes 
the endangered population to stay put until it is too late to escape the life threatening danger 
from the perpetrators (Luttwak 1999) which is unethical. In an interview with retired Colonel 
Chimusoro (not real name) who was part of the UN mission at the time of the genocide, he 
explained the gruesome massacres of civilians that were abandoned by UN peacekeepers at the 
height of the genocide and he came to the conclusion that the UNSC had little or no respect for 
African lives. He further lamented the ongoing tragedy that Africans continue having faith in 
the protection of our populations by the same powers that have never demonstrated genuine 
respect for African lives since the period of slavery.23 
Basing on the discussion above it is evident that the Security Council needs to develop effective 
mechanisms to intervene in situations where genuine genocide is detected since long term 
implications of non-intervention can be disastrous. In the same vain, the AU should give more 
priority towards operationalization of the slogan “African Solutions to African Problems” more 
so when there is growing evidence that UN peacekeepers do not prioritize the interests and 
sovereignty of the host population and government. The importance of implementing African 
Solutions to African problems was emphasised by Chiwenga (2015) when he gave the example 
of Botswana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe that came to the rescue of Mozambique during the 1980s 
civil war in that country that was sponsored by apartheid South Africa and some foreign 
Western powers. He highlighted that the regional countries assisted according to their military 
and resource capabilities where Botswana assisted with logistical support such as vehicles and 
combat supplies and Zimbabwe was fighting alongside the Mozambican army for ten years 
                                                          
23The retired colonel who had earlier served in Somalia argued that the butchering of Somali civilians by UNITAF 
and UNOSOM II was a clear demonstration that African lives were being used as cannon fodder as opposed to 
being genuine targets for protection by UN peacekeepers, a situation that should have galvanized African leaders 
to desist from relying too much on UN peacekeeping missions on the African continent. 
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(Ibid.). African countries that were supporting the Mozambique National Resistance 
Movement (RENAMO) were Malawi, Kenya and South Africa in a bid to remove from power 
the Marxist Government led by President Samora Machel (Ibid.). African solidarity that was 
demonstrated by countries that stood by the Mozambican Government is what is expected from 
African countries under the umbrella of the AU. The case of allowing genocide to unfold in an 
African country and waiting for outside powers to come to the rescue is retrogressive, 
counterproductive and outright irresponsible on the part of African statesmen who still look up 
to their former colonisers for political and humanitarian bail-outs.24 Genocide is symptomatic 
of civil wars, failing and failed states, and it also triggers regional instability as genocide 
generates refugees that spill over into neighbouring countries as happened in Somalia and 
Rwanda where sanctuaries for the refugees ended up being “hotbeds for terrorism” (Frost 
2012:101). On a cost comparative schedule deterring genocide is a lot cheaper than attempts at 
addressing the effects of the genocide since affected countries could become launching terrorist 
bases. This should give impetus to the AU to invest more resources in the early warning and 
preventive systems to avoid African countries degenerating into civil wars. 
This section has demonstrated that the UN Security Council failed to provide timely 
authorization for a more forceful UNAMIR despite knowledge of on-going genocide, crimes 
against humanity as well as war crimes that were being perpetrated in Rwanda. The failure has 
been explained by the strong US lobby for a weak mission; as well as fear of the use of the veto 
power by the US that was strongly against any reinforcement of UNAMIR that could slow 
down the advancing RPF Army to defeat the Rwandan Government forces and usurp power 
through force of arms in clear violation of the host state’s national sovereignty (Kabau 
2012:88). The entire UN Security Council demonstrated a profound lack of interest in 
authorizing forceful military intervention to protect and rescue millions of Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus that were threatened with mass slaughter during the Rwanda genocide, a development 
that seriously tarnished the integrity of the UN Security Council and its peacekeeping missions. 
The failure also demonstrated that the UN peacekeepers attach little importance to African lives 
                                                          
24 Chiwenga gave other examples where African nations have demonstrated the resolve and ability to solve 
African crises without outside interference. The SADC intervention in Lesotho is one living example and SADC 
intervention in the DRC is yet another relevant example. Chiwenga further highlighted that foreign powers craft 
UN Security Council resolutions that promote divisions among AU member states and they exploit such divisions 
to promote their own self-interests following the divide and rule concept of subjugating African populations. 
Moreover, he added that foreign powers exaggerate the inability of African countries to find African Solutions to 
African Problems because they want to remain relevant in the search for solutions to African problems they would 
have helped create. 
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that are considered less valuable than their European counterparts as demonstrated by the 
double standards in the handling of the Bosnian and Rwandan crises. 
5.4 Ethical challenge of sovereignty and human security 
In the course of discharging UNSC mandates in peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers continue 
to face ethical problems and challenges related to respecting host state sovereignty on one hand 
and protection of human security on the other. What to prioritize in a given mission differs 
from one mission to another as the application of the principles of peacekeeping namely 
consent, impartiality and minimum use of force appear to be mission specific and not 
universally applied. The Rwandan mission, like many others during the early 1990s, raised 
many ethical questions regarding respect and safeguarding of host state sovereignty of a regime 
that was actively sponsoring and orchestrating genocide against a segment of its own 
population as opposed to safeguarding the safety of victims of the state sponsored genocide. 
The Rwandan experience triggered serious policy and ethical debate on how to deal with the 
violation of a formerly well-established principle of non-interference in domestic matters when 
Secretary General Kofi Annan lamented that: 
I also accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small 
and weak states. But to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity? (Annan 2000:47-48).  
In the case of Rwanda, the politics of racial discrimination, economic and political self-interests 
of the powerful states, especially the US and Britain, played a critical role in determining the 
conduct of UNAMIR before and during the genocide.25 
Under the strong influence of the US the Security Council insisted on the deployment of a very 
weak mission in Rwanda and most importantly Americans insisted on non-intervention in the 
face of overwhelming evidence of mass atrocities, arguing that any change of the peacekeepers’ 
mandate would require the consent of the belligerents (Murphy 1996:245). This was clearly 
                                                          
25 In an interview with a former Foreign Minister in Harare, he emphasised the point that when it comes to UN 
peacekeeping missions in Africa, the “Them and Us  Syndrome” comes into play as the US and her European 
allies will always treat African lives as less valuable, less precious than the lives of the white community” adding 
“look at how the UN Secretariat that is dominated by the American and EU staff officers prioritised the withdrawal 
of whites from Rwanda, after which they withdrew most of the peacekeepers from Rwanda in the hope of 
protecting the image of the UN as an organization as opposed to prioritizing the protection of vulnerable Rwandan 
civilians.    
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organized hypocrisy as there was no truth in the alleged respect for the need for consent from 
the warring parties. The two powerful members of the Security Council, the US and Britain 
effectively blocked any meaningful and effective intervention in Rwanda as 800,000 to a 
million civilians were slaughtered in a state sponsored genocide (Mgbeoji, 2003:104). Various 
reasons for the failure to come to the rescue of the Rwandan civilians facing imminent death 
fall into two broad categories.  
Advocates for the first school of thought on this subject include (Melvern 2004; Power 2003; 
Prunier 1997) who argue that the reluctance to effectively respond to the genocide was a 
reflection of the tension that exists between the classic norm of respect for state sovereignty 
and the emerging norm of human security as well as a practical appreciation that intervening 
to stop a genocide or mass violation of human rights could be very difficult, dangerous and 
expensive in both human lives and treasure. The other school of thought however argues that 
the rhetoric about respecting Rwanda’s sovereignty and explaining the violence in Rwanda as 
a civil war was designed to keep the world community outside Rwanda in order for the RPF to 
gain military victory uninterrupted by outside interference (Branch 2005 and Philpot 2005). 
The key dilemma was on one hand between respecting the territorial and political sovereignty 
of Rwanda, a state that was sponsoring genocide against its own population and on the other 
hand, the protection of human rights and security interests of the native population against 
gross human rights abuses (Harrington 2009:159). Sadly, the international community under 
the strong influence of the Anglo-American alliance opted to ignore the plight of the Rwandan 
population that was facing mass slaughter during one of the worst genocides of the twentieth-
century. This goes to confirm that peacekeepers were predominantly not meant to be absolutely 
neutral in their operations and that their activities are designed to promote the interests of some 
powerful countries in any given mission as was the case in Congo during the early 1960s and 
Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. What is evident in UN peacekeeping operations is that there 
are multi-interest actors that try by all means to influence the outcome of peacekeeping 
missions to achieve their own selfish interests irrespective of the political and economic impact 
on the host population and government.26 
                                                          
26These were the views expressed by a retired Lieutenant General Nyambuya on 15 October 2015. He highlighted 
that the self-interests of the big powers are manifested starting from the crafting of UNSC resolutions for 
peacekeeping missions as different interest groups attempt to outmaneuver each other well before the UN troops 
are deployed in the target country. As a result of such competing national self-interests, the world witnessed the 
dismal response to the Rwanda genocide as the French, Belgians, British and Americans were trying to maximize 
their national benefits from the symbolic presence or the absence of peacekeepers in that country without paying 
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Rieff (1995:155-62) argues that the evidence supporting the view that the US wanted a very 
weak peacekeeping mission deployed in Rwanda was available even before the finalization of 
the Arusha Accords. Firstly, the US applied its political muscle to insist that UNAMIR would 
have a very restricted mandate and operational capability basing on the argument that a weak 
mission with a consent-based mandate was non-threatening to the signatories of the agreement 
hence more acceptable to the parties to the conflict (Ibid.). Secondly, when the strength and 
composition of UNAMIR was deliberated in the Security Council, the US influenced the 
adoption of the least effective option thus ensuring a weak mission. Thirdly, the authorized 
mission, once in Rwanda, experienced serious operational, financial and logistical challenges 
due to the negative influence of the US whose budgeting considerations guaranteed that the 
critical resources for UNAMIR to be effective in discharging its mandate were not forthcoming 
(Ibid.). Existing literature on the deployment and conduct of UNAMIR acknowledges that the 
mission was very weak as it was poorly manned and grossly under equipped to the extent that 
the peacekeepers were unable and in some cases deemed unwilling to prevent and forestall the 
genocide in Rwanda (Power 2003:329-45). 
The US and the UK adopted unethical policy positions that not only led to the deployment of 
a very weak UNAMIR but also to the withdrawal of the bulk of the peacekeepers at the peak 
of the genocide and in that regard, sabotaged any possibility of a humanitarian intervention as 
outlined in the Genocide Convention (Barnett 2002). Instead of advocating for reinforcements 
for UNAMIR when news of genocide first surfaced, the US under the influence of the Belgians 
and the British, not only prevented attempts at reinforcing the peacekeepers already in Rwanda 
but instead strongly advocated for the reduction of deployed peacekeepers, a role considered 
to be counterproductive and destructive as this act served to empower the genocideries. 
Gourevitch and Lamb (1998:150) observed that "… the desertion of Rwanda by the UN force 
was Hutu Power's greatest diplomatic victory to date, and it can be credited almost single 
handedly to the US." The inference of this argument is that the UN abandoned Rwandans at 
the time of their greatest need and that a humanitarian intervention should have been launched 
to protect Rwandan civilians against their own government sponsored genocide, which could 
have reinforced precedents set by humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo 
(Al Qaq 2009:107). Indeed after the Rwandan genocide international debate on military 
                                                          
attention to the plight of the suffering population and the violation of Rwanda’s national sovereignty that they 
were practicing.      
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humanitarian intervention intensified culminating in the adoption of the concept of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the UN General Assembly in 2005. 
The next section examines Belgian participation in UNAMIR and the negative role it played 
towards undermining the outcome of that mission. 
5.5 Unethical Belgian participation in UNAMIR 
This section examines the motive of having Belgian troops participating in UNAMIR a mission 
deployed in her former colony, a practice that was discouraged during the traditional 
peacekeeping missions launched during the Cold War. Understanding the motivation of 
Belgian participation in the mission would assist in unpacking the role played by the Belgian 
troops in undermining host state sovereignty through cooperation with the RPF as well as its 
lobby to have all UN peacekeepers withdrawn from Rwanda following the killing of the ten 
Belgian troops on suspicion of complicity in the assassination of the Rwandan president 
together with his Burundian counterpart.   
During the first generation of peacekeeping missions, it was not permissible and very unusual 
that ex-colonial powers would contribute peacekeepers to UN missions in their former 
colonies. Melvern (2001) acknowledges that UN doctrine prohibits former colonial powers 
from participating in peace-keeping missions in their former colonies.27 It is not clear whether 
Belgium offered to participate in UNAMIR or it was invited by the Secretary General. One 
account states that the Belgians were invited by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali while the 
other version states that the RPF suggested the participation of Belgian peacekeepers to 
neutralize French influence in Rwanda (OAU Panel of Experts 2000). Irrespective of which 
account is correct, Belgian participation was considered to be "a mixed blessing" right from 
the initial deployment (Dallaire 2004: 89 and Prunier 1995:194). France offered to participate 
in UNAMIR but was denied the opportunity because the RPF opposed French participation 
due to France’s long standing political and military relationship with the Rwandan Government 
(Melvern Op. Cit.). The rationale for denying former colonial powers from participating in 
peacekeeping missions in their former colonies was that former colonizers would find it 
                                                          
27 Former colonial powers could however organize peacekeeping missions to manage the transition towards 
independence as happened in Zimbabwe where a Commonwealth Peacekeeping mission was deployed to monitor 
the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. In actual fact, colonial powers preferred to mount peacekeeping 
missions that were under their complete control as opposed to missions that were under the command and control 
of the UN since they would have limited influence over UN sponsored missions, a situation that militated against 
their national self-interests. 
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extremely difficult to remain impartial in a situation in which they had clearly defined self-
interests and preferred political outcomes of the mission. This policy was adopted to dispel any 
fears of UN peacekeepers serving the interests of the former colonizers yet in practice, the 
interests of western powers were taken care of by US dominance of the missions at the strategic 
and operational levels as demonstrated in chapters three and four of this thesis. 
The British were denied the opportunity to contribute peacekeepers during the Suez crisis of 
1956 and the Belgians were denied a similar opportunity during the Congo crisis of 1960 to 
1964 (Al-Qaq 2009). Surprisingly, the Belgian government was not only keen to support 
UNAMIR but actually provided the strongest military contingent to the Rwandan mission and 
was assigned the most strategic and sensitive military sector of securing the capital Kigali and 
the airport (OAU Panel of Experts Report 2000). In actual fact, Belgian troops formed the 
military backbone of UNAMIR. The justification for deploying Belgian troops, the only NATO 
country to do so remains unclear although this appears to have been a well calculated strategy 
to implement the regime change agenda designed to displace French influence from the Great 
Lakes region and replace it by an English speaking regime that advanced the geo-strategic 
interests of the Anglo-American alliance (Interview with an African Diplomat in Addis Ababa 
2015).  
General Dallaire advances the argument that a deal could have been struck between the French 
and Belgian authorities for Belgian troops to protect French interests in Kigali after the 
departure of the French battalion as required in the Arusha Peace Agreement (Dallaire 2003). 
On the contrary, the Rwandan government that was very close to the French authorities was 
being undermined by the presence of Belgian peacekeepers implying that French interests in 
Rwanda were also being undermined by the presence of Belgian troops in Kigali. Prunier 
(1995:103–6) argues that France feared that the RPF, with Ugandan diplomatic and military 
support represented a formidable threat from the Anglo-American alliance against a former 
French-speaking colony. Belgian troops were therefore not necessarily promoting French 
interests as Belgian peacekeepers deliberately undermined the Rwandan government authority 
and sovereignty favouring the RPF to the extent that it is strongly suspected that they were 
instrumental in the assassination of the two presidents on 06 April 1994 that triggered the 
genocide (Bruguire Report 2006). Moreover, it was the RPF that suggested the deployment of 
Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda to counter the influence of France during the deployment of 
UNAMIR as stated above. France desperately tried to prevent the coming to power of “English-
speaking Africans” in Rwanda but failed (Hintjens 1999:273). In facilitating the coming to 
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power of the RPF, the peacekeepers were playing the role of managing the demise of French 
influence in Rwanda and the ascendancy and installation of the RPF regime. Once hostilities 
started, the UN following its traditional practice, sided with the US in facilitating the demise 
of the Habyarimana regime (Al-Qaq 2009:162). This was in clear violation of the host state 
sovereignty that attracted hostility from those that were going to lose power as a result of 
Belgian manipulation of the crisis to secure an outcome favourable to the Belgians and their 
US and UK allies.  
5.5.1 Anti-Belgian sentiments in Kigali 
According to the Bruguire Report (2006), the origins of the anti-Belgian troops’ presence in 
Kigali can be traced to several factors. Firstly, the participation of Belgium in UNAMIR was 
at the recommendation of the RPF that aimed at neutralizing the strong French influence in 
Kigali; Secondly, the entry into Kigali by the RPF battalion, under the escort of Belgian 
peacekeepers on 28 December 1993 as part of the Arusha Agreement, caused some serious 
resentment and mistrust of the Belgian contingent among government troops and elements 
loyal to the Rwandan government. This was aggravated by the questionable conduct of Belgian 
troops during their stay in Kigali, where they were perceived to be favouring the RPF elements 
deployed in the capital. Of particular importance was the alleged role played by the Belgian 
peacekeepers in the assassination of the two presidents on 06 April 1994.28 
On the fateful day when the presidential jet was shot down, Belgian peacekeepers had earlier 
escorted RPF rebels into the Akagera national park located in the direction from which the 
missiles that shot down the presidential plane were fired (Bruguire Report 2006:7). The Belgian 
Parliamentary Commission that investigated the killing of 10 Belgian peacekeepers failed to 
identify the RPF rebel officials who were escorted into the national park and the exact nature 
of the mission thereof (Ibid.). The fact that despite the death of 10 Belgian soldiers in Kigali at 
the hands of the Presidential Guards troops, the Belgian Parliamentary Commission failed to 
identify the RPF officials that were escorted to the area considered to be the launching base for 
the missiles, significantly contributed to the strong theory and suspicion that Belgian 
peacekeepers were directly or indirectly involved in the conspiracy and possibly the actual 
facilitation of the terrorist attack of the two presidents (Ibid). Empty missile launchers were 
                                                          
28 The Security Council has failed to commission an independent international inquiry into the deaths of two 
African presidents. Efforts to establish such an inquiry continue to be blocked by powerful members of the 
Security Council whose international standing might be jeopardized by the true findings of such an investigation. 
133 
 
later found abandoned in the Akagera national park which tends to reinforce the suspicion of 
the Belgian peacekeepers’ unexplained visit to the park on the day the two presidents were 
assassinated. 
It is now an undisputed fact that the missiles that were used to shoot down the presidential 
aircraft were from the official inventory of the Ugandan Armed Forces, thus linking the 
Belgians and RPF to the shooting incident.29 The Rwandan forces had no anti-aircraft missile 
systems in their military inventory. On the contrary, the RPF had surface to air missiles (SAM 
14 and SAM 16) missiles in their inventory (Bruguire Report Op. Cit.). The fact that the 
Rwandan Forces did not have anti-aircraft missiles in their inventory dispels the theory that 
Presidential Guards troops shot down the aircraft. We can recall that Belgian troops’ (not 
peacekeepers) role in the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba as discussed in 
Chapter Four of this thesis.  
There appears to be too much of a coincidence in that the Belgians were directly involved in 
the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba, in covert cooperation with the American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). In Rwanda Belgian troops were implicated in the terrorist attack 
on the presidential plane that killed the Rwandan President and his Burundian counterpart, an 
act that triggered the genocide. In both cases the CIA was implicated. The failure by the 
international community to investigate the assassination of the two African presidents reflects 
the existence of a powerful influence within the Security Council to block any such attempts 
at establishing the true facts as to who shot down the presidential aircraft killing two African 
heads of state (Philpot 2005). 
It is evident from the discussion above that the deployment of Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda 
was unethical right from the start. The deployment ultimately resulted in unethical conduct by 
the peacekeepers arising from the strategic role they were meant to play in the implementation 
of a geo-strategic plan to promote Belgian and Anglo-American interests designed to dislodge 
French influence from this region. Worse still, the Belgian authorities influenced the Security 
Council to withdraw the bulk of UN peacekeepers at the height of the genocide following the 
withdrawal of the entire Belgian contingent. 
                                                          
29 The origins of the missiles used were from an official weapons consignment delivered to Uganda from the 
USSR. The serial numbers of the fired cartridges matched the remaining missiles still in the Ugandan military 
inventory, thus linking the RPF and possibly the Belgian peacekeepers to the act of assassination.   
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The next section examines the unethical conduct of the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda to 
determine the degree to which host state sovereignty and peacekeeping principles were violated 
or undermined. 
5.6 An analysis of unethical conduct by UNAMIR 
This section aims to demonstrate that UNAMIR was intrusive in the political and military 
affairs of Rwanda. These intrusive activities were meant to serve the interests of big powers 
that were sponsoring the RPF rebel movement and in doing so the peacekeepers were 
undermining host state sovereignty. I will demonstrate that UNAMIR acted along similar 
modus operandi as UN peacekeepers in Congo during the early 1960s where ONUC actively 
participated in regime change activities to the extent of being accomplices in the assassination 
of government officials that had earlier consented to the deployment of the peacekeepers. 
5.6.1 UNAMIR unethical intrusiveness in Rwanda domestic affairs 
The composition of UNAMIR (320 civilian staff and 2 548 troops) depicted a mission that was 
not primarily meant to effectively deal with any wayward behaviour by spoilers of the peace 
agreement but rather to supervise the assembly of the Broad Based Transitional Government 
(BBTG), a new political dispensation through a regime change process that was to be micro-
managed by the peacekeeping mission (Al Qaq 2009:114). A critical analysis of the conduct 
and activities of UN personnel reflects deep involvement as opposed to nominal participation 
in Rwandan political affairs through squeezing and pushing the Habyarimana government to 
accelerate its political and economic liberalization processes in order to fast track the outcome 
of the transition process in whose outcome was in favour of the Anglo-American sponsors of 
the opposition parties including the RPF (Ibid.). In doing so, the peacekeepers aggravated an 
already volatile political environment to the extent that resorting to violence as a means of 
mitigating or even reversing the effects of the fast track political liberalization process became 
the most logical and practical strategy for the greater part of the Hutu population (Ibid.). There 
was very little the GoR could do to reverse the course of political developments as the forces 
marshalled against it were formidable.  
One diplomat that the researcher interviewed in Addis Ababa acknowledged that once a 
country accepts the deployment of peacekeepers, it is a public admission that it would have 
failed to run and administer its own domestic affairs without outside interference hence failed 
and failing states must bear the consequences of having peacekeepers on their soil. He added 
that the presence of UN peacekeepers is a direct result of their political incompetence to 
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stabilize the political and security situation in the affected country. 30  He emphasised that 
Rwanda was no exception as it had to submit most of its government economic, political and 
military functions to direct and indirect monitoring and supervision by the civilian component 
of UNAMIR and military peacekeepers on behalf of the Security Council. These views are 
shared by an official from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
(ACCORD) that was interviewed by the researcher in Durban on 16 July 2015. He argued that 
African states have themselves to blame for having their sovereignty violated by UN 
peacekeepers because the UN does not invite itself to come to these countries. He added that 
failure to resolve internal conflicts through dialogue, coupled with the politics of exclusion and 
winner takes all mentality result in the deployment of UN peacekeepers. On arrival they 
interpret the situation through their own lenses and attempt to seek solutions that they believe 
will bring about long lasting solutions to the country even if it means violation of state 
sovereignty to achieve this objective. In his view, the peacekeepers intrusive activities in the 
political activities of the host country such as monitoring and supervision of the political 
processes constituted unpopular but necessary intrusive behaviour on the part of the 
peacekeepers that undermines host state sovereignty in order to achieve a better future for the 
population. However what this official failed to acknowledge was the fact that peacekeepers 
intrusiveness was meant to promote the self-interests of some big powers at the expense of the 
local population. Regrettably, in the majority of cases, host governments have little room to 
manoeuvre in order to limit the extent of the intrusiveness by the peacekeepers because they 
would have voluntarily consented to the deployment of foreign forces on their soil in the first 
place. This was the case with the Rwandan government although the incumbent government 
agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeepers under duress from the US authorities. 
Al Qaq (2009:114) argues that the Habyarimana government had consented to the deployment 
of UN peacekeepers under duress hence the host-state consent it granted was coerced consent 
because it acquiesced to the deployment of peacekeepers in Rwanda as an alternative to a 
military defeat by the RPF and also as a result of increased international political isolation. 
This view is buttressed by Prunier (1997:101-102) and Des Forges (2007:50) who confirm that 
the GoR agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeepers as the only viable alternative to a 
                                                          
30 The diplomat gave an analogy of a domestic squabble between a husband and wife. He said that once the in-
laws or neighbours are invited to assist in resolving their dispute, in the majority of cases these outsiders end up 
knowing too much about the private life of the affected couple and their advice, to be effective, should be premised 
on certain domestic sensitive facts that might appear as if they are intruding in the private affairs of the couple 
seeking assistance.  
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military crashing defeat by the RPF on the battlefield. The GoR was rescued from a humiliating 
military defeat by the RPF through the timely military intervention by French troops during the 
1993 rebel military offensive operations (Ibid). Added to this, the UN system was conscious 
of the fact that the outcome of the Arusha Agreement amounted to a “negotiated surrender of 
political power” by the incumbent government hence its approach in dealing with the regime 
was cognisant of the regime’s inherent political, economic and military weaknesses (Al Qaq 
2009). In the same vein, the main leverage the UN had over the GoR was the threat of 
withdrawing the peacekeepers. A withdrawal of UNAMIR would translate into a defeat of the 
GoR on the battlefield (Al Qaq 2009). With this in mind we can appreciate the negative impact 
of the threats of peacekeepers’ withdrawal that were exerted on the GoR to speed up the 
transitional process which it viewed as a negotiated surrender of power and privileges to the 
opposition. 
In a letter to President Habyarimana in January 1994, the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali 
reminded the state president that continued presence of UNAMIR was dependent on the fast 
track implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreements. He stressed that in its Resolution 893 
of January 1994, the Security Council had “strongly urged the parties to comply fully with the 
Arusha Peace Agreements…the Council stressed that continued support for UNAMIR would 
depend upon the full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement 
(UN Doc. United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996:42) 
Mounting additional pressure on the Rwandan government to speed up the implementation of 
the Arusha protocols, the Council further warned: “…Security Council calls the attention of 
the parties to the consequences for them of non-compliance with that provision of the 
Agreement. It notes that UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties 
implement the Arusha peace Agreement fully and rapidly (S/PRST/1994/8, dated 17 February 
1994). The Secretary General further ratcheted up the pressure on the Rwandan Government 
by threatening to withdraw UNAMIR if the transitional process was not speeded up 
(S/1994/360, dated 30 March 1994). In a deliberately calculated move to further mount the 
pressure on the Rwandan President, on 05 April 1994, instead of extending UNAMIR mandate 
by six weeks as recommended by the Secretary General to the Security Council, an extension 
of only four weeks was granted on condition that the Secretary General reported progress on 
the implementation of the transitional process, failure which UNAMIR was to be withdrawn 
(S/RES/909 (1994) dated 5 April 1994). The unethical and irresponsible withdrawal of the bulk 
of UN peacekeepers that took place at the height of the genocide was in part a fulfilment of 
137 
 
this threat that was meant to pressurize and squeeze the GoR to speed up implementation of 
peace agreements that the government considered to be a “negotiated surrender” of political 
power (Al Qaq 2009 Op. Cit.). The deliberate and concerted pressure on the GoR however 
ended on 06 April 1994, when the Presidential plane was shot down triggering the genocide 
and the RPF final and decisive military offensive operation to take over complete and undiluted 
political power in Kigali and not necessarily to stop the genocide.  
5.6.2 An analysis of UNAMIR’s failure to use force to stop the genocide 
UN initial response to the outbreak of the genocide was to evacuate foreign nationals, 
especially American and European citizens, after which the Security Council authorized the 
withdrawal of the bulk of the peacekeepers in an act of abandoning the endangered Rwandese 
to their fate (OAU Panel of Experts Report 2000). Having realized that indeed genocide was 
taking place in Rwanda, potent ethical arguments and justifications were articulated with a 
view to stop the genocide but no decisive action was taken to effectively bring the genocide to 
an end (Aoi 2011:85). Reluctance by big powers to launch a military humanitarian operation 
in Rwanda emanated from the absence of strong power-political national self-interests, as well 
as absence of geo-strategic justification for the use of force for humanitarian reasons in Rwanda 
(Ibid.). In fact the powerful members of the Security Council played power-political games to 
justify non-intervention.  
The US, was not keen to financially support or take part in an expensive enforcement mission 
following the Somalia disaster, arguing that another failed intervention would tarnish the image 
and authority of the UN as there was a strong perception that another intervention in Africa 
would most likely fail hence non-intervention was meant to preserve the image and authority 
of the world organization (Ibid). The ethical justification for a military intervention was 
primarily humanitarian, to stop the genocide and preserve precious human life and the need to 
promote multilateral security. The ethical counter-argument for non-intervention was to 
preserve and protect the international image and authority of the UN through the avoidance of 
yet another disaster in military humanitarian intervention, in a mission that was promising to 
be complex and difficult (Al Qaq 2009). It was generally argued that Rwanda had no strategic 
importance to justify an expensive military humanitarian intervention a perception that was 
worsened by the restrictive US Presidential Policy Directive (PPD 25) which viewed UN 
peacekeeping operations as having been over used by major powers hence it sought limiting 
scenarios in which the US would support UN peacekeeping missions (PDD 25 2004). Fears of 
launching yet another failed mission in Rwanda soon after the Somali debacle contributed to 
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UN inaction. The US was the strongest opponent to any attempt at using military force in 
Rwanda as it argued that any hasty military intervention in Rwandan civil war would result in 
failure as was the case in Somalia (Barnett 1997:572). Thus the mandate for UNAMIR was 
very restrictive in what the mission could do without prior approval from New York. 
Hiding behind a restrictive interpretation of its mandate, UNAMIR remained idle and watched 
hopelessly as Rwandans were slaughtering each other during one of largest and fastest 
genocides of the 20th century (Sitkowski 2006:111). Although the Security Council mandate 
did not categorically authorize UNAMIR to use force to protect civilians in danger of being 
killed, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) drafted and distributed by the force commander 
General Dallaire authorized peacekeepers to use force for the sake of protecting endangered 
civilians. Sitkowski (2006:16) observed that UNAMIR ROE authorized peacekeepers to use 
force in order to “prevent crimes against humanity, but these were deliberately not applied” 
demonstrating continued existence of ambiguity in the exact role of military peacekeepers in 
peace operations with a humanitarian dimension (Ibid). Paragraph 17 of the ROE specifically 
authorised UNAMIR peacekeepers to use all means available for protecting Rwandan civilians. 
It stated in detail that: 
Crimes against Humanity: Ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts may also be 
committed during this mandate and will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available 
means to put an end to them. Examples: Executions, attacks or displaced persons or refugees, 
ethnic riots, attack on demobilized soldiers, etc. On such occasions, UNAMIR military personnel 
will follow the ROE outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or 
in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity 
(ROE-Operational Directive No.2 dated 19 November 1993). 
Directives such as this were very uncommon during traditional peacekeeping operations as this 
violated the principle of minimum use of force except in self-defence (UN Doc. S/1999/1257). 
The deteriorating security situation in Rwanda where low level acts of genocide were taking 
place and preparations for genocide were evident through the distribution of war materials and 
the spreading of hate language against the Tutsi influenced General Dallaire to draft this rare 
set of ROE. The Force Commander described the inclusion of paragraph 17 in the ROE as 
breaking new ground in a bid to compensate for the absence of a Chapter VII mandate that 
authorizes the use of force for the protection of civilians (Dallaire Op. Cit.:71-72). Although 
the ROE was in force among UNAMIR contingents, it was neither endorsed nor denounced by 
UN headquarters when the draft copy was submitted for approval. This was condoned possibly 
because it was morally appropriate to use force other than in self-defence for the sake of 
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protecting endangered innocent civilians in a situation of an ongoing genocide. It would have 
been legally and ethically justifiable to use force in order to curb crimes against humanity in 
line with the provisions of the Genocide Convention. What is morally apprehensible is that the 
provisions of paragraph 17 were not applied to curb or stop the genocide. The mission lacked 
both the authority and capacity to use force in defence against gross human rights violations as 
stated in paragraph 17 of the ROE. As a result the parties to the conflict took advantage of the 
weak UNAMIR as a golden opportunity to reorganize and regroup their forces for the 
resumption of the unfinished civil war (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:282). 
Reasons given for non-use of force to stop the Rwanda genocide was that the ROE were self-
limiting and restrictive in that they prescribed that authority to use force of arms in situations 
other than legal self-defence had to be secured from the Sector Commander of Kigali or from 
the Force Commander who in turn had to seek authority from his superiors in New York 
(Sitkowski 2006). This is evidenced by denial of permission for the Force Commander to use 
force to protect the Rwandan Prime Minister Madam Agathe Uwilingiyimana who was killed 
in a UN compound in the presence of peacekeepers (OAU Panel of Experts Report 2000). This 
also partly explains why the ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed in cold blood without firing 
a single bullet in self-defence (Ibid). The other reason for non-use of force was fear of 
triggering a violent military backlash from government forces once peacekeepers used fire 
arms aggressively against government security elements threatening the lives of government 
officials and committing genocide.  
The Carlsson Report (1999) noted that General Dallaire did not launch a military operation to 
rescue the captured Belgian peacekeepers that were being tortured by Presidential Guards 
soldiers because he felt the risk of intervening peacekeepers’ casualties would be unacceptably 
too high to justify an attempt at rescuing the ten peacekeepers. He equally felt that UNAMIR 
had too limited resources in manpower and military fighting capacity to mount a violent rescue 
operation. Considering that UNAMIR contingents had no adequate food, medical supplies, 
ammunition and combat supplies, it would have been a futile if not suicidal attempt at rescuing 
fellow peacekeepers through the use of force as the peacekeepers were completely 
outnumbered and out gunned by government forces. In addition, such an act of war would 
almost have guaranteed the withdrawal of government consent to the continued deployment of 
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the peacekeepers.31 This scenario posed a serious military ethical challenge on whether or not 
to risk the lives of many more peacekeepers in an attempt at rescuing ten Belgian peacekeepers 
implicated in the shooting of the presidential plane. The future of the mission itself would have 
taken a totally different and dangerous course had an attempt to forcefully rescue the Belgian 
troops been mounted. Considering that UNAMIR was a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission 
General Dallaire decided that it was prudent to let the Belgian troops pay the ultimate price 
without any assistance from their fellow UNAMIR peacekeepers (UN Doc. S/1999/1257). 
5.6.3 Unethical and senseless withdrawal of peacekeepers amid genocide 
The killing of ten Belgian UNAMIR peacekeepers provoked the immediate and senseless 
withdrawal of the entire Belgian contingent that was the backbone of UNAMIR. Belgium, for 
unethical and selfish reasons, irresponsibly and senselessly lobbied for withdrawal of the entire 
UNAMIR in order to avoid being singled out as the only country that abandoned the Rwandan 
civilians at the time of their greatest need (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000:174). The lobby was 
supported by the US and resulted in an unethical compromised decision to reduce UNAMIR 
to a derisory and ineffective 270 peacekeepers (UNSC RES/912 of 21 April 1994)32. The 
Secretariat officials in New York instructed General Dallaire not to take any action towards 
protecting the Rwandan population facing the threat of genocide under the pretext of being 
impartial in a situation of a “civil war” (Boutros-Ghali 1999:138). This was a demonstration of 
having little respect for African lives. 
What this basically meant was that the international community literally abandoned the 
Rwandan population at the time of their greatest need when they were facing mass murder. 
This was indeed a morally reprehensible decision, which had far reaching implications in that 
over 800 thousand Rwandese lost their lives and the genocide triggered a massive exodus of 
refugees to neighbouring countries namely Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire.  
                                                          
31 In an interview with a Colonel who was with an African contingent in Kigali at the outbreak of the genocide, 
he confirmed that the idea of rescuing the Belgian peacekeepers was not entertained for long by other contingents 
that were scared of reprisals by government forces that were vastly superior to the peacekeepers in every respect. 
He added that any forceful attempt at rescuing the peacekeepers would have been interpreted as an act of war 
against the host government that was morning President Habyarimana who had been killed in circumstances that 
implicated the Belgian peacekeepers that were detained, tortured and later killed by the Presidential Guards troops.  
32 UN Security Council Resolution 912 S/RES/912), dated April 21, 1994, para. 8, reduced the UNAMIR troops 
to 270 peacekeepers. The Rwandan UN Ambassador Jean-Damascène Bizimana complained that: “The 
international community does not seem to have acted in an appropriate manner to reply to the anguished appeal 
of the people of Rwanda . . . The option chosen by the Council, reducing the number of troops in UNAMIR . . .is 
not a proper response to this crisis. . . .”  (UN Doc. S/PV.3368 dated 21 April, 1994). 
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Commenting on the unethical decision by the Security Council, Secretary General of the OAU, 
Salim Ahmed Salim is quoted as having lamented that: 
It was absolutely incomprehensible for Africa that the UN should withdraw the majority of its 
troops from Rwanda and refuse to change its decision at the very time its presence is required to 
end the massacre of innocent people. The Security Council must recognize it is the responsibility 
of the international community to end the large-scale killings and genocide being perpetrated in 
Rwanda (Furley 1998:240-241). 
The OAU itself did nothing to come to the rescue of the Rwandan civilians because there was 
no consensus on what was the best response to the genocide among African states. The OAU 
Report on The Preventable Genocide (2000) made a very illuminating conclusion regarding 
the apartheid like decision to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR after the successful withdrawal 
of foreigners from Rwanda when it stated that: 
There are reasons why Africa has been marginalized, why the world is indifferent, why there 
seems to be a double standard when it comes to Africa. Events in recent years make inescapable 
the conclusion that an implicit racism is at work here, a sense that African lives are not valued as 
highly as other lives. Nowhere was this demonstrated more flagrantly than when UNAMIR was 
instructed by New York in the first days of the genocide to give priority to helping expatriates 
flee Rwanda, and if necessary to go beyond its narrow mandate to achieve this end (OAU Report 
on The Preventable Genocide 2000:252). 
The OAU Report fell short of clearly acknowledging that the African states with the 
responsibility of protecting their own citizens must be seen doing everything in their power to 
safeguard the human security of their citizens; as opposed to relying on outside peacekeepers 
whose agenda is not always in sync with the wishes and aspirations of the African populations 
in affected countries. The realization that when it comes to saving African lives, the USSC 
plays double standards should in itself galvanise African states to jointly seek African solutions 
to African problems without over reliance on outside assistance.  
Africa continues to be marginalized, and the world continues to be indifferent, while double 
standards continue to be applied to African conflict areas yet little to nothing is being done to 
improve Africa’s self-sufficiency in dealing with her regional conflicts.33 These observations 
                                                          
33 These were the views of a frustrated diplomat interviewed in Pretoria during the SADC Defence and Security 
Coordinating meeting held in October 2015. He further lamented that, “Programmes to mobilize financial 
resources to make the AU self-sufficient are never implemented because Africa lacks unity of purpose when it 
comes to peace and security issues on the continent. Our heads of state are always being manipulated by the big 
powers for the sake of continued financial aid which in itself is meant to perpetually lock our countries in the 
dependency syndrome that serves the interests of our former colonial masters.” 
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call for a serious continental determination to develop the political will power and unity of 
purpose among African leaders to channel financial and human energy resources towards 
investing in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives by African states themselves in order 
to operationalize the “African Solutions to African Problems” dictum. It is disheartening to 
note that the continental organization still heavily relies on donor funds to finance its 
continental security challenges, yet some of the conflicts are instigated by the same donor 
community that comes under the pretext of assisting in resolving the conflicts they would have 
instigated.34. In an interview with Ibbo Mandaza (November 2015) in Harare, he highlighted 
the fact that Africa can achieve self-sufficiency in addressing continental security challenges 
in the same manner that the OAU had unity of purpose when it sought to liberate the continent 
from colonialism. 35  The same degree of commitment, dedication and sacrifice has been 
watered down as each African state minds its own business to the extent of even being used as 
spring boards by powerful western countries to launch insurgency military attacks in 
neighbouring countries to further the self-interests of foreign powers. 
5.6.4 UNAMIR’s unholy alliance with the RPF 
After the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement (APA), the RPF successfully negotiated on 
28 December 1993 for the deployment of its advance battalion in the heart of Kigali allegedly 
to provide protection to its officials working on implementing the BBTG. The RPF protection 
battalion was quartered around the parliament building, strategically located in the central 
district of Kigali, and this eventually became the forward logistics base for perpetrating the 
RPF military offensive operations. Furthermore, the parliament building served as an advance 
bridgehead for launching the military campaign that toppled the Rwandan government 
(Bruguire Report 2006:32).The decision to deploy the RPF battalion at the parliament building, 
the seat of government, had a devastating psychological impact on government forces and 
                                                          
34 This was the view of an African diplomat interviewed in Harare on 13 November 2015. The Ambassador 
lamented the AU continued dependency on foreign funds to run its operational and security budgets and added 
that “some of the so called AU strategic partners are like arsonists who set your house on fire and later come 
dressed as fire brigade to pretend as if they genuinely want to assist you in putting out the fire yet they would have 
created access for their intrusion in your own domestic affairs without you realizing it. They will be pursuing their 
own selfish interests, based in your country, undermining your sovereignty under the cover of assisting you to put 
your house in order.”  
35 In an interview in Harare on 15 November 2015, the academic called for commitment and sacrifices of similar 
magnitude as demonstrated during the decolonization era if the slogan “African Solutions to African Problems” 
can be fully operationalized. He however acknowledged that African countries continue to be divided by former 
colonial powers to guarantee that there is no unity of purpose among the African states as such unity acts against 
the self-interests of the big powers that benefit from the fragmented approach of African states.  
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officials alike who felt that this was a confirmation of a surrender of political power in the 
making. Confirming the strategic importance of the parliament building area, General Dallaire 
acknowledged that UNAMIR was initially opposed to the selection of this site in central Kigali 
because it was “a position which permitted considerable control over communication arteries 
between the city and the airport and also the resupply communication access onto another 
principal roads” (Dallier’s Testimony to the ICTR on 25 February 1999). Thus the selection of 
this vital location had both military and political strategic significance that favoured the 
occupants of this vital piece of ground at the centre of the capital.  
Dismas Nsengiyarmene, former Prime Minister of Rwanda, testified that the RPF exerted 
pressure on the interim Prime Minister Madam Agathe Uwilingiyimana to have its battalion 
deployed on the parliament building premises from where the rebel troops took advantage of 
the concession which was meant to smuggle weapons, ammunition as well as additional 
unsanctioned troops into Kigali (Testimony by Dismas Nsengiyarmene to the ICTR). This 
account is corroborated by Gerad Ntashamanje who confirmed having witnessed secret 
infiltrations by the rebels into Kigali of “reinforcements of the RPF’s military capability, 
particularly the supply of surface-to-air missiles.” Most disturbing is the fact that UNAMIR 
not only witnessed the clandestine operations by the RPF but also abated and facilitated the 
smuggling efforts in clear violation of their mandate and the principles of peacekeeping 
operations especially that of impartiality. 
A Belgian peacekeeper, Corporal Johnny Boreaux, who participated in the deployment of RPF 
battalion from their headquarters in Mulindi to Kigali on 28 December 1993; testified on 15 
December 1996, that the RPF was infiltrating unauthorised rebels into Kigali when he stated 
that the monitoring system that had been put in place, “allowed soldiers (RPF) dressed as 
civilians to infiltrate Kigali and to commit assassinations” that would be blamed on government 
forces (Bruguire Report 2006:33). This is corroborated by Human Rights Watch (2006) that 
observed that the Arusha Peace Accord permitted the RPF a total of six hundred soldiers only 
in Kigali but the rebel movement clandestinely infiltrated more troops, weapons and 
ammunition in violation of the peace agreement. To further corroborate this account, Belgian 
Colonel Luc Marchal, who was UNAMIR commander of the Kigali region also added that he 
had always believed that each time the RPF rebels went out looking for firewood in the northern 
region of Rwanda, “it was in order to bring back weapons” (Bruguire Report Op.Cit.). This 
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assessment has been further corroborated by several peacekeepers interviewed by this 
researcher.36 
The bottom line remains that UNAMIR condoned the RPF illegal smuggling of unauthorised 
personnel, weapons and ammunition into Kigali whilst they kept government heavy weapons 
under their custody without applying the same measures and principles to the rebel movement 
in clear violation of the principle of impartiality.37 General Dallaire appeared to have been 
working closely with the RPF leadership with the intention of facilitating the illegal, strategic 
military build-up in anticipation of the military offensive against the Rwandan government. 
Black (2014) highlights that there was massive evidence of RPF build-up of men and war 
materials from Uganda despite UNAMIR’s presence, a mission supposedly deployed to 
guarantee a peaceful transition to multi-party democracy yet it ended up serving as a smoke 
screen for US strategic interests and her allies. Black also adds that Dallaire hid this build up 
not only from the host President and the Rwandan Army but also to his immediate superiors 
Booh-Booh and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (Ibid.). In so doing, General Dallaire was 
undermining the sovereignty of Rwanda at the same time violating peacekeeping principles of 
host state consent and impartiality. In this regard, UNAMIR violated an unwritten assumption 
and responsibility that peacekeepers should not aggravate or worsen the already precarious 
situation in which the host country finds itself during the entire duration of the mission’s 
deployment.  
In an act of defiance and lack of respect for the Rwandan authorities, General Dallaire closed 
one of the two runways and left open runway 28 that overlooked the heavily wooded Masaka 
Hills from where the missiles that killed the President Habyarimana were fired. The closure of 
the runway was done at the request and insistence of the RPF (Black 2014). The closure of one 
                                                          
36 Retired Colonel Bambazonke (not real name) admitted that “UNAMIR peacekeepers were sympathetic to the 
plight of Tutsi exiled rebels and refugees whose human rights to return home were being blocked and violated by 
the Habyarimana regime that was practicing apartheid like policies against a minority segment of the Rwandan 
population.” He added that “this sympathy made the peacekeepers turn a blind eye and in some cases assisted the 
RPF in the smuggling of illegal weapons and ammunition because we strongly felt that the Tutsi deserved better 
treatment and this could only materialize if enough military pressure was exerted on the government of Rwanda 
by the rebels who were fighting to liberate themselves just as we liberated ourselves from our colonial masters. 
The only difference was that the Tutsi were being subjugated by fellow Africans in a land of their common 
ancestors.” 
37 The Arusha Peace Agreements had directed the peacekeepers to establish a weapons free zone around Kigali 
by withdrawing heavy weapons from the belligerents and keeping them in safe custody. UNAMIR kept 
Government heavy weapons under custody while at the same time allowing the RPF to smuggle its heavy 
weapons, (including missiles use in the shooting of the presidential aircraft) into the country from Uganda and the 
northern demilitarized zone into Kigali. 
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of the two runways in January 1994 channelled approaching aircraft for landing to a single 
approach route thus raising the probability of precision aiming and hitting oncoming aircraft. 
The closure of the runway was done without prior consultation with the Rwandan government 
authorities in violation of host state sovereignty. This act alone signifies the extent to which 
peacekeepers can go towards undermining host-state sovereignty in furtherance of the interests 
of big powers that are the main sponsors of UN peacekeeping missions. 
The preparations for the RPF military offensive to effectively take over power in Kigali was 
manifested by several activities that started long before the shooting down of the presidential 
aircraft and the military offensive operation that ensued thereafter. The Bruguire Report 
(2006:40) highlights some of the prominent signs for the preparation of a major military 
offensive by the RPF which include the following: stepping up of campaigns to recruit young 
exiled Tutsis and those within the country to join the RPA; the logistical preparations for a 
major military campaign through stockpiling of weapons and ammunition caches by the rebel 
movement in the de-militarized zone that was under UNAMIR control; the unchallenged 
infiltration of rebel combatants; weapons and ammunition into Kigali including the SAM 16 
anti-aircraft missiles under the guise of fetching firewood from RPF Headquarters in Mulindi 
under the escort of UNAMIR troops and replenishment of weapons from Uganda with the 
connivance of the peacekeepers. 
These observations and views are corroborated by UNAMIR Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal 
who testified that the RPF strategy was to mislead the international community together with 
the peacekeepers on their real intensions when he stated that: “I state this with all the more 
conviction as I myself (sic) was fooled by their persistent propaganda when faced with the 
ARUSHA negotiations. Once in KIGALI, I realized that there was a gap between words and 
deeds. A milling machine, that’s what this totalitarian movement was.” (Bruguire Report 
2006:40). Colonel Luc Marchal had earlier noted in his diary on 04 April 1994 that: “in fact 
the theory defended is that the sole motivation of the RPF in taking up arms against the current 
government is not the victory of democracy but the conquest of power by violence … this 
theory fits my observations and deductions” (Quoted in Bruguire Report 2006:43). 
According to the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000), the military offensive 
operations by the RPF against government forces began several hours after the shooting down 
of the presidential. The capacity to launch a countrywide military offensive by the RPF within 
several hours of downing the presidential plane suggests a deliberately pre-planned military 
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operation; as it is impossible to initiate battle procedures and launch an offensive campaign for 
a large military force within a few hours unless they were already on standby to spring into 
action. Thus the genocide that was triggered by the terrorist assassination of president 
Habyarimana was meant to trigger the civil war that was destined to benefit those who 
masterminded the conspiracy against the legitimate GoR.38 The level of commercial looting of 
strategic minerals from eastern DRC tends to confirm this observation as western powers 
together with their regional proxies continue to prolong the UN mission in this region for them 
to loot natural resources without paying taxes to the DRC government in violation of that 
government’s sovereignty. 
 
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that the granting of consent to the deployment of 
peacekeepers does not in itself guarantee success of the mission. The Rwandan genocide 
happened when the two belligerents had signed the Arusha peace agreement and conceded to 
the deployment of international peacekeepers, yet the mission was a total failure. The 
undermining of the host state’s sovereignty aggravated the tension between government 
loyalists and the rebels as UNAMIR was accused of being not only sympathetic to the rebel 
cause but actually facilitating the infiltration of weapons and rebel fighters into Kigali in 
anticipation of the civil war that would eventually topple the legitimate host government. 
The Rwanda civil war and genocide effectively belied the Arusha peace agreement and this 
was a direct result of a weak mission coupled with weak implementation which further 
undermined a peace agreement that had already weakened the government’s cohesion and 
authority. Steadman (1997:25) is of the view that a strong UNAMIR with credible capability 
to effectively deal with extremists and spoilers could have prevented the genocide. However 
the real problem was that such a force could not be created and deployed in Rwanda as this 
could have scuttled Anglo-American strategic plans to re-shape the Great Lakes region in their 
favour. The overall ethical assessment of UNAMIR is that the mission facilitated the downfall 
of the Rwandan government, as well as the military ascendency to power of the RPF. In doing 
so, the mission did very little to protect the victims of the genocide that was aggravated by the 
RPF military offensive operations that violated the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement as 
                                                          
38  Views expressed in an interview with a senior military analyst who decided to remain anonymous. The 
interview was carried out in Harare on 14 August 2015.  
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well as Rwanda’s national sovereignty in their bid to take over complete and undiluted power 
in Kigali. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the factors that contributed to the deployment of a weak and ineffective 
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda and the role the peacekeepers played in facilitating the fall 
of the host Rwandan government that had consented to the deployment of the mission under 
duress from foreign powers. UNAMIR was mandated to cooperate with the host government 
in order to guarantee the implementation of the Arusha peace process, yet some of its 
contingents acted in ways that undermined host state sovereignty by collaborating with the RPF 
that was aiming at a military defeat of the government of Rwanda. UNAMIR, like other second 
generation peacekeeping missions of the early 1990s, was an intrusive and invasive instrument 
of the US tasked with the responsibility of facilitating and supervising the downfall of a 
Francophone regime in Kigali and the installation of a pro-Anglo-Saxon regime in that country. 
In this regard, UNAMIR served to mitigate Franco versus Anglo-American rivalry in Rwanda 
where it was originally designed to preside over a peaceful and orderly regime change in 
Rwanda though events got underway but ultimately the strategic result was realized (Al Qaq 
2009:161).  
The chapter argued that the response by the international community was driven by narrow 
national self-interests primarily those of the US and its British allies and that the ultimate 
objectives of the mission had little to do with upholding international moral obligations and 
justice by coming to the rescue of victims of the genocide. The Security Council denied the 
OAU to be in charge of the neutral international force to oversee the implementation of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement; because doing so could have derailed Anglo-American geo-strategic 
plans to displace French influence from the African Great Lakes region. The DPKO 
deliberately failed to make use of the OAU and Rwanda’s neighbouring states, the countries 
that could have exerted their influence towards a successful implementation of the Arusha 
Agreements. This failure resulted in a disconnection between the negotiated settlement and the 
implementation process that ultimately led to the catastrophic genocide (Eriksson 1996). Thus, 
the Rwanda peacekeeping experience highlights the critical importance of the implementation 
phase of any negotiated settlement between warring parties (Scorgie 2004:66). It is a sad reality 
that a noble institution such as the UN undermined its integrity by turning its back to UNAMIR 
when the Rwanda theatre of operations became killing fields and slaughter camps during the 
genocide (Barnett 2002:1-21). 
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The chapter also exposed UNAMIR’s intrusiveness in the domestic affairs of Rwandan politics 
ultimately undermining Rwanda’s national sovereignty. It highlighted that UNAMIR played 
as a proxy force and political instrument to promote Anglo-American geo-strategic, neo-liberal 
political and economic interests. Equally, the chapter has argued that UNAMIR was deployed 
to facilitate the establishment of a pro Anglo-American government in Rwanda through a 
regime change strategy that was implemented with the full knowledge of the commander of 
UNAMIR and some officials at the UN Secretariat. Peacekeepers’ sympathy and unethical 
cooperation with the RPF rebels contributed to the demise of the host Rwandan government in 
violation of that country’s state sovereignty and the provisions of the Arusha Peace Accords 
(Chossudovsky 2003). Moreover, the presence of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda gave a false 
sense of hope and security to the Rwandan government and its population as the RPF was left 
to plan and execute a military offensive operation to topple the government in Kigali in order 
to avoid a power sharing political arrangement as agreed in the Arusha Peace Accords. The 
chapter also highlighted the fact that peacekeepers with a weak mandate and an ineffective 
military strength can only use force in self-defence and that they cannot protect civilians from 
gross human rights violations by spoilers of the peace agreement.  
The withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR peacekeepers from Rwanda clearly left the local 
civilian population with inadequate protection and exposed them to the vagaries of the genocide 
perpetrators. This explains why the local population and the international community 
condemned and criticized peacekeepers’ decisions to abandon hundreds of thousands civilians 
who were ultimately slaughtered by the genocideries (Zacarias 1996:18). The mission was 
complicit to a military coup d’état by the RPF against a legitimate host government in violation 
of the Arusha Peace Agreements.  
The case study has confirmed what was established in earlier case studies of Congo (1960-
1964) and Somalia (1992-193) that peacekeeping operations are primarily designed to 
influence local politics in host countries in accordance with the preferences of one or other 
foreign powers. In so doing, peacekeepers not only promote neo-liberal Western agenda but 
also facilitate the entrenchment of neo-liberal hegemonic agenda of one of the major powers 
in competition with others in the Southern hemisphere (Al Qaq Op. Cit.:161). 
The deliberate mishandling of the Rwandan genocide by the UN Secretariat, through failing to 
effectively take measures to stop the genocide galvanized international perception regarding 
UN sponsored military humanitarian intervention; to the extent of serving the purpose of 
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affirming the Western neo-liberal ideological doctrine that advocates for more and not less UN 
sponsored military interventions in African countries in violation of host countries’ state 
sovereignty (Al Qaq 2009:99-100). Such policy changes that culminated in the adoption of the 
R2P Doctrine have witnessed abuse of humanitarian interventions in countries like Libya and 
Syria; where regime change agenda is implemented under the guise of addressing humanitarian 
concerns.  
The lesson to be learnt is that UN peacekeepers should avoid a reputation for glaring 
weaknesses and inconsistencies while at the same time peacekeepers’ strength and capability 
should endeavour to raise the opportunity cost of non-compliance or non-cooperation with the 
agreed peace process. In the case of Rwanda, the mission failed because UNAMIR was 
deliberately made weak by the Anglo-Saxon allies as the weakness served their self-interests 
at the expense of the millions of Rwandese who were killed, maimed or displaced as a result 
of the civil war and genocide. Finally, this chapter has reinforced the observation made by Al 
Qaq (2009:161) that UN peacekeeping missions were primarily designed to influence the 
outcome of host-nation local politics in accordance with preferences of one or more foreign 
powers demonstrated in in the case studies of Congo in the early 1960s and Somalia in the 
early 1990s. The findings of this chapter further buttress the view that peacekeeping missions 
not only promote the neo-liberal Western agenda but also facilitate the entrenchment of the 
hegemonic agenda of one or more major powers in competition with others in the southern 
hemisphere. 
The next chapter examines ethical challenges related to UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping mission 
in Darfur.  





Multilateral Response to Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur: A Case Study of United 
Nations Organized Hypocrisy in Peacekeeping 
6.1 Introduction 
The conflict in Darfur is a complex security challenge with multiple actors such as the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) and its sponsored militias, other militia groups sponsored by 
regional and foreign powers, the AU, the UN, the big powers namely China and the US and 
their multinational corporations seeking a stake in Sudan’s rich natural resources. 39 
International response to this crisis has been influenced by arguments in defence of host state 
sovereignty; claims of threats to international peace and security, decisions by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) to indict the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir and the evolving 
nascent doctrine and norm of R2P that advocates for military humanitarian intervention to save 
civilian lives in situations similar to that prevailing in Darfur (Sitkowski 2006:148).   
The reason for choosing this case study is that the UN/AU hybrid mission in Darfur is one of 
the quintessential current peacekeeping operation in that: it is one of the twenty-first century 
missions to be deployed after the adoption of the R2P doctrine; it is currently experiencing 
major ethical and operational challenges in fulfilling its ambitious and high sounding mandates 
and lastly it encompasses major characteristics of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. At the 
time of deploying peacekeepers in Darfur in 2004, the conflict and atrocities in that western 
region of Sudan were considered to be the worst humanitarian disaster across the entire world 
as well as the first genocide of the twenty-first century (Tatum 2010). In 2004, the US labelled 
these atrocities “genocide” (Kristof 2005). The Security Council and other big powers did not 
agree with this labelling of the civil conflict in Darfur triggering serious debate on appropriate 
response to the crisis (Badescu 2011). 
The atrocities in Darfur were expected to shock the “conscience of mankind” and galvanize 
world opinion towards adopting and employing effective measures to stop the ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity that were being perpetrated by government sponsored Arab 
                                                          
39  It is estimated that Sudan’s oil reserves together with its enormous natural gas deposits rival those of Saudi 
Arabia and its high-purity uranium deposits are considered to be among the top three largest deposits in the world. 
It is further estimated that Sudan has the fourth-largest deposits of copper in the world (American Bedu 2008). 
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militias against non-Arab Africans. 40  This did not happen underscoring the tension and 
yawning gap that continues to exist between the collective international community’s will to 
operationalize the doctrine of R2P and the existing Westphalian state-centred norm of state 
sovereignty (de Kerckhove 2008:233).  
The Darfur humanitarian disaster provided the AU and the UN with a “litmus test for the R2P 
framework” considering that it was the first conflict to be dealt with by the UN after the 
adoption of the principle of R2P at a world summit in 2005 (McClean 2008:14). The 
international community failed to act decisively or it demonstrated unwillingness to 
operationalize the R2P doctrine, preferring to settle for an ineffective UN/AU hybrid 
peacekeeping mission (Kindiki 2007). This failure to come to the effective rescue of 
endangered civilians in Darfur forms the basis of this case study as it attempts to expose the 
hypocrisy of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa which basically fail to live up to the ideals 
espoused by the world body. The chapter aims to demonstrate the continued prevalence of the 
four dominant fallacies of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa namely: “the gulf between 
mandates and means; the inadequacy of symbolic deterrence in the face of a systematic 
campaign of violence; the pervasive ambivalence within the UN regarding the role of force in 
pursuit of peace and an institutional ideology of impartiality even when confronted with 
attempted genocide” (UN Doc. A/54/549 para 503). 
This chapter further highlights the continued mismatch between high sounding and impressive 
mandates for the peacekeeping mission in Darfur on one hand and the lack of practical and 
political commitment to provide the necessary resources to implement the mandates on the 
other. The chapter will expose the myth that Western powers are truly concerned about saving 
strangers’ lives in Africa when they organize highly publicized marches and campaigns such 
as the “Save Darfur” rallies. It will be argued and demonstrated that realist calculations and 
considerations that serve the national self-interests of big powers take precedence over 
idealistic and altruistic wishes to save civilian strangers on the African continent. The chapter 
will highlight more critically, the ethical challenges associated with the protection of civilians 
in civil war situations as being experienced in Darfur (Badescu and Bergholm 2009).  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section gives a brief background to the 
conflict in Darfur. The second section highlights AU response to the conflict while section 
                                                          
40 For a detailed account of the ethnic clashes in Darfur, See Prunier, (2006); Prunier (2007) and de Waal, (2004) 
who offer detailed accounts of historical background to the conflict.  
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three covers UN response to the crisis. Section four explores the ethical and practical challenges 
being faced by hybrid peacekeepers in Darfur. Sections five and six investigate US and Chinese 
responses respectively. The last section is the conclusion that summarises the main arguments 
of the chapter.    
6.2 Background to the Darfur conflict 
Sudan’s population is divided along religious, ethnic and tribal lines. It is estimated that 
religiously, 70 percent are Muslims, 25 percent Animists and 5 percent Christians (Ejibunu 
2008:3). The region of Darfur is located in western Sudan and its population is characterized 
by a complex tribal mix of Black Africans and Black Arabs with the Arabs that speak Arabic 
forming the greater majority (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009:109).  
The Darfur region, like other southern regions dominated by the Black Africans, has 
systematically suffered neglect and marginalization by successive governments since 
independence in January 1960 (Flint and De Waal 2008). This regional neglect was also 
extended to health care facilities, infrastructure and the local economy which led the Darfuris 
to realize that within their own country they were not treated as full citizens hence they resorted 
to violence as a means to attain self-determination (Burr and Collins 2008:9). The failure by 
the GoS to protect its people from depravation exacerbated the insecurity situation in Darfur 
and provided a rallying point for deprived groups to wage a campaign of violence as a way of 
expressing their grievances (Ibid.).  Having peacefully coexisted for centuries, the current 
conflict and misunderstanding among the ethnic groups in Darfur started when the Khartoum 
government adopted a pro-Arabic national policy that introduced segregation and exclusion 
against non-Arabs leading to social and political tensions (Prunier 2007:5).  
Although the friction in the Darfur region started a long time ago, the current conflict started 
in February 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) attacked GoS military establishments as a response to decades of political 
exclusion, as well as economic marginalization and deprivation (Badescu 2011:138). The 
Darfur crisis was equally triggered by the momentous North-South Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) that brought a peace settlement in South Sudan and left the Darfuris out of 
the settlement despite appeals to the GoS to accommodate their political, economic and 
developmental concerns in the peace talks (Power 2004). The immediate spark for the current 
conflict in Darfur was therefore the denial of political and economic space for Darfuris to 
participate in the negotiations that were meant to end the twenty one year war between the GoS 
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and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The North-South 
comprehensive peace settlement created fears that Darfuris would be deprived of political 
power and economic wealth-sharing agreement negotiated between the government and the 
SPLM/A.41 
The military response by the GoS to the insurgency was widespread and ruthless. Government 
forces launched counter attacks targeting whole villages of African Darfuris from three ethnic 
groups namely the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa that were considered to be anti-government in 
what was interpreted as a government sponsored military genocidal campaign (Prunier 2006). 
The aim of the government sponsored violence against the supporters of the rebel movements 
appeared to be wiping out and eliminating these non-Arab ethnic communities in order to 
effectively neutralize any potential for a formidable political opposition from this region 
resulting in over 400 000 civilians killed and millions made homeless and landless or driven 
into refugee camps (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009). The Sudanese Government military 
reaction involved arming and sponsoring the horse mounted Janjaweed Arab militias by 
supplying them with weapons of war, giving them air support; while according them free reign 
to terrorize, rape, and pillage the non-Arab villages in Darfur region in a bid to alienate and 
deprive the rebels of their local civilian support base (Human Rights Watch 2004).  
The Janjaweed unleashed a scorched earth terror campaign against the Black non-Arab 
communities through burning their villages; raping, looting their property, abducting their 
inhabitants, destroying their livestock and forcing them to abandon their homes; water points, 
mills, and other village assets (Human Rights Watch, 2004:14). Alex de Waal (2005), observed 
that the GoS deliberately and consistently “franchised its counter-insurgency operations” to the 
Janjaweed Arab militia forces that had been committing atrocities against the civilian 
population while the government provided the militias with combat support and military 
intelligence. Worse still, the government allowed Janjaweed militias to operate with complete 
impunity, creating an “ethics-free” ruthless military campaign against civilians (Ibid: 129). 
                                                          
41 In an interview with an African diplomat in Addis Ababa on 13 October 2015, he stressed that the African 
Darfuris feared to remain under perpetual subjugation of the Arab authorities whose apartheid like policies denied 
the ethnic groups of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa any meaningful role to play in national politics and economic 
activities as the central government practiced politics of exclusion and segregation. He further pointed out that 
whereas there were grievances among the segregated ethnic groups in Darfur; the current crisis was instigated and 
fuelled by western foreign powers that are keen to deliver autonomy to this region. In this bid, they are actively 
supporting insurgents that are fighting for secession or greater autonomy as was the case with South Sudan hence 
this conflict to a large extent is a proxy war meant to serve the self-interests of western powers seeking to have 
unfettered access to vast mineral deposits in Darfur region.  
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These acts were designed to deliberately inflict physical community destruction that would 
drive the victims away from their ancestral villages (Tatum 2010:151).  
The 2003 dramatic upsurge in the humanitarian crisis in Darfur attracted unusually high global 
attention and media coverage that led to the visit of Darfur region by the then UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, on 29th June 2004. This was followed by General Colin Powel’s visit, 
then Secretary of State of the US on 30th June 2004 who declared that genocide was taking 
place in Darfur (Natama 2010:2). This categorization of the conflict as genocide remained an 
American view not shared by other members of the Security Council and the AU.  
The international reaction to the atrocities being perpetrated in Darfur was varied both in scope 
and intensity. The Security Council found it extremely difficult and controversial to determine 
that there was a threat to or breach of international security considering that the GoS activities 
were mainly targeted at its own population in a civil war setting. The fact that the politics and 
causes of the conflict were largely internal to Sudan strictly meant that the crisis was an internal 
Sudanese affair that did not warrant outside intervention (Bellamy and Williams 2010). 
The following section briefly discusses the reaction of the AU as it formed the basis for the 
establishment of the hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping. 
6.3 AU response to the Darfur crisis 
This section briefly examines the AU response to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the 
extent to which it demonstrated the organization’s resolve to seek African solutions to African 
problems as well as safeguarding Sudan’s national sovereignty against possible humanitarian 
military intervention by Western powers. The nature and manner in which the AU responded 
is important as it partly informs us on the overall response by the UNSC to the crisis in Darfur. 
Murithi (2009:2) observed that the speed, boldness and determination to seek “African 
solutions to African problems,” demonstrated by the AU was evidenced by the organization’s 
ambitious deployment of a “hasty, erratic, and not carefully planned” peacekeeping missions 
in Burundi (2004), Darfur (2004) and Somalia (2007). The AU mission to Sudan (AMIS) was 
largely ineffective because it lacked adequate funding and logistical support. 
The catalyst to AU response to Darfur conflict was the signing of an AU brokered partial 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on 08 April 2004 in N’Djamena, Chad. This was 
between the GoS and two rebel movements namely the JEM and the SLM/A leaving out other 
insurgency groups (Bellamy and Williams 2010:207). The fact that some parties to the Darfur 
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conflict did not append their signatures to the ceasefire agreement made the operating 
environment for the peacekeepers very difficult and dangerous.42  On 28 May 2004, a Ceasefire 
Monitoring Commission was established following the signing of further agreements in Addis 
Ababa marking the decision to deploy AU military observers and a small protection unit to 
monitor ceasefire implementation in Darfur (Ibid.). Subsequently, this led to the establishment 
of a Humanitarian Ceasefire Commission and the hurried and inadequately planned 
deployment of (AMIS 1) which deployed 60 military observers and a small contingent of 
protection force of 310 soldiers in June 2004 (Birikorang 2009:7). This peacekeeping force 
level was in every respect grossly inadequate to meet the challenges on the ground and to fulfill 
its mandate (Holt and Berkman 2006:5). Unfortunately, the ceasefire did not hold leaving the 
AU observer mission to operate in a war zone area with no capacity to adequately defend itself 
let alone protect civilians.43 
The AU deployment into the Darfur region was a bold step reflecting the AU’s political 
determination to follow through on its commitment to non-indifference to intra-state conflicts 
on the continent (Aboagye 2007). This was done in an attempt to seek African solutions to 
African problems following a marked decline in Western countries’ interest in participating in 
peacekeeping missions in Africa after the 1992 Somalia peacekeeping debacle. The UN’s 
response to conflicts in Africa since then had been reflective of “abdication from responsibility, 
or minimalist peacekeeping interventions, in the aftermath of the Somali debacle of the UN 
Operation in Somalia and the 1994 Rwanda genocide” (Aboagye 2007:4). Additional troops 
were thus required to boost the effectiveness of the African peacekeepers.  
Further consultations with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) resulted in approval of 
reinforcements for peacekeepers in Darfur that transformed the mission to become AMIS II. 
This mission was established with a force level of 3 320 personnel composed as follows: 670 
observers, 1703 protection force, 815 civilian police (CIVPOL) and 132 civilian staff 
(Neethling 2009:11). Despite these reinforcements, the mission proved to be ineffective, 
                                                          
42 UNAMID fatalities of peacekeepers in Darfur are very high. According to UNAMID Facts and Figures (2015) 
the breakdown of the casualties is as follows: 154 military troops; 47 civilian police; 1 military observer; 4 
international civilians serving with the mission; 24 local civilians serving with the mission and 2 other non-
members of the mission. 
43 In an interview with one of the military observer who participated in AMIS 1, he questioned the seriousness of 
both the dispatching countries and the AU department responsible for peacekeeping missions considering that the 
observers were clearly deployed in a hostile area without adequate protection vehicles such as armoured cars and 
heavy weapons to deter rebel groups that were not part of the partial peace agreements. In his view the AU was 
being over ambitious and sacrificing African troops in dangerous theatres of war without first securing a 
comprehensive cease fire among the belligerents. Interview held in Addis Ababa on 18 0ctober 2015.  
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mainly because the AU lacked the means, expertise and resources to effectively plan and launch 
complex and modern peacekeeping operations, hence the search for a partnership with the UN 
which has more planning expertise, experience and resources for peacekeeping operations 
(Aboagye 2007:5). In an effort to influence the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to 
Darfur, several international NGOs including the Global Policy Forum highlighted and 
emphasized the gross operational and logistical inadequacies inherent in AMIS II which it was 
hoped, could be addressed by the deployment of a more resourced UN peacekeeping mission.  
Aboagye (2007:8) argues that the AU intervention in Darfur happened by default as opposed 
to being a deliberately planned peacekeeping operation. The absence of peacekeeping 
deployments by the UN and the international community, he argues, “forced the AU to be seen 
to be doing something in line with its newly adopted policy shift from non-interference to non-
indifference as endorsed by the Union’s constitutional right to intervene” (Ibid.: 9). This policy 
shift was reinforced by the much talked about but hardly implemented policy rhetoric and 
slogan of seeking African solutions to African problems. Thus the ineffectiveness of the AU 
mission and the desire by various NGOs and Western powers to have a UN mission deployed 
to Darfur influenced the calls for the deployment of a UN mission which was vehemently 
denied by the Sudanese Government.44 
The worsening situation in Darfur during 2006 and a corresponding failure by the AU to fully 
support AMIS II, led the UNSC to approve resolution 1706 that authorized the deployment of 
17 300 UN troops to reinforce poorly funded and ill-equipped AU troops (Weiss 2009:135). 
The GoS strongly objected to this resolution arguing that if the UN peacekeepers deployed 
without its consent, they would be treated as “foreign invaders.”  It follows therefore that the 
original plans to hand over the AU mission to the UN were scuttled by the Sudanese authorities 
leading to further negotiations that ultimately resulted in the UNSC resolution 1769 that 
authorized the deployment of a UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping mission to Darfur (UNAMID), 
                                                          
44 In an interview with a Sudanese diplomat in Addis Ababa in October 2015, he informed this researcher that the 
Sudanese Government was afraid of a regime change agenda that the UN peacekeeping missions are now known 
to be associated with. In his own words, “The government of Sudan was clearly of the view that Western powers 
wanted a different regime in Sudan that would normalize relations with the Western powers leading to the 
dislodgement of Chinese and Russian influence in the country in order for them to exploit the vast mineral 
resources in my country. Having witnessed the modus operandi of UN peacekeeping missions in previous 
operations in Congo in the 1960s, Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, it was evident that UN peacekeepers 
were not going to come simply to the humanitarian aid of the Darfuris but to use them in the process to achieve 
their own selfish political and economic objectives.   
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the first of its kind in the history of UN peacekeeping.45 The hybrid mission is formally and 
officially both a regional and UN mission where the AU and the UN jointly approve the 
appointment of senior officials and the composition of the mission while the UN provides 
UNAMID’s “command and control structures and backstopping” together with financing its 
operations (Ban 2010a).Thus the hybrid option was a compromise deployment of a joint 
UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Durward 2006:27). Adoption of this type of 
mission was meant to avert a UN military humanitarian intervention that was going to be 
resisted by the Sudanese government through force of arms as well as the need to maintain a 
mutually beneficial working relationship between the GoS and powerful members of the 
Security Council that had vested self-interests in Sudan. The successful deployment of 
UNAMID served to protect the national sovereignty of Sudan from being violated by a 
humanitarian intervention force spearheaded by the western powers. Governments friendly to 
Khartoum had successfully protected the Sudanese national sovereignty against possible 
infringement by foreign forces even when it was evident that there were documented cases of 
large-scale atrocities and crimes against humanity (Simon 2008:57). 
Abass (2007:432) observed that the adoption of a hybrid mission was critical as it averted a 
perception among African and Arab countries that the UN was acting illegally or illegitimately 
in a manner that threatened or violated Sudan’s state sovereignty. In this regard, the innovative 
and unprecedented transformation of AMIS II into UNAMID hybrid mission was a “legitimacy 
boost” for the AU since it was the only international body that had the state consent of the 
Sudanese government (Ibid.). However, the first and primary challenge to the UN/AU hybrid 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur was that there was no peace to keep in the Darfur region and 
that the Sudanese government was not fully cooperating with the international community in 
finding a lasting solution to the Darfur crisis (Murithi Op.Cit.:13). Military clashes involving 
Government troops, militias sponsored by the government and the various other militia groups 
continued to take place constituting a major source of insecurity among the civilian population 
and the peacekeepers (UN Doc. S/2013/22 dated 10 Jan 2013.  
                                                          
45 The hybrid nature of UNAMID was manifested by the following: first, the UN component of the combined 
mission was grafted to an existing AU mission (AMIS) and the combined mission was expected to support the 
implementation of an AU negotiated peace settlement; second, the UN/AU mission has characteristics of both 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.     
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The next section analyses the response by the UN to the crisis in Darfur and the operational 
effectiveness of UNAMID towards protection of civilians facing threats of crimes against 
humanity.  
6.4 Organized hypocrisy: UN response to the Darfur crisis 
This section critically examines the factors that contributed to the dismal response by the 
UNSC to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. It aims to expose the hypocritical nature of the big 
powers that portray a misleading positive public picture of being concerned about the welfare 
and suffering of African populations in conflict situations yet they end up perpetuating the 
conflicts in pursuit of their self-interests at the expense of the host population and government. 
There is a need to first define what organized hypocrisy is all about. 
6.4.1 Definition of organized hypocrisy 
Dijkzeul and Beigbeder, (2003) have noted that the concept of organized hypocrisy and the 
political and diplomatic dynamics associated with it are not commonly known to many scholars 
and practitioners of global politics, diplomacy and governance. They also observed that these 
dynamics have implications on the conduct of UN peacekeeping missions and global 
governance. Identifying aspects of organized hypocrisy as a deliberate source of UN 
peacekeeping missions’ failure helps in understanding the causes and dysfunctional nature of 
UN peacekeeping operations.46 
According to Lipson (2007) organized hypocrisy is a phenomenon espoused by organizational 
behaviour theorists to explain how organizations respond to conflicting and challenging 
pressures emanating from external environments through adoption of contradictory actions and 
statements in order to deliberately mislead the public. Organized hypocrisy is manifested by 
inconsistencies and contradictions between publicly pronounced organizational expressions 
and aspirations to respect norms such as state sovereignty yet in real practice, these norms are 
violated. Krasner (1999) argued that organized hypocrisy explains the enduring and routine 
violation of state sovereignty. Brunsson (1989), one of the leading theorists on organized 
hypocrisy argued that organized hypocrisy refers to organizational responses to “conflicting 
logics of consequences and appropriateness.” It also refers to parallel structures that are set by 
organizations as what happened during UN peacekeeping operations in Congo during the early 
1960s. Secretary General Hammarskjold established a secretive cabinet of Americans special 
                                                          
46 See also Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M., (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. 
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advisers and himself known as the “Congo Club” to run the affairs of the UN peacekeeping 
mission whose aim was to entrench US hegemony in Africa after dislodging Belgian post-
colonial influence in that country (O’Brien 1962:56). Brunsson (1989:27) concluded that 
“organized hypocrisy is a fundamental type of behaviour” in most political organizations. 
In the case of the crisis in Darfur, organized hypocrisy has had the effect of widening and 
exacerbating the resource gap between theoretical commitments as stated in the UN mandates 
for UNAMID and the provision of resources to execute the mandates resulting in undermining 
efforts to mitigate the suffering civilian population in Darfur. In actual fact, UNAMID’s 
mandate appears to have been deliberately designed to dilute and diminish the mission’s 
effectiveness towards achieving its basic and primary objective of providing adequate physical 
protection to civilian victims of war in Darfur (Jibril 2010:15). The mandate for UNAMID 
responsibilities covers protection of the civilian population, enhancement of physical security 
for NGOs undertaking humanitarian activities; promotion of human rights and the rule of law, 
and finally monitoring and verifying the implementation of peace agreements (UN Doc 
S/RES/1769 of 2007). Despite the deaths of over 460,000 Darfuris and an estimated 2,500,000 
internally displaced people who abandoned their homes as a result of the conflict, UNAMID 
like most UN peacekeeping missions in Africa remains undermanned and under-equipped with 
critical shortages of road transport and aviation assets as widespread atrocities continue. 
Considering the UN failure to effectively respond to the tragic crises in Rwanda and Darfur in 
order to save civilians, these failures qualify to be labelled and classified as organized 
hypocrisy by the world body that is charged with the responsibility of safeguarding 
international peace and security. UN failure to stop the killing of Tutsis in Rwandan or protect 
civilians in Bosnian zones declared ‘safe areas’ led to the accusations of UN hypocrisy in its 
peacekeeping rhetoric (Rieff, 1996; Barnett, 2002). That hypocrisy is again being practiced in 
Darfur where very little practical measures are being put in place to enhance the protection of 
civilians. Detailed aspects of this hypocrisy are covered in the paragraphs below. 
6.4.2 An overview of UN response to the Darfur crisis 
The UN response to the Darfur crisis can be likened to its response to the Rwandan crisis in 
1994 where a semblance of serious humanitarian intervention only took place after the 
genocide had run its course and over 800 000 civilian lives had been lost (Mgbeoji, 2003). 
Jean-Marie Guéhenno UN Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping at the time of the crisis, 
after having observed the foot dragging by big powers regarding UN response to the crisis in 
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Darfur, warned that UNAMID faced the greatest risk of failure compared with other UN 
missions deployed in the previous 10 years and encouraged that “it was imperative that the 
United Nations rose collectively to meet the challenges, or it would fail” (UN Doc 
GA/SPD/382 of 2007; UN TODAY 2010: 6). His fears were fulfilled as the world body failed 
to live up to expectations of the suffering population in Darfur whose hopes had been raised 
following the decision to deploy UN/AU peacekeepers to protect civilians affected by the 
conflict. 
Bureaucratic and diplomatic wrangling among the Security Council P5 to secure and promote 
their self-interests added weight to the slow decision making process regarding international 
response to the crisis in Darfur. The case study on Rwanda and the current study on Darfur 
reveal that in situations where the P-5 are indifferent, nothing or very little can be done as they 
pretend to be doing something through organized hypocrisy. In situations where they have 
vested strategic self-serving interests, they either act as obstacles to action in order to protect 
their interests as happened in Rwanda or they intervene in ways that promote their self-interests 
and not to serve the interests of the wider good (UN 43rd Conference 2008:25). 
Enabulele (2010:420) observed that China and Russia were considered to be the main 
stumbling blocks against any strong military humanitarian response against the GoS by the 
Security Council. This assertion is based on China’s shareholding of fourty percent in Sudan’s 
oil production industry while Russia is considered to be the leading arms supplier to the GoS 
(Clough 2008). However, the US also had its self-interests to safeguard by avoiding a direct 
military clash with the government of Sudan (Cohen and O’Neill 2006). Considering that the 
Darfur crisis started at the height of the US led western armies’ invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, there is a theory that argues that western powers would not have seriously preferred to 
launch another military humanitarian invasion of an Arab country.47 This argument will be 
further developed in subsequent paragraphs below. 
6.4.3 An ethical assessment of UN response to the crisis in Darfur 
The UN Security Council adoption of Resolution 1556 of 2004 marked its official reaction to 
the conflict in Darfur. The resolution harshly condemned the brutal acts of violence in Darfur 
and determined that: “… the situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security and to stability in the region’’ (UN Security Council 2004). Thereafter very little was 
                                                          
47 Leading proponents of this theory include Cohen and O’Neill 2006.  
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done to demonstrate a serious and purposeful determination to bring sanity to this region. This 
led then Secretary General Kofi Annan to call for appropriate action in Darfur that did not rule 
out military action against the perpetrators of the ethnic cleansing activities (UN Doc 
SG/SM/9197 AFR/893 HR/GN/1077, April 7, 2004).  
In 2005, UN SC Resolution 1593 referred the perpetrators of human rights abuses in Darfur to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution although Sudan has not ratified the ICC 
Statute (De Haas 2008:226). The Sudanese government refused to surrender the officials 
implicated for prosecution ultimately leading to the indictment of President Al Bashir for 
prosecution by the ICC a situation that further complicated the relationship between the host 
state and the Security Council. The western world’s support for indicting the sitting President 
of Sudan and attempting to send him to the Hague for prosecution while appearing morally 
necessary, had the effect of derailing any meaningful negotiations the Security Council has 
been pursuing with authorities in  Khartoum over the regime’s cooperation with UN/AU 
peacekeepers.  
The Security Council, without consultations with the GoS passed Resolution 1706, in August 
2006 authorizing the deployment of a UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to Darfur whose 
mandate included the “use of all necessary means … to protect civilians under threat of physical 
violence” (UN Doc. S/Res./1706, 2006). In adopting Resolution 1706 the Security Council 
made its first country-specific reference to the protection of civilians in armed conflict with 
specific focus on Darfur (Roberts 2008:125). The GoS sensed danger in the implementation of 
this resolution hence its strong opposition to it. It feared that the proposed UN mission with a 
strong western peacekeepers’ presence “could serve as an occupation force” in Darfur thereby 
undermining its state sovereignty (De Haas 2008:314).  The GoS rejected resolution 1706 on 
the basis that it was tantamount to an invasion of its territory and a serious violation of its state 
sovereignty. 
Against strong advocacy for a military humanitarian intervention to stop the “genocide” in 
Darfur, the GoS linked the Western sponsored “Save Darfur” campaign and activism with US 
military actions in Iraq. The Sudanese authorities successfully portrayed US and Western 
activism in Darfur as both oil and other strategic minerals oriented machinations as well as an 
anti-Islamic crusade (Igiri and Layman 2004:21). Thereafter, it took extensive high-level 
negotiations among the P5, the UN Secretary-General, the EU and the League of Arab States 
and the AU to secure the consent of the GoS to the deployment of a UN/AU hybrid 
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peacekeeping mission that was predominantly manned by African peacekeepers48 (UN Doc. 
S/2007/301/Rev.1 dated 5 June 2007).  
UNAMID was deployed with a vague and ambiguous mandate particularly regarding provision 
of protection to civilians. This was deliberately done to mask the major disagreements among 
the permanent members of the Security Council that had conflicting self-interests to promote 
and safeguard in Sudan (Badescu 2011:140). In this regard, it is apparent that the suffering 
civilian population that was placing its hope on UN protection had been grossly let down. Some 
analysts like de Waal (2007) concluded that the weak response by the UN marked the failure 
of the R2P framework. Others felt it was too early to declare the emerging norm and doctrine 
a failure based on one case study (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). Whatever interpretation is 
given to the deployment of a weak UNAMID, the mission served as a convenient alternative 
to a Western powers’ direct military involvement in Darfur (Cohen and O’Neill 2006: 52). 
Although largely ineffective, the deployment of this hybrid mission was ethically a lesser evil 
than allowing the western powers the opportunity to launch a military humanitarian 
intervention that was most likely to result in far more civilian casualties as happened in Libya.   
6.4.4 Ethical and political justification for a hybrid peacekeeping Mission in Darfur 
The decision to adopt a UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur did not come about as 
a deliberate, well calculated innovative idea of burden sharing between the two organizations. 
It was a compromise between the GoS which had previously refused to consent to a deployment 
of a purely UN force on one side and the UN on the other arising from the western countries’ 
agitation to mount a massive military humanitarian operation in Darfur to “save the civilian 
population” (Durward Op.Cit.). It also was a compromise to address the internationally 
acknowledged fact that peacekeeping efforts in Darfur required enhancement in order to be 
effective’ (Ban & Konaré 2007). It was a compromise that took into consideration the self-
interests of the great powers with vested interests in Sudan and not necessarily meant to 
effectively address the plight of the suffering population in that region. Institutionally, 
UNAMID became the first peacekeeping mission that was truly a formal joint undertaking 
                                                          
48 Important to note is the fact that despite the changing  doctrine and practice of UN peacekeeping operations, 
the “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” as enunciated by the Capstone 
Doctrine still upheld the cardinal and founding principles of peacekeeping namely consent of host state; 
impartiality and use of force only in self-defence. See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines. Available www.pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone%20Doctrine%20--
%20Consultation%20Draft.pdf Accessed on 18 April 2016. 
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between a continental organization and the world body reflecting a new convergence of 
regional and UN peacekeeping undertakings (Coleman 2011:537).  
The prevailing circumstances at the time of adopting UNAMID were that the GoS had refused 
to consent to deployment of a “purely” UN mission to replace the African mission that was 
already on the ground but was facing enormous financial and logistical challenges due to 
inadequate international support. The Sudanese Government opposed the proposed UN 
deployment arguing vehemently that allowing non-African troops into Darfur would be 
tantamount to agreeing to be re-colonized (Badescu 2011:64). In actual fact the government 
threatened to wage a holy war (jihad) against such a force if deployed. The GoS strongly 
objected to multilateral intervention by outsiders in the case of Darfur because it did not share 
the humanitarian justification of doing so and more importantly strongly felt that the crisis in 
Darfur was an internal matter to be addressed by Sudanese people themselves without outside 
interference. 
The Sudanese ambassador to the UN eloquently demonstrated the fear that the humanitarian 
intervention that was being contemplated could serve the self-interests of the intervening 
Western powers. He wondered whether the crisis in Darfur was not being used as a Trojan 
horse to advance hidden self-serving agendas for those advocating for UN military 
humanitarian intervention in that region (Krieg 2013). In saying this, the ambassador was 
expressing genuine fears and concerns among weak and developing countries that the concept 
and doctrine of humanitarian intervention as enshrined in R2P was being abused as a subtle 
grand strategy by powerful western countries to extend and broaden their geo-political and 
economic influence thereby guaranteeing unfettered access to vital natural resources essential 
for the survival of their economies (Krieg Op.Cit.:46). These sentiments are shared by Ottaway 
and Lacina who observed that following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 
presumably on humanitarian grounds, genuine fear of a new imperialism was particularly 
prevalent and acute among developing countries that had experienced colonization, and that 
military operations constituting international interventions revive bitter memories of the 
colonial past (Ottaway and Lacina 2003:74). An alternative form of international response to 
the humanitarian crisis in Darfur had to be found that did portray neo-colonial connotations or 
threaten the national sovereignty of the Sudanese government and people more so considering 
that the regional AU peacekeeping mission had dismally failed to deliver on its mandate to 
protect civilians in Darfur. 
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It has been noted that regional peacekeeping missions face ethical challenges of legitimacy and 
capacity considering that regional actors like the AU can be plagued with several limitations 
to be serious brokers in domestic conflicts. The AU mission that preceded the deployment of 
the hybrid mission compellingly illustrated these glaring limitations. It failed to meet the 
challenges of the atrocities and displaced civilians in need of protection despite the African 
political will and determination to resolve the Darfur crisis (Badescu 2011:68). As the AU 
experience in Darfur demonstrates, legitimacy can be compromised by over dependency on 
outside financial and logistical donor assistance, whose donations usually come with strings 
attached and certain conditionalities that may not be in the interests of the host population or 
the regional actors (de Coning 2006). These are some of the ethical and practical considerations 
that led to the adoption of a hybrid style peacekeeping mission in Darfur. 
It follows therefore that one of the major advantages of adopting a hybrid concept of 
peacekeeping operations in Africa is that it brings to an end the undignified “begging 
syndrome” characteristic of AU sponsored peacekeeping missions. Both the predecessor OAU 
and now the AU are notoriously known for going to the Western powers with a begging bowl 
in hand for financial and logistical donations to support African peacekeepers (Yorke 2001:86). 
The adoption of the hybrid option clearly spells out the division of labour and burden sharing 
strategy between the AU and the UN hence it has been hailed as a serious and practical attempt 
at transcending the old practice characterized by ad hoc and at times erratic financial and 
logistical contributions from former colonial masters, meant to promote neo-colonialism in 
affected regions (Piiparinen 2007:385). The Somalia debacle in which vulnerable Somali 
civilians were abandoned after the death of only 18 US troops followed by the UN troop 
withdrawal from Rwanda after 10 Belgian troops were killed highlighted the dangers of having 
African peacekeeping missions dominated by western countries. 
To avoid a repeat of such embarrassing episodes of UN peacekeepers abandoning endangered 
African populations, it is morally and ethically desirable to adopt a hybrid concept of 
peacekeeping in Africa where the bulk of the peacekeepers are African troops with the political 
resolve to withstand high rates of troop casualties. The abandonment of African missions by 
Western peacekeepers at the height of conflicts exposes thousands of vulnerable civilians at 
risk of being harmed. Morally, this appears as if African civilian lives were being abandoned 
by their benevolent Western saviours thus portraying a misleading picture that UN 
peacekeeping missions in Africa, involving troops from developed countries were genuinely 
concerned about the well-being of African populations. It therefore comes as no surprise when 
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analysts observe that a moral and ethical problem arises each time African populations are 
abandoned by peacekeepers in a bid to save the lives of peacekeepers as happened in Somalia 
and Rwanda (Barnett 2002).  
The reason for abandoning African missions is simply that these countries are not primarily 
answerable and accountable to the endangered populations, but rather to their domestic 
electorate. Once the electorate back home disapproves of the body-bags coming from African 
missions, their respective governments are politically forced to abandon the poor and 
endangered African populations irrespective of the consequences. The ethical challenge arising 
from the abandonment of civilians in African missions is that the local populations usually 
invest their trust in the protection capacity of peacekeepers through their coming to seek refuge 
near peacekeepers’ bases yet the peacekeepers’ priority is preserving their own lives and not 
that of civilians. Once the foreign troops leave at the height of the conflict as happened in 
Somalia and Rwanda, the vulnerable population presents itself as a large soft target thus 
unintentionally facilitating their own mass killings by the unruly gunmen seeking revenge 
against those who had put their trust in foreign troops as exemplified in the Rwandan crisis 
(Piiparinen Op.Cit. :375). 
6.5 Political and ethical challenges to UNAMID peacekeeping operations 
The international community has over the past thirteen years made several attempts at resolving 
the Darfur crisis using different conflict management and resolution strategies yet these efforts 
including peacekeeping missions have failed to produce desired results. One of the main 
reasons for this failure is due to lack of an all-inclusive political process towards finding a 
lasting political solution to the crisis49, which has been classified by the UN as “the world’s 
worst humanitarian disaster in recent times” (Ejibunu 2008:24). Those who blame the GoS for 
lack of progress point towards a distinct lack of political will on the part of the government to 
effectively implement policies of political accommodation and national integration in a country 
                                                          
49 In an interview with J. Makusha on 07 August 2015 at Great Zimbabwe University in Masvingo, Zimbabwe, 
he castigated the approaches adopted by foreign mediators to political conflicts in Africa. His views were that 
Africa is driven by communitarian approaches to resolving problems whereas outsiders are guided by liberal 
approaches hence their approaches are ineffective in addressing the real issues that give rise to conflicts on the 
continent. Moreover he highlighted the fact that UN peacekeepers use coercion and not persuasion hence the need 
for Africans to dominate UN missions in Africa. He further highlighted that UN peacekeeping missions are 
purported to come and help settle instabilities in Africa yet the rebels fighting sitting governments are sponsored, 
supported and armed by the very powers that are the major sponsors of UN peacekeeping missions. He wondered 
where rebels with torn clothes end up with new weapons at times better weapons than for government soldiers 
would have sourced the weapons. Makusha emphasised that peacekeeping missions create opportunities for 
foreign powers to exploit Africa’s natural resources illegally 
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of such an ethnically, racially, religiously and economically diverse population (Ibid.). In 
addition those blaming the Sudanese Government for lack of political settlement,there are some 
who blame the respect for Sudan’s national sovereignty that impeded the launching of a robust 
military humanitarian operation against the perpetrators of “acts of genocide” (Weiss 2009:44). 
The AU has failed to bring pressure to bear on the Sudanese president and the rebel groups in 
order to force them towards embracing the peace initiatives it initiated. To make matters worse, 
some western powers are financing and sponsoring insurgent groups fighting both the 
peacekeepers and the host government. Such sponsorship of rebel groups in Darfur complicates 
the political operating environment for the hybrid peacekeepers. 
The first ethical challenge to be considered is to do with the attitude and behaviour of the 
Sudanese Government towards the peacekeepers. The GoS after reluctantly accepting the 
deployment of UNAMID deliberately complicated and at times disrupted the deployment 
processes and operating environment of the peacekeepers. Murithi (2009:16)highlighted 
examples of Sudanese Government’s interference with peacekeeping deployments such as: 
refusing troops from particular countries; holding equipment in the customs warehouses from 
where most equipment had to be transported to Darfur; denying permission for flights at night 
and limiting patrol areas to UNAMID observers and peacekeepers. UNAMID land movements 
and patrols as well as flight requests continue to be restricted with the government citing lack 
of sufficient notification time, lack of government written authorization and insecurity 
challenges as reasons for denying planned activities (UN Doc. S/2013/22 dated 10 Jan 2013). 
The GoS agreed to allow night flying on condition that the UN upgraded its airports in Darfur 
as the government tried to maximize its benefits from the presence of UNAMID on its soil (UN 
Doc S/2007/759 dated 24 December 2007). 
Reporting to the UN Security Council on the situation in Darfur, Titov (2010:1) emphasized 
that the challenges facing Darfur must be met within a national context. He stated that, “The 
conflicts in Sudan, which have a primarily internal structure, cannot be solved in a peace-meal 
fashion or by addressing primarily external factors.” Titov noted that formal talks between the 
major warring parties had not been possible since some of the groups are externally handled 
and manipulated. Despite successes in some regions of Darfur, the hybrid force has so far failed 
to be more effective than its predecessor AMIS at protecting the population of Darfur. The 
frustrating strategies employed by the GoS to the deployment and operational activities of 
UNAMID reflect limited host state consent at the strategic level, which is just short of 
demanding the withdrawal of the hybrid peacekeepers from the country as the mission has been 
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allowed limited operational space to manoeuvre. This has led Beck (2011:28) to conclude that 
Darfur offers a classic case of an assertive state at the operational level whose activities are 
enough to curtail the efficacy of the mission yet remaining out of the immediate danger of 
receiving international punishment or censure at the strategic level. 
The second major ethical challenge is related to security concerns facing UNAMID’s 
operations in Darfur because there is no peace to keep in that region. The absence of a 
comprehensive ceasefire agreement among the belligerents creates a very dangerous operating 
environment for the peacekeepers. The increased proliferation of factional insurgent groups 
has significantly contributed to worsening insecurity of the Darfur region since these groups 
did not consent to the deployment of peacekeepers in the first place. This explains why 
UNAMID has experienced high levels of banditry, occasional military engagements, ethnic 
clashes and deadly attacks on its peacekeepers (UN Report 2009:7). The peacekeeping mission 
remains grossly ill-equipped to deal with violations of the ceasefire by both government troops 
and insurgent groups hence protection of civilians is seriously compromised. The best 
peacekeepers can do in order to protect the civilian population is facilitating their movement 
to internally displaced people (IDP) camps (Coulon and Liegeois 2010).  
A rebel attack on peacekeepers in July 2008 resulted in seven peacekeepers killed and twenty-
two others wounded. General Agwai, then commander of UNAMID blamed the heavy losses 
on the UN Security Council which had deployed the peacekeepers without adequate resources 
to protect themselves against such attacks (Anyidoho 2006). Critical to note is that the EU and 
US partners and other donor countries that were upbeat about deploying a robust UN 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur with a stronger mandate and firepower to effectively deal with 
perpetrators of violence in Darfur have reneged on their earlier pledges. This goes to further 
demonstrate that altruistic and ethical considerations regarding the protection of endangered 
civilians were never the primary reasons for wanting to launch a military humanitarian 
intervention in Darfur. If the western powers were truly concerned about the suffering of 
civilians in Darfur, they should have fully equipped the predominantly African hybrid mission 
to execute the very tasks they were planning to undertake if indeed these tasks were 
humanitarian in nature.  
Gowan (2008:453) argues that the UN is riddled with a “systemic crisis” because its traditional 
framework for guiding peacekeeping deployments as well as many of its assumptions about 
transitions from war to peace have been found wanting in many cases involving peacekeeping 
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missions. Murithi (2009:3) concurs and is also of the view that the UN has “stumbled into a 
series of missions in an increasingly ad-hoc fashion” the consequences of which have been the 
inabilities to effectively plan, prepare and deploy effective peacekeeping operations on the 
ground hence the failure to deliver the desired results. Whereas these observations are correct, 
what they miss is the linkage of these failures with organized hypocrisy practiced by the UNSC 
in its peacekeeping missions in Africa.  
The third challenge facing UNAMID is related to the ethical challenge of using force to protect 
civilians in Darfur. Justification for the ‘use of force’ for the sake of protecting civilians 
knowing fully well that some civilian casualties would occur is difficult to sustain more so 
when the peacekeepers themselves do not have the capacity to protect themselves from the 
rebels. Badescu and Bergholm (2009: 301) observed that the hybrid peacekeepers in Darfur 
had no peace to keep and at the same time their mandate was not to wage war, meaning that 
their presence was just symbolic. This view was echoed by then UNAMID Force Commander 
General Martin Luther Agwai who stated that even if the mission was fully equipped and 
resourced, “peacekeepers would not stand between rival armies and militias engaged in full-
scale combat.” Adada (2008:3) emphasized UNAMID lacked five critical capabilities to 
enhance their effectiveness namely: surveillance aircraft for reconnaissance, attack helicopters 
to deal with spoilers, medium lift helicopters to support both movement of troops and for 
logistical support, qualified military engineers and logistical support staff.  
The modern international state system is founded on the principle that sovereign nation states 
have a right to non-intervention and unwarranted external interference in their domestic affairs. 
State sovereign immunity has been violated by UN peacekeepers in the altruistic doctrine of 
protecting civilians from conflict that prioritizes human security. The use of force in these 
circumstances has been formalised through the adoption of the doctrine and concept of 
responsibility to protect civilians in conflict areas as is the case in Darfur. 
UNAMID peacekeepers in Darfur have remained ill prepared and insufficiently equipped for 
the mission of protecting civilians due to several factors that revolve around the fact that 
protection of civilian strangers on the African continent remains a non-priority for big powers 
whose main priorities are to safeguard their self-interests even if it means this is done at the 
expense of the local population.50 Added to this is the fact that there continues to exist an ethical 
                                                          
50 This point was emphasised by the DRC ambassador to Zimbabwe citing the failure of UN peacekeepers in the 
DRC to prioritize the protection of Congolese civilian population. In an interview in Harare on 12 November 
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tension between the new norm of human security and its related doctrine of R2P on one hand 
and the continuing dominance of the realist doctrine that prioritizes respect for state sovereignty 
and promotion of national self-interests on the other. False humanitarian rhetoric as part of 
organized hypocrisy should be taken seriously as abuse of this altruistic term by the US led to 
attacks on Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011. Abuse of the ethical humanitarian justification for 
using military force tends to blur the distinction between genuine and legitimate exceptions to 
the non-intervention norm (Terry 2002)   
The fourth challenge facing UNAMID is bureaucratic procedures that hinder effective decision 
making within the AU and UN systems. Commenting on the slow and late response of the UN 
to the crisis in Darfur, Human Rights Watch summed it up as “…too late, too little.” 
Considering the combined AU/UN bureaucratic decision making procedures coupled by 
deliberate efforts by the Sudanese Government to ensure that its sub-optimal performance 
activities are kept in check, it is therefore not surprising to witness the logistical and operational 
difficulties which UNAMID is operating under that contribute to its limited success.  
The fifth challenge is related to the high protection expectations of the civilian population in 
Darfur that the hybrid peacekeepers cannot satisfy. This results in an ethical problem in that on 
one hand, the internally displaced population holds the peacekeepers in high esteem and 
harbour great expectations regarding the peacekeepers’ ability to provide them with protection. 
Some of the influential religious Sheikhs have gone to the extent of considering UNAMID as 
“a powerful military ally that will help them train their self-defence militias and transform the 
camps into entrenched bastions from which they’ll be able to conduct military operations” 
(Weissman 2008:16). On the other hand the GoS holds the peacekeepers in contempt as they 
are labelled as an “anti-Arab” military force that serves the interests of the anti-government 
rebels (Ibid.).  
There are few incidences in which the peacekeepers are credited with effective protection of 
civilians one of which involved UNAMID troops that staved off military attacks that “could 
have cost many more civilian lives” (Holt, Taylor, and Kelly 2009, 358). Success stories of this 
                                                          
2015, his main argument was that UN peacekeeping missions constitute a lucrative business for the developed 
countries whose military industrialized complexes that supply weapons and ammunition used by the peacekeepers 
greatly benefit from continued peacekeeping operations. The same also applies to multinational corporations that 
supply other combat and logistical supplies. In his view, this explains why UN missions in Africa are prolonged 




nature are few and far in between. In other incidences, UNAMID exaggerates the GoS denial 
of access to areas requiring investigation on crimes against humanity. An example that 
illustrates this point is when UNAMID claimed to have been “denied access by Sudanese 
military at a checkpoint” when they attempted to investigate the report about 200 women that 
had been raped in El Fasher, North Darfur. The official UN bulletin misinformed the world 
that the peacekeepers had been denied access to the area when in fact they interviewed a few 
witnesses before they were confronted by Sudanese intelligence officials who asked them to 
leave after they had obtained confirmation of the crime committed (Reeves 2007). Fabrication 
of such lies is meant to serve a hidden agenda of UNAMID leadership while at the same time 
angering the government officials in Khartoum, 
The existence of an undermanned and ill-equipped hybrid UNAMID mission in Darfur in 
reality represents symbolic gestures and face saving measures to portray a positive picture that 
the world community was responding to the plight of Darfur’s civilian population yet in 
practice little is being done to protect the civilians. Moreover, because of the tasks related to 
the protection of civilians, the neutrality of UN peacekeepers has increasingly been 
compromised as demands from concerned governments and humanitarian agents call for the 
effective protection of civilians, which entails that peacekeepers take military coercive action 
against spoilers that potentially put them on a collision course with different armed groups 
embroiled in the conflict (Clement and Smith 2009).  
6.6 US attitude and response to the Darfur crisis 
The US attitude and position regarding a particular peacekeeping mission has a significant if 
not a dominant role in the nature and conduct of that mission. This is because of its political 
and financial contribution as it contributes a quarter of all UN peacekeeping expenses. In the 
case of the Darfur crisis Williams and Bellamy (2005: 36–40) are of the view that US’ geo-
strategic self-interests revolve around access to oil deposits and exchange of vital and strategic 
intelligence in the “war on terror” campaign that has been waged following the 9/11 attacks.  
The US response to the Darfur crisis should be considered within the wider context of 
US/Sudan relations since the end of the Cold War. According to the World Savvy Monitor 
(2010:1)“…the relationship between the two countries has been incoherent over the past 
decades as it alternated from being allies against Libya at one stage to a situation where the US 
was supplying arms of war to the secessionists in South Sudan.” At some point the US 
considered Sudan a pariah state harbouring Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda movement; yet 
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on the other hand the US developed the Chevron oil installations which it abandoned when the 
US imposed economic sanctions against Sudan (Ibid.). At the outbreak of the Darfur conflict 
in 2003, the US considered Sudan as an ally in its Global War on Terror yet at the same time 
accusing it of pursuing a policy of genocide against the Black African civilian population in 
Darfur. This was a practical example of the realist approach to US foreign policy where it 
considers that there are no permanent friends in international relations but permanent interests.      
Having noted acts of indiscriminate killing of civilians by government sponsored Janjaweed 
militias in Darfur, former US Secretary of State General Colin Powell declared on 9 September 
2004 that genocide was indeed taking place in Darfur and that the GoS and its Arab rebel 
militias bore the responsibility (US Department of State: 2004). This classification and 
categorization of the Darfur civil war as genocide, was neither adopted by the UN Security 
Council nor the Secretariat hence it remained a purely American labelling of this civil war. 
This categorization generated controversy as the European Union (EU), China, Russia and the 
AU did not agree to the assertion that genocide was indeed taking place in Darfur (World Savvy 
Monitor Op.Cit. :2). The US declaration of genocide in Darfur was interpreted as both a heroic 
expression of concern and more cynically, as a way to transfer responsibility for the Darfur 
crisis to the UN (Ibid.). Despite different interpretations of what was going on in Darfur, the 
humanitarian crisis in this region triggered western calls for military humanitarian intervention 
to stop the Arab militias from terrorizing innocent and vulnerable civilian population in Darfur 
(Gberie 2004). The “Save Darfur” campaign exerted a lot of pressure on politicians in 
Washington to launch a humanitarian intervention in Darfur as if they were genuinely 
concerned about the welfare of African strangers. The proponents for a military humanitarian 
intervention had to resort to sensationalization of the humanitarian crisis in order to garner 
American population’s sympathy and support. 
A US diplomat based in Sudan once acknowledged that by explaining to the American public 
that Arabs were massacring Africans in Darfur, “we are harnessing two very powerful feelings 
in American society: anti-Arab racism and pro-African paternalism” (Coulon and Liégeois 
2010). This sensational advocacy and strategy did not work. It did not lead to a military 
humanitarian intervention as realist international politics militated against such action by those 
inclined to embark on such a military adventure (Heinze 2009:1). There was a US self-serving 
strategic reason and justification for passing on the responsibility of protecting civilians in 
Darfur to the UN. Alex de Waal noted that: “… it is not too cynical to assume that President 
Bush’s advisors calculated that once a UN force had been approved, any disappointments could 
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be placed at the door of the UN and the troop contributing countries not the U.S.” (de Waal 
2007: 378). There are other possible realist self-serving strategic reasons why the US avoided 
a military humanitarian intervention option in Darfur. 
According to Engdahl (2007:1) the major American interest in Darfur is access to oil fields and 
not humanitarian concerns as he observed that the case of Darfur is a new Cold War over oil 
between China and the GoS on one side and the US with her western allies on the other side. 
He highlights that of particular interest is Bloc 6 of oil concessions which straddles western 
Darfur, near the border with Chad and the Central African Republic. China’s National 
Petroleum Company, (CNPC) holds the rights to this oil field which the  Sudanese government 
announced in 2005 that it had discovered oil in Darfur with an estimated capacity of 500 000 
barrels/day (Ibid. :5). Had the US succeeded to convince the UNSC to accept the genocide 
charge, this would have given it the opportunity to spearhead a drastic and violent “regime 
change” intervention by NATO under the auspices of humanitarian operations leading to 
serious undermining of Sudan’s national sovereignty as was the case with Libya where the 
country was subjected to massive aerial bombardment by NATO under the pretext of 
“protecting the civilian population” against the Gaddafi regime.51 This largely explains why 
the GoS refused the deployment of a purely UN “peacekeeping” mission in the Darfur 
preferring a predominantly African peacekeeping operation under African command. This 
stance adopted by the GoS resulted in the deployment of a watered down peacekeeping 
mission. UNAMID was deployed with a weaker mandate and very little material support from 
developed countries that initially favoured a robust UN humanitarian intervention force. The 
current weak UNAMID serves US interests in that it does not have the military muscle to 
interfere with insurgent activities that are being funded by the US and its allies. The US had to 
re-strategize having failed to sell the genocide theory to the international community. It sought 
to maintain a working relationship with the GoS in the fight against global terrorism whilst at 
the same time sponsoring rebel forces fighting the same central government in Darfur. 
Engdahl (2007:11) observed that most of the arms that have fuelled the killings in Darfur and 
even in South Sudan have been brought into that country through murky, protected private 
“merchants of death” such as the notorious former KGB operative, Victor Bout who operates 
                                                          
51 In an interview with a diplomat in Harare in November 2015, he expressed the view that the US and EU efforts 
to influence the deployment of a robust UN peacekeeping force in Darfur with a stronger mandate to impose peace 
in Darfur was meant to ultimately result in regime change or the secession of Darfur region adding that ultimately, 
the US and its allies want access to the untapped vast oil reserves in Darfur. 
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from the US. He adds that since the discovery of oil in this region, the US has fuelled the 
conflict that has led to the deaths of tens of thousands and several millions displaced from their 
homes. In this regard, a strong UNAMID is not desirable as it will interfere with the operations 
of US proxy forces operating in Darfur fighting the Sudanese Government. It follows therefore 
that the US is the primary architect of the “organized hypocrisy” approach adopted by the UN 
as it has the overwhelming influence over its allies when it comes to adopting strategies to 
counter the spreading influence of China in Africa in general and Sudan in particular. 
Given this situation, the US authorities opted to maintain a working relationship with the GoS 
at the strategic level as it feared that any western sponsored military attack on Sudan at a time 
when western powers were heavily involved in military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq 
would be interpreted as yet another invasion of an Arab country, thus fuelling further anti-
Western terrorist sentiments and activities. 52  At the operational level, the US continued 
financing insurgent groups fighting the Khartoum government. These self-serving priorities 
and considerations trumped gross humanitarian concerns over human rights violations in 
Darfur and ultimately influenced the adoption of a peacekeeping mission as opposed to a 
military humanitarian intervention to save Darfuris experiencing mass atrocities and crimes 
against humanity. This calculus in the US decision making process goes to demonstrate that 
national self-interests take precedence when considering the nature and size of peacekeeping 
intervention force to be deployed in any African country.53 In addition it demonstrates the 
nature of organized hypocrisy practiced by the UN under the leadership of the US strategists. 
A closer examination of big powers’ politics and their interests in Africa reveals the 
                                                          
52 Interview with a Minister of Foreign Affairs (name withheld) held in Harare during visit to the National Defence 
College in Harare. He stressed that the US considered it safe to play double standards with the Sudanese 
authorities. On one hand the Khartoum government was considered an ally in the fight against Global Terrorism 
yet on the other hand, the US was sponsoring a proxy war to check-mate the growing Chinese influence in that 
country whose natural resources are at the centre of the conflicts bedevilling various regions of Sudan. He added 
that the establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 is indisputable evidence that US policy-
makers now view Africa rich in mineral and natural resources as an area of military contention with China for the 
foreseeable future. 
53 This was the view of one senior military commander who served with UNAMID. In an interview on 03 April 
2016, he declared that, “Do not ever think or imagine that the big powers would ever prioritize the welfare and 
well-being of African populations sacrificing their own economic benefits in the process, even if it means 
watching the poor African civilians dying in their thousands as long as the end result is profitable to their cause 
as happened in Rwanda.” He went on to add that, “neo-liberal economic policies being propagated by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions through Structural Adjustment Programmes were impoverishing millions of African 
populations and their governments that are lured into perpetual debts yet the western powers continue with the 




machinations of the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) that fuels conflicts on the African 
continent.  
Erlinder (2010) noted that the American empire’s political, economic and military 
manipulations benefit from fuelling local conflicts to ensure that its allies prevail in every 
corner of the globe. Accordingly the US has stepped up ongoing war for control of Sudan’s 
resources namely: petroleum, copper, gold, uranium, and fertile plantation lands for sugar and 
gum Arabic (essential for Coke, Pepsi and Ben and Jerry’s Ice cream. It has been observed that 
the war in Darfur is being played out on the ground through the “Humanitarian” NGOs, private 
military companies, “peace keeping” operations and covert military operations backed by the 
US and its closest allies. The Washington Post of 27 April 2006 pointed out that Sudan has 
been using its oil for committing a cardinal sin of developing an economy independent of the 
US.  This, the paper continued, is not permissible to the US as any developing nation that 
attempts to develop an independent economy is considered a pariah state. Sudan has benefitted 
from its political and business relationship with China to the extent of being able to develop an 
economy independent of the US. 
Considering that China is the biggest investor in the Sudanese oil industry, and that China is 
the biggest trading partner of the Sudanese government there is a conflict of interest between 
China and the US that has witnessed both powers fighting proxy Cold Wars in Sudan, starting 
with Southern Sudan and now in Darfur. The next section examines China’s interests in Darfur 
and how this influenced the peacekeeping efforts in that region. 
6.7 China’s Strategic Interests in Darfur and their impact on UNAMID 
China has been the strongest ally of the Al Bashir government. This is so for several reasons. 
First, China’s major reason for its steadfast support for the Sudanese Government is meant to 
serve as a counter strategy to check-mate and counter-balance US spreading hegemony in 
Africa (Bellamy and Williams 2010). Although China relies on coal for most of its energy 
needs it is the second largest consumer of oil in the world after the USA. Currently China 
imports about half of its oil supplies from the Middle East, and that percentage is projected to 
grow in stiff competition with the US demand for the same commodity from the same region. 
According to Elizabeth Economy (2007:15) China’s most successful African energy 
investments have been in Sudan which now exports 60 percent of its oil output to China. 
China’s growing influence in Africa and the Middle East positions it in direct competition for 
energy resources with the US and the West as one analyst told the Financial Times that: 
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“China’s strategy in the middle East puts us in competition for influence. But the answer is not 
a confrontational approach over energy interest- it is a more cooperative relationship with the 
Chinese on energy security” (The World Savvy Monitor 2008:5). 
Newly discovered natural resources in Sudan have made that country of great strategic 
importance to big powers and powerful corporations. Sudan is believed to have oil reserves 
rivalling those of Saudi Arabia (The International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007:3). It has the 
largest deposits of natural gas and in addition it has one of the three largest deposits of high-
purity uranium in the world along with the fourth-largest deposits of copper (American Bedin, 
2008:3). The Chinese oil rights stretch from the southern region to the Darfur region, near the 
border with Chad and the Central African Republic. US interests in these oil reserves caused it 
to orchestrate the genocide campaign against the GoS at the same time sponsoring insurgents 
against the Khartoum government in an effort to promote Darfur’s secessionism as did 
Southern Sudan (Zhang 2006). 
China currently draws an estimated 30% of its crude oil from Africa. This competition over 
African natural resources has a strong bearing on how peacekeeping missions in Africa are 
constituted as great powers jostle to ensure that their geo-strategic and economic interests are 
not undermined by the deployed peacekeepers. China buys two thirds of Sudan’s oil, sells 
weapons and military aircraft to the GoS and has used its seat on the UNSC to dilute resolutions 
aimed at pressuring the Sudanese Government to stop the atrocities in Darfur (World Savvy 
2008:11). In this regard, China protects Sudan from unwarranted UN attention with its Security 
Council Veto. It is Sudan’s largest trading partner. One human rights group reported that China 
was the main supplier of small arms used by government sponsored militias in Darfur (Ibid.). 
With the US supplying arms of war to rebels fighting the Sudanese government and the Chinese 
supplying weapons being used by pro-government rebels in Darfur, it follows that the conflict 
is a proxy war that is largely fuelled by foreign interests hence its resolution will equally largely 
depend on the satisfaction of the foreign powers behind the civil war.  
6.7.1 Chinese Response to the Darfur Crisis 
China has provided political support to the GoS throughout the Darfur crisis whilst also 
contributing troops to UNAMID. China has opposed the indictment of President Omar Al 
Bashir by the ICC, a position similar to that of the AU and the Arab League and it has used its 
veto powers to keep away undue pressure on the Sudanese government (Engdahl 2007:13). 
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China insists that it has been unfairly targeted on the Darfur issue since one Chinese spokesman 
remarked that: “China has been using its influence to the largest extent possible to persuade 
the relevant parties to resolve the situation in Darfur” (World Savvy Monitor Op.Cit.:11). In 
an effort to overcome its negative image over Sudan, China has offered to mediate in the Darfur 
negotiations, it supported the resolution calling for the establishment of UNAMID and has sent 
315 Chinese peace keepers equipped with 145 heavy vehicles to Darfur since 2007 (Zhang 
Op.Cit.:98). China insists that the Darfur crisis is not an “ethnic genocide” as alleged by the 
US. China believes that the crisis in Darfur is a struggle over natural resources mainly between 
Arabian and African black tribes complicated and exacerbated by global climatic change (Ibid 
:100). As such China believes that the Darfur crisis needs international efforts to restore peace 
and stability and it appears prepared to play an active role in safeguarding its investments whilst 
championing the AU’s position on the crisis. China has equally cautioned western powers 
against resorting too easily to imposition of economic sanctions and embargoes; and turning 
too easily to use of force (Brosché 2008:97). To make matters worse, the AU has allowed 
individual countries like Libya and Qatar to initiate their own peace talks outside the strategic 
guidance of the continental organization.54 These parallel initiatives tend to undermine the 
effectiveness of the AU in addressing the crisis in Darfur.    
Gomes (2015) is of the view that the EU and US preferred a purely UN mission in Darfur 
where some EU countries could donate sophisticated military equipment to be manned by the 
Europeans themselves in order to advance their self-interests through undermining the host 
state sovereignty.55 Now that the GoS rejected the deployment of EU or western troops in 
Darfur, the donor countries have withheld their equipment, thus undermining the operational 
effectiveness of UNAMID in the process. The refusal by Sudanese authorities to surrender the 
perpetrators of atrocities in Darfur to The Hague for prosecution, angered western powers who 
                                                          
54 In an interview with Gomez a senior official in Addis Ababa in October 2015, he lamented the practice of AU 
member states and outsiders usurping the power of the AU and mounting their own initiatives to broker peace 
talks in Darfur without synchronizing their efforts with the position of the AU. He was of the view that these 
countries should sponsor AU initiated negotiations as opposed to mounting parallel negotiations that have the 
potential of undermining the authority and success made by the continental body.  
55 Gomes is of the view that a strong UNAMID is undesirable to the western sponsors of the rebel movements 
fighting the Sudanese government. What the western powers want to achieve is the installation of a puppet regime 
in Darfur that will give their oil giants unfettered access to the rich oil fields in the Darfur region. It follows 
therefore that UNAMID is deployed to deliberately mislead the world that a genuine peace settlement is being 
sought in that region which translates to organized hypocrisy.  
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facilitated the indictment of President Al Bashir.  In an interview with an African diplomat in 
Harare on 11 February 2016, he argued that: 
Although President Al Bashir was not directly involved in the acts of atrocities, considering that 
he was the Commander in Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces and that operations were 
conducted in line with his policies, he should have surrendered the indicted officials if he felt that 
they had acted outside his official orders and parameters of waging the war against rebels in 
Darfur. The fact that he refused to surrender these officials made him an accomplice to the crimes 
against humanity committed in his name (Interview with an African diplomat in Harare on 11 
February 2016).  
This was the first time that a sitting head of state was indicted for prosecution at The Hague by 
the ICJ in clear violation of Sudanese national sovereignty. Sudan’s instability is aggravated 
by the fact that its security is undermined by several internal conflicts that are linked to regional 
conflicts that are also fuelled by foreign interests emanating from outside the African continent. 
Sudan is located at the centre of a very unstable region with multiple inter-broiled and cross-
border conflicts. The porous borders with Chad, the DRC and Uganda are constantly violated 
by armed rebel groups from these countries escaping from home country security forces in hot 
pursuit and they end up crossing into Sudan where they aggravate the security situation (Coulon 
and Liégeois 2010). 
The mass atrocities witnessed in Rwanda and Srebrenica’ shocked the “conscience of 
mankind” and led to the advocacy for the R2P doctrine that was adopted at the world summit 
in 2005.56 However, in real life situations, ethical and moral considerations play second fiddle 
when it comes to big powers’ decision making processes regarding peacekeeping responses to 
crises on the African continent. Whereas Russia and China were protecting their lucrative 
business interests with the GoS, the US was equally doing the same as well as trying to keep 
Sudan as an ally in the war against terror. All this was being done at the expense of protecting 
civilian Darfuris that were internationally acknowledged to be under threat of ethnic cleansing 
and genocidal attacks by the same government these powers were doing serious business with, 
paying lip service or little attention towards capacitating the peacekeepers on the ground to 
discharge their mandate of protecting civilian populations.57 
                                                          
56 The adoption of R2P as a doctrine and international norm was the culmination of several years of research and 
lobbying for the adoption of such drastic concept that had far reaching consequences on such other international 
norms as the inviolability of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters of UN member states.  
57 This was the view of one senior military commander who served with UNAMID. In an interview on 03 April 
2016, he declared that, “Do not ever think or imagine that the big powers would ever prioritize the welfare and 
well-being of African populations sacrificing their own economic benefits in the process, even if it means 
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The indictment of President Al Bashir for war crimes, while appearing morally necessary, 
served to undermine Sudan’s state sovereignty. It has had the effect of derailing any meaningful 
negotiations the world community has been pursuing with authorities in Khartoum over the 
regime’s cooperation with UN/AU peacekeepers. The Sudanese government officials view the 
indictment as a political act, designed to ‘obstruct’ political developments in Khartoum. This 
development led Krieg (2013:47) to conclude that a combination of colonial legacy and recent 
experiences of ostensible humanitarian interventions have created fear in former colonies that 
Western powers employ the humanitarian argument to serve as a vehicle to circumvent the 
sovereignty principle with the ultimate aim of having unfettered neo-colonial access to exploit 
a countries’ natural resources.  
6.8 Conclusion 
The conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur presents a formidable and complex multilateral 
challenge to UN peacekeeping efforts towards finding a long term solution to the crisis (Bah 
and Johnstone 2007:29-43). Chijiiwa (2013:35) observed that the crisis in Darfur resembles a 
classic/text book example of a government that was either unwilling or unable to protect its 
civilian population, a situation that makes Darfur a strong candidate for the application of R2P 
doctrine where the international community is expected to come to the rescue of the victims of 
crimes against humanity. This did not happen despite widespread acknowledgement that the 
conflict in Darfur was generating mass civilian atrocities or acts of genocide, which according 
to R2P should have triggered a coercive humanitarian intervention. Weiss (2009:135) termed 
the UN response to the crisis “collective waffling reflecting an unadulterated respect for 
Khartoum’s sovereign prerogatives.” Several geo-strategic and ethical reasons for this poor 
response have been highlighted in this chapter.  
Two major reasons have been identified for the UN’s failure to operationalize the doctrine of 
R2P in Darfur. First ethical reason, was the resistance by the Sudanese government and her 
allies to any external coercive measures or intervention that threatened Sudan’s state 
sovereignty in the name of protecting civilians in Darfur. Attempts at operationalizing the R2P 
doctrine in Darfur following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1706 triggered serious and 
                                                          
watching the poor African civilians dying in their thousands as long as the end result is profitable to their cause 
as happened in Rwanda.” He went on to add that, “neo-liberal economic policies being propagated by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions through Structural Adjustment Programmes were impoverishing millions of African 
populations and their governments that are lured into perpetual debts yet the western powers continue with the 
same policies that are condemning the populations of Africa to eternal poverty.” 
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contentious debate regarding the use of force for humanitarian purposes that thwarted any 
attempts at military humanitarian intervention (Badescu 2011:136). The second ethical reason 
was the realization that the use of force in trying to protect civilians in Darfur was going to be 
a very costly undertaking in both material and human lives since the GoS had threatened to 
resist any foreign troops deployed on its soil without her consent (Bellamy 2009:198). Thus, 
the proposed deployment of a UN military humanitarian intervention force was abandoned and 
replaced by a UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping mission that remains under equipped and poorly 
funded almost 10 years after its deployment, factors that have contributed to its gross 
ineffectiveness to discharge its primary objective of protecting civilians exposed to crimes 
against humanity.  
The chapter also highlighted that the responses by the big powers to the “conscience-shocking” 
situation in Darfur remain governed by geo-strategic self-interests of the major powers as well 
as regional political dynamics and regional interests at stake. It is not the magnitude or degree 
of suffering by the victims of atrocities and crimes against humanity that determine practical 
international responses, but rather the geo-strategic and economic self-interests of the powerful 
nations that dictate the magnitude and quality of UN responses to humanitarian crises 
especially on the African continent. This implies that ethical and moral considerations are only 
publicly acknowledged while practically the responses take a totally different dimension in 
what has been observed as organized hypocrisy by the Security Council and its Secretariat. The 
other reason for the poor performance of the UN in Darfur is that whereas the Darfur civil war 
has local and regional causes, the conflict is to a large extent a proxy war fuelled by foreign 
powers that take advantage of the political fault lines in the local ethnic relationships in order 
to promote their own self-interests as they compete for the control and exploitation of natural 
resources.  
The Darfur case study has demonstrated that practical limits and ethical problems of UN 
missions are largely explained by the power politics and the pursuit of self-interests by the P5 
as they debate on what measures to adopt in order to address a particular crisis. It has been 
observed that where the P5 have a consensus to act, they can authorize a powerful mission to 
produce desired results and in situations where there is no consensus, as was the case in Darfur, 
the Security Council may opt to do nothing or decide to make a symbolic and ineffective 
gesture as was the case in Rwanda and now in Darfur. Such symbolic responses qualify to be 
categorized as “organized hypocrisy.” It follows therefore that the success or failure of UN 
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peacekeeping missions has more to do with the private and self-interests of the big powers as 
opposed to the desire to assist affected populations in target countries.  
It is widely acknowledged that humanitarian military intervention is a dangerous and difficult 
undertaking. Irrespective of this realisation, UN policymakers continue to deploy small, 
inadequately equipped and poorly funded peacekeeping forces into these dangerous theatres of 
operation where there is no peace to keep and with vague and unachievable mandates in what 
is clearly organized hypocrisy on the part of UN authorities. 
The chapter has demonstrated the continued conflict between states’ self-interests on one hand 
and the humanitarian needs of vulnerable and unprotected African civilian communities on the 
other hand. This tension remains a serious challenge to the operationalization of the R2P as a 
doctrine to render effective protection to the victims of internal conflicts in Africa. The complex 
political and security situation in Darfur with fragile peace agreements that were violated willy-
nilly, witnessed a largely symbolic international response to the humanitarian crisis because 
geo-strategic and economic self-interests of some of the permanent members of the Security 
with the “omnipresent” veto power, deterred any strong action against the Sudanese 
government. The chapter has also demonstrated that the international community’s hesitancy 
to effectively grapple with crimes against humanity in Darfur exhibits the proven and growing 
lack of political will and lack of agreement among the P5 to come to the rescue of endangered 
civilian populations in Africa. This exposes the characteristic of a “selective security system” 
and “double standards” applied by powerful nations when dealing with humanitarian disasters 
on the African continent (Lowe, Roberts and Zaum 2008). This should therefore further 
encourage the AU and African leaders to genuinely explore strategies for the operationalization 
of the principle of seeking “African Solutions to African Problems” that currently exists in 
theory only. It is disheartening to note that current attempts at seeking conflict resolution 
through peacekeeping in Africa are dependent of foreign donations that come with strings 
attached (Interview with Ambassador Mapuranga on June 12, 2015). This trend can only be 
reversed if African leaders realize that UN peacekeepers deploy with hidden agendas not 
clearly spelt out in their mandates. In most cases these hidden agendas do not serve African 
interests hence the urgent need to operationalise the dictum “African solutions to African 
problems” within the shortest possible feasible period. 
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The next chapter is the concluding chapter of this study that will be followed by scholarly and 
practical recommendations to address identified ethical challenges to UN peacekeeping 
























An ethical critique of the violation of UN peacekeeping principles 
7.1 Introduction 
United Nations peacekeeping operations are based on three principles that govern their 
constitution, legitimacy and conduct of field operations. These principles are; consent of the 
parties to the conflict, impartiality towards treatment of parties to the conflict through ensuring 
that peacekeepers do not take sides by favouring one party to the conflict at the expense of 
others, and non-use of force except in self-defence or in defence of the mandate (Goulding 
1993:445). These principles are viewed as being interlinked, hence the term “holy trinity” and 
are considered critical to the effectiveness and success of peacekeeping operations (Liu 1992). 
Peacekeeping principles “play a pivotal ontological and semantic role” in that they describe the 
essence of peacekeeping as a distinct tool for the resolution of conflicts (Tsagourias 2006:2). 
According to The Blue Helmets (1996:37-39), the principles governing UN peacekeeping 
missions were first formulated and promulgated by the then UN Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjold during United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) deployment to diffuse the 
1956 Suez Crisis. This deployment is officially acknowledged as the first UN armed 
peacekeeping mission (Ibid.).  
Karns and Mingst (2001:215) argue that UN peacekeeping principles have reached a level 
where they have acquired constitutional status in the sense that their application and acceptance 
continues despite radical changes to the context, environment and substance of peacekeeping 
operations. Wedgewood (1995:640) posits that peacekeeping has a “singular origin in a kind 
of ethical non-violence” hence the adoption of the three principles that form the bedrock of UN 
peacekeeping missions. According to Durch and Berkman (2006) during the Cold War, UN 
peacekeeping operations were the preserve of supposedly neutral, medium sized and non-
aligned states whose military troops were tasked to competently monitor a buffer zone between 
states without the mandate to effectively defend the international boundary. During this period, 
it was generally believed that the strict observance of the principles of peacekeeping constituted 
the embodiment of both the political principle and mission protection strategy that also served 
the interests of host states. In that regard, the conceptual idea of establishing peacekeeping as 
a tool for conflict management sounded as a very innovative and noble idea, however the 
application and implementation of these principles in the field of operations in most cases, 
violated host state sovereignty as demonstrated in the case studies of this thesis. 
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Conceptually, traditional peacekeeping missions posed little threat to norms of international 
sovereignty and territorial integrity as theoretically envisioned by the UN founding fathers. UN 
peacekeeping missions were expected to serve with the consent of all the parties to the conflict 
and play a non-coercive role when handling disputes. Sadly, the current state of UN 
peacekeeping practice as well as its future appear to be in jeopardy as a result of violations of 
both the “holy trinity” principles of peacekeeping and host state sovereignty. Berman and Sams 
(2000:172) observed that UN peacekeeping operations have become “more intrusive, 
multidimensional and often coercive” thus not only broadening their scope but also challenging 
their conceptual coherence and ultimate intentions. This chapter seeks to provide a critique on 
why peacekeeping principles are being violated and why peacekeepers continue to undermine 
host state sovereignty. The chapter also attempts to unpack the meaning and application of UN 
peacekeeping principles and why big powers not only undermine these principles but also 
violate host state sovereignty in pursuit of their national self-interests.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section one examines the meaning of consent, its 
relationship with nation-state sovereignty and the problems associated with its practical 
application. Section two analyses the meaning and challenges associated with the principle of 
impartiality. The third section examines the meaning and ethical challenges linked to the 
practical application of the principle that deals with “non-use of force except in self-defence.” 
Section four is a theoretical and conceptual explanation why UN peacekeepers are in the habit 
of violating the cardinal principles of UN peacekeeping. Finally, the fifth section is a critique 
of UN peacekeeping missions through the African ethical lenses. The above section is followed 
with a conclusion. 
7.2 Host state consent 
The first fundamental ethical principle of peacekeeping operations that contributes towards 
their constitutional and legal basis for deployment and continued presence of a peacekeeping 
force within a state is host state consent. This is a vital requirement for the deployment of 
consensual peacekeeping missions for the simple reason that state sovereignty plays a critical 
role in the context of establishing a UN mandate for non-violent peacekeeping intervention. 
Tsagourias (2006:3) buttresses this point by acknowledging the criticality and centrality of host 
state consent when he states that “…consent is critical for the creation of a conducive operating 
environment for a peacekeeping force inside a target country and this consent provides the 
mission with the relevant legal and legitimate basis, failure which the deployment would be 
viewed as a violation of host state sovereignty.” Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter prevents the 
184 
 
world body from intervening in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of member 
states (United Nations Charter 1945). It follows therefore that the deployment and continuous 
presence of a peacekeeping mission requires the host state’s consent, failure which, the 
deployment will be in violation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter.  
Since there are no provisions for peacekeeping missions in the UN Charter, peacekeeping 
operations derive their legitimacy from the Security Council resolutions and host state consent 
(Jett 2001:39). Host state consent legitimizes the deployment of foreign troops in a given 
country. Consent is derived from the parties’ “perceptions of the peacekeepers’ impartiality 
and moral authority” (Durch 1993:12). Essentially, consent serves to reduce the risk to the 
peacekeepers and more importantly, upholding this principle preserves the sovereignty of the 
host state (Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Any erosion of consent can significantly diminish the 
peacekeepers’ ability to fulfil their mission and mandate in addition to endangering their lives 
hence peacekeepers have an incentive not only to maintain consent but also to cultivate and 
nurture it for the benefit of all concerned. In theory, host state consent and Security Council 
mandate together make a very strong case that prevents the world body from intervening and 
meddling in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states without their approval. 
The presence of host state consent also ensures that peacekeepers are in the majority of cases, 
deployed into stable and “permissive” operational environments where the use of force in self-
defence is anticipated to be at a minimal. In that regard, irrespective of how the operating 
environment is, it is critical that the mission maintains and upholds its legitimacy since 
legitimacy of peacekeeping troops influences the behaviour of local actors, general support 
from the population and provides the basis for continued acceptability (Latif and Khan 
2010:236). In the post-Cold War era, host consent has been granted grudgingly in some cases 
as it was not offered freely and wholeheartedly by receiving states. Some powerful states have 
sought to apply various strategies to manipulate weak states into accepting peacekeepers’ 
deployment in their territories for meagre political and economic incentives thereby 
undermining their state sovereignty and national integrity. It is therefore pertinent to investigate 
why the big powers go to the extent of coercing receiving states to accept the presence of UN 
peacekeepers against their will.  
Welsh (2008:562) noted that in cases such as in Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, host state 
consent was coerced by the big powers through diplomatic, political and economic pressures 
especially in situations involving humanitarian emergencies. In the African context, the 
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Sudanese President was coerced to accept UN peacekeepers in Darfur against his government’s 
wishes (De Haas 2008). In the DRC, UN peacekeepers remain deployed in that country when 
the host government demanded their departure or their drastic scaling down all to no avail. 
These cases are testimony to the current practice of undermining host country’s sovereignty, a 
development that heralded a significant and regrettable departure from the original founding 
principles of UN peacekeeping operations as a non-coercive tool of third-party involvement 
designed to ameliorate and contain violence without undermining the authority of the host 
government.  
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, post-Cold War peacekeeping operations are a tool 
that is being frequently used to undermine host state sovereignty through manipulation and 
violation of host state consent. At the international level of states’ interaction, the concept of 
sovereignty implies the ability to deny any unwelcome foreign intervention in domestic affairs 
that are strictly considered to be within the jurisdiction of the state. In practicing its sovereignty, 
the state is not subject to any foreign authority of any nature whatsoever, including ethical 
values, without its consent and out of response to its national interests (Abu al-Haj 2013:118). 
Some scholars argue that the principle of non-intervention is not absolute citing situations 
where a government fails to protect its citizens from genocide, it would have reneged on its 
responsibility to protect its own population. The most recent example in Africa is when the 
Libyan government threatened to massacre its own citizens that were revolting against 
Gaddafi’s continued rule, the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone as the international 
community assumed the responsibility of protecting the Libyan population against its own 
government.   
The principle of non-intervention is considered to be one of the fundamental principles of 
International Law that is designed to guarantee international order and the independence and 
sovereignty of states, hence the commitment and undertaking by member states to respect 
rights of each state and not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states (Shukri 
1986:141). Regrettably, the principle of territorial integrity, though substantially retained in 
theory, has in practice, been negatively affected and substantially watered down as a result of 
the effects of globalization and accelerated interdependency among member states (Enabulele 
2010:409-410). Host state consent in the context of UN peacekeeping operations has equally 
been watered down and violated as a result of these global forces. 
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7.2.1 The problem of state sovereignty and human security 
The need for host state consent prior to the deployment of peacekeeping missions at times 
causes problems in some complex mission environments. The importance accorded to human 
security over the past two and half decades has taken centre stage to the extent that if a UN 
mission does not guarantee or be seen to be prioritizing human security in the first place, then 
it is considered a futile undertaking (Latif and Khan 2010:236). This implies that human 
security, under these circumstances is being accorded higher priority over that of state 
sovereignty.  
Newman and Richmond (2001:4) observed that the focus of post-Cold War peacekeeping has 
dramatically shifted towards human security in the context of international society. This view 
is supported by the Brahimi Report (2000) which called for a stronger rethinking regarding 
human security (Peou 2002:65). These developments have resulted in the complication of 
issues regarding host state consent in the context of “new humanitarian interventions” and state 
sovereignty. This complication has resulted in a dilemma between the defence of humanity and 
defence of sovereignty and it is unclear which principle should prevail when they are in conflict 
(Latif and Khan 2010:237). Following the humanitarian disasters that happened in places like 
Somalia, Rwanda, DRC, Bosnia and Haiti, the UN Secretariat came to acknowledge the 
existence of the dilemma of nation state sovereignty and human security. In the year 2000, the 
then Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that in the practice of classical peacekeeping 
operations, “consent” by host states was vital however, he was also quick to highlight and 
emphasize the problem that exists in contemporary missions when he stated that:   
I also accept that the principle of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small 
and weak states. But to the critics, I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights, violations that offend every 
precept of our common humanity? (Annan 2000:47-48). 
He further acknowledged that humanitarian interventions can be used as a cover up to interfere 
in the internal affairs of sovereign states and that it can be used by secessionist movements 
from affected countries to deliberately provoke governments to commit gross human rights 
violations and trigger foreign intervention in support of their cause (Ibid.). A problem arises 
where it is not clear what action the international community should take in order to assist the 
suffering population without undermining the sovereignty of the host state that is suspicious of 
actual intensions of the intervening forces. 
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The granting of host state consent is further problematized by both endogenous and exogenous 
factors such as: the type of conflict; timing of the intervention; self-interests of great powers; 
the nature and interests of domestic and external actors, and the nature of threats and challenges 
to the operating environment (Latif and Khan 2010:235). UN missions that witnessed increased 
interventions in internal conflicts, increase the conflict between the values of state sovereignty 
and human rights and in so doing, they further blur the distinction between domestic and 
international issues (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). Whereas there are many cases where the 
UN missions have intervened in civil conflicts with the invitation and consent of the host states 
and the warring parties, there are equally many precedents where the UN interventions were 
undertaken without consent of the belligerents which tends to legitimize the predominant 
evolving logic that “rights of states may shift to rights of human beings” (Ibid.). Boutros-Ghali 
(1992) was supportive of this normative change when he stated that, “…the time for absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty has passed.” This assertion tends to confirm the view highlighted by 
Debrix (1999:17) that UN peacekeeping was invented as a serious undertaking to realize the 
establishment of “a neo-Kantian universal moral community in which process, peacekeeping 
was to be used as a proxy.” Manipulation of host state consent to facilitate peacekeepers’ 
deployment in selected countries tends to support this view point.   
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) states that state 
sovereignty carries with it the responsibility to ensure the safety of the lives of its citizens and 
their welfare implying that it is an obligation for member states to consent to and actively 
facilitate humanitarian assistance on the basis of customary international law. The report 
further states that: “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,  
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt 
or avert it, the principle of non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect” 
(ICISS 2001:xi).  
Under modern international understanding, state sovereignty inheres in the people and the 
state’s sovereignty is thus conditional and is therefore challenged when a government wilfully 
embarks on activities that cause death and widespread suffering among its population 
(Ademola 2005). It follows that a state that fails to act decisively towards protection of its 
innocent population in turn loses claim to its sovereignty. This appears to be making it easy for 
the UN to intervene without state consent hence states are suspicious of foreign interventions 
as they are used by big powers as a way of interfering with domestic affairs of less powerful 
states. In cases where it is proven that there is dereliction of responsibility to protect innocent 
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civilians on the part of the state, sovereignty and human security interests of international 
community come into conflict with potential results that national sovereignty interests could 
play second fiddle (Chartoff 2009). Thus, the ethical problem arising from the competing 
interests of state sovereignty and human security remains contentious in international relations. 
7.2.2 A critique to the principle of host state consent 
The UN approach to strict compliance with the consent-based missions was seriously 
undermined and challenged by warlords in civil conflict zones like in Angola, Liberia, Somalia 
and the DRC where peacekeepers were attacked in a bid to terminate the deployments that were 
viewed by non-state actors as disrupting their agenda and grand political designs. These 
developments further complicated the issue of host state consent and gave rise to the advocacy 
for robust peacekeeping and more calls for peace enforcement missions where Africa was used 
as a pioneer continent and testing ground for peacekeepers with explicit authority to use force 
in order to enforce peace in Somalia (Al-Qaq 2009). 
Peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era are increasingly being launched under Chapter 
7 of the Charter (enforcement action) implying that the importance of host government consent 
is being whittled down, though in some cases consent has continued to be sought after for 
pragmatic and principled reasons (Zaum 2008:90). Coercive tendencies by big powers over 
weak states have led Berdal (2008:176) to lament that UN peacekeeping operations that were 
originally designed as a limited non-coercive tool of third party involvement in conflict 
management, reliant on host-state consent and geared towards diffusing and containing 
violence have been profoundly affected by changes in the political context and member states’ 
ambitions over time. Given this development, important to note is the fact that when there is 
no consent, the principle of impartiality becomes more problematic as highlighted in the next 
section that examines the meaning and problems associated with the principle of impartiality 
in UN peacekeeping operations.  
7.3 The ethical principle of impartiality 
Impartiality is an abstract political term, subject to differing interpretations by different interest 
groups bent on satisfying their own self-interests. Broadly speaking, it is a product of 
perception as well as of practice and it has a direct relationship with the principle of consent in 
that to retain host state consent or that of the belligerents, peacekeepers must be seen to be 
impartial which leads to cooperation of the parties to the conflict.  
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Being impartial in peacekeeping operations, means that peacekeepers cannot take sides in 
disputes among local belligerents. To a very large extent, impartiality is derived from consent, 
which in turn is closely connected with maintaining a non-threating military posture that is 
linked to the principle of non-use of force except in self-defence (Interview with General 
Nyambuya 13 October 2015). The General’s views are derived from UN guidelines on 
peacekeeping operations (UN Doc. GA/SPD/120, 1997). In cases where the UN peacekeeping 
operation has retained absolute consent from the conflicting parties, peacekeepers can more 
easily claim to be acting in accordance with the principle of impartiality toward the parties 
(Ibid.).  Osmancavusoglu, (2000) observed that in conflict situations involving ethnic-based 
issues, or the collapse of state institutions, the UN has lacked clear consent from the parties to 
the conflict  a trend that continues to endanger the lives of peacekeepers.  
Gibbs (2000:360) defines peacekeeping impartiality as follows: “peacekeepers will be 
expected to serve universalistic interests (such as attenuation of violent conflict or protection 
of minorities from persecution) and must not serve the parochial interests of specific foreign 
powers, which seek to project their influence into the conflicts in question.” From a theoretical 
perspective, the general assumption is that UN peacekeepers are not biased and remain as 
objective and disinterested parties as they can humanly be. However, in practice it is extremely 
difficult to be impartial in the interpretation and implementation of UN Security Council 
resolutions since from the outset, the Secretariat was never designed to be completely 
autonomous from great power influences (Ibid.).  
Simply put, the UN Secretariat is there to serve the interests of the P-5 first and foremost to 
avoid unnecessary friction with the main financial sponsors of the UN peacekeeping budget.  
Levine (2011) observed that the interpretation and understanding of impartiality has evolved 
in conformity with the UN greater willingness to get embroiled in intrastate conflicts. This has 
been coupled with UN peacekeepers’ ever increasing involvement in multi-dimensional and 
humanitarian missions where their mandates authorize them to deal with human rights abuses 
and protection of civilians as well as performing their traditional tasks of monitoring and 
overseeing an end to local hostilities. 
At the time of adopting the principle of impartiality, the then Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjold (1956) emphasized that the UN mission would not “influence the military 
balance in the present conflict and thereby the political balance affecting the efforts to settle 
the conflict.” This has not been the case in most UN peacekeeping missions as demonstrated 
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in the case studies in preceding chapters, where the principle of impartiality was seriously 
violated and compromised.  
The principle of impartiality requires that UN peacekeeping missions should be “strictly 
impartial” in their dealings with the host government and other non-state actors. To guarantee 
impartiality in a civil war setting where the peacekeepers are tasked with the responsibility of 
maintaining law and order is extremely difficult, especially in civil war settings that include 
many competing warlords as demonstrated in the case studies on Somalia, and Darfur. 
The vital importance of impartiality in peacekeeping has been stressed by James (1993) one of 
the most distinguished authorities on this subject who noted that: “it is impartiality which gives 
peacekeeping its distinctiveness... Impartiality is the lifeblood of peacekeeping.” The 
significance of peacekeeping impartiality is also shared by several authors such as Diehl 
(1993:8-9); Fetherston (1994); Goulding (I993:454); Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (I996:I25); 
Vayrynen (1996:35) and Vohra (1996:63-85 who regard impartiality as one of the key 
cornerstones of peacekeeping operations. These authors also add that impartiality, provides 
peacekeepers with a sense of legitimacy, which helps facilitate the success of peacekeeping 
operations. Despite these acknowledgements, the importance of impartiality continues to be 
whittled down hence the need to determine the theoretical basis for this unfortunate 
development.  
According to the Brahimi Report (2000) in contemporary peacekeeping missions, impartiality 
is no longer viewed and understood as equal treatment of all parties to a conflict under all 
circumstances but as “adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a 
mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles”. This interpretation of impartiality enables 
peacekeepers to distinguish between aggressors and victims and deal with them differently.  
7.3.1 Ethical challenges to the maintenance of impartiality 
The post-Cold War era witnessed a dramatic increase in UN peacekeeping missions as a result 
of an increase in civil wars that required third party intervention and mediation as civil wars 
replaced inter-state wars as the major global security threats (Frederking 2007:42). In the 
process of increasing interventions in internal conflicts, peacekeeping missions with 
multidimensional scope and mandates have resulted in peacekeepers increasingly handling 
national security issues such as maintenance of law and order as well as human security issues. 
This development has created ethical problems in the field of operations as emerging norms of 
human security have increasingly led to complex peacekeeping missions whose impartiality is 
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questionable (Hampson and Malone 2002:77-98). The major challenges for UN peacekeeping 
missions in the post-Cold War era are linked to the development of concepts and norms which 
authorize the deployment of peacekeepers in “semi-permissive or non-consensual 
environments where they have increasingly been called to operate since 1988” (Hansen, 
Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2004:6). It is therefore imperative that this chapter attempts to 
unpack the major theoretical and philosophical reasons why there is growing appetite to deploy 
UN peacekeepers in “semi-permissive and non-consensual” operating environments. 
As we have seen in chapter four on Somalia, ethical challenges arise when disarmament 
mandates are sanctioned by the Security Council as happened in Somalia during the manhunt 
for warlord General Farah Aideed. UN peacekeepers became embroiled in local conflict thus 
becoming a direct threat to some of the clan leaders. This was a direct interference with the 
power dynamics within the local clan power structures in which peacekeepers’ attempts at 
disarming the warring factions in Somalia, and efforts to capture Farah Aideed translated to 
forfeiture of all pretences of impartiality as United Nations troops became active belligerents 
in the conflict (Sens 1997). Under these circumstances, the most logical outcome of the venture 
was to abandon the mission, leaving behind a Somalia that was worse than what the 
peacekeepers found it in terms of political cohesion and humanitarian suffering. 
During contemporary peacekeeping missions, the UN continues to demonstrate a propensity 
towards dictating or imposing solutions to the disputants/protagonists by prescribing preferred 
views of the organization on how a crisis should be resolved. This approach does not give the 
belligerents options to explore and adopt their common grounds and implement them as a basis 
for a long term peace agreement. Based on this perspective, Coicaud (2001:25.) argues that 
“the UN has lost its innocence and peacekeeping has lost its impartiality as it aims to impose a 
specific agenda and solution on the disputants.” Foreign political impositions such as the one 
attempted by UN forces in Somalia demonstrate the lack of sensitivity by UN peacekeepers 
when they disregard the national aspirations and self-determination of host populations.  
The next section examines the issues related to the use of force in peacekeeping other than in 
self-defence and in defence of the mandate. 
7.4 The use of force in UN peacekeeping missions 
The use of force by UN peacekeeping missions is a controversial and politically sensitive issue 
that is yet to be resolved among UN member states. Tardy (2007:49-70) observed that the UN 
has always found it challenging to reconcile its primary role of maintaining international peace 
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and security and the idea of coercion through robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement. He 
further adds that the UN blurred the lines between robustness and peace enforcement with its 
operations in the DRC and Mali. And that it is uncertain how long troop contributing countries 
are willing to sustain this level of robustness where troops are constantly exposed to danger. 
This has resulted in serious divisions among member states. 
 China and the developing countries advocate the use of force in self-defence as outlined in the 
founding principles of peacekeeping. Western countries support the use of force for the 
purposes of implementing tasks given in Security Council mandates that are beyond self-
defence yet Western countries are reluctant to provide the fighting troops and adequate 
logistical resources to successfully undertake such missions in fear of own citizens’ casualties 
(Findlay 2002:327-328). The Security Council continues to authorize peacekeepers’ use of 
force in situations that go beyond self-defence such as protection of civilians and maintenance 
of law and order and public security (Johnstone 2009:65). A peacekeeping mission that 
transcends the legal limits of self-defence becomes an active hostile force, and the host state 
could revoke its consent, a development that could serve to weaken the chances of the mission 
being a success. 
Blocq (2006:202) observed that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which define the scenarios 
for the use of force lack adequate ethical guidance with respect to the proper use of force to 
protect civilians. He further posits that in spite of the absence of such detailed ethical 
guidelines, peacekeepers are still expected to act morally in this “ethical vacuum.” In addition, 
Weiss, Forsythe and Coate (2004:48) observed that peacekeeping missions have become more 
ambitious and at times more robust, a result of less friction and suspicions in the Security 
Council that had stifled peacekeeping operations prior to the 1990s. Blocq (2006:205) further 
notes two ethical issues that concern the lack of adequate guidance that peacekeepers require 
in that ROEs are of a discretionary nature since they lack firm ethical guidelines for 
peacekeeping operations; a situation that is further aggravated by the fact that the ROEs are an 
amalgamation of legal, political, and military operational exigencies hence they contain some 
ambiguities in relation to how peacekeepers should apply political and legal requirements 
underlying these rules on the use of force.  
United Nations Security Council mandates for the protection of civilians are a new addition to 
mission objectives reflecting a normative shift in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The 
Brahimi Report (2000) clearly states that “UN peacekeepers who witness violence against 
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civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic 
UN principles.”  This normative shift is supported by the ICISS which went a step further and 
gave birth to the controversial concept/principle of “responsibility to protect” (ICISS 2001). 
Although this “responsibility to protect” norm was endorsed at the 2005 World Summit, there 
is still no consensus on the practical application of the principle thus raising a number of 
practical and ethical challenges on how peacekeepers should protect civilians without 
endangering themselves and other civilians who might be attacked elsewhere as a punitive 
measure for close liaison with peacekeepers. 
In practice, increased UN propensity towards the use of force other than in self-defence raises 
a number of dilemmas in the execution of peacekeeping missions. Findlay (2002) has observed 
that this is more apparent when peacekeeping practitioners in the field lack “institutionalized 
guidance” on the use of force resulting in ad hoc, improvised, incoherent and inconsistent 
responses to challenges encountered in the mission areas. The pervasive functions of 
contemporary peacekeeping operations namely protection of civilians and provision of law and 
order, functions that are ideally and traditionally the responsibility of the host government, 
raise numerous dilemmas that demand the development of solid doctrinal guidelines.  
7.4.1 Problems related to the use of force 
The first problem in the use of force is that the proactive use of force as expected in robust 
peacekeeping may indeed contribute towards restoration of peacekeepers’ credibility but in the 
process may also worsen the mission’s operating environment by increasing the risks to 
peacekeepers in a situation where peacekeepers are overwhelmingly outnumbered by local 
forces (Roberts 1994:23-24). As a result, many pacifists object to the use of military force on 
the assumption that physical force creates more problems than it tries to solve, and that it is 
morally wrong anyway to use directed force in non-coercive peacekeeping operations 
(Janzekovic 2006:43).  
Examples that come to mind where use of force by peacekeepers worsened the situation include 
the UN missions in Somalia, DRC and Darfur where peacekeepers were outnumbered by local 
forces and in so doing, they were subjected to life threatening situations. In the cited countries, 
the use of force by peacekeepers resulted in peacekeepers’ exposure to more attacks, deaths, 
robberies as well as being taken hostage as manifestation of a deteriorating operating 




The second problem, which has direct linkages to the first, is that the use of force by United 
Nations peacekeepers in complex civil wars such as in Somalia, DRC and Darfur frequently 
involves killing and injuring civilians as well as armed spoilers in a war-like situation. Once 
civilian and even combatant casualties increase, as experienced in Somalia in 1993, 
international and local outcries and accusations of peacekeepers’ brutal and colonial like 
behaviour take centre stage as neither the UN nor its leading members are immune from such 
accusations (Janzekovic Op. Cit.:24). Belligerents who command some respect and sympathy 
from the local population tend to find plausible excuses to abandon whatever diplomatic and 
political negotiations currently underway and revert back to violence once the use of force is 
seen to be deliberately targeting certain factions, thus further complicating the operating 
environment and possibly prolonging the conflict and the mission resulting in a lose-lose 
political outcome.  
Janzekovic (2006:152) argues that most of humanity is morally torn between not interfering in 
another state’s genocidal activities because of the very real risk of own countrymen’s death or 
injury to family and friends on one hand, and the dreadful realisation that every minute of 
inaction means that more atrocities are occurring on the other hand. He further argues that for 
the sake of a suffering and dying humanity, it is morally not good enough to be stunned into 
indecision since only observers to atrocities have the luxury of moral indecision since those 
suffering and dying in their tens of thousands have no such moral dilemmas to worry about. 
Just-war theorists and utilitarians support a view somewhere in the middle. They are of the 
view that it is at times morally prudent and appropriate to use force, particularly in response to 
life threatening situations, but at other times it is not appropriate where the anticipated solution 
or outcome would cause more harm than good (Orend 1999:323-53). 
The third problem is that use of force by peacekeepers could result in the risk of undermining 
perceptions about the impartiality of the peacekeeping force involved in the hostile acts. 
Maintaining impartiality in humanitarian situations poses great difficulties especially if aid is 
needed in certain areas more than others. Peacekeepers cannot afford to create enemies in a 
foreign land as they desperately need local allies and supporters. Cooperation with locals 
irrespective of their status is needed more so if the mission is operating in a hostile 
environment.  
The fourth problem linked to the use of force is that once civilians fully appreciate that the 
peacekeepers are mandated to protect them, they will re-locate to where peacekeepers are 
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deployed in the hope of getting safety under the protection umbrella of the peacekeepers against 
the local belligerents. Several scenarios can be triggered by such a development. The displaced 
civilians seeking shelter from the peacekeepers can overwhelm the capacity of the mission and 
expose it to manipulation by those who want the operation to fail or invite robust action from 
peacekeepers in the hope that it will work to their advantage (Johnstone 2009:70). The safety 
expectations of the civilian population are naturally raised once they are under the protection 
of peacekeepers and the protectors may resort to use of force in the event that the lives of the 
civilians are threatened by spoilers. 
The fifth ethical problem arises when protection of civilians in one area results in reprisals 
against other civilians elsewhere as a consequence of peacekeepers’ isolation of this part of the 
population from some of the factions. Giving civilians protection knowing full well that others 
are going to be victimized as a result of this noble initiative puts the peacekeepers in a serious 
dilemma (Johnstone 2009:70). Peacekeeping troops are sometimes exposed to attacks while 
protecting relief aid. In such circumstances, peacekeepers are entitled to fight back in self-
defence. However such responses are at times misconstrued as an act of hostility by some 
spoilers which lead to more fighting resulting in the escalation of the conflict to guerrilla 
warfare and possible withdrawal of consent by affected parties (Viloria 1999:5). Related to this 
dilemma is the timing and scale of the use of force by peacekeepers which if not properly 
considered would result in worsening the situation.  
The sixth problem arises when deciding whether peacekeepers should pre-emptively use force 
in their bid to protect civilians. This is so especially when there is evidence of the intent by 
spoilers to harm civilians. Under such scenarios peacekeepers either have to proactively use 
force or they should wait until the damage is done in which case civilians would have been 
killed whilst peacekeepers were exploring other appropriate measures before using force to 
protect the civilians. Pre-emptive action translates to a declaration of war which could escalate 
to levels that most peacekeeping missions are not equipped to wage on a sustained basis. In 
Somalia, proactive use of force resulted in disaster as the warlords responded viciously to 
peacekeepers’ initiative to forcefully disarm them as “insecurity and suspicion replaced consent 
and trust” (Tanner 1996:140-141).  
The “deeper dilemma” arising from the protection of civilians’ norm is that of trying to achieve 
order and justice at the same time. Johnstone (2009:71) observed that protection of civilians is 
part of trying to restore order through quick results yet this effort can undermine long-term, 
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multidimensional efforts to achieve justice. If peacekeepers were to wait for political and 
diplomatic efforts to protect civilians to bare the desired results while civilians are being 
butchered, that scenario would seriously undermine the reputation and legitimacy of the 
mission and equally lose credibility and support among locals and international well-wishers 
the mission needs for success.  
The principle that a peacekeeper must refrain from using armed force until absolutely necessary 
is related to the principle of impartiality. The use of force against one party translates to taking 
sides with the other party, in violation of the principle of non-interference and impartiality. 
This led the US Department of the Army, to sum up the dangers and dilemmas associated with 
use of force by peacekeepers as follows: 
…the use of force by peacekeepers usually attracts a violent response from the affected parties 
ultimately resulting in heightened tensions, polarized public opinion against the peacekeepers 
and foreclosure of available negotiating opportunities. In that process, the impartiality of the 
mission is compromised and violence is escalated outcomes that are counterproductive to the 
overall attainment of mission objectives US Army (FM 100-23:34).    
The well- documented and publicized failures to protect civilians by UN peacekeeping 
missions in Bosnia, Rwanda, DRC and Sudan led to the realization that civilians caught up in 
conflict zones cannot be protected by international humanitarian law alone but with physical 
action to stop the human rights violations. This influenced UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 
advocacy for a “culture of protection” to be adopted by the international community (UN Doc. 
S/2005/740:15). This proposal, according to Tanner (2010:209-217), inevitably introduced 
ethical conflict between the protection of civilians and the consent of local parties to the fore 
implying that peacekeepers were now expected to deploy with sufficient fire-power and 
determination to use force to deal with spoilers, a requirement that was not well received by 
developing countries that were suspicious of the motives behind this policy shift from 
traditional peacekeeping principles. The next section examines the theoretical reasons why 
traditional peacekeeping principles have been violated over the past decades as demonstrated 
in the case studies 
7.5  Theoretical explanations for systematic violation of peacekeeping principles 
This section attempts to unmask some of the unethical power dynamics that lead to the 
systematic and deliberate violation of UN peacekeeping principles. The section focuses on 
possible theoretical explanations for the behaviour of certain powerful actors, especially the 
big powers towards the suffering populations in conflict riddled countries in Africa. It 
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highlights the fact that the humanity of countries in conflict, especially in Africa, is not as 
valuable when compared to those who are in militarily and economically advanced countries. 
This is amply demonstrated by the international responses to bombings in Paris where dozens 
of innocent civilians were killed compared to the same international response to hundreds of 
thousands of civilians massacred in cold blood in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. 
The disparity in the urgency of responses demonstrates that as human beings, we do not share 
the same moral values in that some societies are considered to be more equal than others. In 
this regard, the chapter also aims to refute the commonly accepted belief that UN peacekeeping 
missions are predominantly launched to attain altruistic and cosmopolitan objectives that are 
universally in the interest of humanity, inclusive of host populations. In line with this argument, 
UN humanitarian interventions are said to be inspired by moral considerations in order to 
promote the well-being of humanity in fulfilment of a cosmopolitan or a global ethic that 
emphasises universal value systems and universal cosmopolitan responsibilities (Dower 2002). 
Based on how the international community responded to humanitarian crises in Africa 
following the end of Cold War, this section highlights that it is misleading to argue that 
humanitarian crises have been responded to with a clear determination to address the plight of 
affected civilians. On the contrary, sceptical realists’ analysis and observations highlight the 
fact that material interests and big powers’ national self-interests have largely determined the 
size and nature of international responses to crises in African countries hence the responses 
have predominantly remained highly selective (Binder 2009). This section further addresses 
the selectivity issues regarding UN peacekeeping responses to humanitarian crises. 
7.5.1 UN peacekeeping as a vehicle to spread neo-colonial and neo-liberal values 
Political analysts have observed that UN peacekeeping shares with colonialism attributes and 
capabilities to reconstruct identities through reconfiguration of cultures, races, gender relations 
and class stratus in host countries to suit the intentions of the fast spreading neo-liberal world 
order. Peacekeeping missions have been noted as having their ultimate objective the 
encapsulation and reframing of the global political economy that entrenches neo-colonial 
power relations between the developed and developing countries, neo-liberal marketization of 
target countries and economic militarization of host countries to benefit the military industrial 
complexes in the leading weapons manufacturing countries (See Desire Industries: Sex 
Trafficking… Neo-Liberal World Order). To achieve these goals that favour the interests of 
the big powers, UN peacekeeping missions are manipulated in very subtle ways to advance the 
national self-interests primarily of the US and her Western allies. The use of UN missions falls 
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under the collective responsibility norm and custom where there is no moral pressure directed 
or exerted on specific individual actors hence the growing preference to ride on the 
benevolence of UN peacekeepers.  
Susan Rice at the time she was US Ambassador to the United Nations was quoted as having 
declared that since America’s resources and influence are finite, the country considers the 
United Nations as a strategic partner in safeguarding its national security and interests in that 
the world body accords the opportunity to share the financial costs and other logistical and 
military burdens of dealing with global security problems. In so doing global problems are not 
left to be tackled by America alone (Rice 2011). This simply implies that UN peacekeeping 
missions serve the self-interests of the US and its allies designed to configure affected target 
countries to suit the neo-colonial economic and political image imposed from foreign countries 
with little respect for traditional indigenous value systems. 
Susan Rice’s statement was a clear pronouncement that UN peacekeeping missions are indeed 
manipulated or taken advantage of, to promote US national and global interests across conflict 
riddled regions. Spreading of such lofty neo-colonial and neo-liberal values cannot effectively 
take place through the respect and adherence to UN peacekeeping principles. The four case 
studies of this thesis demonstrated that UN peacekeeping missions in Africa not only pose a 
threat to the autonomy of targeted developing countries on the continent but have been 
effectively used as proxy forces by powerful nations to undermine host state sovereignty in a 
bid to consciously and deliberately promote foreign geo-political and economic interests at the 
expense of the host country’s population. 
What is most disturbing is the fact that some Western powers have gone to the extent of 
initiating and sponsoring conflict in African countries with the ultimate intention of sponsoring 
military intervention in those target countries under the pretext of peacekeeping yet their 
ultimate objective would be guaranteeing that the host country is under their economic grip 
and effective geo-political sphere of influence. According to Elizabeth Schmidt (2013) many 
of the armed conflicts and political predicaments bedevilling the African continent are not 
entirely and solely an outcome of African mismanagement of their domestic political affairs. 
She argues that they are also a direct consequence of foreign interference, machinations and 
intrusion into the domestic affairs of African sovereign states and concludes that military 
interventions in Africa have aggravated the worsening of the conflicts so created and indeed 
harmed the civilian populations of African countries (Ibid.). The publicly acclaimed altruistic 
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intentions of peacekeeping interventions are indeed misleading. This is because peacekeeping 
interventions on the African continent are intricately linked to the issues of effective control of 
African countries and their natural resources as well as domination of the African political 
space by the big powers in order to entrench their spheres of influence. This explains why 
Tardy and Wyss (2010) noted that Africa has become the “epicentre of UN peacekeeping” as 
well as the “experimental laboratory” where peacekeeping norms are formulated, practiced and 
even violated when it suits the powerful nations. 
7.5.2 Double Anarchy and UN peacekeeping operations 
During the Cold War, the two ideologically opposed camps were preoccupied with the 
maintenance of the balance of power in an international environment where any military 
manoeuvres that interfered with the domestic politics of any state were strictly interpreted as 
targeted at disrupting the existing delicate balance of power to the disadvantage and detriment 
of one of the super powers (Frost 2009). This sensitivity towards maintaining the delicate 
balance of power was significantly reduced at the end of the Cold War thus creating an 
opportunity for some powerful states to strongly consider military interventions in the domestic 
affairs of smaller and weaker states under the misleading guise of promoting and maintaining 
international peace and security as happened in Somalia, Iraq, DRC, Libya and Darfur.  
The growing and recurrent practice of UN troops conducting offensive military operations in 
host countries continues to threaten host state sovereignty that has been a pillar of international 
politics since the Treaty of Westphalia (Ibid.). The increasing prevalence of UN sanctioned 
military operations in developing countries on the periphery has been explained by the 
existence of an operating international environment that is characterised by two anarchies 
namely: global civil society and the society of sovereign states (Ibid.:124). Given this scenario, 
big powers are abusing UN peacekeeping missions as a smoke screen to cover their true geo-
political objectives of power projection or to protect and extend their spheres of influence as 
was the case in Congo, Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur (Gibbs 2000:51). Such exploitation of 
UN missions by powerful states to further their national self-interests tend to compromise the 
legitimacy and ethical integrity of these operations (Ibid.). 
The case study on Somalia clearly demonstrated that there was no genuine sympathy and 
consideration for the suffering Somali population. Working in a coalition of twenty countries, 
the US contributed 28 000 out of a total 37 000 troops thus demonstrating that the presence of 
nineteen other countries could not negatively impact on the non-altruistic objectives that the 
US aimed to achieve. In actual fact, the presence of the accompanying nineteen other countries 
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only served to legitimise the entire mission in the eyes of the international community. Equally, 
operating under the UN banner did not deter the US from pursuing its national self-interests in 
the war ravaged and famine stricken Somalia (Ibid.).  
The case study on Rwanda further demonstrated that there was no genuine consideration of the 
civilian population that was being subjected to genocidal activities. All the US and its allies 
wanted was the displacement of French influence from the Great Lakes region in order to gain 
unfettered access to mineral rich eastern Congo. The case studies in this thesis have 
demonstrated that the developed countries that predominantly sponsor and advocate for 
intrusive UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, have little or no respect for the suffering African 
populations in conflict countries, a situation that is supported by the theory of group mentality. 
The Rwanda case study indeed demonstrated that at the time of withdrawing peacekeepers 
from that country, the big powers were busy reinforcing peacekeepers in Kosovo, a country 
that was facing less danger compared to Rwanda genocide. 
7.5.3 Group Morality and the conduct of UN peacekeeping missions 
The conduct of UN peacekeeping missions is influenced more by the prominence given to 
group morality as opposed to international morality. According to Mary Maxwell (1990:74) 
international morality entails order as governed by the laws and regulations together with 
welfare provisions depicted by acts of mercy, benevolence and generosity towards others in 
foreign lands. Group morality on the other hand concerns itself with the cohesion of the in-
group to strengthen itself in order for it to attack or to defend itself against possible hostilities 
from outside the group (Ibid.:106). In this regard, group morality is synonymous with racism; 
xenophobia; nationalism and ethnocentrism: attributes that enhance beliefs in self supremacy 
over others as well as perceptions that help the group to identify itself from potential enemies 
or competitors for survival (Ibid.). 
Group morality generally manifests itself through activities that are highly altruistic towards 
itself such as self-sacrifice, team spirit and loyalty to the ideals of the group-attributes that are 
indeed virtuous towards the group members. Important to note is the fact that group morality 
emphasises on the moral superiority of one’s own group over non-members that are considered 
as barbarians, heathens or infidels thus downgrading the moral importance of other groups 
hence denying them their right to be treated with moral consideration. The same mentality is 
applicable to the conduct and behaviour of powerful nations that draft UN peacekeeping 
resolutions and sanction the deployment of peacekeepers to selected countries. Members of the 
Security Council codify and promulgate peacekeeping resolutions as if they are designed to 
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attain international justice yet they primarily serve their own self-interests at the expense of 
local populations. Moreover, the P-5 group mentality lacks any binding obligations towards 
moral accountability by individual members for the group’s unethical activities. 
In the light of the previous chapters in which this researcher discussed some of the problems 
related to peacekeeping operations in post-colonial Africa, it became clear that most of these 
peacekeeping operations did not successfully accomplish their missions. In fact these 
peacekeeping operations have ended up getting entangled in intractable controversies that 
sometimes defeated the publicly stated purpose of these missions. The peacekeeping operations 
in the DRC, Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur have been a spectacular failure in the sense that 
despite the efforts that were put in these peacekeeping missions by the United Nations, with 
the exception of Rwanda, most of these African countries have remained in a state of perennial 
civil war.  
In the light of the examples given in the previous chapters, it is evidently clear that these 
peacekeeping missions were entangled in numerous problems which can easily lead the reader 
to question the commitment of those countries that were commissioned by the UN to participate 
in these peacekeeping operations. Equally questionable are the true intentions of the main 
sponsors of these missions. In this regard there are two ethical explanations that can shade light 
into the behaviour of these peacekeepers and their chief sponsors.  
7.5.3.1 Ethical theory on kin altruism among nations 
The first ethical theory is based on the prevalence of kin altruism among nations. According to 
the ethicist Peter Singer, kin altruism is the tendency inherent in our human nature to help those 
whom we deem to be close to us than those who are distant from us (Singer 1981:14). One way 
of promoting group altruism lies in pursuing the group’s national interests to the exclusion of 
the interests of any other nationalities that are deemed as not belonging to the same group or 
nation. Singer further states that, “group altruism would work best when coupled with a degree 
of hostility to outsiders, which would protect the altruism within the group from penetration 
and subversion from outside. Hostility to outsiders is in fact, a very common phenomenon to 
social animals” (Singer 1981: 20). This has been manifested through historical periods of 
slavery, colonialism, and currently in the global fight against terrorism. Kin altruism implies 
that by nature human beings do not have a sense of concern to those who do not share the same 
nationality with them.  
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If we are to apply the theory of kin altruism to the practice of peacekeeping missions in Africa 
as demonstrated in the previous chapters, we can conclude that the lives of those who were 
suffering as a result of civil war and political persecution did not matter so much when 
compared to the lives of peacekeepers as well as the lives of powerful nations sanctioning the 
deployments. When American lives were lost in Somalia during the UN mandated intervention, 
the Americans unceremoniously withdrew from Somalia whilst the civil war was raging on 
among the Somalis. Another vivid example which demonstrates the predominance of 
promoting group altruism in peacekeeping operations was that of Rwanda whereby 
approximately one million innocent lives were lost as a result of an ethnic cleansing genocide 
whilst the UNSC was doing nothing. This example convincingly demonstrated that the lives of 
Rwandese did not matter much as compared to the lives of the Westerners who were hurriedly 
evacuated out of Rwanda by French troops at the start of the genocide. There is no doubt that 
if a genocide was detected that it was about to take place in one of the economically developed 
countries in Europe, the reaction from the UNSC would have been swift and effective in 
preventing it from occurring. In this regard, sympathy is not a universal feeling that is shared 
equally among all of humanity, rather we are more inclined to feel more sympathetic to those 
who are close to us in terms of culture, skin, colour and language. 
From anthropological studies, kin altruism is found in ethnicity whereby the humanness of 
other people is judged or appreciated on the basis of their ethnic affinity to our own humanity. 
Munyaradzi Murove (2016) observed that the theory of kin altruism is closely related to the 
anthropological theory of ethnicity which states that, “ethnic groups develop ties of loyalty 
among themselves and hostility to those who are considered to be outside the group. This 
obviously implies that that which is moral will always remain relative to the group”. Murove 
went on to say that, “In our contemporary times this type of reasoning has gained a great deal 
of popularity in theories of international relations – especially the theory of sceptical realism 
which argues that governments are not morally accountable to the citizens of other nations 
because they don’t share common moral values with those citizens” (Murove 2016:206). This 
mode of thinking and argument partly explains the attitude of indifference which has been 
displayed by UN peacekeepers in selected African countries as we have seen in the previous 
chapters. It is an attitude that dehumanises those who are seen as not belonging to the 
nationality or ethnic group of the peacekeepers from outside the continent.  
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7.5.3.2 The pursuit of national self-interests 
The second ethical issue that serves as a plausible explanation to the behaviour of foreign forces 
in peacekeeping missions is related to the pursuit of national interests in UN peacekeeping 
missions. Thomas Hobbes came up with the theory that the reason why international relations 
are anarchic lies in the fact that within the international sphere, human beings do not share 
common values and that there is no common power to determine what is right and wrong, 
hence the relations of states are solely based on the pursuit of national interests (Hobbes 1962). 
Hobbes’ theory of the absence of morality in international relations was adopted by Hans 
Morgenthau who characterised international relations as based on political realism which is 
mainly based on the presumption that we should accept human nature as it is.  
The tenets of Morgenthau’s theory of political realism are as follows: Politics, whether 
domestic or foreign, is essentially a struggle for political power, which means the domination 
of human beings by [other] human beings. …The primary criterion for a country’s foreign 
policy as long as that country exists must be the pursuit of enhancing national interests; where 
peace is the main goal of a state, it puts itself in the hands of the most reckless member of the 
community of states. In the struggle for power a competition or alignment of interests is 
possible. Where interests coincide, collaboration between the nations is possible; where 
interests collide, rivalries and conflicts between them are unavoidable (Cited in Kung 1998: 
39). Since the international political scene is dominated by the pursuit of national interests, it 
follows that the issue of domination plays an indispensable role in the realisation of a particular 
country’s national interests.  
Equally, the pursuit for power within the international arena is the reason for collaboration 
among states who otherwise would be enemies. The quest for power or domination remains 
central to international relations. As we have seen previously, the quest for national interests 
has influenced decisions to participate in peacekeeping missions. When the powerful members 
of the UNSC realise that a country plagued by conflicts does not have anything they can gain 
from, they usually do not participate in such peacekeeping missions. In other cases they do not 
even sanction the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions. The idea of undertaking 
peacekeeping missions on the basis of promoting national interests can also imply that if a 
possible participant in peacekeeping mission’s national interest are not at stake, it means that 
the would-be participant nation can easily withdraw from supporting such a peacekeeping 
mission. In the light of such reasoning, if continuous civil war is to the interest of powerful 
countries it means that those powerful countries will not support the end of such a civil war. It 
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is mainly for this reason that we can say that the pursuit of national interests in peacekeeping 
operations does militate against peace and security in strife torn parts of the world. 
A publicly stated concern for the suffering of others which is expressed in the form of UN 
peacekeeping missions is in itself a disguised pursuit of national interests and not necessarily 
a manifestation of sympathy as demonstrated in the case studies. David Hume is more nuanced 
in this trend of thought. Thus he writes that: 
  
There is a principle, supposed to prevail among many, which is utterly incompatible with all 
virtue or moral sentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the most depraved 
disposition, so in its turn it tends still further to encourage that depravity. This principle states 
that all benevolence is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a farce, fidelity a snare 
to procure trust and confidence; and that, while all of us, at bottom, pursue only our private 
interests, we wear these fair disguises in order to put others off their guard and expose them 
the more to our wiles and machinations (Cited in Rogers 1997: 141-142). 
Following this line of thinking, it is the prevalence of self-interests in human nature that makes 
peacekeeping missions some form of organised hypocrisy as it was stated in chapter five. It is 
the dominance that is given to self-interest at a micro-level (individual social outlook) and 
macro-level (international relations) that sometimes serves as a rationale behind the continuous 
failure in most of the UN peacekeeping missions in African countries that have been given as 
case studies in this thesis. If morality or a feeling of benevolence does not exist among 
individuals within society, what more of in the realm of international relations? Ethicists such 
as Peter Singer argue for the principle of equal consideration in our relationship with others or 
in our general life outlook.  
As Singer puts it, “The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we 
give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our 
actions”. In this type of reasoning, the implication is that we should treat others in similar 
manner which we ourselves so desire to be treated. Singer went on to state that, “The principle 
of equal consideration of interests therefore may be a defensible form of the principle that all 
humans are equal, a form that we can use in discussing more controversial issues about 
equality” (Singer Op.Cit.: 21-23). In this regard, the principle of equal consideration implies 
that we should see all human beings as equal to our own humanity regardless of race, colour, 
sex and economic status. 
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In light of the arguments presented above, it is high time African leaders seriously came to 
terms with the fact that human beings behave differently when dealing with members of their 
own group compared to non-members of their group. According to Mary Maxwell (1990:118), 
people from within the same group tend to be altruistic, cooperative and willing to make 
sacrifices for others within the same group. Their behaviour towards non-members of the group 
is characterized by mistrust, fear and lack of sympathy and compassion for persons of an alien 
culture. This observation explains the organised hypocritical approach to UN peacekeeping 
missions in Africa that are portrayed as altruistic undertakings designed to come to the rescue 
of suffering populations by benevolent outsiders. This interpretation hides the true agenda of 
the main sponsors of UN peacekeeping that serves their interests. It follows therefore that in 
pursuit of their self-interests, peacekeepers are expected to effectively deal with potential 
spoilers bent on derailing the achievement of the ultimate objective of ensuring that a regime 
favourable to the big sponsors of peacekeeping is left in power in order to guarantee continued 
political and economic ties after the departure of the peacekeepers. 
It is this researcher’s view that African leaders should always be suspicious of the true 
intentions of powerful countries that have traditionally acted on strategic issues that enhance 
their strategic self-interests more than acting on moral principles and considerations when 
dealing with alien groups in their conduct of international relations. Whereas African countries 
seek self-determination, this endeavour is seriously and continuously thwarted by big powers 
as is the case with the Democratic Republic of Congo where the US and her allies continue to 
seek perpetual entrenchment of their hegemony in order to guarantee their unfettered access to 
Congo’s abundant natural resources at the expense of the Congolese population. A politically 
and militarily strong and stable DRC is not in the interests of the Western powers hence the 
continued meddling in her internal politics through the continued and unwelcome presence of 
UN peacekeepers. Such behaviour highlights the role of group morality in the games that 
nations play at the international level. From the discussions in previous chapters, it has been 
observed and demonstrated that although UN missions serve the self-interests of big powers, 
they have been “clothed in the international moral garment of ethical righteousness” hence the 
general perception that UN peacekeeping missions are morally designed to serve the interests 
of the suffering host populations. 
7.6 The need for African leaders to be suspicious of UN peacekeeping missions 
It has further been observed that as part of group morality, people from the same group very 
easily come to the belief and conclusion that certain value systems and other political or 
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economic arrangements agreeable to their society are equally beneficial to others. This explains 
why Western powers are persistently engaged in the spread of democratic values, capitalist 
market economic principles and neo-liberal value systems that they believe are universally 
acceptable and applicable to all societies across the globe based on their belief that what is 
good for them should be equally good for other societies. In order to minimize their direct 
involvement in spreading these value systems, they have been perfecting their skills of using 
UN missions do the donkey work on their behalf without risking their own kith and kin in 
dangerous missions in Africa. It follows therefore that organised hypocrisy associated and 
practiced by big powers manifests itself in exaggerated righteousness of UN peacekeeping 
towards African populations. African leaders must therefore always keep in mind that human 
groups always practice double standards of morality when dealing with their domestic 
constituencies when compared with foreign/international populations. Moreover the countries 
that make the highest financial contributions to UN peacekeeping expenses would naturally 
and undoubtedly wish to ensure that their contributions result in the promotion of their own 
national interests. 
In a study carried out by Stojek and Tir (2015), they established that a budget of US$7.9 billion 
was required to finance 16 UN missions across the globe. They further noted that out of this 
amount, the top five contributing countries paid 63 percent of the entire peacekeeping budget 
while the 11 top contributors paid up to 82 percent of the budget. The fact that very few 
countries pay enormous amounts of money towards meeting operational costs of UN 
peacekeeping missions implies therefore that their national interests come before the interests 
of local populations that UN peacekeepers are expected to protect. This observation led Mingst 
(2003) to conclude that given this scenario, national self-interests of the highest paying 
countries must be viewed as primary motivations for the choice and determination of regions 
and countries where UN peacekeepers are deployed. It is not the magnitude of suffering 
populations that is the primary motivation for deploying UN peacekeepers as happened in 
Rwanda during the genocide. It follows therefore that group mentality of powerful countries 
that have the resources and capacity to finance UN peacekeeping missions collectively 
influence where peacekeepers are deployed in a clear demonstration of selectivity that is driven 
by group mentality and self-interests. The case in this thesis revealed that economic interests 
were of paramount importance in each of the deployments covered in this study despite public 
rhetoric that the missions were deployed for either humanitarian reasons or to uphold 
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international security. The critical linkage between economic issues and world politics has been 
highlighted by many theorists such as Cox (1987) and Gill and Law (1993).  
Considering that UN peacekeeping deployments are a very expensive undertaking, the rich and 
powerful nations that top the contribution list for peacekeeping expenses, would naturally 
expect a significant return on their investment once the conflict ends. In most cases they do not 
have to wait until the end of the conflict simply because the continuation of some of the 
conflicts provides lucrative business opportunities for these developed countries hence it is in 
their self-interests that the conflicts are perpetuated. At the end of the conflict, it is in their 
interest to ensure that a government system that is amenable to their economic and political 
self-interests and value systems is left in power with state institutions that would guarantee 
continued political and economic relations with the sponsoring powers (Stojek and Tir 
2015:354). It follows therefore that countries with a geo-strategic importance and those with 
greater geo-economic potential for post conflict business opportunities will receive a 
significantly higher probability for the deployment of UN peacekeepers and not the countries 
where human suffering is the highest and thus requiring the most urgent international attention. 
Since altruistic considerations are not the primary motivators for UN peacekeeping 
deployments, respecting peacekeeping principles during operations is therefore not a priority 
especially if doing so retards the rate of progress towards the attainment of desired goals by the 
main sponsors. 
Carr (2010:39) observed that since the end of World War I in 1918, the English speaking 
developed countries have formed and constituted the most dominant group in world affairs to 
the extent that they have crafted theories of international morality designed to perpetuate their 
supremacy, “policies that are expressed in the idiom peculiar to their self-interests.” A very 
close scrutiny reveals that indeed the English speaking countries namely Australia, Canada, the 
UK and the USA have been the leading countries in spearheading the formulation and 
designing of peacekeeping new and highly intrusive doctrines of UN peacekeeping. The 
doctrines sound appealing on paper yet when it comes to implementation, they are manipulated 
to serve the self-interests of the very big powers that sponsor and sanction the deployment of 
UN missions in the false name of serving humanity. Carr (2010) further notes that the fact that 
France has played a rather limited role in the formulation of current international morality 
doctrines, this has led some observers and analysts of international relations to conclude that 
the English speaking people are monopolists of international morality and that they are 
consummate international hypocrites. The crafters of UN peacekeeping doctrine have 
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portrayed it as a doctrine of harmony designed to serve international interests, hiding the fact 
that the doctrine is primarily designed to advance the interests of the big powers. 
A case in point is the formulation of the doctrine of R2P that was spearheaded by Canada and 
Australia which has been coined a doctrine of the harmony of interests and of international 
solidarity. This doctrine should be seen in its proper perspective as a mockery to the suffering 
African masses that continue to wallow in abject poverty yet their natural resources continue 
to be exploited and in some cases looted by the very dominant big powers whose international 
policies are designed to entrench their privileged positions. All this is done at the expense of 
the under-privileged populations whose inferior industrial base and old-fashioned 
technological know-how cannot effectively compete with the developed world advocating for 
the adoption of such policies. This is a clear reflection of group morality and double standards 
practiced by the developing countries towards African populations that are considered inferior 
to the white race. Based on these arguments, internationalism as advocated by 
cosmopolitanism, is a doctrine and concept that was derived from the doctrine of harmony of 
states and it is extremely difficult to decouple these concepts from the self-interests of those 
who advocate and promulgate them (Carr 2010:41).  
It should therefore not come as a big surprise that the principles of UN peacekeeping and that 
of state sovereignty are continuously violated with impunity by UN missions because such 
violations are in tandem with the advancement of sponsors’ self-interests. Moreover, the 
remaining dominant super power (US) has mastered the strategies of using UN peacekeeping 
missions in a deliberate attempt to perpetuate the current status quo where her global influence 
prevails over mostly countries on the periphery where most peacekeeping missions are 
deployed. In this regard, doctrines such as humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism embraced by 
the UN Secretariat serve to further US hegemony across the entire globe. The ultimate objective 
of using UN missions to spread Western value systems is the attainment of “world union of 
democracies, in which the US plays a dominant role” (Streit 1998). 
Rubinstein (2010) observed that UN peacekeepers’ prioritization of big powers’ concerns and 
interests ahead of those of host populations and governments is a practice reminiscent of earlier 
imperial policing strategies and tactics. Added to this observation is the growing practice of 
unequal sharing of the risk burden in UN missions that are deployed in hostile and semi-
permissive theatres of operations. Cunliffe (2009) noted that the most risky missions are 
lopsided in favour of countries with the least ability to bear the burden, namely the poor and 
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weak states on the periphery. He further observed that the powerful countries that make the 
decisions on deployment in dangerous theatres are not the once who carry out hazardous tasks 
reflecting a global governance structure that appears on the surface as organizational 
dysfunction yet in reality, it serves a deliberate strategic function of perpetuating US influence 
and that of her allies over the affairs of weak and poor countries on the periphery without being 
exposed to the dangers and risks of policing unruly regions and countries. 
Consequently, because UN peacekeeping missions are designed to promote the self-interests 
of the US and her allies, Richmond (2004) concluded that the nature of peace arising from UN 
missions in conflict countries is “virtual peace” based on contested attempts at imposing 
imported neo-liberal democratic models of governance as opposed to the preferred or practiced 
systems on the ground as happened in Somalia where the clan system of governance was 
demonized by peacekeepers. Important to note is that the “virtual peace” imposed by foreign 
sponsored UN peacekeepers results in negative peace that is premised on externally formulated 
forms of governance that are alien to the local population.  
7.7 An Afrocentric ethical critique of the UN peacekeeping operations 
The spreading of neo-liberal Western doctrines of “democratisation, globalisation and human 
rights” through various strategies including UN peacekeeping operations in Africa deserves a 
serious critique through African philosophical lenses in order to come up with strategies to 
ameliorate the impact of these externally imposed value systems. According to Okoye (1972) 
colonisation meant loss of sovereignty by colonised Africans. In the same vain neo-colonialism 
being perpetrated by UN peacekeepers is further entrenching the control of political and 
economic systems in African countries to the detriment of self-determination and national 
sovereignty of affected countries.   
This section seeks to establish Afrocentric views about UN peacekeeping missions’ conflict 
resolution approaches in Africa. In African ethics, the moral imperative is to strive to achieve 
the right relationships between the “individuals, the community, and the environment” and this 
implies that it is “self-evidently right” (Hammond-Tooke 1998:8). According to African moral 
philosophy, community constitutes the basis for morality considering that it provides 
guarantees and safeguards for the well-being of both the individual members and the 
community (Rasheed and Olowu 1993). The African ethical concept of Ubuntu places 
emphasis on listening to all views inclusive of dissenting voices, seeking consensus derived 
from respect for all and the creation of a harmonious, stable and equilibrium state (Nicolson 
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2008:10) that prioritises the well-being of all the citizens. In this regard, traditional African 
practice places emphasis on collective management of family, tribal or clan issues where 
formal and informal rules are formulated and developed to further the primacy of collective 
interests (Tshikwatamba 2003:10).   Post-peacekeeping environments as witnessed in Congo 
during the 1960s and in Somalia during the early 1990s were not conducive for the promotion 
and guaranteeing of “the well-being” of both the individual and the community as evidenced 
by the negative peace that prevailed after the departure of the peacekeepers (Lyons and 
Mastanduno 1995). UN peacekeeping approaches to settling disputes among belligerents in 
African conflict situations are significantly different from the African traditional political 
approach of seeking consensus on the solutions to the dispute that would be binding to all 
parties concerned. African traditional conflict resolution approaches put emphasis on securing 
a buy-in from all affected parties before adopting a binding resolution. This traditional African 
approach to conflict settlement was observed by Gyekye (1987:8) who said that African 
philosophical frameworks sought to establish consensus towards addressing political 
challenges, thus consensus was sought and arrived at in situations where there was opposition. 
This approach is unlike the foreign imposed solutions brought about by the western sponsored 
peacekeeping missions in Africa. 
Ramose (1999:98) highlighted the major differences in dispute settlement between African and 
modern European approaches. He observed that African traditional parliamentary systems 
prioritised free and serious deliberations and consultations aimed at making laws and 
establishing communal solutions to the problems that triggered the disputes. Ramose (1999:94) 
went on to say that since colonisation up to this day, the Europeans and their US allies continue 
to impose upon the indigenous African population their alien views and value systems that are 
radically opposed to the African value systems. In the same vain, Murove (2016) observed that 
Africans were required to learn and embrace Western values as enshrined in Western culture, 
language and religion… at the same time the Africans were expected to deny and denigrate 
their own African values that were “the source of their identity of Umuntu.” These arguments 
do not totally discourage the adoption of certain positive value systems from other traditions 
of the world. Cultural traditions are dynamic and are bound to be influenced by other cultures 
as is happening within the contemporary global village. 
Globalisation that has been brought about through westernisation has been embraced by most 
African elites to the detriment of the preservation and promotion of African value systems. In 
this regard, Wiredu (1980:21) lamented that “It would profit us little to gain all the technology 
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in the world and lose the humanist essence in our culture.” What this implies is that Africans 
should, where possible, only adopt positive attributes of ethical traditions from other cultures 
and preserve that which is positive from our traditional practices (Mazrui 2009). African 
traditional conflict resolution practices that seek accommodation of all belligerents in order to 
secure lasting community peace deserve serious attention and prioritization 
Coicaud (2001) observed that UN peacekeepers accord the belligerents little room to deliberate 
and workout home-grown solutions to their problems as solutions prescribed and imposed from 
outside the continent are given preferential priority as happened in Congo, Somalia and 
Rwanda. The alien solutions imposed serve to promote neo-liberalism through the 
reconstruction and reconfiguration of African cultures to suit Western value systems. Elizabeth 
Schmidt (2013) observed that some conflicts on the African continent are indeed foreign 
instigated and sponsored, to create an opportunity for some foreign powers to apply the “divide 
and rule” strategy as well as creating an opportunity for them to meddle in the domestic affairs 
of affected countries in a bid to advance their own self-interests. This calls for an urgent need 
for an in-depth, self-introspection process of thought and action that is geared towards the 
creation of a new domestic African paradigm that is culturally relevant, morally justifiable, 
economically vibrant and politically geared towards attainment of real genuine liberation 
African liberation. (Towards a Second Liberation Africa and the World Crisis 1987:18) 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are three main principles that govern the conduct of 
peacekeeping operations that have stood the test of time despite the evolution of peacekeeping 
that has witnessed reinterpretation of these principles and definitions emanating from the 
changing geo-political operating environment resulting from the end of the Cold War. Tension 
and conflict of interests continue to exist between Westphalian and post-Westphalian views of 
peacekeeping operations within the UN, especially concerning the scope of multilateral 
authority vis-à-vis sovereign authority, and the legitimacy of peace operations. This chapter 
has reiterated several cases where state sovereignty has been violated by peacekeeping 
operations, a development that undermines the integrity and credibility of UN peacekeeping 
missions. 
Failure by UN peacekeepers to adhere to the three “holy trinity” principles of peacekeeping 
has resulted in unwarranted additional expenses to everyone involved in the mission in terms 
of the duration of the mission, resources required, spilt blood and lack of faith in the power of 
the international community (Brown 1994:602). Once admitted into the host country through 
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host state consent and Security Council authorization, peacekeepers should remain impartial in 
their dealing with parties to the conflict since any deviation from this position, real or 
perceived, would result in the withdrawal of consent by some of the actors leading to conflict 
that might trigger the use of force by the peacekeepers. Any use of force other than in self-
defence risks escalating the tensions in the theatre of operations ultimately resulting in loss of 
lives among civilians, combatants and even peacekeepers themselves with an inevitable 
outcome of mission failure.  
Robust peacekeeping has been likened to a kind of social engineering, where attempts are made 
to alter political, social and economic structures of targeted countries along Western 
preferences through the use of peacekeeping missions. This is a deliberate attempt at 
entrenching Western influence across the entire globe, a strategy influenced by group morality.  
In this regard, peacekeeping operations are now being used as a form of riot control by the big 
powers directed against unruly parts of the developing world and the global south in order to 
advance and uphold liberal peace. Such attempts at construction of a neo-liberal democratic 
peace across the third world using peacekeeping as a proxy, endangers the lives of 
peacekeepers and the credibility of the UN as an organization that champions peaceful co-
existence of member states and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Imposed neo-liberal solutions 
on affected third world countries undermines the sovereignty of host countries as well as 
denying them the opportunity to determine their preferred development path towards 






Ethical and Policy Recommendations 
8.1 Prelude to ethical recommendations 
This research has established that in all the four case studies covered in this thesis, host state 
sovereignty was violated with impurity to the detriment of the local population. In that regard, 
the deployment of UN peacekeepers on the African continent should not be celebrated as a 
panacea for solving African problems. The responsibility for solving African problems remains 
with African states that have the mandate and obligation to protect their own citizens without 
necessarily being over dependent on foreign interventions to come to the rescue of African 
populations in times of conflict.  
The case studies covering Congo (1960–1965) and Rwanda in 1994 demonstrate that the extent 
of UN peacekeepers’ violation of state sovereignty went as far as the peacekeepers facilitating 
the overthrowing of host governments by opposition movements that were amenable to the 
dictates of Western powers sponsoring the missions. In the case of Somalia (1992-93), 
peacekeepers actively engaged in military offensive operations to kill or capture the most 
powerful warlord General Farah Aideed in an attempt to change the political status quo and 
impose a preferred warlord Ali Mohammad Mahdi in a regime change style of operation 
reminiscent with other case studies covered in this thesis. The attempted imposition of Western 
preferred Somali leaders was being done to the detriment of the Somali population that was 
left worse off at the time the peacekeepers departed in 1993. Many innocent civilians were 
killed in the crossfire when American Special Forces were attempting to capture or kill General 
Farah Aideed. In Darfur, the magnitude of peacekeepers’ interference in the internal affairs of 
the Sudanese government was only limited through the demands by the Sudanese government 
for a UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping mission that was dominated by African troops and excluding 
military personnel from countries considered to be unfriendly or hostile to the Sudanese 
government.  
The Sudanese authorities had learnt the lessons from the Congo crisis of the early 1960s and 
some of the outcomes of recent UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda. They 
learnt that the ultimate aim of these peacekeeping missions was not the resolution of the 
underlying root causes to the conflicts but to topple the host governments as happened in Congo 
and Rwanda.  
214 
 
Despite having a predominantly African peacekeeping mission in Darfur, the Western powers 
have successfully managed to have the sitting President of Sudan, Al Bashir indicted for 
prosecution at The Hague for crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated against the 
Sudanese population in Darfur region. This portrays a misleading picture that Western powers 
are more concerned about the well-being of African populations than their governments yet the 
majority of conflicts that bring misery and suffering to the African masses would have been 
engineered and sponsored by the same foreign powers. 
An ethical assessment of the conduct by UN peacekeepers in all the case studies reveals a 
deliberate pattern where Western powers under the leadership of the US, continue to engage in 
organised hypocrisy and playing double standards when deploying UN peacekeepers in Africa. 
What the big powers preach about the role and objectives of peacekeepers towards protecting 
civilian populations in conflict countries does not tally with the practice and outcomes of UN 
peacekeeping missions in target countries. In cases like the current deployment in the DRC, 
peacekeepers have been molesting local civilians through rape cases, drug and human 
trafficking and introduction of foreign cultural practices such as pornography that not only 
violate host state sovereignty but also undermine the basic human rights of affected civilian 
populations.   
This thesis has demonstrated that UN peacekeepers’ active participation in the assassination of 
Patrice Lumumba in January 1961; the deliberate attempt at targeting General Mohammed 
Farah Aideed for assassination or capture in 1992 and alleged aiding of assassins for the 
Rwandan and Burundian Presidents at Kigali airport that was under the effective protection of 
UN  peacekeepers, all point towards a deliberate and consistent pattern/trend where UN 
peacekeepers are used as proxy forces to facilitate regime change in host countries especially 
in cases where the host government would have fallen out of favour with some powerful 
western countries. In the DRC President Laurent Kabila was assassinated whilst UN 
peacekeepers were deployed in the capital and in Sudan the sitting President and Head of State 
was indicted for prosecution with the concurrence of UN peacekeepers in the country. All these 
facts and examples of violation of host state sovereignty demonstrate that UN peacekeeping is 
a hypocritical political process with well-designed and carefully orchestrated conceptual 
underpinnings and underlying objectives to be attained in target countries as demonstrated in 
the case studies. Despite all this evidence of UN peacekeepers meddling in the internal politics 
of host African countries, regrettably African leaders still continue to have trust and confidence 
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in the ability of UN peacekeeping missions to bring about durable peace and security to the 
suffering African populations in conflict situations on the continent.  
The resource gap between the demand for competent African troops and operational resources 
to assist fellow African countries in trouble and the practical inability to mobilise the required 
resources has regrettably always been cited as the justification for Africa’s continued reliance 
on foreign troop assistance towards resolving African security challenges. This is indeed an 
unfortunate situation in that focus is diverted from empowering or assisting the affected 
government with the responsibility to protect its own citizens in order for it to find amicable, 
all inclusive political solutions to the local crises without the invitation of foreign troops. Some 
members of the Security Council prefer a system where UN peacekeepers deploy and meddle 
in the internal affairs of African countries to the extent of participating in the assassination of 
African leaders in the name of protecting African populations from their own leaders. The 
billions of dollars spent on financing expensive peacekeeping operations in Africa could 
produce better poverty alleviation results through development projects that would ultimately 
improve the well-being of affected populations. This option is not preferred because sponsoring 
UN peacekeeping missions in itself is big and lucrative business for developed countries. 
The primary concern of this study was to establish the extent to which the African sovereign 
state with its internationally recognised responsibility to protect its own citizens can offer 
effective peace and security to its citizens without resorting to inviting foreign peacekeepers to 
resolve local conflicts. The study established that most of the conflicts in Africa are fuelled by 
foreign powers who take advantage of the ethno-tribal differences with an ultimate objective 
of influencing the outcome of the conflicts in their favour and not in the interest of the host 
population. Having been deprived of their unfettered influence over African countries through 
decolonization the Western powers under the leadership of the US, have crafted strategies to 
effectively use UN peacekeepers to re-instate western powers’ political, economic and cultural 
influence over African countries. This is achieved through peacekeeping and peace-building 
operations that ensure that target countries are left under the effective control of Western 
political and economic influence that has little respect or concern about the impact of such 
foreign manipulation over the local population and host state sovereignty. UN peacekeeping 
missions are deployed with high sounding altruistic morally appealing objectives yet once on 
the ground, peacekeepers engage in immoral and unethical activities that do not only 
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undermine host state sovereignty but also undermine national aspirations for self-determination 
in sharp contrast with publicly claimed objectives of the mission.  
This study has further demonstrated that some UN peacekeeping missions undermine host state 
sovereignty primarily to secure and guarantee Western powers’ unlimited access to raw 
materials to keep their industries running at the same time denying the same access and 
influence to their competitors but not in the case of Rwanda. In light of the above, this study 
has further demonstrated that UN peacekeeping operations whose major financial contribution 
comes from the developed countries in the west, serve to promote western powers’ self-
interests in line with the realist school of international relations where moral and ethical 
considerations have no significant role to play in the conduct of international relations. 
 
The study revealed that the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Congo during the early 1960s 
was primarily meant to achieve two objectives. First UN peacekeepers were to facilitate the 
introduction and establishment of US hegemonic geo-strategic influence in that country and 
region following the departure of western colonial powers through decolonization. Second, the 
presence of UN peacekeepers was meant to effectively deny the Soviet Union any foot hold in 
that country following the departure of the Belgians at independence.  Both objectives had 
nothing to do with addressing the root causes of the conflict neither were they meant to enhance 
the well-being of the Congolese population. This goes to demonstrate that it is misleading to 
expect or entrust UN peacekeepers to effectively come to the rescue of the local population in 
conflict situations on the African continent. 
 
In the case of Somalia the world was led to believe that UN “humanitarian” military 
intervention was motivated primarily by altruistic and moral concerns about the starving 
Somali population. This study has demonstrated that UN peacekeeping military intervention 
was launched when the effects of the drought and famine were already subsiding hence 
altruistic considerations were not the primary driving motivation. The hidden motive for 
intervention was for the US and its western allies to have effective control of Somalia whose 
coastline covers one of the most strategic choke points on the vital commercial sea routes that 
pass through the Gulf of Eden and the Suez Canal.  Moreover the US was aware of the vast 
untapped oil reserves in Somalia that it wanted to make sure that these resources remained 




Instead of coming to the rescue of the Somali population, UN peacekeepers under the 
leadership of the US ended up killing hundreds of Somali civilians and exacerbating the war 
situation through the war economy that served to prolong the conflict and not to address the 
root causes of the conflict. It follows therefore that the military “humanitarian” intervention 
did not significantly alleviate the suffering of the Somali population, in actual fact it left the 
population and country worse off than the peacekeepers found on arrival. The same can be said 
for the Rwandan peacekeeping mission that set the stage for the slaughter of over 800 000 
innocent civilians through withdrawal of the bulk of peacekeepers to facilitate an effective 
takeover of the reins of political and military power by the RPF that was supported by the 
Anglo-American alliance.   
The Rwandan case study demonstrated that UN peacekeepers were deployed to facilitate the 
transfer of power from the Hutu majority government to the Tutsi minority rebel movement. 
The rebel movement enjoyed political, diplomatic and military support primarily from the 
Anglo-American alliance that wanted to dislodge French influence from the central African 
region. The ultimate objective for the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was to have a strong 
Anglo-American foot-print established in central Africa in order to guarantee these foreign 
powers unlimited access to the vast natural and mineral resources in eastern DRC through 
Uganda and Rwanda. The deployment of a very weak and ineffective UN peacekeeping 
mission in Rwanda was designed not to interfere with the RPF military offensive operations to 
topple a legitimate government of Rwanda that was French speaking and sponsored by the 
French government. Based on these findings, it follows therefore that the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Rwanda did not prioritise the protection of vulnerable Rwandan civilian population 
but rather to introduce and entrench Anglo-American geo-strategic influence in the region 
designed to guarantee the US and its allies unlimited access to the riches of eastern DRC.  
 
This is demonstrated by the current and ongoing looting of strategic minerals and other natural 
resources from that region through illegal operations orchestrated from Rwanda and Uganda, 
both close allies of the British and the Americans. In actual fact, instead of protecting the 
civilian population in Rwanda, UN peacekeepers sacrificed over 800 000 civilian lives to 
ensure that the rise to power of the RPF was undisturbed by the presence of a powerful UN 
mission in the country. This is further evidence that demonstrates that the protection of civilian 
population in Rwanda was never a genuine priority for the peacekeepers, it was used as a smoke 
screen to mask the true objective of the mission which was regime change. As a result of this 
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revelation, the UN mission in Rwanda has been thoroughly discredited and rebuked for its 
failure to protect endangered civilians facing imminent danger of mass atrocities and genocide. 
 
The study further demonstrated that Western advocacy for a UN humanitarian military 
intervention in Darfur–Sudan was primarily meant to facilitate the secession of Darfur Province 
that is rich in untapped vast oil and gas reserves. Considering that China is the main beneficiary 
from the oil reserves in South Sudan, Western powers aimed at using UN peacekeepers to 
entrench the Darfur region under their influence and deny the Chinese and Russians the major 
partners of the Sudanese Government, access to the vast natural resources in Darfur. It follows 
therefore that the motive for launching a UN humanitarian mission in Darfur had very little to 
do with coming to the rescue of the Sudanese population facing crimes against humanity but 
rather to advance the self-interests of the western powers that have perfected the diplomatic 
and political skills of using UN peacekeepers as proxy forces to serve their self-interests whilst 
they violate host state sovereignty and undermine the well-being of the host population. The 
thesis highlighted the fact that rebel groups fighting the Sudanese Government in Darfur are 
being sponsored by some western powers thus prolonging the conflict yet the official narrative 
is that the Sudanese Government is not keen to engage the rebels in meaningful dialogue to 
address the root causes of the conflict. The Darfur case study adds credence to the argument 
that African countries with the responsibility to protect their own populations should do 
everything in their powers to resolve their internal political squabbles and desist from inviting 
foreign troops under the UN banner to come and help resolve their internal problems. 
 
All the four case studies in this thesis have demonstrated that UN peacekeeping missions 
cannot be trusted to effectively come to the rescue of African civilian populations in conflict 
riddled countries. This study has further demonstrated that there is abundant and overwhelming 
evidence as well as growing suspicion that UN peacekeepers are being used as proxy forces to 
fight subtle geo-strategic and geo-political wars on behalf of some Western powers under the 
leadership of the US. Such activities and practices are immoral and unethical in that in trying 
to achieve the self-interests of the Western powers, UN peacekeepers contribute towards 
aggravating the conflict situation and prolonging some of the conflicts through war economies 
brought about by the presence of UN peacekeepers. This situation is aggravated by western 
sponsorship of some parties to the conflicts, thus extending the suffering of affected civilian 




All these observations regarding UN peacekeepers’ violation of host state sovereignty and 
undermining the well-being of host populations point towards the fact that African sovereign 
states with the mandate and responsibility to protect their own citizens are best placed to protect 
their own citizens provided African leaders prioritize the well-being and security of all their 
citizens irrespective of ethnicity; religion; political orientation and demographic 
considerations. African leaders should seriously carryout some deep self-introspections and 
answer the question if they truly believe that foreign powers can invest billions of dollars in 
UN peacekeeping and indeed come to the assistance of African populations in conflict if there 
is nothing for them to benefit from the peacekeeping interventions. With all the evidence about 
the true nature of UN peacekeeping missions as demonstrated in this study it is difficult to 
establish why our African leaders continue to place confidence in the capacity of UN missions 
to solve African problems in favour of indigenous populations. This study also revealed the 
need for African leaders to revisit the traditional ways of resolving local conflicts as these 
methods have stood the test of time.  
 
Where internal frictions start simmering, African leaders must be empowered and assisted 
primarily by fellow Africans to fulfil their mandate and responsibility to protect own civilian 
populations rather than waiting and entrusting that responsibility to foreign UN peacekeepers 
whose primary mission is to entrench the geo-strategic self-interests of foreign powers and not 
necessarily the protection of African civilian populations in conflict situations as demonstrated 
in the case studies above. Having demonstrated the extent to which UN peacekeeping missions 
have embroiled themselves in facilitating regime change in host countries in violation of 
national sovereignty and their organised hypocrisy of pretending to be genuinely concerned 
about the plight of host civilian populations, this thesis has five major ethical and practical 
recommendations to make based on the outcome of this study. 
 
8.2 Ethical and Policy Recommendations 
The first recommendation is that African countries should desist from investing their trust and 
confidence in UN peacekeeping operations on the continent simply because these missions are 
not meant to promote African value systems and Pan Africanism. In light of this 
recommendation African leaders must desist from politics of alienation and segregation along 
tribal, ethnic and religious lines since foreign powers bent on retaining unfettered influence 
over access to Africa’s natural resources take advantage of these political and developmental 
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fault lines to fuel conflicts in resource rich African countries. Ironically, the same foreign 
sponsors of conflict in Africa are invited together with other foreign troops to come and “broker 
solutions” to the very conflicts they would have masterminded and engineered taking 
advantage of the political, economic, developmental and ethnic fault lines in the relations of 
local African populations. In light of these observations, where affected African governments 
fail to find local solutions to their local problems, they must seek solutions from regional 
African countries that have vested interests in the long term peace and stability of the entire 
region as they are the ones mostly affected by the spill over effects of conflicts in neighbouring 
countries.  
Undoubtedly some regional powers could be harbouring hegemonic ambitions over their 
neighbours. These would be neutralized by the influence of less ambitious neighbours who 
have the collective security interests of the entire region as demonstrated by SADC intervention 
in the Mozambique and Lesotho crises. Whatever the state of the regional economic resources, 
African leaders must mobilise adequate logistical and financial resources from within the 
African coffers and channel them towards the realization of African Solutions to African 
Problems. It is through this approach that the continent can ultimately bring to an effective end 
the current practice of being over-dependent on foreign donors and so called strategic partners 
that prioritise their own self-interests at the expense of the well-being of the generality of local 
populations affected by the conflicts.  
The second recommendation is based on the continued failure of UN peacekeeping missions 
in Africa to attain the desired objectives of durable peace and tranquillity in conflict countries 
and regions. Continued conflict situations in resource rich countries guarantee a continuous 
demand for weapons that keep the Military Industrial Complexes in continuous and profitable 
weapons production to meet growing demand from conflict regions. In this regard, it is not in 
the interest of some Western powers and their multinational corporations to have total peace in 
countries and regions where UN peacekeeping missions are deployed. It is therefore incumbent 
upon African leaders to realize that UN peacekeeping missions constitute big business for the 
developed countries and their multinational corporations. UN peacekeeping missions are not 
primarily deployed to bring about effective peace in target countries before a preferred regime 
has been put in power. Rather UN missions are designed to create long term business 
opportunities for both arms suppliers as well as those who supply combat and logistical support 
for the unending peacekeeping operations. In that regard, whereas African populations look 
forward to a post UN mission situation that addresses their political, economic and social 
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plight, major sponsors of UN peacekeeping missions anticipate the establishment of market 
economies and western liberal value systems that pay little attention to the plight of the poor 
populations in the host countries. In fact these market economies further lock local economies 
towards supplying raw materials to keep developed industries running at the long term 
disadvantage of the local African populations. Thus it should always be remembered that the 
big and powerful global powers will do everything to influence the outcome of peacekeeping 
missions in their favour because what they prioritise in international relations is not friendship 
based on altruistic ethical values but rather the promotion and maximization of their national 
self-interests even if it means violation of host state sovereignty or undermining the well-being 
and national aspirations of the host population.  
The third recommendation is that African leaders should invest in the security of their countries 
if they are to safeguard their national sovereignty against foreign manipulation and 
interference. This calls for our leaders to be always alert to the big powers’ actual intentions 
when they authorise deployment of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Sudan managed to 
effectively resist the deployment of a strong UN “humanitarian” mission because it was alert 
to the machinations behind the intended deployment and it was assisted by its strong political, 
economic and military ties to both China and Russia as well as its strong military combat 
capability. In the four case studies of this thesis, it is evident that where the host country’s 
military strength was considered to be weak, UN peacekeepers took advantage of the prevailing 
situation to advance the political, economic and strategic self-interests of the western powers 
sponsoring the mission. Strong security institutions save as an effective deterrent to would-be 
rebel movements as they realize that their gains through the use of violence would be out-
weighed  by their losses arising from the responses from robust security sector institutions. 
Having made this recommendation, it is prudent to emphasize that strong security sector 
institutions should not be used to ill-treat sections of the populations that have genuine 
grievances as the concept of sovereignty continues to evolve. 
The fourth recommendation is that African leaders must agree to respect a set of African value 
systems which when violated they can be resolved on the basis of peer review and corrections 
as opposed to waiting for foreign forces from outside the continent to come and resolve African 
conflicts. This approach requires transparency in its conceptualization and implementation for 
it to succeed. Coupled to this approach, African countries must desist from donor dependency 
because no African country is too poor to fail to survive within its means if priorities are right. 
The ethical problem of donor dependency is that once a country accepts a favour it would 
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indirectly have accepted to be used as a proxy at some point as all donations have different 
degrees of conditionalities. It follows therefore that the more a country is dependent on foreign 
donations, the more it compromises on its national sovereignty. 
Finally, Africa needs to invest in research and development so that it does not continue relying 
on foreign technology to drive its economic development and equipping its own military and 
other security sector institutions with equipment from outside the continent. Strong research 
and development will lead to strong economic performance and development which ultimately 
leads to less internal friction among different ethnic/tribal groupings. Lack of technological 
advancement has so far resulted in Africa having imported ethical systems that are interpreted 
through hermeneutical lenses. In this regard, the AU should mobilise human and financial 
resources towards sponsoring “trans-disciplinary research” to establish the main sources of 
conflict on the continent and how best they can be addressed without biased approaches to 
resolving them. This would guarantee that recommended solutions are both practical and 
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Appendix 1: Letter of Informed Consent to Participants 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam       June 2014 
 
Letter of Informed Consent 
Dear Participant 
Sir/Madam, my name is Herbert Chingono, a PhD Candidate at the School of Religion, 
Philosophy and Classics in the Department of Ethics Studies at the University of KwaZulu- 
Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. The title of my thesis is, Ethical Challenges to United 
Nations Peacekeeping Missions and National Sovereignty: A Critical Study of the United 
Nations Missions in Africa with Specific Reference to Somalia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Sudan. 
I am kindly requesting you to participate in an interview process in your individual capacity as 
an accomplished Academic/Bureaucrat/Civil Society Practitioner/ 
Diplomat/Politician/Political Analyst, conversant with the political and strategic dynamics of 
the United Nations peacekeeping operations. I hope to learn and benefit a lot from your rich 
experience as I endeavour to satisfy the objectives of my study. It is estimated that the interview 
will last for about 45-60minutes. 
Sir/Madam, you may be aware that since the end of the Cold War peacekeeping has taken 
centre stage at both the academic and policy levels in an endeavour by the UN and regional 
groupings such as the AU and EU to promote collective international peace and security. 
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According to the UN Charter, nation states are sovereign within their territories and are immune 
to external interferences except in grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity. The same UN organization sometimes deploys peacekeepers without 
invitation or full consent from affected member states in violation of its Charter in situations 
that fall far short of the grave circumstances enshrined in its Charter. This practice presents 
ethical dilemmas since the sovereignty of a country and its responsibility to protect its own 
citizens would have been suspended the moment peacekeepers are deployed in a country. 
Experience has demonstrated that in some cases peacekeepers have left the country previously 
under UN peacekeeping with a new government following a regime change masterminded by 
peacekeepers and their sponsors. In other cases, former government officials have been sent to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) or International Court of Justice (ICJ) for trial. 
Sir/Madam, you may want to note that Somalia was left to deteriorate into a failed state after 
the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers following the departure of US forces that had turned the 
UN peacekeeping mission into an offensive military operation to assassinate one of the 
warlords General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. In the Ivory Coast a UN peacekeeping mission 
evolved into an offensive military operation whose objective was overthrowing a sovereign 
government whose leader had fallen out of favour with some permanent members of the UN 
Security Council namely USA, France and the UK. In the DRC, operation Artemis was 
launched primarily to satisfy French and EU interests and not to resolve the crisis in that 
country. In Rwanda, the UN Security Council ordered the bulk of UN peacekeepers to abandon 
the endangered Rwandans at the height of the genocide. 
These big powers appear to be using peacekeeping missions to promote and advance their own 
geo-strategic and national interests at the expense of the suffering populations they purport to 
be protecting. Thus the concept of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa has come under serious 
scrutiny in a bid to determine the real motives behind these multinational deployments. The 
UN interventions in Somalia, Sudan and DRC have demonstrated that military interventions 
are not an alternative to diplomacy neither are they the only and unavoidable alternative to end 
intra-state conflicts.  
Sir/Madam, you may arguably note that the practice of peacekeeping interventions is not being 
applied evenly across similar situations in Africa. In Rwanda the UN Security Council watched 
hopelessly as approximately one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were butchered during the 
1994 genocide. In neighbouring DRC the same UN Security Council deployed one of the 
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largest peacekeeping missions in Africa, yet the situation in that country was far less volatile 
compared to what transpired in Rwanda, a clear manifestation of deliberate selectivity and 
preferential deployments. In Sudan, the USA has been calling for the labelling of the Darfur 
conflict, “genocide” with the intention of finding an excuse for deployment of a robust UN 
peacekeeping mission to safeguard its national and allies’ interests in clear violation of that 
nation’s state sovereignty. It is this ethical dilemma of deploying UN peacekeeping missions 
in Africa in violation of national state sovereignty that has led the researcher to embark on this 
fieldwork to satisfy research objectives outlined below. 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To critically explore the extent to which the African state with its UN mandate of 
responsibility to protect its own citizens can offer effective peace and security to its citizens 
rather than outside peacekeeping interventions. 
2. To analyse why UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, specifically in Somalia, Rwanda, 
Sudan and the DRC have failed to attain the desired objectives. 
3. To proffer scholarly and policy options on how sovereign states particularly in Africa, 
with the UN mandate of responsibility to protect, can offer effective peace and security to their 
citizens rather than UN peacekeeping interventions.  
Sir/Madam, if you agree to my request for an interview, I will be asking you some questions to 
address each of the objectives stated above and would appreciate it if you could answer as 
honestly and factually as possible. In the event that you are not comfortable to answer some of 
the questions, you are free to decline answering such questions. Your honest views and 
opinions are what I look forward to getting from you as there is no right or wrong answers. 
Please note that I will be taking down notes during the interview to help me correctly capture 
your input. The notes will ultimately help me in the consolidation, analysis and presentation of 
collected data in order to come up with correct and informed findings of the research.  
Your participation in this interview process in absolutely voluntary and you may choose to 
withdraw from the interview process anytime. I wish to rest assure you that there will not be 
any negative implications if you choose to withdraw. 
I equally wish to assure you that your confidentiality will be seriously safeguarded since the 
results of this research could be published in international journals. The completed thesis could 
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be used by other university students undertaking similar studies as well as form the basis of 
presentations at academic seminars and conferences. In that regard, none of your personal 
identification information will be released in any form as the interview scripts will be fully 
secured under lock and key and will be destroyed after a period of five years. 
Sir/Madam, if you have any questions or areas for clarification regarding this study, you can 
contact me at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics. 
My contact number is (+27 837 614 816) or you may contact my supervisor, Dr. Felix 
Munyaradzi Murove at the same university campus as above, his contact number is (+27 332 
606 056). My e-mail address is 212562201@stu.ukzn.ac.za OR chingonoh@yahoo.com 





Important contact details you may want to use are as follows: 
Researcher                                               Supervisor 
Herbert Chingono    Dr. Felix Munyaradzi Murove 
University of KwaZulu-Natal   University of KwaZulu-Natal 
School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics       School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics 
Private Bag X01    Private Bag X01 
Scottsville, 3209    Scottsville, 3209 
Pietermaritzburg    Pietermaritzburg 
Republic of South Africa   Republic of South Africa  
Tel: +27 837 614 816    Tel: +27 332 060 056 
Fax: +27 332 605 858    Fax: +27 332 605 858 
E-mail: 212562201@stu.ukzn.ac.za OR 
chingonoh@yahoo.com   E-mail:  murovem@ukzn.ac.za 
Consent 




Hereby confirm that I understand the contents and nature of this study and agree to participate. 
I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced to do so whatsoever. I also 
understand that I can withdraw from this interview at any point should I not wish to continue. 
I understand my name will remain confidential. 
 
________________________________  ________________________ 
Signature of Respondent                  Date 
 
_______________________________  ________________________ 


















Appendix 2: Questionnaire 
Questionnaire for Diplomats, Academics, Politicians, Political Analysts, Bureaucrats, Security 
Personnel and Civil Society/NGOs 
Questionnaire/ Interview guide 




4. Political Analysts 
5. Bureaucrats 
6. Civil Society/NGOs 
Section B. Objective Number 1 
To critically explore the extent to which the African state with its UN mandate of responsibility 
to protect its own citizens can offer effective peace and security to its citizens without outside 
peacekeeping interventions. 
Q1.1. In your view, to what extent can African states, effectively guarantee peace and security 
to own citizens without outside peacekeeping intervention? 
Q1.2. Why are African countries prone to internal conflicts that are taken advantage of by the 
international community to intervene in their internal affairs? 
Q1.3. In your view, why has the international community, specifically at the level of the UN 
sanctioned the deployment of peacekeeping missions in some conflict countries in Africa 
without prior consideration of the ethic of state sovereignty? 
Q1.4. The concept of “African solutions to African problem” appears to be ineffective in 
resolving internal conflicts in Africa necessitating the deployment of UN peacekeepers.  In 
your view, why is it so? What can be done to effectively operationalize the concept of “African 
solutions to African problems? 
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Section B. Objective Number 2 
To analyse why UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, specifically in Somalia, Rwanda, DRC 
and Sudan have failed to attain the desired objectives. 
Q2.1. Why have peacekeeping missions in Africa and more specifically in Somalia, Rwanda, 
DRC and Sudan failed to achieve the desired objectives of durable peace and security? 
2.2. It has been observed that UN peacekeeping missions in Africa violate host nations’ state 
sovereignty. What are your views regarding the ethical challenges associated with violation of 





Q2.4. What measures would you recommend for adoption in order to enhance the individual 
capacity of countries with internal conflict to be able to resolve their problems without UN 
peacekeeping interventions. 
Q2.5 Who are the major beneficiaries of peacekeeping missions in Africa? 
Section C. Objective Number 3 
To proffer scholarly and policy options and recommendations on how particularly in African 
states, with the UN mandate of responsibility to protect, can guarantee peace and security to 
their citizens rather than UN peacekeeping interventions. 
Q3.1 Using UN peacekeeping experience in Somalia, Rwanda, DRC and Sudan, what ethical 
scholarly solutions can be suggested to enable African states to effectively guarantee peace and 
security to their citizens rather that depend on outside interventions? 
Q3.2. In your view, what are the major ethical challenges that may be encountered in an effort 




Q3.3 What long term suggestions can you proffer to minimize and ultimately eliminate the 
AU’s over dependence on outside assistance that includes funding, material resources and 
peacekeepers in trying to implement the concept of “African solutions to African problems”? 
Q3.4 In your view, what additional ethical policy solutions can be proffered to enable African 
states to guarantee effective peace and security to their citizens rather than depend on UN 





















Appendix 3: List of Interviewees 
Ethiopia 
Ambassador Mr Albert Ranganai Chimbindi, (Head of Zimbabwe Mission to Ethiopia) 08 
September 2015. 
Dr Ato Kwamena Onoma (Head African Centre for Peace and Security Training Institute of 
Security Studies), 12 September 2015, Addis Ababa. 
Mr Simon Badza, (Political Officer, African Union Peace and Security Council), 09 September, 
2015. 
Lieutenant Colonel Mike Chipoyi (Special adviser AU Peace Support Centre), on 09 
September 2015. 
Mr Musifiky Mwanasali (Special Adviser for Defence and Security: AU Headquarters) 12 
September 2015. 
Dr Gomesh (Senior Political Officer at AU Headquarters) 15 September 2015. 
Dr. N. Mlambo (Expert in the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) Issues) 
on 23 September 2015. 
South Africa 
Mr Isaac Moyo, Ambassador (Head of Zimbabwe Mission in Pretoria) on 12 November 2015. 
General (retired) Paulino Macarique, (Former Commander Mozambique Defence Forces, 15 
November 2015. 
Zimbabwe 
Dr. Ibbo Mandaza (Political Analyst and Executive Director, SAPES Trust) 15 July 2015 
Ambassador Maupanga (DRC Ambassador to Zimbabwe) 05 October 2015. 
Lieutenant General M. Nyambuya (retired) (Former Deputy Force Commander in Somalia) on 
13 October 2015. 
Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku (Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations) on 17 October 2015. 
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Ambassador Machivenyika Mapuranga (Former Zimbabwe’s ambassador to the United States) 
on 19 November 2015. 
Ambassador Mtetwa (Former Zimbabwe Ambassador to Ethiopia) on 25 November 2015. 
General Constantino Guvheya Chiwenga (Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces) 28 
November 2015. 
Ambassador Manzou (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Zimbabwe) 0n 17 June 2015. 
Professor Madhuku; (Dean Faculty of Law: University of Zimbabwe) on 18 August 2014. 
Professor Manyeruke; (Dean Faculty of Social Sciences: University of Zimbabwe) 
Professor J. Moyo, (Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education: Government of Zimbabwe) 
Dr. R. Uriga (Great Zimbabwe University) 10 March 2014. 
Dr. J. Mukusha (Great Zimbabwe University) 10 March 2014. 
Colonel Masanganise (retired) (Former head of Zimbabwean peacekeeping contingent in 
Rwanda during the genocide) 11 March 2014. 
And several serving officers who (requested to remain anonymous)served in UNAMIR during 
the Rwanda genocide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
